WO2006087784A1 - 認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ及び情報サーバ - Google Patents
認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ及び情報サーバ Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2006087784A1 WO2006087784A1 PCT/JP2005/002454 JP2005002454W WO2006087784A1 WO 2006087784 A1 WO2006087784 A1 WO 2006087784A1 JP 2005002454 W JP2005002454 W JP 2005002454W WO 2006087784 A1 WO2006087784 A1 WO 2006087784A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- information
- value
- authentication
- identification information
- server
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3228—One-time or temporary data, i.e. information which is sent for every authentication or authorization, e.g. one-time-password, one-time-token or one-time-key
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the present invention relates to an authentication method, an authentication system, and a tag device thereof, an information reference client, an authentication server, and an information server, and discloses the identification information of the thing and information of the thing corresponding to the identification information from the identification information.
- the present invention relates to an authentication method, an authentication system, a tag device, an information reference client, an authentication server, and an information server that perform authentication when referring to the information.
- Wireless tags have been devised in various ways, including the field of SCM (Supply Chain Management), and are attracting attention as one of the fundamental technologies that will support the future ubiquitous society.
- SCM Serial Chain Management
- wireless tags are expected to have various security problems.
- Randomize wireless tags such as by localizing information on wireless tags, covering with a special shield, or having a special wireless tag called a blocker tag, so that the reader does not read the wireless tag.
- a special shield or having a special wireless tag called a blocker tag
- each method can only be selected from disclosure or not, and a plurality of wireless tags can be individually set. Disclosure control is not possible.
- Patent Document 1 describes that a processing history of a product with a wireless tag is used as a database.
- Patent Document 1 Japanese Patent Laid-Open No. 10-124781
- Security problems assumed in the prior art include the following.
- First refer to the wireless tag correctly and do not check it.
- Information disruption attack that notifies the same ID to the server at multiple locations at the same time.
- the pesticide used in the process of growing vegetables is also added to the pesticide. It is conceivable that the collected RFID tag information is automatically added to the vegetable management history, but when the RFID tag information added to the pesticide is notified to the production management system, the Without checking that the wireless tag is being referenced, it is possible to send false IDs of pesticides that are not actually used, for example, and to register false information. Similar examples include fake company attendance or receive only benefits without purchasing a product.
- a general consumer power CD, a book, and a memo pad are carried around in a bag, and these are provided with a wireless tag for product management.
- the wireless tag is assumed to have an effective range of about 3m.
- a sparsely populated environment such as a coffee shop, it is not difficult to identify the owner of a thing.
- the information itself that can be collected from individual items is harmless, but when this information is combined, various things can be inferred.
- the present invention has been made in view of the above points, and an authentication method capable of authenticating that the tag device information is referred to by a legitimate referer by associating the tag device with the information of the referrer,
- the overall purpose is to provide an authentication system, its tag device, an information reference client, an authentication server, and an information server.
- an authentication method of the present invention provides an authentication method for publicizing identification information of an object and performing authentication when referring to information of an object corresponding to the identification information power and the identification information.
- a predetermined calculation of a temporary first value representing the latest reference of the identification information of the object and a temporary second value for reference issued for each reference to the reference person of the identification information A third value is generated and the third value is verified to authenticate the relationship between the object and its reference person.
- FIG. 1 is a configuration diagram of an embodiment of a wireless tag authentication system of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of each device of the wireless tag authentication system of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 A diagram showing a configuration of U-SEED caches 2-3, 4-6.
- FIG. 4 A diagram showing a configuration of the user authentication DB3-1.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram showing the configuration of tag authentication DB4-5.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram showing the configuration of PML-DB4-7.
- FIG. 7 is a process flowchart of the wireless tag 1.
- FIG. 8 is a processing flowchart when a tag is referred to by the PML information reference client 2.
- FIG. 9 is a processing flowchart of PML information reference client 2 when referring to PML information.
- FIG. 10 is a process flowchart of the user authentication server 3.
- FIG. 11 is a processing flowchart for tag authentication of the PML server 4.
- FIG. 12 is a processing flowchart when PML server 4 requests PML information.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining a tag authentication processing sequence.
