Legal Methodology

This paper explains Third World Approaches to International Law (“TWAIL”) as a historically-aware, epistemologically-focused, integrated methodology that aims to explore the enduring effects of colonialism on international law and provide an alternative version of the history of international law from the perspective of Third World people.

Метою серії науково-методичених видань “Академія порівняль-
ного правознавства” є інтенсифікація наукової дискусії з найбільш
складних і актуальних питань порівняльного правознавства, сприяння
вдосконаленню викладання порівняльно-правових дисциплін у вищих
юридичних навчальних закладах.
Людмила Андріївна Луць — доктор юридичних наук, професор
кафедри теорії та історії держави і права Львівського національного
університету імені Івана Франка, автор підручника “Сучасні правові
системи світу” (Львів, 2003), монографії “Європейські міждержавні пра-
вові системи та проблеми інтеграції з ними правової системи України
(теоретичні аспекти)” (Київ, 2003) та ін. Відкрита лекція Л.А. Луць пред-
ставлена на другому міжнародному науковому семінарі “Порівняльне
правознавство: сучасний стан і перспективи розвитку” в м. Сімферополі
25–29 квітня 2007 р.

L’ouvrage Interprétation des lois traite des méthodes et des principes qui guident les juristes lorsqu’ils interprètent les textes législatifs en droit canadien, que ce soit dans un contexte de common law ou de droit civil. Depuis sa première édition, en 1982, cet ouvrage a su rendre compte des nombreux développements qu’a connu l’interprétation des lois tout en conservant à la fois une perspective critique et sa vocation pédagogique. Si le traité a ainsi contribué à la formation de plusieurs générations de juristes, il est devenu une référence incontournable et une autorité reconnue auprès des tribunaux, des praticiens, ainsi que des chercheurs en droit. Cette cinquième édition constitue une version enrichie et mise à jour des éditions précédentes, dont le contenu a également fait l’objet d’une révision en profondeur.

Cet article expose le canon interprétatif standard dans l’Allemagne d’aujourd’hui.
L’analyse conceptuelle placée au début permettra d’éclaircir une terminologie méthodologiques très souvent confuse en différenciant les arguments, les méthodes et les système (école) interprétatives.
Ensuite on va focaliser l’attention sur les évolutions ayant jalonnée l’établissement du canon interprétatif actuel. Il s’agit d’un débat doctrinaire développé au cours de XIX et XX siècles entre courants méthodologiques concurrents comme l’école subjective (exégèse évoluée), l’école objective (Kohler) et l’école historique objective (Interessenjurisprudenz de von Heck).
Dans la partie finale l’analyse déconstruit le canon interprétatif l’actuel on Allemagne. On obtient ainsi un aperçu d’un système méthodologique qui est  parmi le plus avancés dans le monde d’aujourd’hui.

Rozważania nad metodologią nauk prawnych wypada rozpocząć od dostrzeżenia kontrowersji dotyczącej samej natury nauk prawnych. Dyskusja nad metodą naukową prowadzi do kwestionowania przez niektórych naukowości badań prowadzonych nad prawem. Czy zatem prawo jest nauką? Co wyróżnia refleksję naukową od tej nienaukowej? Specyficzny język, odrębny od języka uważanego za naturalny; własna metoda prowadzenia refleksji oraz wreszcie określony przedmiot badań. Zazwyczaj dodaje się jeszcze konieczną powtarzalność i przewidywalność wniosków oraz wyników badań. Co do specyfiki języka prawnego i języka prawniczego raczej nie ma wątpliwości. Dobrze oddaje to refleksja Johna Locke’a:

Czyż nie zdarza się często, że człowiek z podstawowym wykształceniem bardzo dobrze rozumie tekst lub prawo, które czyta, dopóki nie skonsultuje się ze znawcą prawa lub nie pójdzie do doradcy prawnego; który w chwili, gdy objaśni mu [literę prawa], sprawia, że słowa te albo nic nie oznaczają albo, to co jemu się podoba? (Locke 1836, s. 364).

