The Use of Chemical Weapons by Arab States

© Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied or distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal. The Use of Chemical Weapons by Arab States Chris Quillen The reasons for the use of chemical weapons remain an understudied concept in international relations despite their continual use in conflicts. By comparing chemical weapon use by the regimes of four Arab states — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — over the last 50 years, this article seeks to discern the scenarios in which chemical weapons use is likely, and it offers policies to dissuade or, at least, mitigate their use. As allegations continue to arise about the use of chemical weapons (CW) by the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria, as well as by the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an assessment of what drives governments to use chemical weapons is long overdue. Unfortunately, the Middle East provides ample historical precedent for this analysis. Over the last 50 years, the regimes of four Arab states — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — have all used chemical weapons in combat.1 While these attacks are devastating to victims and damaging to the international nonproliferation regime, this trend presents an opportunity for comparative analysis of what drives states to cross the threshold of employing chemical weapons and what can possibly be done to prevent such use in the future. Although determining the actual reasons why a government would use CW is virtually impossible without access to the key decision-makers, this analysis endeavors to identify the situations in which resorting to CW is most likely.2 This article briefly explores each of the four case studies — Egypt, from 1963 to 1967; Iraq, from 1983 to 1988; Libya, in 1987; and Syria, from 2013 to present — before presenting a comparative analysis. First, superficial commonalities between the cases are explored in order to eliminate these variables from the equation: including each country’s religious and ethnic make-up, regime type, and rationale for acquisition. Next, similarities in the decisions to use CW, such as the length of the conflict and the lack of preparations by adversaries, are examined to explain such decisions. Finally, these factors are compared to instances of nonuse of CW by the same states to determine their utility. This analysis will demonstrate that military dictatorships that have failed to achieve their objectives through conventional means are more likely to employ chemical weapons when their adversary is not prepared to protect itself against CW and lacks the ability to retaliate in kind or escalate the conflict. While writing this article Chris Quillen was Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. He is working on a book entitled The Evil Genius’s Guide to Weapons of Mass Destruction. 1. A fifth Arab state, Sudan, has also been accused of using CW, but these allegations remain unconfirmed. See Michael Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1998), pp. 115–36. 2. This article extends Kenneth Pollack’s argument to chemical weapons, that “Arab militaries display far more similarities of military effectiveness than differences, and for this reason one can feel comfortable considering explanations that consider them as a collective whole.” Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 594. MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ✭ VOLUME 71, NO. 2, SPRING 2017 HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.3751/71.2.11 194 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL While modern chemical weapons were famously introduced in the First World War and used again in the Second, since the end of World War II their use in combat has been relatively infrequent. These four case studies of CW use by Arab states do not represent all CW use in the modern era, but they are among the most well-known and best documented examples. Additional post-1945 uses of CW include several controversial claims in the Cold War context, such as allegations by both the Soviet Union and the United States of the other’s use in Southeast Asia, as well as possible Soviet use in Afghanistan in the 1980s.3 The Iranian regime was also accused of using CW in 1987 and 1988 in retaliation for Iraq’s extensive use of CW against Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq War.4 Terrorist groups have also used chemical weapons including the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo and their deadly attacks with sarin nerve agent in Matsumoto in 1994 and Tokyo in 1995.5 In October 2014, ISIS reportedly started using chlorine in their bombing attacks in Iraq and added mortar shells and mustard gas to its arsenal in 2015 in attacks against civilians and Kurdish fighters in both Iraq and Syria.6 CASE STUDIES EGYPT, 1963 AND 1966–1967 In the early 1960s the Egyptian government started work on what it called Project Izlis, with the intention of developing chemical weapons. Egypt’s first chemical weapon production facility opened in 1963 outside of Cairo under the innocuous name of the Abu Za‘bal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides. At least initially this facility is believed to have produced tear gas (phenacyl chloride or CN), mustard gas, and phosgene possibly with help from the Soviet Union.7 In September 1962, the Egyptian government supported a group of Yemeni army officers in their efforts to overthrow the monarchy and replace it with a republican 3. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), “Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, Vol I: Key Judgements (SNIE 11/50/37-82JX), February 2, 1982, available on the CIA website, www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000284013.pdf. 4. DCI, “Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War [redacted],” Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (NI IIM 88-10004C), April 1988, available on the CIA website, www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001079783.pdf. 5. David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996). 6. Although ISIS is an Arab-led organization controlling territory and using CW in combat, this group does not rise to the level of “Arab state” presented here, because it is not recognized by any state in the United Nations and has been designated as a terrorist organization by numerous countries. That said, the scenarios in which ISIS has used CW share some similarities with the presented cases including the targeting of unprotected civilians and Kurdish fighters rather than Syrian government forces that are prepared for both offensive and defensive chemical warfare operations. For additional details, see Chris Quillen, “The Islamic State’s Evolving Chemical Arsenal,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 39, No. 11 (Oct. 2016), pp. 1,019–30. 7. Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring–Summer 1998), p. 48. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 195 government similar to the Egyptian model under President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser. Despite Egyptian support, the deposed Imam, Muhammad al-Badr, was able to flee to the mountains, establish a base of support among local tribesmen, and enlist help from the like-minded royals of Saudi Arabia. As a result, the Egyptian intervention in Yemen ended up becoming significantly more costly and lasted considerably longer than Nasser had originally intended.8 The failure of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria the year before, however, made success in Yemen essential to Nasser. No wonder then that the intervention in Yemen has been described as “the single most important foreign policy issue facing Egypt, the Arab World’s center of gravity, from October 1962 to May 1967.”9 Due to the difficulties of fighting Yemeni royalists in their mountainous cave hideouts, the Egyptian military resorted to chemical warfare as early as June 1963.10 This first attempt, however, appears to have been experimental partly to judge the effectiveness of CW in combat but likely also to determine international reaction.11 While the attack appeared to be effective in causing casualties, and the international reaction was muted, Egypt nevertheless refrained from using CW for the next three years. This restraint was likely due to Nasser’s efforts to cut a peace deal with Saudi Arabia and to Cairo’s deteriorating relations with both Washington and Moscow.12 By late 1966 the Egyptian situation both at home and in Yemen was dire, and peace talks with Saudi Arabia had failed. In December, the Egyptians renewed the use of CW and would continue until their withdrawal in mid-1967. Between January and July of 1967, the Egyptian military launched a steady series of chemical attacks against Yemeni forces, ending only after Egypt’s defeat in the June 1967 war with Israel necessitated an Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen.13 In the end, Cairo is assessed to have launched between 30 and 40 separate CW attacks in Yemen — almost all of them between December 1966 and July 1967.14 IRAQ, 1983–1988 Iraq possibly started investigating a chemical weapons program as early as the 1960s, presumably influenced by Egypt’s use of CW in Yemen (and reportedly with substantial assistance from Cairo15), as well as by the drive to counter the regional 8. For details on the shifting Egyptian policies on Yemen, see A. I. Dawisha, “Intervention in the Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Policies,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 1975), pp. 47–63. 9. Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 16. 10. W. Andrew Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1991), pp. 109–10. 11. Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War (New York: Bodley Head, 1968), p. 257–73. 12. Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble, pp. 102–73, 215–61. 13. Terrill, “Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” pp. 113–14. 14. W. Seth Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Memorandum No. 9 (Dec. 1988), p. 2; Terrill, “Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 115; Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War, pp. 257–69. 15. Richard L. Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2 (Spring 2005), p. 193. 196 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL power of Israel and Iran, among others. A formal decision was made to build the facilities needed to develop chemical weapons after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, a goal Iraq achieved in the early to mid-1980s.16 After the fall of Mohammed Reza Shah in 1979, Iran and its military were in a state of chaos. Iraqi president Saddam Husayn apparently saw this as an opportunity to replace Iran as the preeminent military power in the Middle East and, more immediately, to regain the Shatt al-‘Arab waterway that Baghdad had ceded in the 1975 Algiers Accord. In September 1980, Saddam launched a massive attack on Iranian territory that met considerable success and enabled Baghdad to achieve its initial objectives and seek a negotiated settlement.17 However, Iran repelled the invasion and, by June 1982, had regained its lost territory and launched a counterinvasion of Iraq.18 Iran would largely remain on the offensive for the next six years as Iraq attempted to defend its territory.19 The war finally ended in August 1988 under a United Nations–brokered ceasefire that returned all territory to the 1975 Algiers Accord borders. During the course of the war Iraq engaged in the most extensive use of chemical weapons since World War I, admitting to using 1,800 tons of mustard gas, 140 tons of the nerve agent tabun, and more than 600 tons of sarin.20 The first major Iraqi chemical attack occurred in August 1983 when Baghdad launched mustard gas attacks against both Iranian and Kurdish targets.21 Hundreds of additional attacks followed against multiple targets including Majnun Island, the Faw Peninsula, and the predominantly Kurdish town of Halabja.22 Nearly two-thirds of all chemical weapons, however, were used during the final 18 months of the war — particularly the final five Iraqi offensives from April to July 198823 — as Baghdad sought a favorable negotiated settlement to the conflict. 16. For details on the development of the Iraqi chemical weapon program, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II: The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 506–12. 17. Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iraq-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 46. 18. For a contemporary account of Iraq’s goals and challenges during the war, see Milton Viorst, “Iraq at War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 2 (Winter 1986/87), pp. 349–65. 19. For a detailed military analysis of the war, see Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II. 20. Charles Duelfer, ed., Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (known as the Duelfer Report), Vol. III: Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program (Washington, DC: CIA, 2004), p. 10. Iran also reportedly used CW during the 1987–88 period, but a discussion of Iranian CW use is beyond the scope of this article. For more info, see DCI, “Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use.” 21. According to David Segal, “Despite the failure of Iran’s hastily planned and poorly executed initial offenses, 1983 and early 1984 were desperate times for Iraq, when it looked as if the country would be defeated through sheer force of numbers.” From “The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5 (Summer 1988), p. 955. 22. For a complete list of the major Iraqi CW attacks, see Duelfer Report, Vol. III, p. 10. In total, Iraq is considered responsible for the vast majority of approximately 250 chemical attacks throughout the war. DCI, “Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use,” p. 3. 23. Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 224–28. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 197 LIBYA, 1987 In the 1970s, Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi started a chemical weapons program, culminating in the development of the Rabita CW facility outside of Tripoli, one of the largest chemical facilities in the developing world. While his motivations for this decision probably can never be known for sure, the most common rationales given by analysts include his desire for regional hegemony and possibly an attempt to counterbalance the perceived Israeli nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Equally plausible is the possibility that Qadhafi had noticed Egyptian efforts in Yemen with CW — particularly the relatively mild international reaction — and consequently decided to pursue a similar capability. This trend was likely reinforced by the apparent success of the Iraqi government in the 1980s in using CW to thwart Iranian attacks while again facing minimal international condemnation.24 Given Qadhafi’s regional aspirations, Libya intervened militarily to support a counterinsurgency by Chad’s Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT, from Gouvernement d’Union nationale de transition) in its southern neighbor in 1978, 1979, 1980–81, and 1983–87. However, only the final invasion involved the use of CW and only then at the end of the Libyan offensive in 1987. After four years of fighting, various Chadian factions finally banded together — including Qadhafi’s GUNT allies after 1986 — to drive the Libyans out of their country (with French support). In March 1987 Chadian forces captured the Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum in a major defeat for the Tripoli regime.25 Shortly afterward, Qadhafi’s troops were forced to surrender their main base in the northern Chadian city of Faya-Largeau, leading to serious demoralization and a large number of defections among Libyan forces.26 In September 1987, as the Libyans were nearing defeat, Qadhafi reportedly ordered a chemical weapons strike using mustard gas against Chadian forces, though some reports say it failed to hit the target.27 Although small-scale and seemingly experimental (and reportedly using CW acquired from the Iranian government28), this attack represented a watershed moment in Libya’s quest for regional domination. Despite this desperate attempt, Tripoli was forced to withdraw from Chad shortly afterward, except for a disputed border area. SYRIA SINCE 2013 The Syrian regime reportedly started its chemical weapons program in earnest following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, including the construction of multiple facilities 24. W. Andrew Terrill, “Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 48–49. 25. On the importance of the battle for Ouadi Doum, see Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 391–97. 26. Terrill, “Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons,” pp. 53–55. 27. Terrill, “Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons,” p. 55; Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” p. 5. 28. R. Jeffrey Smith, Joby Warrick, and Colum Lynch, “Iran May Have Sent Libya Shells for Chemical Weapons,” The Washington Post, November 20, 2011, https://wapo.st/2nKw6TY. 198 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL outside major cities.29 In its early stage the Syrian program received help from the Egyptians following their demonstration of CW capability in Yemen.30 However, the program became a much higher priority for Syria after its defeat by Israel in 1973 and the destruction of its missile presence in Lebanon by the Israeli Air Force in 1982. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Syrian CW program continued to expand in an effort to counter the perceived Israeli military advantage.31 In March 2011 massive protests began in Syria calling for the resignation of President Bashar al-Asad. After a harsh military crackdown by the regime of Asad’s Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party (ba‘th referring to the “resurrection” or “revival” of the Arab nation), an armed insurrection against the regime eventually grew into a fullscale civil war, which many have seen as pitting the country’s majority Sunni population against the ruling clique from the minority ‘Alawi sect, to which Asad and most of the regime’s leading officials belong. As the war has progressed, military forces from a wide range of international actors have gotten involved including most notably Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. The opposition has grown to include a number of moderate forces and Sunni Islamist extremist groups including the alQa‘ida–affiliated Fatah al-Sham Front (fat′h al-Sham referring to the “opening of alSham,” i.e., greater Syria; formerly called the Nusra Front, from an Arabic word for “victory” and “support”) and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham. Frustrated with its inability to suppress the revolt, the Syrian regime resorted to the use of chemical weapons against civilian targets in the Aleppo suburb of Khan al-‘Asal in March 2013.32 Additional attacks followed in both April and August, including August’s sarin gas attacks in the Damascus suburban area of Ghuta that reportedly killed 1,400 people.33 After these attacks crossed the “red line” that US president Barack Obama had set one year earlier on CW use,34 the Asad regime was pressured to surrender its chemical arsenal — most importantly by its patrons in Moscow.35 While this effort was successful in destroying much of Syria’s CW arsenal,36 the Asad regime 29. M. Zuhair Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1997), pp. 104–5. 30. Terrill, “Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons,” p. 48; Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” p. 4. 31. Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” pp. 104–8. 32. Although the United Nations did not assign blame for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the only credible user of CW remains the government given the lack of capability by the opposition particularly given the employment by aircraft. The following section on CW uses in Syria are drawn from United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final Report (hereafter: UN Syria CW Mission Report), December 12, 2013, p. 18-21. 33. The UN Syria CW Mission Report claimed to have “clear and convincing evidence that chemical weapons were used against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale” (p. 19). 34. On August 20, 2012, President Obama responded to questions about his administration’s Syria policy by stating, “We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is [if] we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” Quoted in James Ball, “Obama Issues Syria a ‘Red Line’ Warning on Chemical Weapons,” The Washington Post, August 20, 2012, https://wapo.st/2nxYXMj. 35. Eric Sterner, “Dictators and Deterrence: Syria’s Assad, Chemical Weapons, and the Threat of U.S. Military Action,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2014), pp. 407–23. 36. Naftali Bendavid, “Removal of Chemical Weapons from Syria Is Completed,” The Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2014, https://on.wsj.com/2aNt8sR. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 199 apparently retained some of these weapons and the ability to produce more.37 The regime continued attacking civilians with chlorine, which had not been included in the disarmament agreement. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) determined with “a high degree of confidence, that chlorine had been used as a weapon in three villages in northern Syria from April to August 2014”38 without assigning blame to the Syrian government. Subsequent joint OPCW-UN investigations went a step further specifically blaming the Asad regime for one chlorine attack in April 2014 and two chlorine attacks in March 2015.39 Dozens more were alleged throughout 2015 and 2016, but the active civil war has hindered detailed investigation.40 In April 2017, the regime reportedly returned to the use of sarin, killing dozens of civilians; this time in the town of Khan Shaykhun. But it remains unclear if this nerve agent had been retained by the government or newly manufactured.41 COMPARING ARAB STATE CW USE These four cases are particularly useful due to the similarities between them regarding religion, ethnicity, regime type, and rationale for acquiring chemical weapons. These similarities on important variables will enable a better understanding of the most important driving forces behind the decisions to use CW. RELIGION AND ETHNICITY All four of these states share considerable similarities in both religion and ethnicity (and some significant differences as will be discussed below). All four are majority-Arab states, with Egypt, Libya, and Syria all over 90% Arab in their population. Iraq is slightly more mixed, with Arabs making up 75–80% of the population and most of the remaining being Kurds. All four leaders discussed above — Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser, Saddam Husayn, Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi, and Bashar al-Asad — were 37. Colum Lynch and David Kenner, “U.S. and Europe Say Assad May Have Kept Some Chemical Weapons,” Foreign Policy, August 23, 2016, https://atfp.co/2bRVcZS; Adam Entous and Naftali Bendavid, “Mission to Purge Syria of Chemical Weapons Comes Up Short,” The Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2015, https://on.wsj.com/2ntyAnI; Adam Entous, “Assad Chemical Threat Mounts,” The Wall Street Journal, June 28, 2015, https://on.wsj.com/1drvcT7. 38. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Decision: Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria, Executive Council Meeting, February 4, 2015, www.opcw.org/fileadmin/ OPCW/EC/M-48/ecm48dec01_e_.pdf. The three villages referred to were Talmannis and Tamani‘a, near the city of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man in Idlib Governorate, and Kafr Zita, in Hama Governorate. 39. See the third and fourth reports of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism: UN Security Council Document S/2016/738, August 24, 2016, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/2016/738; and UN Security Council Document S/2016/888, October 21, 2016, www. un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2016/888; respectively. 40. Kareem Shaheen, “Assad Regime Accused of 35 Chlorine Attacks Since Mid-March,” The Guardian, May 24, 2015, www.gu.com/world/2015/may/24/syria-regime-accused-of-using-chlorine-bombs-oncivilians; Maksymilian Czuperski et al., “Breaking Aleppo,” Atlantic Council, February 13, 2017, www. publications.atlanticcouncil.org/breakingaleppo/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/BreakingAleppo.pdf. 41. Louisa Loveluck and Zakaria Zakaria, “World Health Organization: Syria Chemical Attack Likely Involved Nerve Agent,” The Washington Post, April 5, 2017, https://wapo.st/2oRuM2P. 200 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL or are ethnically Arab as well. The populations of all four countries are more than 90% Muslim in their religious beliefs, but with some important distinctions. Egypt and Libya are both overwhelmingly Sunni. Iraq, however, has a 60–65% Shi‘i majority with a 32–37% Sunni minority (members of which operated most of the levers of power under Saddam, when the CW were used). Syria has nearly the opposite demographic dynamic: a 74% majority Sunni population and an 11% minority of ‘Alawis, who belong to an offshoot of Shi‘ism dating back to the ninth century CE and include the Asad family and much of the Syrian regime’s ruling elite. Nasser, Saddam, and Qadhafi were all Sunni Muslims, albeit largely secularist in their political orientation. Bashar al-Asad, also a secularist, is the sole non-Sunni among the leaders. These demographics are significant in that these Arab states have armies made up mostly of Arab Muslims who have largely used chemical weapons in attacks on fellow Arabs or fellow Muslims. Egyptian CW attacks in Yemen targeted a population mainly comprised of Arab Muslims (mostly Shi‘a in the regions affected, with many Sunnis as well). Iraqi attacks primarily focused on the Iranian armed forces, made up mostly of Shi‘i Persians, and on rebellions inside of Iraq by (mostly Sunni) Kurds and (mostly Arab) Shi‘a. In Syria the government has targeted rebels and civilians who are overwhelmingly Sunni Arab. Libya’s single CW attack in Chad primarily targeted non-Arab Chadians (since Chad’s 12% Arab minority was largely supportive of Libya) and likely affected both Muslims and Christians given the demographic makeup of that country. These facts are particularly ironic given that Arab states claimed to have developed chemical weapons as the “poor man’s atomic bomb” as a counterweight to the perceived Israeli nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, but have never used them against a Jewish or Israeli target.42 REGIME TYPE Perhaps more significant for the decision to use chemical weapons, all four of the regimes discussed can be described as military dictatorships under the control of a single party, a single clan, or a single man. Both Nasser and Qadhafi had themselves been military officers that played leading roles in the coups that brought them and their military colleagues to power. While Saddam did not serve in the military, he did play a major role in the Ba‘th’s 1968 seizure of power in Baghdad. When Saddam formally ascended to power in 1979, he quickly adopted military style dress and claimed a leading military role.43 Bashar al-Asad only joined the Syrian military as his father groomed him for power. Bashar inherited the presidency from his father, Hafiz al-Asad, who — like Nasser and Qadhafi — had been a military officer and a leading figure in the 1970 seizure of power in Syria by the military wing of the Ba‘th Party. Moreover, all four regimes adopted similar policies of either Arab socialism or Ba‘thism at home and of opposition to colonialism and Zionism abroad. These regimes were so similar in fact that three of them at 42. Although Golda Meir, then Israel’s foreign minister, argued that since Nasser had used CW against his fellow Arabs, he would not hesitate to use them against Israelis. Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War, p. 259. 43. Segal argued, “If anything, the Iraqi government tries to gain popular support through close association with the armed forces,” in “The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,” p. 955. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 201 various times engaged in differing levels of discussions about uniting their respective countries within a pan-Arab federation.44 This heavy military influence and reliance upon military force to retain power impacted both military use and the employment of chemical weapons. Given the concentration of power into the hands of a single individual in all four states, the initial decision to use chemical weapons likely rested with that individual and was not a battlefield decision. Crossing the chemical threshold was likely a choice only the president could make. However, once the decision was made it appears likely that military commanders sought additional authority to employ CW as needed in battle.45 Egypt and especially Iraq made extensive use of CW after breaking the taboo, at which point the additional use of CW was authorized by military commanders within certain parameters. From 1983 to 1986, Saddam Husayn alone held release authority for CW, but in late 1986 he delegated the authority to his military forces. Officers initially balked at their newly acquired authority until the president personally visited the front lines to confirm his decision.46 Saddam apparently made this decision after extensive use of CW against Iranian forces had proven to be tactically effective, and he no longer feared an international backlash. Similarly, Nasser likely delegated the authority to use CW in Yemen due to the geographic separation of the conflict from Egypt and the mild international opposition the early uses had faced. Given the extensive and continuing of use of CW by the Asad regime, it appears likely this authority has been delegated to military commanders in the field. RATIONALE FOR ACQUISITION All four governments were motivated in their desire for chemical weapons for similar reasons, at least according to their public justifications. Mainly, this was a desire to counter the perceived Israeli military advantage in conventional and nuclear arms. This similar rationale is unsurprising given that all four operated in roughly the same geographic area (the Middle East and North Africa), and all were from the first or 44. Almost immediately after coming to power in Tripoli in 1969, Qadhafi raised the idea with Nasser of forming a unity government, and the two countries (along with Sudan and later Syria) formed the Federation of Arab Republics, but it ultimately collapsed in 1977. As Pollack argued, even though Qadhafi was willing to take a back seat to Cairo, both Nasser and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, “concluded that Libya and its young dictator were too much trouble to become intimately bound to, even taking into consideration Libya’s oil wealth.” Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 361. Prior to Asad’s and Saddam’s rise to power, both Syria and Iraq had been involved in other pan-Arab projects, including the United Arab Republic (formed by Egypt and Syria from 1958 and 1961), the Arab Federation (formed by Iraq and Jordan in 1958), the Unified Political Command (between Egypt and Iraq in 1964), and an announced Syrian-Iraqi-Egyptian union in 1963 that never came to fruition. 45. Scott Sagan succinctly laid out this dichotomy wherein leaders fearful of military coups would maintain strict control over the decision to use CW (as indicated by strategic culture theory), and military commanders who will seek autonomy in future use once the taboo is broken (as indicated by organization theory). Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrines and Command and Control Systems,” in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, eds. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 36–46. 46. Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Planning the Unthinkable, eds. Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, pp. 63–65. 202 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL second generation of postcolonial leaders (Nasser, Qadhafi, and Saddam were all contemporaries with one other and with Bashar al-Asad’s father and predecessor, Hafiz). Saddam Husayn was probably most forthcoming in expressing his motivations when he stated in July 1990, “Now, Iraq is in possession of the binary chemical weapon. According to our technical, scientific, and military calculations, this is sufficient deterrent to confront the Israeli nuclear weapon.”47 THE DECISION FOR USE In addition to these similarities, these Arab governments all appear to have decided to use chemical weapons in similar circumstances. First, conventional military means had failed to achieve the desired objectives. Second, their enemies were unprepared to fight on a chemical battlefield, lacking protective equipment such as gas masks. Third, the enemy was unable to symmetrically respond with their own chemical weapons or escalate the conflict by other means, such as nuclear or biological weapons. CONVENTIONAL FAILURE In all four cases the use of chemical weapons was only authorized after conventional forces had failed to meet military objectives following several years of combat.48 In fact, each initial use of CW seems to have been a desperate act by a losing military and a political leadership anxious to maintain military support. Leaders of military dictatorships know the value of success on the battlefield and fear losses that could cause military commanders to launch a coup at home. In Yemen, Nasser faced a considerably more difficult opponent than originally expected, thanks in part to Saudi support to the royalists as well as a weak ally in the republican regime in Sana‘a.49 As the war progressed the Egyptians took on an everincreasing role in both military and government affairs, which seemed to change their mission from one of intervention to support a friendly regime to outright occupation.50 After the war, Nasser would admit “we never thought it would lead to what it did.”51 The steady increase in the Egyptian military commitment in Yemen put a serious strain on the economy and weakened Nasser’s standing in the Arab world. The number of Egyptian troops deployed to Yemen reached a high of 70,000 — nearly a third of the 47. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program: More Self-Reliant, More Deadly [redacted],” Research Paper (SW 90-10053JX), August 1990, p. 1, available on the CIA website at www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000072254.pdf. 48. According to Pollack, “Four areas of military effectiveness stand out as consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces: poor tactical leadership, poor information management, poor weapons handling, and poor maintenance.” While CW were sometimes employed in an effort to overcome these challenges, these efforts were largely ineffective. Arabs at War, p. 574. 49. For a detailed discussion of Egyptian military failings in Yemen including the perceived need to resort to CW, see Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 47–57. 50. This apparent shift to occupation occurred in the summer of 1963, which also saw Egypt’s first use of CW. This is likely not a coincidence, but further evidence of Cairo’s growing desperation. Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble, pp. 123–24. 51. Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 66. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 203 country’s entire military force. The total cost for the war included as many as 20,000 Egyptian lives and approximately a half-billion dollars that Cairo could not afford to lose.52 Egyptian troops in particular were shocked at the opposition they faced. Nasser, fearing an armed revolt, turned a blind eye to his troops capitalizing on the black market in ‘Aden, and he increased military privileges at home for both them and their families in the hopes of pacifying their demands.53 Thus Nasser appears to have been desperate for a quick victory and was probably under pressure from his military to use all means necessary to end the war.54 In the final year he resorted to chemical weapons to break the stalemate or, as Kenneth Pollack put it, “Chemical warfare was Egypt’s final bid, and this too proved inadequate.”55 While Nasser authorized an early use of CW after only 10 months of combat, this appears to have been experimental, testing both the effectiveness of the weapons and the reaction of the international community. The vast majority of CW use in Yemen did not occur until four years of fighting had failed to dislodge the Yemeni royalist opposition.56 Saddam Husayn similarly did not authorize the use of lethal chemical agents until a full three years into his war