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Information and delay in an agency model. (2010). Drugov, Mikhail.
In: RAND Journal of Economics.
RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:598-615.

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  1. Bargaining with informational and payoff externalities. (2021). Drugov, Mikhail.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:30:y:2021:i:2:p:398-419.

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  2. Optimal contracts with contingent allocation. (2020). Galavotti, Stefano ; Chillemi, Ottorino ; Gui, Benedetto .
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s016517652030149x.

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  3. Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation. (2015). Strausz, Roland ; Fiocco, Raffaele.
    In: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
    RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:24:y:2015:i:3:p:550-569.

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  4. Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9929.

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  5. Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Fiocco, Raffaele.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9928.

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  6. Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium. (2014). Drugov, Mikhail.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10021.

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  7. Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4774.

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  8. Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Fiocco, Raffaele.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4758.

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  9. Delegation and dynamic incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:randje:v:45:y:2014:i:3:p:495-520.

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  10. Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation. (2012). Strausz, Roland ; Fiocco, Raffaele.
    In: SFB 649 Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2012-055.

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References

References cited by this document

    References contributed by pwa594-11889

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  2. Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design. (2020). Krahmer, Daniel.
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  3. Motivating the optimal procurement and deployment of electric storage as a transmission asset. (2020). Sappington, David ; Brown, David P ; David, .
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  4. Motivating the Optimal Procurement and Deployment of Electric Storage as a Transmission Asset. (2019). Sappington, David ; Brown, David.
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  5. A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability. (2019). Vinella, Annalisa ; Danau, Daniel.
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  17. Bargaining with Informational Externalities in a Market Equilibrium. (2014). Drugov, Mikhail.
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  47. .

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  50. Incitations et information corrélée : conséquences sur lorganisation des marchés publics.. (1996). Thomas, Lionel.
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