Ronald Dworkin

Life's Dominion is subtitled 'An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia', and the promise of rational argument is welcome and richly fulfilled. Fights about abortion are bitter and worldwide, as Ronald Dworkin observes, and nowhere more bitter than in the United States. 'Opposing armies march down streets or pack themselves into protests at abortion clinics, courthouses, and the White House, screaming at and spitting on and loathing one another. Abortion is tearing America apart. It is also distorting its politics, and confounding its constitutional law.'

An advocate must be aware of the mental environment of the judge, particularly the appellate judge.  Their quiet presence has not impeded the use of labels, including judicial attitude as well as a whole subset of ideological labels such as conservative, liberal, activist, restraintist, interpretivist, noninterpretivist, positivist, and with a pejorative ring, biased.

Such bents of mind are the pylons around which the persuasive course must be raced.  After the judge masters the facts and distills the relevant legal principles from a case, something must push him toward a decision.  In the great percentage of cases, the process of assimilating facts and principles points unerringly to one outcome.  However, in a small percentage of cases consensus cannot be readily attained.  In these cases, the holding may be influenced one way or another by the attitude of the judges.  Fortunately, the advocate can acquire the necessary sensitivity to these attitudes through episodic ventures to a court of appeals.

Dans les études comparées « droit et littérature » ou « économie et littérature », on cherche souvent en priorité ce que la littérature peut nous apprendre sur le droit ou l’économie. C’est prendre un risque : celui d’oublier la
dimension littéraire des textes étudiés. À plus forte raison, c’est prendre le risque de passer à côté d’un fait précieux, à savoir que la littérature est autre chose qu’un instrument talentueux assigné à la valorisation des thèmes qu’on lui livre : la littérature est plus que cela ! Elle sait elle-même user des autres – en l’occurrence, user du droit et de l’économie comme d’instruments, les mettre à son service. Il n’est pas rare que, ne cherchant pas à représenter ces deux univers, elle les détourne de leurs fins, les vide de leurs fonctions manifestes, mais en conserve mécanismes, raisonnements et vocabulaire : la littérature tire du droit et de l’économie des éléments de poétique qu’elle s’agrège et qui la renforcent, sans qu’elle se soucie de nous apprendre nécessairement quelque chose sur ces deux disciplines, objet de son pillage.
PLAN de l'article :
    Balzac/Piketty : la ruse de la Littérature
    L’inversion (des valeurs) de M. de Norpois : Qu’est ce que la littérature ?
        La carrière littéraire : à quel taux placer sa vie ?
        M. de Norpois ? Un bon inverti en vaut deux
        Tante Léonie ? Une valeur à investir
        L’« action nominative de la Compagnie des Eaux » : Contre Sainte‑Beuve appliqué
    Détournement du droit et de l’économie par la Littérature
    La Peau de chagrin : la vie est consomptible par le premier usage
        La lettre de change : qu’est-ce que la vie ?
        Le droit fantastique
        La Peau comme instrument du droit : une condamnation du littéralisme
        Confusion entre vie, argent et temps : d’une usure à l’autre
    « La fille de cuisine était une personne morale » : le droit, auxiliaire de la littérature

RESUMO: As afirmativas tais como: os juízes decidem segundo as suas íntimas convicções morais e políticas, usando as regras apenas para uma justificativa posterior ou secundária; ou, para conhecer profundamente o Direito deve-se ab initio saber como os juízes decidem e não o que as regras estabelecem, ou que o Direito é parcialmente determinado, são algumas das proposições que erroneamente são tomadas por muitos estudiosos que fazem uma leitura completamente desastrada e precipitada acerca da obra O Conceito de Direito do filósofo Herbert L. A. Hart. O presente estudo se propõe a elucidar e expor a leitura correta, precisamente no que tange o entendimento acerca da unidade lógica entre legislação e precedente num contexto de aplicação de regras.

In this essay I argue that religion, understood as harmony with the transcendent source of existence and meaning, is a good that practical reason grasps as an objective, distinct and important aspect of human well-being, one which reasonably takes pride of place among the various aspects of a good human life due to its architectonic role in structuring and adding a transcendent meaning to all of the other goods that we pursue. On the basis of this view of religion, I go on to suggest that religious belief and practice deserve special protection in law, above and beyond mere preferences and even other conscientious commitments. I develop this view through a dialectical engagement with Dworkin, Barry, Eisgruber and Sager.

