Chemical Weapons

The article presents a comprehensive and cross-cutting review of key marine waste issues, taking into account: sources, fate, risks, transport pathways, threats, legislation, current challenges, and knowledge gaps. The growing amount of both human-created waste in seas and oceans and waste reaching marine ecosystems from land is one of today’s challenges for the global economy and the European Union. It is predicted that if no decisive steps are taken to limit the amount of this type of waste, there may be more plastic waste than fish in the oceans after 2050. The influence of microplastics and nanoplastics on living organisms remains undiagnosed. Within the international and EU law, solutions are being developed to properly manage waste on board ships and to reduce the impact of processes related to the recycling of the vessels on the environment. Currently, over 80% of ships are dismantled in the countries of South Asia, in conditions that threaten the environment and the safety o...

The aim of the article is to examine the legal position presented by the UK after the 2018 airstrikes in Syria, both from the perspective of the legality of humanitarian intervention as well as the criteria employed with regard to a humanitarian intervention in the doctrine of international law. The thesis underlying this paper is that humanitarian intervention is illegal under contemporary international law, since neither the UN Charter nor customary norms allow for a humanitarian intervention, and the UK's legal position and the reaction thereto do not change this state of the law. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part examines the UK's 2018 legal position in the light of international law, while the second part analyses the humanitarian intervention as invoked by the UK from the standpoint of two criteria of humanitarian intervention presented in the legal doctrine, that is, the reason behind the intervention and its goals.

This article examines the issue of riot control agents as it relates to the subject of chemical weapons arms control at the international level and, more specifically, implications for the United States. The article examines how the issue of riot control agents has complicated efforts for the United States to enter into and ratify chemical weapons-related arms control agreements. The article provides an overview of chemical weapons, examines the relevant arms control agreements, explores why and how riot control agents influence debates over the merits of these treaties, and explains why riot control agents remain a contentious issue in chemical weapons arms control and foreign policy in the United States.

The reasons for the use of chemical weapons remain an understudied concept in international relations despite their continual use in conflicts. By comparing chemical weapon use by the regimes of four Arab states-Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria-over the last 50 years, this article seeks to discern the scenarios in which chemical weapons use is likely, and it offers policies to dissuade or, at least, mitigate their use. As allegations continue to arise about the use of chemical weapons (CW) by the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria, as well as by the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an assessment of what drives governments to use chemical weapons is long overdue. Unfortunately, the Middle East provides ample historical precedent for this analysis. Over the last 50 years, the regimes of four Arab states-Egypt, Iraq, Lib-ya, and Syria-have all used chemical weapons in combat. 1 While these attacks are devastating to victims and damaging to the international nonproliferation regime, this trend presents an opportunity for comparative analysis of what drives states to cross the threshold of employing chemical weapons and what can possibly be done to prevent such use in the future. Although determining the actual reasons why a government would use CW is virtually impossible without access to the key decision-makers, this analysis endeavors to identify the situations in which resorting to CW is most likely. 2 This article briefly explores each of the four case studies-Egypt, from 1963 to 1967; Iraq, from 1983 to 1988; Libya, in 1987; and Syria, from 2013 to present-before presenting a comparative analysis. First, superficial commonalities between the cases are explored in order to eliminate these variables from the equation: including each country's religious and ethnic make-up, regime type, and rationale for acquisition. Next, similarities in the decisions to use CW, such as the length of the conflict and the lack of preparations by adversaries, are examined to explain such decisions. Finally, these factors are compared to instances of nonuse of CW by the same states to determine their utility. This analysis will demonstrate that military dictatorships that have failed to achieve their objectives through conventional means are more likely to employ chemical weapons when their adversary is not prepared to protect itself against CW and lacks the ability to retaliate in kind or escalate the conflict.

Neither non-lethal violence nor psychochemical weapons are new concepts. History provides examples of attempts to use these both to limit the scope of war and to turn mind-altering compounds into weapons. One of these substances has been marijuana. Although previous efforts to find its military applications failed, the idea persists – as indicated by a US patent granted in 2017. As “weaponized cannabis” may again attract the interest of government agencies, the consequences of its potential deployment call for a debate. In an attempt to encourage such a discussion, in the context of the ongoing decriminalization/legalization of marijuana in some countries and US states, the article raises ethical issues pertaining to weaponized cannabinoids. It argues against the militarization of the drug, on the basis that such a development would constitute an ultimate instrumentalization of marijuana and result in a dangerous destabilizing reconstruction of its meaning along the lines of state coercion.