with Iran.57 By the time CW were employed, all Iraqi military advances had been repulsed, Iraqi forces had been forced out of Iranian territory, and the Iranians had captured significant parts of Iraq. Saddam had failed to gain a quick victory and achieve a favorable negotiated settlement. When the initial decision was made to use CW, Saddam’s military faced desperate times and his regime was in serious jeopardy.58 As Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner argued, “It was only after Iraq was forced on the defensive and suffered major defeats that it seems to have begun to treat gas warfare as a possible solution to its military problems.”59 Libyan leader Qadhafi used CW against Chadian forces only at the very end of the conflict after a decade of on-again, off-again fighting. Multiple interventions in Chad had been relatively successful for Libya while the Chadians remained divided amongst themselves, but once the forces in Chad started to work together (with some French help), Libyan defeat was not long in coming. As Libyan forces were quickly routed in the northern regions of Chad they had dominated for so long, Qaddafi’s small-scale use of CW seemed to be a final desperate ploy to appear strong in the face of clear defeat. Qaddafi was so desperate to hold on to the Aouzou Strip, the stretch of land extending approximately 60 miles south of the internationally recognized Libyan-Chadian border, that in a final attempt to maintain his position he increased his forces in the region 52. Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble, pp. 190–99. 53. Terrill, “Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” p. 110; Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble, pp. 199–205. 54. James, Nasser at War, p. 61. 55. Pollack, Arabs at War, p. 57. 56. Adeed Dawisha referred to this final phase of Egyptian policy in Yemen as the “Politics of Confrontation,” after Cairo had failed to secure a quick victory and multiple peace negotiations had collapsed. Dawisha, “Intervention in the Yemen,” pp. 57–61. 57. Iraq had used tear gas against both Iranian and Kurdish targets multiple times, but August 1983 was the first use of a lethal agent such as mustard gas. DCI, “Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use,” p. 7. 58. For a detailed discussion of Iraqi military failings against Iran including the perceived need to resort to CW, see Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 182–235. 59. Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II, p. 510. 204 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL to nearly 15,000 troops — over one-third of the entire Libyan army. Libya suffered a terrible toll for its intervention in Chad, suffering at least 7,500 dead and losing nearly $1.5 billion in equipment in 1987 alone.60 Finally, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad did not use chemical weapons against its own people until two full years of fighting had failed to achieve victory. The overwhelming manpower advantages of the opposition likely led to Damascus’s decision to cross the “red line” and employ CW for the first time. As with Egypt, Iraq, and Libya, the first use of CW was small-scale, not terribly effective, and met with muted international criticism or, as one observer described it, “the Syrian government’s attacks started small and grew as Assad tested and crept up to President Obama’s red line.”61 None of this is meant to imply that CW use was justified by extreme circumstances. Rather the delay in using chemical weapons should be viewed as a partial victory for the nonproliferation regime and the taboo against their use. CW were not the first choice of any of these countries and were only used as a weapon of seemingly last resort.62 All four countries tried to hide and at least initially deny the use of CW — an implicit acknowledgement of its unacceptable nature in combat. Iraq even tried to argue that the use of CW on Iraqi territory for self-defense was not a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol — despite the fact that Iraq was also using CW against targets within Iran. In these circumstances the use of chemical weapons appears, at least in part, to be an effort to use every tool available to stave off ignominious defeat. In this regard, deploying CW clearly failed to meet the objective. Despite using CW, Egypt withdrew from Yemen in disgrace, Libya fled from Chad after significant losses, and Iraq fought Iran to a standstill. Only the Asad regime’s use of CW has an uncertain result, but the protracted nature of the Syrian conflict would suggest that the use of chemical weapons has not been decisive on the battlefield. The fear of defeat and possible military overthrow as a result is all the more pronounced since most of these conflicts were wars of choice initiated by the CW-using nation. Egypt intervened in Yemen to support a Nasserist regime and further the cause of panArabism under military-led governments. Iraq attacked Iran to capitalize on the mayhem of the Islamic Revolution and try to supplant Iran as the regional leader. Libya invaded Chad to capture the mineral-rich Aouzou Strip and expand Qadhafi’s area of influence. Only the Syrian case appears to not be a war of choice — although an argument could be made that a less violent response to the protesters by the Asad regime might have staved off civil war. A counterargument could be made that, in each of these conflicts, chemical weapons were simply not ready to be used any sooner than when they were actually employed. While this argument bears consideration in the Iraqi and Libyan cases since their CW arsenals achieved operational capability close to the time of their first use, it does not hold true in all cases. Although Cairo’s indigenously produced CW was not available until the mid-1960s, 60. For a detailed discussion of Libyan military failings in Chad, see Pollack, Arabs at War, pp. 375–412. 61. Sterner, “Dictators and Deterrence,” p. 408. 62. By contrast, Italy started using chemical weapons against Ethiopian forces in 1935 after only three months of combat. Lina Grip and John Hart, “The Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1935–36 Italo-Ethiopian War,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program (Oct. 2009). CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 205 Egypt likely had CW available before the intervention in Yemen from old stocks left behind after the British withdrawal. However, evidence is lacking that these old British weapons were used in Yemen.63 Syria in particular possessed a fully realized CW capability from the very beginning of the conflict, but it was not brought to bear until two years of conventional fighting had failed to achieve victory. Both Iraq and Libya endured several years of fighting while simultaneously pursuing CW capability. In particular, Iraq likely had at least a minimum CW capability available for use prior to its actual employment. All in all, the delay in using CW until after several years of conventional combat seems to reinforce the argument that they were not a weapon of first choice but one of last resort. UNPREPARED TARGETS All four states used chemical weapons in a broader military conflict and not as stand-alone events. Two used them exclusively outside of their own territory (Egypt in Yemen and Libya in Chad), while Syria used CW only within the country against its own citizens. Iraq employed chemical agents both inside of Iraq (against both Iranian forces and Iraqi citizens) and inside of Iran (against Iranian forces). Despite these differences between civilian and military targets, all of those targeted shared one important characteristic that likely contributed to the attractiveness of their use: the lack of preparations against chemical weapons. Unprepared enemies have consistently proven to be the most vulnerable to CW attacks.64 Chemical weapons were effective during World War I, primarily in 1915, when they were first introduced and little protective equipment was available. They were also effective in 1917, when the introduction of mustard gas negated the effects of newly developed gas masks. In the buildup to and conduct of World War II all three major Axis powers used chemical weapons but only against unprotected soldiers and civilians: Italy against the Ethiopians, Japan against the Chinese, and Germany against its own citizens.65 The targets of Arab CW have been similarly defenseless. The royalist forces in Yemen had no protective gear to speak of. The Iranian military had minimal equipment at the beginning of the war and virtually nothing for the irregular troops of the Basij paramilitary force used in human wave attacks. According to a 1988 Central Intelligence Agency memo, “Iraq was able to use CW to minimize personnel and territorial losses … because Iran had only limited CW protective capabilities and could not retaliate in kind.”66 Chadian forces lacked protective gear, but did receive some US assistance after the Libyan attacks. Civilians in both Iraq and Syria had no protection at all. As Richard Russell argued, “Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians.”67 63. Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” pp. 48–49. 64. Thomas L. McNaugher, “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the IranIraq War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 19–21. 65. For further background, see Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to al-Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2006); Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare (London: Chatto and Windus, 1982). 66. DCI, “Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use,” p. 3. 67. Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” p. 187. 206 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL This lack of protective equipment obviously increases the effectiveness of CW but likely also influences the decision to use them. The less protected the target, the more effective the weapon; the more effective the weapon, the more likely it will be used. Thus, well-prepared opponents possessing effective protective equipment and countermeasures are less likely to face chemical weapons on the battlefield than unprepared military forces or, even worse, civilians.68 For the potential CW user, a hardened target likely discourages use, as there is little benefit to crossing the CW threshold and inviting international condemnation if the weapons are militarily ineffective. Thus, those nations facing potential CW-armed adversaries would do well to prepare their defenses (both military and civilian), not just to mitigate the effects of a chemical attack, but to actually prevent an attack in the first place. We can call this phenomenon preparatory deterrence — when one nation’s preparations for combat deter another from attacking. INABILITY TO ESCALATE Preparatory deterrence differs from escalatory deterrence, wherein one state deters an attack through the ability to escalate the ensuing conflict to an unacceptable level of damage for the attacker. In the case of a chemical weapons attack this escalation could occur through an overwhelming conventional response, matching a chemical attack with a retaliatory chemical attack or escalating to a nuclear option. In all four cases, the victims of CW attacks lacked any ability to escalate the situation. The Yemeni royalist forces were only able to hold their defensive positions in the rugged terrain of the mountains and lacked any ability to respond to CW attacks. The Iranians (at least until 1987) did not have a chemical option to use in retaliation when Iraq made the decision to use CW and never achieved the level of Iraqi capability during the war. According to the CIA, Iraq’s “decision to use chemicals during the war … was undoubtedly influenced by the lack of a significant Iranian countercapability.”69 Iran’s only choice was to attempt to use its considerable size advantage to overwhelm their smaller Iraqi opponent — an option already being employed before the use of CW by Baghdad. The other victims of Iraqi chemical weapons, including Kurdish and Shi‘i civilians and rebels, had even less capability than the Iranians. The Chadians lacked any options for CW or other retaliatory measures. Despite arguments made by the Asad regime that chemical attacks have been conducted by rebellious elements inside of Syria, it does not appear that the Syrian opposition (with the notable exception of ISIS) has any significant ability to use chemical weapons to retaliate for its use by the regime. While the US under President Barack Obama began to use its own military might to deter Asad’s use of CW on behalf of the opposition, these attempts were so poorly conducted that they lacked all credibility — as evidenced by the Asad regime’s continuing CW attacks.70 As of this writing, it remains to be seen whether the more muscular policy of President Donald 68. Richard Russell argued preparations to operate on in a chemical environment “would dampen the confidence of potential adversaries to use chemical weapons effectively against US forces on the battlefield.” Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” p. 207. 69. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program,” p. 11. 70. Sterner, “Dictators and Deterrence,” pp. 407–23. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 207 Trump — namely, directly targeting Syrian military forces who conduct CW attacks — will have the desired effect of dissuading additional CW use by the regime. NONUSE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS Comparing these instances of chemical weapons use to instances of nonuse by the same Arab states reinforces much of the conventional wisdom on deterrence. However, the comparison adds a greater layer of detail to the decisions particularly with regard to chemical battlefield preparations and to the length of the conflict. Egypt was actively using chemical weapons in Yemen in June 1967, but it did not use them against Israel at the same time. While availability may have been an issue, given logistic lead times between Yemen and Israel, Egypt was also likely deterred by Israeli military capabilities as well as Israeli defenses against chemical weapons. The fact that Egypt did not use CW against Israel, despite several military losses, “strongly suggests that the potential benefits of employing chemicals did not match the probable costs of Israeli retaliation.”71 The length of the conflict, at only six days (only three of which involved Egypt), likely also contributed to the lack of chemical combat, as Egyptian forces did not have time to ready their CW. The same factors — a short conflict against a strong, prepared enemy — were undoubtedly at play in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which only lasted 19 days. The notable difference is the availability of chemical weapons to Arab forces. In 1973 Egypt was no longer tied down in Yemen and arguably had sufficient time to deploy CW in advance if it planned to use them, but Cairo was again unwilling to cross that line against a capable enemy. Similarly, Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurds, Iraqi Arab Shi‘a, and the Iranians up to 1988, but it did not use them in the occupation of Kuwait in 1990 or against US-led Coalition forces in 1991. In Kuwait, Iraqi military forces experienced almost uninterrupted victory, occupying the country in only two days and thus obviating any need for CW. In opposing Coalition forces the following year, Baghdad faced a similarly short conflict involving only 100 hours of ground fighting. In both cases, the abbreviated nature of the conflict minimized opportunities to employ CW and likely avoided a buildup of internal pressure to use them to avoid defeat. According to the CIA, “the battle developed so rapidly that Baghdad probably was never able to effectively target coalition forces.”72 Kenneth Pollack argued the long logistical process of filling and deploying CW was another factor: This process would have required several days for any tactically significant use of chemical warfare. However, U.S. forces moved so fast and overran Iraqi defensive lines so quickly that the special Iraqi units tasked with filling, moving, and ensuring the firing of the WMD [i.e., weapons of mass destruction] munitions could not have done so in time.73 71. Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” p. 3. 72. CIA, “Why WMD Were Withheld,” Memorandum, March 1991, available as part of Bernard Rostker, “Iraq’s Scud Ballistic Missiles,” Department of Defense Information Paper (2000038-0000006), July 25, 2000, www.gulflink.osd.mil/scud_info/scud_info_refs/n41en044/071596_cia_75701_75701_01.html. 73. Kenneth M . Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 264–65. 208 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Undoubtedly, both types of deterrence — preparatory and escalatory — played a role as well. Coalition forces led by the United States advertised their ability to fight in a chemical environment, and Washington implied (if not actually stated) a clear willingness to respond overwhelmingly to Iraqi CW use. Similarly, Iraq attempted to draw Israel into the conflict by launching missiles at Israeli cities, but only with conventional warheads. Saddam Husayn was likely deterred from using CW against Israel for the same reasons he did not employ them against the Coalition.74 However, that did not stop Baghdad from using chemical weapons against Iraqi citizens as soon as the war was over.75 Other nonuses of CW by Arab states include Iraq during the 2003 invasion of Iraq by US-led Coalition forces and Libya during the 2011 uprising against Qadhafi. Both cases involved a direct (and ultimately successful) attempt to remove the regime’s leaders by force — the situation often assessed to be the most likely scenario for CW use. However, both cases involved governments that had largely dismantled their CW capabilities and lacked any ability to employ them quickly. Saddam only had access to legacy capability and no real weapons, while Qadhafi was still in the process of destroying his CW stockpile.76 Both conflicts were also relatively short from the beginning of hostilities to the fall of the regime. Coalition forces invaded Iraq in March 2003, effectively taking control of the major cities and toppling the Ba‘th regime by April. The uprising against Qadhafi started in February 2011 in the midst of the Arab Spring, and he was captured and executed only eight months later. Unfortunately, examples of Syrian nonuse of CW are lacking. Syria likely did not have an operational CW capability during the 1973 war with Israel,77 and it is currently using them in its civil war. CONCLUSIONS This article indicates that decisions to employ chemical weapons (CW) are likely influenced by the military prowess of the opponent — including the ability to employ overwhelming, even regime-changing conventional force, to retaliate in kind with chemical weapons, or to escalate to nuclear weapons — but not exclusively so. Perhaps equally important is the preparedness of the enemy to operate despite the use of chemical weapons. Since the end of World War I, chemical weapons have been used almost exclusively against unprepared targets, both civilian and military. Thus, deterring chemical weapons use is not exclusively an offensive calculation but a defensive one as well. This is a lesson that may sometimes be forgotten given the over- 74. For a detailed discussion of deterrence issues in 1990–91, see Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” pp. 199–204; Avner Golov, “Deterrence in the Gulf War: Evaluating New Evidence,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2013), pp. 453–72. 75. Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” p. 203. 76. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Some Officials Fear Gaddafi Could Turn to Mustard Gas Stockpile If He Gets Desperate,” The Washington Post, March 20, 2011, p. A16; Simon Denyer, “Gaddafi’s Chemical Arms Spur New Fears,” The Washington Post, September 8, 2011, p. A1. 77. For now-dated discussions of how Syria might have employed CW against Israel, see, Diab, “Syria’s Chemical and Biological Weapons,” pp. 108–10; Carus, “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” pp. 8–10. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ARAB WORLD ✭ 209 whelming power of nuclear weapons, but it is well worth remembering as chemical weapons again rear their ugly heads. Efforts to prevent chemical weapons use do not need to rely only on retaliatory threats, but they could also benefit from the provision of protective equipment to both military forces and civilian populations. Providing such nonlethal aid in Syria and Iraq today would not only save lives, but it might also discourage or even prevent further CW use. Finally, conflicts that risk the use of chemical weapons because one or more adversaries possess CW capabilities apparently grow more dangerous as they progress. Allowing such conflicts to fester increases both the opportunities and the likelihood of CW use as leaders worry about the effect that a lack of military success is having on their government. International conflict resolution early in the struggle is essential to avoiding the conventional military failure that increases the likelihood of CW use. Conventional deterrence theory has long argued that regime-threatening behavior, such as a US-led march on Baghdad in 1991, is likely to cause a chemical attack. However, this analysis demonstrates that our definition of “regime-threatening” needs to be expanded to include leaders’ perceptions that any military defeat, whether in their home country or abroad, could potentially become a regime-ending event. The fear of military defeat followed by military coup is very real and is likely influencing the decision to use CW. As the international community works to avoid future uses of chemical weapons in combat, we would do well to look at these alternative solutions in addition to the standard threats of retaliation or sanctions, which are inherently reactive. More proactive policies including increasing protective capabilities of at-risk populations and more aggressively seeking conflict resolution will likely decrease the possible uses of chemical weapons in the future. If nothing else, these policies are likely to save lives.