According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only holds people responsible for creating disadvantage. This revision enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to those who are disadvantaged by preventing disadvantage to others, like dependent caretakers, without compromising the responsibility–sensitivity at the heart of luck egalitarianism.

Takozvani „egalitarizam sreće“ – kako je Elizabet Anderson (Elizabeth Anderson)
brendirala jednu struju egalitarne misli u političkoj teoriji zbog naglašavanja
pojmova sreće i izbora – javio se u vreme uvećanja nejednakosti i upućivanja brojnih udaraca Nove desnice državi blagostanja. Teorija o jednakosti resursa Ronalda Dvorkina (Ronald Dworkin) bila je među najznačajnijima u okviru kampa egalitarizma sreće. Ako lošu sreću treba kompenzovati, da li treba kompenzovati i svaku nesreću i da li se time poništava i individualna odgovornost? Da li dobra sreća poništava zasluge i odgovornost te je treba neutralizovati? To su neka od pitanja koja su podstakla rasprave u toj struji egalitarne misli. Dvorkin je pokušao da pomiri jednakost sa konzervativnom idejom odgovornosti. Iako se taj pokušaj može posmatrati i kao hvatanje za slamku da bi se opstalo u trci sa Novom desnicom, odnosno preozbiljno shvatanje libertarijanske kritike i nastojanja da se odgovori na nju, mnogi egalitaristi, poput Džonatana Volfa (Jonathan Wolff), misle da je upravo takav liberalni egalitarizam promovisao pogrešan etos jednakosti i da je liberalnu jednakost trebalo zamenitim demokratskom jednakošću koju, na primer, predlaže Elizabet Anderson. U ovom radu ću preispitati Dvorkinovu poziciju i pokušati da odgovorim na pitanje da li zaslužuje da bude tretirana kao egalitarizam sreće, odnosno u kojoj meri je kritika Anderson i Volfa pogubna po njegov egalitarizam sreće. To ću učiniti propitujući i mogućnost razumevanja Dvorkinove teorije kao egalitarizma
odgovornosti jer je on zapravo želeo da objedini kolektivnu odgovornost političke zajednice u pridavanju jednake važnosti svakom ljudskom životu sa pojedinačnom odgovornošću građana za sopstvene izbore. Bez obzira na ovu rekvalifikaciju, pokazaću da postoje problemi i u viziji i u argumentu Dvorkinove koncepcije jednakosti resursa koji je čine ili neadekvatno egalitarnom ili nekonzistentnom.

A descriminalização do aborto pela via judicial no Brasil: a ADPF 442 e a legitimidade democrática do STF para decidir sobre a questão. Diante da propositura da ADPF 442, que pretende a descriminalização do aborto, o debate jurídico sobre o tema, ainda tabu na sociedade brasileira, afigura-se propício e crucial. O presente escrito, servindo-se das lições de Ronald Dworkin, almeja demonstrar que, caso decida pela não recepção do tipo penal em questão, antes de atentar contra a democracia, o STF estará afirmando-a, gozando, portanto, de plena legitimidade para essa atuação.

Ronald Dworkin and Duncan Kennedy represent arguably two opposing poles in legal theory. This paper offers a novel frame for reading their respective legal theories which reconceptualizes the traditional way in which they were opposed, and new ways to compare them, to understand their commonalities and their differences.

While Dworkin is taken to be a champion of a theory of rights, he is also associated with a certain theory of interpretation which holds that even in hard cases judges have limited discretion and a right answer to every legal question we might reasonably encounter. Kennedy, in contrast, seems to disagree with Dworkin in every conceivable respect such as the nature of law and legal reasoning, the role of right, the relation of law to its outsides (politics/ideology), thus questioning the objectivity and neutrality of legal reasoning, and he seems to be advocating what could be termed as a “radical indeterminacy” thesis.

