MILITARY CONCEPT OF THE MODERN BREAKTHROUGH, CREATED BY GEN. ALEKSEI A. BRUSILOV

MILITARY CONCEPT OF THE MODERN BREAKTHROUGH, CREATED BY GEN. ALEKSEI A. BRUSILOV --Luis Lázaro Tijerina Foreword by Adèle Cain Renowned military historian Luis Lázaro Tijerina has turned his sharp analytical mind to the subject of the modern military concept of the “Breakthrough on the battlefield”, a concept created by the Brusilov Offensive of summer 1916, a noted Russian victory in the First World War. The relevance of looking again at Brusilov and the concept generally of the Breakthrough becomes all the more apparent when the author draws our attention to the military buildup at the Russian-Ukrainian border and the danger of it escalating to war. As he notes: “National chauvinism is the putrid smell of death on both sides of the Russian and Ukrainian border.” The modern Breakthrough In the first modern era of the novel Coronavirus plague, a revolutionary concept of the Breakthrough on the battlefield should be contemplated in ushering in a twenty-first century of waging war on all fronts. This modernized form of the Breakthrough should be understood and considered within the realm of the objective perspective of the quantitative and qualitative forces that will play major roles in the art of war. The brief, fashionable era of “Hybrid Warfare” is over, as simple cyber warfare technology along with asymmetrical shock forces will no longer be acknowledged as adequate in defeating any enemy at only one break through along the enemy’s lines, regardless if that enemy be positioned in a large swath of land or within the confinements of a city. What will now be of the utmost importance will be to engage enemy forces using both symmetrical warfare and irregular war along a designated front with tactical nuclear weapons at the various army fronts’ disposal. Using nuclear weapons to enforce a Breakthrough will be achieved through fighting past the exterior lines of the enemy’s army or armies by breaching at innumerable places to throw the enemy into physical and psychological chaos and strategic and tactical disarray. Nothing less than a detailed operation of a sweeping surprise attacks using not only the tried, conventional armies of infantry, airborne and tank forces, but also using together the artillery sectors and tactical nuclear missiles. Intercontinental nuclear missiles should be utilized only when hitting the enemy’s major cities, deep military installations and manufacturing plants that are producing the enemy’s military arms. Before, I go into any major depth or discussion about what I call the Sweeping Front Breakthrough, it is necessary to confront the historical process of the art of war that precedes such a strategic and tactical creative military art. In terms of theory, perhaps the most important concept of the Breakthrough in the offensive attack is the Brusilov Offensive named after the Russian General, Aleksei A. Brusilov, who created the first modern offensive attack with the methodology of an offensive attack at various points of the enemy’s entrench lines, which was qualified by the number of troops available for a Breakthrough or numerous Breakthroughs at many given points, as well as the immediate shock value of the initial attack during the various intervals that various stages of operations are achieved with reconnaissance penetration near the enemy’s frontline positions or deep In the rear of the enemy’s logistic support bases If current military historians and military theorists study what Brusilov achieved against the Austrian-Hungarian forces along the Eastern front, then there will be a deeper understanding, for instance, of what the modern Russian Armed Forces may desire to achieve should they invade the vast territory of the Ukraine in our time. There is a military analysis concerning the Brusilov Offensive Attack that, although written in an almost editorial way, is still very important to read for its succinct view of the Russian way of attacking along the line enemy’s line since the time of Brusilov. Patrick Armstrong, who was a military analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defense specializing in the USSR/Russia military affairs, gives this vital perception of the birth of the modern offensive attack: Brusilov had his soldiers dig trenches – saps – forward so that they would only have 50 to 100 metres to run: “Brusilov wanted the point of departure for the Russian infantry assaults to be no greater than 100 meters, and he preferred that the distance be 60 meters or less”; the British had the whole distance to cover. Third, light reconnaissance teams went into no man’s land to check the accuracy of each phase of the bombardment and direct the next. Artillery is most effective in the first few seconds – merely lying down significantly increases the probability of survival. Brusilov also understood that the cessation of fire will be taken by the enemy as a signal that the attack is about to begin. This will be seen again in Soviet artillery use in the Second World War and is the reason for the Soviet/Russian development of MLRS which produce tremendous explosive fire in very quick times (the BM-21 Grad can fire 40 rockets in 20 seconds. To say nothing of this.) And fourth, Brusilov used every means of deception available to him to make the enemy think the attacks were coming somewhere else: overwhelming the Austro-Hungarian forces with information and options… Brusilov mounted a counterintelligence campaign, sending false instructions over the radio and by messenger while specific instructions concerning the offensive were relayed verbally… false artillery