Problematyczny zatem zdaje się raczej przedmiot badań, a także powtarzalność wniosków.

Z uwagi na to, że „wrażliwość historyczna jest konieczna dla prawnika, który nie powinien rozpłynąć się w teraźniejszości, w przypadkowości powszedniego »dzisiaj«” (Irti, p. 5) we wprowadzeniu w metodologię nauk prawnych naszym towarzyszem będzie doświadczenie rzymskich znawców prawa – jurysprudencji. W istocie, ich metoda interpretacji i znaczenie dla starożytnego porządku prawnego przyrównywane jest do roli sądów w porządkach anglosaskich. „W odróżnieniu od anglosaskiego prawa sędziowskiego czynnikiem prawotwórczym był w Rzymie nie wyrok, lecz porada prawnika (responsum)” (Dajczak, Giaro, Longchamps de Bérier 2019, s. 50). Szczególna rola jurysprudencji może stać się punktem odniesienia dla roli dzisiejszej doktryny prawnej i jej naukowego charakteru.

https://www.copernicuscollege.pl/podreczniki/metodologia-nauk-spolecznych-i-humanistycznych

What is the true methodological core of legal thought? In answering this question the essay tries to differentiate between law and other disciplines and gives a few suggestions of how a student, in preparing her undergraduate papers, could create an interesting topic of research.

There is a pressing need to develop a research methodology for studying judicial opinions that goes beyond both dogmatic analyzes and the established positions developed within philosophy of law and legal theory (e.g. the hermeneutic and argumentative approaches). One possible way is to adopt or modify methodologies developed within empirically oriented social sciences. Most social science textbooks devoted to methodology of empirical research deal with case studies. So far, this research framework developed within the social sciences has not been applied directly to judicial opinions, though they have been used for some empirical legal research studies. Even at first sight, case study research would appear to have potential for use with judicial opinions. The aim of the paper is to answer the question, how and to what extent can case study methodology developed within the social sciences be fruitfully used to examine judicial opinions? The general answer is undoubtedly positive (case studies can bring new, non-trivial threads to the research methodology on judicial opinions), though with many serious and far-reaching reservations.

THE TRIAL COURT,  JUDGE LON E. FARRIS  FROM THE 31ST VIRGINIA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (JUDGE FARRIS OR TRIAL COURT), ERRED WHEN JUDGE FARRIS APPEARED WITHOUT AUTHORITY ON MARCH 8, 2022, PRESIDED OVER PRETRIAL MATTERS, AND ENTERED AN ORDER TO DISMISS DANIEL'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT, JUDGE LON E. FARRIS, ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HOLD A JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAD ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT UNDER THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CITED IN THE UNDERLYING CASE ON APPEAL.

Цель серии “Академия сравнительного правоведения” — оживить научную
дискуссию по наиболее сложным и актуальным вопросам сравнительного
правоведения, способствовать усовершенствованию преподавания сравни-
тельно-правовых дисциплин в высших юридических учебных заведениях.
Бехруз Хашматулла Набиевич — доктор юридических наук, профессор
кафедры права Европейского Союза и сравнительного правоведения Одесской
национальной юридической академии. Автор учебника “Введение в сравни-
тельное правоведение” (Одесса, 2002), монографии “Исламские традиции пра-
ва” (Одесса, 2006), книги “Основы цивилизационного подхода в сравнительном
правоведении” (Одесса, 2007) и др. Открытая лекция Х.Н. Бехруза представлена
на Втором международном научном семинаре “Сравнительное правоведение:
современное состояние и перспективы развития” в г. Симферополе 25–29 апреля
2007 г.