The paper attempts reading Dworkin and Kennedy alongside each other, rather than in opposition, and so it deploys two interrelated strategies to establish such frame. One is concerned softening what appear to be rigid opposition through scrutinizing their writings, whereas the other takes stock of the common themes, presuppositions, images of law, and sensibilities that both share either explicitly or implicitly. This double strategy reveals the arguments that are attributed to them and which they themselves deny they are making. To that end, the paper unveils an unacknowledged shift toward phenomenology in legal theory that took place in the last few decades.

Resumo: O presente texto tem por objetivo lançar uma luz na função e no papel que a Constituição de 1988 normatiza para o Poder Judiciário. Ao contrário do que um senso comum possa aparentar compreender, antes de tudo, o Judiciário deve assumir e desempenhar uma função contramajoritária, não podendo sucumbir para as "vozes das ruas" e acabando por se transformar em um representante de tais interesses. Dessa forma, pretende-se demonstrar que tal argumento, sustentado por membros da doutrina constitucional brasileira, como o Min. Luís Roberto Barroso do STF, é completamente equivocada e apresenta riscos e déficits democráticos. A crítica a tal posição será realizada a partir da teoria jurídica construída por Ronald Dworkin e sua tese do direito como integridade. A presente pesquisa assume uma perspectiva metodológica hermenêutico-crítica a partir da revisão da literatura sobre o tema.

Il volume di Brian H. Bix, qui offerto nell’edizione italiana, vuole costituire un’introduzione ai maggiori autori ed ai più rilevanti problemi (metodologici e sostanziali) della filosofia del diritto. Il libro è diviso in quattro sezioni: nella prima, essenzialmente metodologica, Bix s’interroga sullo status delle tesi concettuali; nella seconda vengono presentate le teorie di cinque tra i più importanti filosofi del diritto del ’900: H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, John Finnis, Lon L. Fuller e Ronald Dworkin; nella terza sezione vengono esaminati i temi più ricorrenti del pensiero filosofico giuridico: dalla giustizia alla pena, dal diritto soggettivo all’interpretazione giuridica. Infine, nella quarta sezione viene offerta una panoramica sulle maggiori correnti e tendenze giusfilosofiche contemporanee.

Gerechtigkeit sollte die Grundlage allen politischen Handelns sein. Doch was, wenn staatliche Maßnahmen und Gesetze dieser Norm widersprechen? Können dann auch in Demokratien Akte des zivilen Ungehorsams gerechtfertigt sein? Und wenn ja, unter welchen Bedingungen? Dieser Band versammelt erstmals die zentralen Positionen einer Debatte, die von Thoreau über Gandhi und Martin Luther King, über John Rawls, Hannah Arendt und Jürgen Habermas bis zur Occupy-Bewegung führt. Auch kritische Stimmen kommen zu Wort, denen ziviler Ungehorsam mal zu viel, mal zu wenig Widerstand bedeutet.

The work of Robert Alexy is closely associated with the “principle theory”. For Alexy himself, the principle theory represents the heart of his theoretical work, around which most of his publications are organized. In Alexy’s work, and in the work of his students, the label “principle theory” suggests theoretical unity. Despite this impression of unity, the principle theory is far more multilayered and multifaceted than the “unitary” label would suggest. The critique of Alexy’s principle theory, which is the topic of this article, has two objectives. First, I distinguish between the different types of theory which have found refuge under the unitary label. By clarifying the different theoretical aspirations pursued by proponents of the principle theory, I systematize these different theoretical and doctrinal efforts which are often not clearly separated in the debate. The critique aims to offer a framework within which to situate the different arguments and criticisms, so that it becomes clearer which type, level or aspect of principle theory the argument is about. This is the constructive part of the critique. Second, the critique aims to evaluate the theoretical and doctrinal positions and achievements of the various principle theories on each of the levels identified. This analysis is for the most part critical. The claim is that the principle theory is wrong on most counts and misunderstands itself by confusing the different levels of its theoretical and doctrinal aspirations. At its origins, as put forward by Josef Esser and Ronald Dworkin in the framework of a theory about the concept of law, it has its merit in rejecting the simplifications of positivist theories of adjudication. A defense of the role of specifically legal principles in the process of adjudication against arguments to the contrary from Larry Alexander and Ken Kress is offered. But the acceptance of legal principles does not entail a validity relation between the law and morality as supported by Alexy. As a theory of norms, the principle theory fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption under rules or the balancing of principles. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights as it is developed in Alexy’s main work “A Theory of Constitutional Rights”. The most promising aspect of Alexy’s principle theory could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.