Was Dr David Kelly lured to his death and left positioned in the Oxfordshire woods seventeen years ago – like a trusting child by a paedophile? Many believe so.

“They didn’t have to kill him!” (Senior UK intelligence operative)2.

The untimely death of the esteemed scientist, Dr David Kelly, occurred some hours between the evening of 17th July 2003 and the following morning. It was the 12th week of Bush and Blair’s illegal war on Iraq and the Occupation.

Between 19 March and 1 August 2003. a bloody backlash had been unleashed by the invasion of Iraq. The death toll had already reached around 15,000 Iraqis – 30 percent of whom were civilians – some 4,300 unarmed people, not to mention foreign military personnel and sundry others – including Dr Kelly.

Following the much more recent crushing of ISIS in Mosul the death toll had topped some 308,000 people.5 The US counter-onslaught destroyed much of the old city, but they were not reported as helping to rebuild.

The limitation, reduction, prohibition or elimination of specific types of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons is, and will continue to be, one of the most important challenges that the international community should face in the 21th century.
To overcome these challenges a multilateral approach through the United Nations and its main organs and specialised international organisations involved in non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control issues is needed. These organs and specialised international organisations are: the General Assembly and its main subsidiary bodies, the Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

The Syrian government has made extensive use of improvised munitions delivering a chemical payload over the course of the civil war, with incidents involving re-purposed toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) substantially outnumbering those committed with military-purpose chemical agents. The majority of incidents have involved either craft-produced rockets known as improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs) or helicopter-dropped improvised air-delivered munitions (IADMs), both delivering a payload of industrial chlorine gas. Through 2017-2018, munitions of both types reached a design equilibrium, exhibiting consistent technical characteristics that distinguished them from earlier generations.

In both munition types, the designs which have emerged share several broad characteristics. These may point to the tactical requirements and practical constraints driving the Syrian government’s chemical weapons program. Both designs are relatively unsophisticated, simplifying their production and use. The munitions are made with basic tooling to very low tolerances, and with no extraneous components. Chlorine gas is the chemical agent of choice, likely for logistical reasons. As a chemical agent, chlorine is easy to procure or produce industrially, has a variety of plausible legitimate uses (e.g. water purification), and chlorine production and use forms part of the industrial backbone of Syrian infrastructure.

Both designs have limited battlefield value. This can be attributed to the typically mild effects of chlorine, as well as the weapons’ lack of accuracy. Nonetheless, the true value of these weapons to the Assad regime lie in their ability to instil terror. It is also noteworthy that two separate branches of the Syrian armed forces – the Syrian Arab Army and the Syrian Arab Air Force – have both delivered chlorine attacks, further supporting the well-established pattern of chemical weapons usage by the Syrian government.

Selected by the Defense Intelligence Agency, FBI, Naval War College Library, UK Defence Staff College,  and other official defense/intelligence collections including  Georgetown University, which included  EEIS in its Selected Resources for Security Studies, calling EEIS  "a sound starter resource for undergraduate students.” .// ""In composing The Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security (EEIS) our goal was to shape a modern encyclopedia offering immediate value to our intended readers by emphasizing matters of espionage, intelligence, and security most frequently in the news. // EEIS is not intended as a classical "spy book," filled with tales of daring operations. More comprehensive coverage of a long history and intricate web of characters, intrigues, and evolution of agencies from a global perspective will require additional volumes. Instead, within a framework of historical overviews, EEIS emphasizes the scientific foundations, applications of technology, and organizational structure of modern espionage, intelligence, and security…. (download to read more) — K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, editors. Cornwall, England. May, 2003"

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) recently confirmed that laboratory tests of samples taken following Daesh attacks on Kurdish forces southwest of Erbil in August 2015 tested positive for sulphur mustard. (see Reuters dispatch by Anthony Deutsch, "Exclusive: Samples confirm Islamic State used mustard gas in Iraq - diplomat" < http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VO1IC >)

Reuters reported that a OPCCW representative "speaking on condition of anonymity because the findings have not yet been released, said the result confirmed that chemical weapons had been used by Islamic State fighters."
This is the second documented use by Daesh/ISIS forces following tests that confirmed use of mustard gas by Daesh/ISIS forces in Syria.

As the Reuters dispatch also points out, the precursors and technology to make these weapons are easy enough to find or create in oil producing regions, and so it is possible ISIS is developing them de novo. More ominous would be if new weapons are be created from remnants of Syria’s former stockpile because it would mean faulty accounting for the weapons supposedly dismantled under international supervision back in 2014.