Private law theory plays a role (for better or worse) in the practice of law, whether that be in education or providing criticism, or contextualizing within a broader frame what private law does and why it does what it does. Yet some say that private law theory neglects history while others say that it does not fully capture history’s possibilities. In this paper, I  explore what it means to use history in theorising by exploring how analytical philosophy has engaged with history since the 1960s, suggesting three possible historical avenues of private law theory.

On reconnaît aujourd’hui que la pluralité juridique, c’est-à-dire la coexistence dans un même espace de plusieurs ordres ou systèmes juridiques concurrentiels, caractérise un grand nombre de sociétés de par le monde. Les juristes, et tous ceux qui s’intéressent à la diversité des cultures juridiques ainsi qu’à leur interaction, ont de plus en plus besoin de maîtriser les concepts, les techniques et les méthodes propres à l’étude pluraliste du droit.

Ce manuel a pour objet de guider le chercheur désireux de mieux connaître les aspects théoriques, méthodologiques et pratiques du pluralisme juridique. Il lui permettra notamment de se familiariser avec les fonctions et les usages de l’approche pluraliste, en plus de l’initier aux exigences de cette méthode sur le plan épistémologique, de même que dans le travail de terrain. Il propose également des contributions qui illustrent et interrogent la pertinence de la théorie pluraliste dans l’étude de certains phénomènes juridiques particuliers.

Cet ouvrage est issu des travaux d’un collectif international d’experts francophones provenant d’horizons culturels et professionnels divers, et riches d’une expérience concrète de l’étude et de l’application de la méthode pluraliste.

Counterfactual history involves asking 'what if' developments had occurred differently and comparing that with what actually happened. Though common in works of popular history and science fiction, counterfactual history remains controversial within the academic discipline of history. It is often dismissed as a mere parlour game or as a work of science fiction rather than of history while other historians have seen it as a necessary corrective to historical accounts because it stresses contingency and helps to question causation and the benefit of highlight. Drawing upon this debate, this paper examines what counterfactual history is and the debates around it. It distils eight main rules of counterfactual historical analysis. It then explores how lawyers use counterfactual analysis and the advantages and disadvantages of using counterfactual history in a legal context. The paper introduces and explores a new concept: Counterfactual Legal History, to see how asking 'what if' question can shed light upon how law actually developed and how it could develop. It shows that by asking what could have been, Counterfactual Legal History highlights not only other possible futures (underlining the contingency of law) but it also emphasizes the importance of agency (showing that other futures are possible and can be achieved). A counterfactual approach provides an assault on a deterministic interpretation of law as being fixed. It provides an opportunity to question and indeed depart from the progress narrative of evolutionary functionalist accounts as identified by Robert Gordon.

This book investigates whether national courts could and should import innovative solutions from abroad in the adjudication of complex legal disputes. Special attention is paid to the concept of “legally relevant damage” and its importance in overcoming the deadlock created by the category of “pure economic loss” in the Portuguese and German tort law systems. These systems are essentially based on the concept of unlawfulness (“Rechtswidrigkeit”), which limits the compensation for pure economic loss to where a protective rule is infringed. These losses have nevertheless been compensated for through the extensive interpretation of rules and the appeal to near-contractual devices, which has been detrimental to legal certainty, the equality before the law, and subjects’ freedom of action. This book explains why courts can and should take a proactive role and apply DCFR-based solutions in order to compensate for every loss that is worthy of legal protection.

La retorica è l’arte della scrittura giuridica, utilizzata dagli avvocati d’ogni tempo per l’elaborazione della difesa forense.
Nel libro, arricchito di esempi pratici tratti dall’esperienza giudiziaria, si illustra il metodo dell’argomentazione retorica, indicandone l’utilità per la stesura persuasiva del parere motivato e dell’atto processuale.
In copertina è riprodotta la Stele di Timocrate, figura in marmo che rappresenta un «amanuense capace di scrivere correttamente», risalente al II secolo dopo Cristo e conservata al Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Atene.