O artigo tem como objetivo destacar os pontos centrais da obra “O Conceito de Direito” de H.L.A.Hart, constantes nos capítulos V, VI e VII. À título conclusivo, serão expostas críticas ao positivismo inclusivo de Hart, principalmente a posição de Ronald Dworkin.

One of Ronald Dworkin’s most distinctive claims in legal philosophy is that LAW is an interpretative concept. According to Dworkin, interpretative concepts are a special kind of concept—a concept whose correct application depends not on fixed criteria or an instance-identifying decision procedure, but rather on the normative or evaluative facts that best justify the total set of practices in which that concept is used. The main argument that Dworkin gives for interpretivism about a given concept –  LAW, among many others – is a disagreement-based argument. In this paper, we argue that Dworkin’s disagreement-based argument relies on a mistaken premise about the nature of disagreement. We propose an alternative analysis of the type of dispute—what we call “Seeming Variation Cases”—that Dworkin uses to motivate the idea of interpretative concepts. We observe that genuine disagreements can be expressed via a range of linguistic mechanisms, many of which do not require that speakers literally assert and deny one and the same proposition. We focus in particular on what we call “metalinguistic negotiations,” disputes in which speakers do not express the same concepts by those words, but rather negotiate how words should be used and thereby negotiate which of a range of competing concepts should be used in that context. Metalinguistic negotiations reflect disagreements that are “genuine” in any plausible sense of the word and they provide the basis for a promising alternative to Dworkin’s interpretivist analysis of Seeming Variation Cases. We claim that this view has quite general theoretical advantages over Dworkin’s interpretivism about Seeming Variation Cases and of the relevant class of legal disputes in particular. This paper thus has two interlocking goals in legal philosophy: 1) to undermine one of Dworkin’s core arguments for interpretivism and 2) provide the foundations for a non-interpretivist alternative account of an important class of legal disputes.

RESUMEN: La aparición en los últimos tiempos de nuevos derechos ha llevado a considerar que estaríamos asistiendo a la emergencia de un nuevo Derecho. No hay sin embargo, hoy por hoy, especificación de la relación entre ese nuevo Derecho (y los nuevos derechos) con el viejo Derecho (y los viejos derechos). En concreto, si ese nuevo Derecho implicaría o no la "superación", por así decirlo, del viejo Derecho. Así las cosas, en este trabajo, utilizando un caso concreto sobre el derecho a la prueba, se defiende la tesis de que la aparición de nuevos derechos y de un nuevo Derecho no implica en absoluto que el viejo Derecho y los viejos derechos estén garantizados sino más bien todo lo contrario: hay que seguir luchando para que, parafraseando a Dworkin, el nuevo y el viejo Derecho, los nuevos y los viejos derechos sean tomados en serio. PALABRAS CLAVE: Derecho, nuevos derechos, viejos derechos, derecho a la prueba, tomar en serio. SUMARIO: 1.-Introducción 2.-El derecho a la prueba. 3.-El derecho en acción. 4.-A modo de conclusión: Tomando la prueba (los viejos y los nuevos derechos) en serio. ABSTRACT: The appearance of new rights in the last number of years has led to the opinion that a new Law would be emerging. There is, however, to this day, no specification about the relationship between that new Law (and the new rights) and the old Law (and the old rights): whether that new Law would outdo, so to speak, the old Law or not. Things being so, in this work, making use of a case concerning the right to evidence, we will defend the theory that the appearance of a new Law and new rights does not at all mean that the old Law and the old rights are guaranteed. It is necessary to keep up the struggle so that, paraphrasing Dworkin, the new and old Law, new and old rights be taken seriously.

Résumé de l'auteur (MB) : " ‘Néoconstitutionnalisme’ est assurément le nouveau nom pour une famille de théories du droit bien connues: un nom jusqu'à maintenant utilisé seulement au sein de la théorie du droit du monde latin. Mais contrairement à une critique récente de Riccardo Guastini, et conformément à une plus large analyse de ce mouvement dans mon dernier livre, Manuale di filosofia del diritto (2011), le néoconstitutionnalisme existe effectivement – exactement comme le droit naturel, le positivisme juridique ou encore le réalisme juridique existent. Dans cette contribution, en fait, trois thèmes centraux du néoconstitutionnalisme sont examinés – la connexion droit-morale, la distinction règle-principes et le balancement ou pondération – afin d’en fournir une meilleure théorie positiviste. Ainsi, je reconnais une connexion contigente mais théoriquement essentielle entre le droit et la morale; j’admets une distinction quasiment radicale entre les règles et les principes juridiques, et je fournis une théorie du balancement (ou pondération) positiviste, réaliste et axiologiquement pluraliste."

Introdução
A escolha de Constituições democráticas e rígidas, com catálogo de direitos fundamentais supremos e protegidos contra as maiorias parla-mentares, acarretou um novo modo de interpretar e aplicar o Direito, o que, por sua vez, implicou um aumento da atividade do Poder Judiciá-rio e uma preponderância deste Poder nas decisões políticas do Esta-do. Esta questão é, então, trazida ao centro do debate jurídico e políti-co atual, levando a notáveis consequências no plano da compreensão e da operacionalização da teoria jurídica, que, a seu turno, deve ser re-pensada para dar conta dessa nova realidade. Com exceção dos Estados Unidos, que adotaram o constitucionalismo desde sua origem, vários países vieram a adotar este modelo de Estado em meados ou fim do século XX. Essa mudança pode ser verificada com a adoção de Constituições democráticas por países europeus no pós-Se-gunda Guerra Mundial 1 , como modo de proteger alguns valores essen-ciais para a sociedade (prevalência dos direitos humanos) e limitação das maiorias representadas no Parlamento que se mostraram perigosas no contexto europeu, a exemplo do nazismo alemão e do fascismo italiano. Já nos países da América Latina (incluindo o Brasil) e do Leste Europeu – em que o constitucionalismo foi adotado –, bem como na África do Sul, a opção pelo constitucionalismo se deu com a adoção de regimes democráticos após longo tempo de governos ditatoriais. É cer-to que a maioria dos países já havia adotado Constituições anterior-mente, mas estas eram apenas documentos políticos, sem serem dota-das de força normativa. A ideia de constitucionalismo que se propõe não é a de adoção de uma Constituição apenas do ponto de vista formal , mas Constituição com catálogo de direitos fundamentais como limites às maiorias 2 .

Judith Jarvis Thomson and others contend that rights are pro-tanto rather than absolute, that is, that rights may permissibly be infringed in some circumstances. Alan Gewirth maintains that there are some rights that are absolute because infringing them would amount to unspeakable evil. However, there seem to be possible circumstances in which it would be permissible to infringe even those rights. Specificationists, such as Gerald Gaus, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hillel Steiner and Kit Wellman, argue that all rights are absolute because they have implicit exceptions, the exceptions being either right-voiding or right-compatible. Specificationists have charged pro-tantoism with preventing rights from being action-guiding, and pro-tantoists have levelled the same charge against specificationism. I show that both charges are mistaken. Pro-tantoists claim that specificationists cannot account for the moral remainder that we recognise in some circumstances and which can be explained by reference to a permissible right-infringement. Specificationists retort that the moral remainder can be explained by invoking compensation-rights. I show that the pro-tantoist claim is true and that the specificationist retort is false on two counts: explanation in terms of compensation-rights is not applicable to all cases; and it fails to account for the moral dynamic in the cases to which it is applicable. The contention that rights are pro-tanto does not conflict with the substance of the contention that rights are trumps, despite claims of specificationists to the contrary.

Taking Rights Seriously is concerned above all with due process, both in law and politics. In this respect, his theory of law and critique of legal positivism frames his theory of politics. He conceives both law and politics in terms of a "right to equality," the aim being to show individuals equal concern and respect. However, whereas he regards legal process as a matter of principle, orientated toward viewing our relations with others in terms of justice, he treats political process as dealing only with policy and focused on promoting the general welfare. The result is an account of law and politics that is original yet idiosyncratic. Though he sees rights-based judicial review as legitimately trumping utilitarian democratic decisions, his account of legal deliberation is in its way democratic, as his view of civil disobedience illustrates, and could apply as much-if not more-to legislatures as to courts.

Abstract: Justice Barroso sustains a theory of constitutional adjudication according to which courts play three distinctive roles in a constitutional democracy: a countermajoritarian role, a representative role and an enlightened role. At face value, this theory shares a central assumption of Dworkin’s jurisprudence, which is the aesthetic hypothesis. On the aesthetic hypothesis, judges should strive to make the law the best it can be through their constructive interpretations. I argue, however, that Justice Barroso’s theory is very different from Dworkin’s version of the aesthetic hypothesis, for the following reasons: 1) Dworkin never claimed that judges are authorized to create laws, even in the limited sense that legal positivists do; 2) Justice Barroso makes no claim to fidelity to our institutional history; 3) Justice Barroso’s theory denies the possibility of objectivity in interpretation; 4) the principle of “local priority” is explicitly denied in Justice Barroso’s theory; 5) there is no conceptual space for protestant interpretation in Justice Barroso’s theory, for interpreting the law is conceived of a task done by authentic interpreters only. I argue that this theory is revolutionary in a familiar sense, which is the doctrine developed by Brazilian lawyers in the 1960’s to justify the military dictatorship. In fact, positive laws make little difference in Justice Barroso’s interpretation, since he constantly decides on the basis of three principles: a) the principle of protecting freedom in personal morality; b) a principle of moralization of society through criminal law; c) a principle of protecting capital in detriment to work, in a neoliberal account.

Resumo: O Ministro Barroso sustenta uma teoria da decisão constitucional segundo a qual tribunais desempenham três papéis distintos em uma democracia constitucional: um papel contramajoritário, um papel representativo e um papel iluminista. À primeira vista, essa teoria compartilha uma premissa da teoria do Direito de Dworkin, que é a hipótese estética. Segundo a hipótese estética, os juízes devem buscar tornar o direito o melhor que ele pode ser por meio de suas interpretações. Eu sustento, no entanto, que a teoria do Ministro Barroso é bastante diferente da versão dworkiniana da hipótese estética, pelas seguintes razões: 1) Dworkin nunca reivindicou que juízes pudessem criar direito, mesmo no sentido limitado que os positivistas jurídicos o fazem; 2) o Ministro Barroso não sustenta uma pretensão de manter-se fiel à história institucional; 3) a teoria do Ministro Barroso nega a possibilidade de objetividade na interpretação; 4) o princípio da “prioridade local” é explicitamente negado pela teoria do Ministro Barroso; 5) não há espaço conceitual para a interpretação protestante na teoria do Ministro Barroso, pois interpretar o direito é tido como uma tarefa apenas para intérpretes autênticos. Eu sustento que sua teoria é revolucionária em um sentido familiar, que é a doutrina desenvolvida por juristas brasileiros nos anos de 1960 para justificar a ditadura militar. Na verdade, o direito positivo faz pouca diferença nas interpretações do Ministro Barroso, pois ele costuma invariavelmente decidir com base em três princípios: a) o princípio do liberalismo no campo moral; b) um princípio de moralização da sociedade por meio do direito penal; e c) um princípio de proteção do capital em detrimento do trabalho, em uma ótica neoliberal.

a teoria de Ronald Dworkin sobre a igualdade baseada na distribuição igualitária de recursos apoia-se na premissa de que todos devem ser tratados com igual consideração e respeito, tanto pelo Estado quanto pelas pessoas, o que conecta essa proposta com o princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana. Segundo esse modelo, a igualdade só pode ser alcançada mediante um projeto de distribuição igualitária de recursos, de modo a permitir que as pessoas tenham as mesmas condições econômicas como ponto de partida, ainda que, no decorrer do tempo, ressurja a desigualdade motivada por fatores diversos (hábitos mais dispendiosos, diferenças de capacidade laboral etc.). Embora seja um modelo ideal, sua implementação pode ser feita mediante ações governamentais, tais como políticas de distribuição de renda. No caso do Brasil, o programa Bolsa Família demonstra, em certo grau, a viabilidade da teoria analisada, inclusive com impactos em nível nacional na redução de desigualdades. Contudo, o programa enfrenta resistências sociopolíticas, fenômeno que também é previsto por Dworkin no desenvolvimento de sua teoria.

Com este trabalho, pretendemos lançar uma crítica a variações atuais do positivismo jurídico. Para tanto, consideramos útil, ainda hoje, traçar a trajetória do debate Hart-Dworkin como espécie de espinha dorsal da teoria dworkiniana sobre o direito válido, apresentada na forma de ataque geral (general attack) ao positivismo jurídico. Na sequência, expomos brevemente a teoria de Dworkin e como ela encaminha a polêmica que segue hoje. Por fim, propomos uma reflexão a respeito da via interpretativa deixada aos positivismos.

Palavras-chave: Dworkin. Positivismos interpretativos. Hermenêutica.

La jurisprudencia constitucional peruana concebía como vicios de motivación de las resoluciones a los defectos en la motivación (interna o externa) así como a la insuficiencia de la misma. Sin embargo, a partir de la sentencia 01747-2013-PA/TC crea la figura de la “motivación constitucionalmente deficitaria”, vicio en el cual se incurre por excluir a un derecho fundamental en una controversia, por atribuir erróneamente un contenido a un derecho, o por realizar una “mala ponderación”. El autor evalúa si esta figura creada por el Tribunal Constitucional peruano impone en la jurisdicción ordinaria un deber de motivación realizable, o si, por el contrario, crea una vía arbitraria para la revisión de causas al extender el deber de motivación a un deber de encontrar “la única respuesta correcta” para cada caso planteado. La conclusión que se sostiene es que por “motivación constitucionalmente deficitaria” el Tribunal Constitucional establece un estándar de motivación inalcanzable (o “alcanzable” por mera coincidencia) que desfigura la garantía de la debida motivación de las resoluciones judiciales, permitiéndose a sí mismo una vía libre y arbitraria para avocarse a causas resueltas con las que discrepen.

The possibility of a normative theory of proportionality in the implementation of the human rights protection have not to lead to be unaware of the specifics of the legal reasoning. A moral and political philosophy discussion can help the concept's analysis and more particularly the analysis of the concept of proportionality, but the philosophical concept of proportionality is not designed for a substitution for the legal reasoning. The paper criticizes as much the normative analysis of proportionality that regards the rights like values to optimize as the juridical analysis that radicalize a strong opposition between rules and principles.

El desarrollo de este trabajo se dirige focalmente a responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿en qué medida el razonamiento práctico, en general, y el razonamiento jurídico, en particular, es capaz de determinar una única respuesta correcta [en adelante: URC]? A los efectos de dar respuesta a tal interrogante, se seguirá la siguiente «hoja de ruta»: i) descripción de la tesis afirmatoria de la URC en Ronald Dworkin; ii) presentación de las críticas a la tesis afirmatoria de la URC formuladas desde las teorías del derecho de Aexy y Finnis; iii) esbozo de las bases para un replanteamiento del problema de la URC; iv) conclusiones

Liberalism is a term employed in a dizzying variety of ways across the humanities and social sciences. This essay seeks to reframe how the liberal tradition is understood. I start by delineating different types of response – prescriptive, comprehensive, explanatory – that are frequently conflated in answering the question “what is liberalism?” I then discuss assorted methodological strategies employed in the existing literature: after rejecting “stipulative” and “canonical” approaches, I outline a contextualist alternative. On this (comprehensive) account, liberalism is best characterised as the sum of the arguments that have been classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, over time. In the remainder of the article I present an historical analysis of shifts in the meaning of liberalism in Anglo-American political thought between 1850 and 1950, focusing in particular on how John Locke came to be seen as a liberal. I also explore the emergence of the category of "liberal democracy". I argue that the scope of the liberal tradition was massively expanded during the middle decades of the twentieth century, such that it came to be seen by many as the constitutive ideology of the West. This capacious (and deeply confusing) understanding of liberalism was produced by a conjunction of the ideological wars fought against “totalitarianism” and assorted developments in the social sciences. Today we both inherit and inhabit it.