The Syrian stockpile was allegedly dismantled under international supervision as part of a deal to avoid potential US/UN intervention following the use of Sarin nerve gas by forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad against a rebellious area near Damascus in 2013. Assad denied he authorized use of chemical weapons. (continued… download ot read more)

AUGUST 28, 2013

Washington — An attack on Syria may indeed spread the war -- and risks escalation and backlash -- but larger interests are at stake. Like it or not, the US is the world's sheriff in these matters.

A deeply flawed analysis recently published in the Guardian exposes the weakest of all arguments against the West taking action, that being because, "chemical weapons are far from being the greatest threat to Syria's people."

The point is that WMD use is a threat to ALL humanity. (download to read more)

Photo Credits:  Save the Children of Syria. TAHIR SQUARE, Egypt — While Egypt's Revolution has, at least for now, moved into a battle for ballots, the legacy of Arab Spring remains bloodied by bullets and bombs in Syria. The destruction, danger, and death in Syria is not new but groups in Egypt tried to raise awareness during the 2012 Egyptian Presidential campaign, both as a direct call to action and as warning of what might happen should civil war break out in Egypt. 25 May, 2012. ©LMG. Photo by K. Lee Lerner. All rights reserved.

Overlapping crisis in Syria shed a large number of casualties caused by civil war and terrorism. Since 2013, over 1 million Syrians landed in Lebanon, Jordan and several European countries as refugees as the consequence of mass violence and unstable political constellation. Statistically it took 25 % of Syrians away from their homeland in the past 3 years. Furthermore, the brutality came into force escalating the crisis through the use chlorine gas as a warfare instrument committed by the Syrian government and its supporting fractions. In addition, some allegations pointed out the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged as a contemporary threat to the crisis as well as heating up the tension over the alleged use of mustard gas upon the clash. In this point of view, the use of chemical weapon in Syria has been emerged as a common norm in the situation of warfare.
 
This undergraduate paper will examines the role of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) as implementing body of Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) in mitigating the crisis in Syria through Non-Proliferation. Along with its campaign in Syria, the OPCW tied a solid partnership with United Nations as a definitive international body in form of OPCW-Joint Mission in Syria. The advocacy of OPCW derived from collective diplomatic provisions and executed in several technical maintenances. Awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, the OPWC has been globally recognized as the most successful organization in field of disarmament over centuries.
 
Keywords: Chemical Weapon, Non-Proliferation, OPCW, Syrian Crisis

Traditionally, chemical attacks are seen as military bombs or home-brewed releases. Some of the original chemical attacks in WWI used industrial gasses such as phosgene. Similarly, industrial sites can be used to create a chemical attack, which is since September 2001. However, the potentially more pernicious attacks could use naturally occurring phenomena, such as “sour gas” oil fields.

This chapter will reflect on the experiences of Mr. Yakup Satar, one of the last known veterans of the First World War (1914-1918) and Turkish War of National Liberation (1919-1922). The study is based on two interviews that I conducted with Mr. Satar’s in his native Eskişehir, Turkey in 2006, two years before his death in 2008. Despite his old age, Mr. Satar shared interesting bits of information regarding his training in chemical warfare by Germans, the fighting in Mesopotamia against the British forces, and his life in captivity. After his release, however, the war was far from over. As a seasoned combat soldier, he joined the Turkish nationalist forces in Anatolia and fought until the final defeat of the Greek army in 1922. It is striking that many of Mr. Satar’s recollections of the battles and army life corroborate the available primary and secondary sources. By presenting and analyzing Mr. Satar’s wartime experiences, this article seeks to contribute to our knowledge on the life of ordinary Ottoman soldier, an important yet understudied topic within the larger social and cultural history of the Ottoman Empire.

Since the Third Review Conference (8–19 April 2013), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the body overseeing the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has had to confront growing evidence of chemical war-fare in the Syrian civil war. Syria became a party to the CWC in October 2013, but investigators have repeatedly confirmed chemical weapon (CW) use by government forces and some chemical attacks by non-state actors. In March 2018, an assassination attempt with an uncommon nerve agent in the United Kingdom, for which the British government accuses Russia, poses a completely different challenge to the CWC’s future. These issues in combination with deteriorating international security cooperation have fractured consensus among states parties.