Begriffe wie "herrschende Meinung" (h.M.), "überwiegende Ansicht" oder "Mindermeinung" (M.M.) werden in der juris-tischen Argumentation in Ausbildung und Praxis verwandt, Bedeutung und Potential dieser Figuren wird aber nicht immer erkannt. Dieser Beitrag will über Hintergründe der Begriffe aufklären und auf dieser Grundlage konkrete Hilfe-stellungen bei ihrer Feststellung und Verwendung geben. Denn die Beherrschung dieser Figuren kann entscheidend für erfolgreiche juristische Argumentation sein. I. Einleitende Begriffsklärung Mit dem Beginn des Studiums tauchen Studierende der Rechtswissenschaften in die juristische Fachsprache ein, die oft Besonderheiten bereithält. Eine besondere Unsicherheit von Studierenden, die sie oft über das ganze Studium hin be-gleitet, ist die Beschreibung von sogenannten Streitständen. Bestimmte Begriffe werden manchmal inflationär, manchmal gar nicht oder falsch gebraucht. Dieser didaktische Beitrag will die Vokabeln des Streitstandes nicht nur definieren, sondern auch Hintergründe offenlegen, die zu einer sicheren und richtigen Verwendung beitragen. Dabei werden wir uns auf den Begriff der h.M. konzentrieren, der Schlüssel für das Verständnis dieser Begrifflichkeiten ist. Was eine herrschen-de Meinung genau ist, konnte bisher noch nicht eindeutig definiert werden. 1 Daher wollen wir uns dem Thema vorsichtig aus zwei Richtungen nähern: Zum einen wollen wir die Vokabeln des Streitstandes und besonders der h.M. situativ verorten, d.h. die Situationen kenntlich machen, in denen sie gebraucht werden. Zum anderen ist der notwendige Bedeutungsgehalt festzustellen, der sich aus der Abgrenzung der Begriffe h.M., a.A., M.M. usw. ergibt. Die Begriffe und insbesondere der Begriff h.M. tauchen auf, wenn im Rahmen einer juristischen argumentativen Auseinandersetzung ein sogenannter Mei-nungsstreit behandelt wird. In der Regel ist das im deutschen Recht dann der Fall, wenn ein Rechtssatz in unterschiedlicher Art und Weise gedeutet werden kann und auch wird. Es geht also um Auslegungsfragen. Die jeweiligen tatsächlich vertre-tenen Lösungen werden als Meinungen gekennzeichnet und mit Argumenten unterfüttert. Der Meinungsstreit taucht in Gutachten, aber auch in Urteilen auf, in denen man sich re-gelmäßig auf eine Meinung festlegt und dies begründet. Was heißt nun aber herrschende Meinung? Manche Eigenheiten der Begriffe ergeben sich schon aus der Abgrenzung zueinander: So wird z.B. zwischen h.M. und herrschender Lehre (h.L.) unterschieden, was darauf hinwei-sen könnte, dass eine h.M. auch eine Beteiligung der Recht-sprechung voraussetzt. Der Gegensatz zur h.M. ist dann die M.M., da sie gerade nicht herrschend ist. Die a.A. ist manchmal gleichbedeutend, manchmal aber auch weiter zu 1 Einen Überblick zu verschiedenen Definitionen liefert Tuschak, Die herrschende Meinung als Indikator europäi-scher Rechtskultur, 2009, S. 5 ff. verstehen: Wenn sich zwei gleichrangige Ansichten gegen-überstehen, gibt es die eine und die andere. Abstufend wird die herrschende Meinung folgendermaßen definiert: "Die allgemeine Meinung beherrscht das Feld ohne ernst zu neh-mende Abweichler (oder jedenfalls werden die Abweichler ignoriert). Die h.M. behauptet sich innerhalb ihres Fachs als Geltungsgrund auch gegen nicht ignorierbare Kritik. Nimmt ihre Anhängerschaft ab, kann sie noch immer als überwie-gende Meinung wirken." 2 Was kennzeichnet nun aber genau eine h.M. und ihr Verhältnis zu anderen Meinungen? Um hier eine bessere Handhabe zu bekommen, soll der Begriff der h.M. schlaglichtartig aus historischer, rhetorischer und dis-kursanalytischer Perspektive geschildert werden.