batteries… https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2021/11/04/the-russian-way-in-warfare-the-brusilov-offensive/ What the Canadian military analyst emphasizes is the first objective Brusilov wanted to achieve was to stun the enemy forces with short but severe and intense artillery firepower, but only attacking with the infantry after they have achieved being as close as they could get to the enemy’s trenches, hugging the enemy in terms of lessening the amount of time and space that had to be achieved to make a violent and unexpected contact with the enemy’s own infantry forces. And more importantly to achieve the Surprise of the attack through various kinds of deception about where his forces would attack, feinting here and there along the enemy’s wide front. If the Ukraine is to be attacked by Russian forces in our era, some of these attack tactics will be used to not only stun the enemy along a wide front but behind the enemy’s lines as well which is a continuation of deep operations which are also a part of Soviet military thought. Although the Russian armies throughout history have been known for the massing of Russian troops before a major attack, they understand the sizeable numbers are not everything. As Clausewitz observed about numerical superiority, “It follows that superiority in numbers is only one of the factor which produce victory; therefore, far from having obtained everything or even the principal thing with superiority in numbers, we have perhaps obtained very little by it, according as the circumstances involved happen to vary” Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. By O.J. Matthijs Jolles. NY: The Modern Library, 1943, 137-38l lam — which to the modern commander means or signifies that numbers are not necessarily to complete victory as the quality of troops not to mention the tactical massing of the troops, along with the correct usage of air support, artillery support, and finally the usage of tactical nuclear weapons in the initial Breakthroughs at any given point are ultimately crucial to the success of the Offensive Attack. To clarify this point, I again turn to Clausewitz — his statement about numbers of massed troops and the initial attack or attacks along the enemy’s defensive positions: “Much more frequently the relative superiority — that is, the skillful massing of superior forcers on the decisive point — has its foundations in the correct appreciation of such a point, in the appropriate direction…” Ibid. 140. If the Russian Armed Forces should attack the Ukraine, the Baltic States or the outer perimeters of Western European countries, for instance, Poland, it will be military stealth, spreading confusion about her intentions through triggering deliberate political provocations on the part of the Western forces which would mean the NATO countries. The Russian military does not count only on a massive number of Russian troops to be the core of achieving total destruction of their adversaries. We know the West can also provoke Russia with economic sanctions and other forms of political repression and harassment. Great Power chauvinism There is in the so-called Western world a nationalist chauvinism masked by NATO in its aspirations to eliminate militarily and politically the so-called Russian expansionist policies. However, there is also a new emergence of Russian chauvinism that has been rebuilt by the Russian capitalism oligarchs and to an extent by proxy, the Russian regime currently in power. We should remember what Lenin wrote in in a Memo to the Soviet Political Bureau: "we consider ourselves, the Ukrainian SSR, and others, equal and enter with them on an equal basis into a new union, a new federation, the Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia". Lenin in that same Memo to the Political Bureau, October 6, 1922, also militantly advocated the idea for the Bolshevik party to defend the right of oppressed nations within the former Russian Empire to self-determination and the right of ethnic nationalities to political equality as well, including the language-rights movement of the newly formed republics. In a rather grim humorous comment, he addressed the question of Russian chauvinism with this quip: “I declare war to the death on Great Russian chauvinism. I shall eat it with all my healthy teeth as soon as I get rid of this accursed bad tooth.” In our time, I would state that the teeth in both camps are rotten, and my assessment is that the Russian people who are still an advanced proletariat people are not interested in war for territorial expansionism. Great Power Chauvinism is in crisis in the West, as it sees that it has lost its power to reign in the various countries that it once controlled through colonialism. From the coming of age of the People’s Republic of China to the defeats in Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Afghanistan and Syria, they see the Ukraine as one of their last opportunities to regain economic and political territory through goading the decadent leadership in Kyiv to help them achieve their goal of destroying Russia. In 2004, the Russian President, Putin gave his view of self-determination and integration, but from a Eurasian point of view, not a Soviet vision, in which he said, "I would say that these problems can be formulated very simply. This is great-power chauvinism, this is nationalism, this is the personal ambitions of those on whom political decisions depend, and, finally, this is just stupidity, ordinary cavemen's stupidity". There is an irony here if not a tragic scenario in the build-up of massive Russian troops along the Russian and Ukraine border. National chauvinism is the putrid smell of death on both sides of the Russian and Ukrainian border. It is not lost on this military historian that the massing of Russian and Ukrainian troops is not so far from where the Brusilov Offensive took place against Austro-Hungarian troops not long after the beginning of World War I. Gerasimov Doctrine With the numbers of massing of troops in the modern Offensive Attack is the “Surprise” factor which is intertwined with superiority of the number of troops and the quality of troops. Although there is much discussion in the Western world among military circles about the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine”, such a military ‘Doctrine’ should be studied and pursued carefully within the historical context of the Soviet and Russian military thought and foresight in history of war engagement. Much of the thought by Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov is a continual work in progress beginning at the entrance of the Russian military engagement against Islamic terrorists’ forces in the state of Syria. As Gen. Gerasimov stated in one brief sentence in his essay, The Value of Science is in the Foresight, “Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template” https://jmc.msu.edu/50th/download/21-conflict.pdf which alludes to “months” and “days” of military activity without the element of surprise which does not lead to a complete annihilation of the enemy but rather a degree of stalemate or uneven progress where both forces, both the offensive and defensive forces, are stalled without a political settlement which is the most important for engaging in war in the first place. The components that General Gerasimov never mentions are neither the massing of superior forces nor the element of surprise. Instead, he dwells on this modern factor of modern warfare: The experience of military conflicts—including those connected with the so-called color revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East—confirms that a perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war. Ibid. The changed rules of warfare What we see from this modern concept of warfare, the so-called ‘Hybrid War model much touted by established American military theorists, is that Gen. Gerasimov, in his visionary way, has foreseen a new way of war when he declares, “The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness”. Ibid. In other words, from the American military point of view there is no value in the massing of troops in the modern concept of general warfare nor is even the element of surprise essential to waging war. It is not that the American military generals state this specifically, but the very fact they rely on advanced military technology like cyberspace military hardware and advanced missile installations or mobile missiles to subdue the enemy is a misconceived way of understanding the ongoing complexity of the ever-evolving art of modern war. What is needed in the American military institutions is a revolutionary, military operations art. I would suggest this must be the case if the American military forces are to move forward, as warfare itself moves forward in intensity and scope in the twenty-first century. Therefore, it is imperative to discuss the possibility of a world war which will be connected to revolutions and civil wars in the progress of world history. In my concerns about the Offensive Attack and the usage of tactical nuclear weapons, I would like to note specifically the importance of “surprise” in the initial attack or attacks along an Offensive Front. I would advocate there to be a quantitative and qualitative Offensive Attack that could be not only successful but far-reaching in terms of in-depth operations behind the enemy lines, it is necessary to instill in the strategic outlook the surprise of the attack, for as Clausewitz advised us, “We say: surprise lies at the foundation of all undertakings without exception, only in very different degrees, according to the nature of the undertaking and other circumstances… Secrecy and rapidity are the two factors in this product”. Clausewitz, 142. However, he warns us about the “moral superiority is able to intimidate and outdo the other, then it will be able to use the surprise with greater success” Ibid, 145. which I would term the Moral Political Authority which is imbued the people of the nation-state or country in which its armed forces, out of political and defensive purposes, wage war in the first place. Sidorenko’s insight Professionally and creatively, I owe a huge debt in the depth of my gratitude to the great Soviet military theorist, Colonel A.A. Sidorenko, whom I consider the father of the modern Offensive Attack with nuclear weapons, and in my own humble way wish only to expand to a small extent his theory on the operational art of the offensive attack. Although my essay on the issue of the Breakthrough in modern warfare may seem archaic and even quaint regarding the various centrifugal forces that place in the ad hoc wars perpetuated spontaneously which led to the rather fashionable term “Hybrid Warfare”, I will quote in full measure certain passages from Col. Sidorenko that hopefully give credence to my conceptual form of a Breakthrough in the modern art of war. The Soviet military theorist describes specifically the old concept of a Breakthrough prior to World War II, when he states: The strong aspect of this form of Breakthrough consisted of the fact that it permitted the maximum massing of forces and means and creating decisive superiority over the enemy on a selected direction. However, experience showed that the laughing of a blow on one direction and passivity on the remaining front, the attainment of the secrecy of preparation of the operation was hindered and the defender had the opportunity to adopt his measures… Therefore, the Breakthrough on one narrow sector with passivity on the remainder of the front, as a rule, of the front, as a rule, did not lead to success. A.A. Sidorenko, The Offensive. Washing D.C: Translated and Published Under The Auspices of UNITED AIR FORCE, 1970, 14, Thus, the attempt at Breakthroughs from the Battles of Verdun and the Somme did not achieve or produce anything than more wasted and massive casualties, and did not decide the outcome of World War I. It would take a general with a will of iron to purse a different, more creative kind of attack. The Russian General A.A. Brusilov would bring creativity to the art of war during the war, specifically along the Southwestern Front where Russian troops were facing off thousands of Austrian and German forces. I would say not since the Napoleonic Wars, was there a general of any merit who would not be shy to stand up and assert himself to fight a war which brought forceful imagination to the forefront in the modern friction of war. Col. Sidorenko emphasizes this kind of energetic warfare by Brusilov: An entirely different character was acquired by the actions when the offensive operation began with the launching of a number of strikes and the simultaneous Breakthrough on several directions… This form of operation was first employed by troops of the Russian Southwestern Front under the command of Gen A.A. Brusilov in June 1916. The troops of the Russian of the Southwestern Front launched an offensive in a zone 470 km wide. In this zone, four army (of which one was the main one) and a number of corps strikes were launched simultaneously. Ibid, 15. This remarkable arduousness for that time in modern warfare history would resonate during the Patriotic War along the Eastern Front when Stalin’s Marshals would create many fronts with numerous army groups that would make General Brusilov’s army corps look small by comparison. Such is the magnitude, when a creative concept comes into being and matures over years during a certain military procedure in the art of war. Thus, the modern offensive attack can be found in the genius of the Brusilov Offensive during the War to end all Wars, his meticulous and detailed military planning withstanding the harsh test of time. However, a well-planned and audacious offensive attack even with the utmost best intentions is not enough, and the Russian military armed forces like their adversaries, are capable of blunders and great debacles as well if their political motives are corrupt and are not in the end considering the overall welfare of the nation’s people who sacrifice their sons, daughters, husbands and wives for national interests, which includes waging a just war, not a war of opportunism and for brutal expansionism at any cost. Only with the moral political and spiritual superiority can victory be achieved against a tenacious and heartless enemy. In my advocating the usage of tactical nuclear weapons on many fronts of the battlefield, it should be understood such warfare must be in harmony with the will of the people who are in the rear of the struggle creating their own fronts of warfare against the enemy. Tactical Nuclear Weapons are the choice of weapons that must be used appropriately during many Breakthroughs among all fronts, when a world war emerges, though as Col. Sidorenko eloquently reminds any military historian or military theorist whose life is imbued with the fate of the people, “If war is unleashed by the imperialists, it will be not only combat with equipment and weapons. The war is waged by people, and man always was and will remain the deciding force in armed conflict” A.A. Sidorenko, 222. If war is unleashed with nuclear weapons along many fronts, the idea of the need for great sacrifice should be wedded into the political, psychological and culture aspirations of the people, which will then be the deciding factors on the course of combat operations. AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT: This military theoretical essay on a modern military operational art is not meant to take sides with the Russian Armed Forces or to disparage in any way the professionals of the American Armed Forces and her allies. However, this work is an attempt to reveal a new kind of military operational art that has its inception in the Brusilov Offensive mode attack that occurred on the Southwestern Front, more specially, a major Russian attack which pitted itself against the armies of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front. The Russian Offensive began on 4 June 1916, and it lasted until late September of that year. It took place in an area of present-day western Ukraine, in the general vicinity of the Ukrainian towns of Lviv, Kovel, and Lutsk. The offensive takes its name after the commander in charge of the Southwestern Front, General Aleksei Brusilov, who with a brilliance for detail and shrewd observation was able to construct a new paradigm of warfare with an ever-flowing, or fluid form of attack against an enemy, fighting and feinting from many areas or points along the main battlefront. It is not with intended irony that we see, again, should there be another world war, there will be needed a more malleable and creative attack offensive strategy in nature which can spread utter fear and chaos into the enemy lines. This essay explores these issues without flinching about the possibilities that could take place either in present-day modern Ukraine or in countries which will know the mayhem of civil war in the coming years. --Luis Lázaro Tijerina May 2020, Quebec, QC; Vermont, Nov. 2021 8