World War I has been called the «The Chemist's War»; not only for the extend of the use of the chemical weapons in the war, but also for the complicity of the scientific and engineering efforts to create and select the most appropriate chemical agents for military use, to improve the procedures of their production, and to discover the most lethal and effective techniques for their usage and deployment in warfare. The involvement of chemical weaponry was deemed necessary at the first stages of war, given the devastating effects that the trench warfare had induced on the troops, where battles lasted months and hundreds of thousands of casualties had to be suffered for a warring side to advance merely several kilometers. While the effect that the chemical weapons had for the termination of the trench warfare is debatable, they constituted the terror of the soldiers at the trenches 1 .

Weapon ban activism typically focuses on the excessive destructiveness of the weapon under scrutiny, and highlights its departure from the commitment to “humane warfare”—a concept enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. However, a variety of weapons are still in use which, based on these qualifications, should likewise be prohibited. In addition, even weapons facing great public outcry and may still be widely used. How then, does the international community decide which devastating weapon is worthy of a ban? This paper tests the explanatory power of both the prevailing realist theory (Weapon Utility) and a constructivist theory by Charli Carpenter, which states that the centrality of a few significant NGOs secures their prominent roles and positions them to act as gatekeepers, giving them power to set or vet the advocacy agenda. The paper first establishes the “observable implications” anticipated by each theory, and then attempts to match them to the realities of historic ban efforts—using Chemical Weapons and Napalm as case studies. Although the strengths and weaknesses of both theories are addressed, the research finds strong evidence to support Carpenter’s theory, further contributing to the dialogue between Constructivist and Realist interpretations.

The Arctic seas are the world's biggest dumping ground for sea-disposed nuclear waste and have served among the primary disposal sites for chemical warfare agents. Despite of scientific uncertainty, the Arctic Council has noted that this hazardous waste still affects adversely the Arctic marine environment and may have implications to the health of the Arctic people. The purpose of this manuscript is to establish the rights and obligations of the Arctic States in connection with sea-dumped chemical weapons and nuclear material under international law of the sea, international environmental law and disarmament law. Such mapping is important for considering options to tackle the pollution to the Arctic ecosystems and because there seems to be yet no such analysis across the legal fields carried out. This paper aims first at identifying the scale and approximate locations of sea-disposed nuclear waste and chemical weapons in the Arctic Ocean. The analysis will further focus on ascertaining the possibilities to minimize their adverse effects on the Arctic marine environment under the applicable legal framework. It will be argued in this manuscript that due to the corrosion of the chemical weapons and nuclear material containers, recovering, rather than confining this hazardous waste might be counter-productive as it might cause a sudden and widespread release of chemical agents or radionuclides when surfacing. In this regard, carrying out an environmental impact assessment prior to each such remediation operation would be necessary to determine the most suitable technique for minimizing or eliminating pollution.

The current shape of the Syrian crisis derives from three key developments witnessed in 2013. Two of them directly strengthened the Assad regime after a succession of military setbacks: first, the growing in- volvement of foreign Shia militias such as the Leba- nese Hezbollah on the side of loyalist forces, starting with the battle for al-Qusayr in the spring; second, the United States’ decision to respond diplomati- cally, rather than militarily, to the chemical attack car- ried out in Damascus in August.

The Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) expressed “grave concern” March 10 about the apparent use of VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim Jong Nam, the estranged half brother of North Korea’s dictator, at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport.

The subject of this discussion are the almost forgotten victims of chemical weapons on the Eastern Front of World War I. Source data related to military operations, in particular to the German gas attacks in the region of the Bzura and Rawka rivers, are the basis for presenting problems related to the estimation of the number of victims of poisonous
chlorine gas in the period between May and July 1915. Using the example of selected data relating to the wave attack of May 31, 1915, I show the specificity and complexity of the source documents closely related to the problem under consideration, that is the issue of the countability of victims of chemical weapons. Indirectly, I show the need and legitimacy
of systematizing and interpreting all available information on what resulted from the historical use of chemical weapons. This would be conducive to deepening our knowledge about the fallen soldiers and their resting places. It would be helpful to initiate work on a digital repository of knowledge on the use of chemical weapons in the past, taking into
account the very diverse descriptions of events and victims of chemical weapons from the Eastern Front of the Great War. Such a digitized resource could contribute to the systematization of highly dispersed source data, their further interpretation and reinterpretation,
and their social activation, for the benefit of deepening knowledge about history and historical awareness and preventing the threat of again turning to the use of such weapons of mass destruction.

Key words: the Great War, Eastern Front, chemical weapon (CW), 1915, chlorine, fatal and non-fatal poisonings, estimation of the number of fatalities, resting places as memory triggers, war cemeteries, peace education, OPCW

The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges.