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Exit option in hierarchical agency. (2004). Shin, Dongsoo ; Lawarree, Jacques ; Kim, Doyoung.
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:8-9:p:1265-1287.

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  1. Mechanism design with collusive supervision. (2009). Celik, Gorkem.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:69-95.

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  2. Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision. (2008). Celik, Gorkem.
    In: Microeconomics.ca working papers.
    RePEc:ubc:pmicro:celik-04-09-13-05-42-19.

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  3. Safety Nets Within Banks. (2007). Gruner, Hans Peter ; Felgenhauer, Mike .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6317.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

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  2. Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. (2006). Jeon, Doh-Shin.
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  3. Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations. (2004). Macleod, W. Bentley ; Arlen, Jennifer .
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  5. The demand for intercity public transport: the case of business passengers. (2003). Carlsson, Fredrik.
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  6. The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies. (2003). Rajan, Raghuram ; Wulf, Julie .
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