Notice and Complaint filed on 5/11/22 versus US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judges sitting in Richmond, Virginia.

The US 4th Circuit Court of Appeals does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" to process a Reciprocal Disciplinary case when the original Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board Order was void ab initio when entered by the VSB DB based on only Virginia courts having "subject matter jurisdiction" to impose discipline on any attorney practicing law in Virginia.

See VA Code § 54.1-3915. Restrictions as to rules and regulations. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title54.1/chapter39/section54.1-3915/

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/446/719/

Sommario: 1. Il precedente giudiziale nel diritto contemporaneo. 2. Il vincolo del preceden- te nell’ordinamento italiano. 3. Precedente giudiziario e problematicità del giudicato. 4. Il valore ipotetico del precedente. Riferimento al modello analitico. 5. Il valore topico del pre- cedente. Riferimento al modello dialettico. 6. Funzioni della topica. Per una determinazione teleologica del precedente: ratio decidendi, principio di diritto, massima. 7. Il processo come luogo topico di determinazione del precedente. 8. Uso eccentrico del precedente nella giuri- sprudenza contemporanea: a) Corte di Cassazione; b) Corte costituzionale; c) Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. 9. Conclusioni. Topica, giurisprudenza e informatica giuridica.

This paper analyzes the different methodological systems used in Bulgarian General legal theory. The choice of methodology is seen as a mean of achievement of the goals of legal education. I accept, that good legal education must prepare legal faculty graduates for the different social roles of modern jurists. In that connection the paper investigates the matter of the " non-legal " knowledge and gives an answer, if the legal education must provide social, political and philosophical knowledge to the students.

(Final copyedited version) This chapter presents legal materiality as a distinct approach within law and humanities scholarship. Legal materiality is concerned with the conditions of possibility in and through which law arises, rather than taking law’s materiality to be self-evident, as when it is regarded as a form of material culture or when objects are taken as symbols of law. It distinguishes between matters and materials: if matters are problematizations or ‘matters of concern’ to law, materials are the attributes or properties that are enlisted in acts of interpretation. Rather than addressing materials as inert physical elements that are acted upon by law, legal materiality is concerned with how materials come to matter by being engaged in the production of legal meaning through interpretive and representational practices. Section 2.2 situates this approach in relation to a broader inheritance of materialism and materiality in the Western tradition. It considers different understandings of “materialism,” such as “new materialisms” and historical materialism, that inform but also diverge from legal materiality. Section 2.3 engages with different uses of “materiality” in recent legal scholarship, followed by a detailed discussion of its meaning in two works of legal theory that have sought to articulate a conception of legal materiality. The concluding section discusses the potentials of this approach for law and humanities scholarship to understand how materials are directly implicated in the making of legal difference rather than serving solely as law’s objects.

Keywords:
materiality, materialism, new materialism, textuality, media studies, Foucault, Latour, Luhmann, Vismann

Comparative legal studies, whether taken as discipline or method, has long been engaged with the conundrum of translation. That is to say, with the question of whether or not it is possible to assert that a legal term, feature or process used in one locus has an equivalent in another, and the extent to which legal features specific to one legal setting, system, culture or mentalité can be ‘understood’ by individuals situated or educated in a different one. Translation is not only an important issue in terms of the focus and content of comparative law, however, but also informs and indeed frames the debate at second order level by permeating both the worldview and method of its proponents. This chapter will discuss how translation and its (im)possibility became the defining criterion within the debate and draw attention to the effect that this second order polarization has had upon contemporary comparative legal studies.

This chapter will focus upon conceptually mapping the place of socio-legal methodology within legal research. Questions to be addressed include: what are the underlying theories regarding the nature of law and legal argument underpinning this form of scholarship? How do we understand the position of law in relation to the general social sciences? Having located this methodological school, I will then proceed to consider what reasons students or researchers might have for engaging in socio-legal research. This will be achieved by discussing five major strands of socio-legal research and how they seek to make distinctive contributions to knowledge. It will be shown that socio-legal scholarship has challenged doctrinal legal research culture by questioning the assumed centrality of law and legal institutions to many social problems. It has sought to present a more complex understanding of 'how legal rules, doctrines, legal decisions, institutionalised cultural and legal practices work together to create the reality of law in action'. 1 As a result, the proponents of the methodology have successfully challenged legal scholars to display greater policy imagination, by acknowledging law's status as just one form of regulation, and cautioning against overly doctrinal understandings of the discipline.

Statutory interpretation is a process by which courts interpret statutes. Statutes/ Acts of Parliament are laws that the Parliament passes. In the Ugandan Context, The Parliament is a law-making organ according to the authority of its powers as stipulated under Art. 79 of the Ugandan Constitution.
Courts are charged with the duty of interpreting laws made by the Parliament in the dispensation of Justice

В статье раскрываются основные идеи учения о праве и государстве Г.Ф. Шершеневича. Дан краткий обзор биографии ученого, определены методологические основания его учения о праве, взгляды на задачи и структуру философии права, раскрыты фундаментальные теоретические понятия права и государства.

Монография посвящена актуальной и малоизученной в российском правоведении теме – сравнительному анализу философских и методологических оснований учений о праве двух влиятельных школ юриспруденции – естественно-правовой и исторической. Автор поставил цель исследовать различия и сходства их представлений с позиции правовой гносеологии, онтологии и аксиологии, представить критический анализ и определить их эвристический потенциал для современного правоведения.
Монографическое исследование состоит из трех разделов. В первом разделе рассматриваются вопросы методологического и философско-правового характера, по которым между исследуемыми школами имеются принципиальные расхождения во взглядах. Во втором разделе автор ставит своей целью изучить сходства в воззрениях на природу права естественно-правовой и исторической школ правоведения. Третий раздел носит критический характер, посвящен исследованию противоречий, ограничений и пробелов в философско-методологических «программах» данных школ, а также изучению тех их идей, которые до сих пор обладают эвристическим потенциалом для правоведения.
В работе привлечен и систематизирован широкий спектр позиций дореволюционных, советских и современных исследователей, рассмотрены взгляды зарубежных ученых-юристов на исследуемые школы правопонимания.

Should comparative methods be considered a classic tool for XIXe century Italian jurists ? Italian jurists were naturally open to comparative laws, mainly because of the country’s political situation. However, among the most significant changes that occurred in legal education at the turn of the 20th century were new teachings of modern comparative law. Indeed, legal methods went through a period of heated critical debate and comparative law started to be considered a very interesting field of study. This led to the development of new topics and the discovery of other legal traditions.

This research guide is intended as a starting point for doctoral researchers in the EUI Department of Law who plan to (or hope to) draw on socio-political, anthropological or historical methodologies as part of their dissertation research. Ultimately, the methods, methodology, and the boundaries of the research project are produced dynamically by the researcher, so this is no more than a starting point, a set of suggestions rather than a book of recipes. All sources listed are available either through the EUI library or free online.

This article draws the attention of historians of scriptural exegesis to the relevance of uṣūl al-fiqh — both as a literary genre and as a discipline of the religious sciences — to an understanding of the semiotic foundations and the hermeneutic discourse of scriptural commentaries (uṣūl al-tafsīr) in mediaeval Judaism and Islam. What are the means through which meaning is produced, what are the conditions to be met for the possibility of their understanding? We find the most systematic and exhaustive discussions on these and related questions not in the commentaries themselves but in compositions on uṣūl al-fiqh.