- FIG. 14 is a diagram for explaining a processing sequence for tag authentication approval.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram for explaining a processing sequence of referring to PML information.
- FIG. 16 is a diagram showing a provision image of an information provision service.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram for explaining details of the tag authentication mechanism of the present invention.
- FIG. 1 shows a configuration diagram of an embodiment of a wireless tag authentication system of the present invention.
- the wireless tag 1 decrypts the tag one-time password (T-SEED) notified from the PML server 4 and authenticates the reference with the tag identifier (T-ID).
- T-SEED tag one-time password
- T-ID tag identifier
- the present invention does not involve wireless, and includes optical means such as infrared rays. Also, contact with IC cards, etc.
- a wireless device is also included in the wireless tag.
- PML information information related to goods is expressed as PML information, but this is not limited to information using PML (Physical Markup Language) defined in EPC global.
- the data is included in the term PML information.
- the PML information reference client 2 refers to the one-time password (U-SEED, reference) from the user authentication server 3 and the PML sano before referring to the PML information that is the information of the object indicated by the wireless tag 1.
- TSEED a personal computer (PC) equipped with a wireless tag reader that has the function of generating a group authenticator from the reference one-time password and clearly indicating the reference relationship with the wireless tag by the group identifier when referring to the PML information
- a PDA Personal Digital Assistant
- a communication device such as a mobile phone, or a server device that bundles multiple RFID tag readers.
- the user authentication server 3 has a function of authenticating a user who references PML information and issuing a user one-time password (U-SEED) to the PML information reference client 2 and the PML server 4. Device.
- the user authentication method is not related to the present invention, and any authentication protocol capable of notifying the wireless tag information necessary for the present invention as additional information can be used.
- the PML server 4 generates and issues a one-time password (T SEED) for the wireless tag in order to authenticate the legitimate reference of the wireless tag, and the one-user password notified from the user authentication server 3 is issued.
- T SEED one-time password
- It is a device that has a function to generate a group authenticator together with the time password (U—SEED), authenticate the relationship between the user and the object, and control the disclosure of PML information that defines information about the object in XML format.
- FIG. 2 shows a functional block diagram of each device of the wireless tag authentication system of the present invention.
- the substance of each functional block is a program, which is expanded on a memory (RAM or the like) and executed by a central processing unit (CPU) of a media reference device that implements the functions of the present invention.
- CPU central processing unit
- the wireless tag 1 includes a tag information management unit 1-1 and a SEED management unit 1-2.
- the tag information management unit 1 1 stores the tag identifier T ID1—3 and the one-time password T-SEED1-4 that uniquely identify the wireless tag in the internal memory, and responds to a PML information reference client with 2 powerful wireless read requests. In response, T ID1-3 and TSEED1-4 are returned.
- the SEED management unit 1-2 has a shared key (S key) for decrypting the encryption of the one-time password T SEED with the PML server 4, and is generated by the PML server 4 with the S key. Decrypts the T SEED that is encrypted and notified, and writes the TS EED into the internal memory of the tag information management unit 11.
- the PML information reference client 2 includes a user information management unit 2-1, a group authentication function C (Client) 2-2, a U-SEED cache 2-3, a PML information reference unit 2-4, It consists of GA generator 2-5.
- the user information management unit 2-1 manages the user identifier U—ID2—6 and user certificate U—CR2—7 by storing them in the internal memory.
- the group authentication function C2-2— has the tag identifier T ID and one-time password T SEED read from the wireless tag 1 and the user identifier U-ID and user certificate U held by the user information management unit 2-1 -A wireless tag reference request is sent to the user authentication server 3 in combination with CR. Then, the user's one-time password U-SEED notified in the RFID tag reference response message is recorded in the U-SEED cache 2-3 in association with the tag identifier T ID, and protected by the S key. Is notified to the SEED management unit 1 2 of the wireless tag 1.
- the PML information reference unit 2-4 passes the one-time password T SEED read from the wireless tag and the one-time password U-SEED recorded in the U-SEED cache 2-3 to the GA generator 2-5.
- a PML information request is made to the PML server 3 including the generated group authenticator GA (Group Authenticator).
- the GA generator 2-5 calculates the group authenticator GA and returns the calculation result.
- the group authenticator GA is generated by G (T—SEED, U—SEED), for example.
- G () is a hash function.
- FIG. 3 shows the configuration of the U-SEED cache 2-3, 4-6.
- U—SEED cache consists of a one-time password U-SEED corresponding to the tag identifier T-ID.
- the tag identifier T ID uniquely identifies the wireless tag.
- the one-time password U-SEED is a temporary one-time password generated by the user authentication server 3 and used for referring to the RFID tag, and is a 128-bit random number, for example. It is also the material that generates the group authenticator GA and is also called the user seed.
- the user authentication server 3 includes a group authentication function UAS (User Agent Server) 3 2, a U SEED generator 3-3, and a user authentication DB (Data Base) 3-1.
- UAS User Agent Server
- U SEED generator 3-3 User Agent Server
- the group authentication function UAServer3—2 compares the user identifier U-ID and user certificate U-CR notified in the RFID tag reference request message with the U-ID and U—CR stored in the user authentication DB.
- User authentication When authentication is successful, U-SEED generator 3-3 is used to generate U-SEED, and PML server 4 is notified with tag identifier T ID and one-time password T-SEED. Also, the new T SEED protected by the S key notified from PML Sano is notified to the PML information reference client 2 together with U-SEED.
- the U—SEED generator 3—3 generates user secret information associated with the current tag identifier T ID.
- U-SEED is a numeric string generated by, for example, a 128-bit random number.
- FIG. 4 shows the configuration of the user authentication DB3-1.
- User authentication DB3-1 is also configured with a user certificate U-CR corresponding to the user identifier U-ID.
- the user identifier U-ID is an identifier for uniquely identifying a user, for example, a user account.
- the user certificate U-CR (User Credential) is a password that certifies the user, for example, or a certificate issued by a certificate authority.
- the PML server 4 includes a tag authentication function 41, a T SEED generator 42, a group user authentication function PML (Physical Markup Language server) 4-3, a GA generator 44, and a tag. It consists of authentication DB4—5, U—SEED cache 4—6, and PML—DB4—7.
- the tag authentication function 4-1 compares the tag identifier T-ID and one-time password T SEED notified from the user authentication server with the T ID and T SEED pair of tag authentication DB4-5. To authenticate. When authentication is successful, a new T SEED is generated using the T SEED generator 42, and the T SEED of the tag authentication DB4-5 is updated. The notified U-SEED is passed to the group authentication function PML4-3. Also, the new T SEED is encrypted with the S key in the tag authentication DB4-5 and notified to the user authentication server 3.
- the group authentication function PML4-3 records the one-time password U-SEED notified from the user authentication server 3 in the U-SEED cache 4-6, and receives a PML information call request from the PML information reference client 2. If the T ID is notified, it will be extracted. Enter the password U—SEED and the one-time password T SEED into the GA generator 4 4 to obtain the group authenticator GA. By comparing this group authenticator GA with the GA notified by the PML information reference client 2, the validity of the relation between the tag and the reference user is verified. If the verification is successful, PML information is extracted from PML DB4-7 and notified to PML information reference client 2.
- FIG. 5 shows the configuration of the tag authentication DB 4-5.
- Tag authentication DB4-5 consists of authentication information corresponding to tag identifier T-ID.
- the authentication information consists of an S key and a one-time password T SEE D.
- the S key is a shared secret key between the PML and the wireless tag, and is used for encryption and decryption of the one-time password T SEED to exchange the one-time password T SEED secretly between the PML server 4 and the wireless tag 1. It is done.
- the one-time password TSEED is information representing the latest reference of the wireless tag generated by the PML server 4, and is, for example, a 128-bit random number. It is also a material for generating a group authenticator GA and is also called a tag seed.
- FIG. 6 shows the configuration of PML-DB4-7.
- PML—DB4-7 consists of PML information corresponding to the tag identifier T ID.
- the tag identifier T ID is a value that uniquely identifies a wireless tag, and the PML information is information related to an object defined in XML format.
- FIG. 7 shows a processing flowchart of the wireless tag 1. This process is started by receiving a command sent from the PML information reference client 2 by radio.
- step S101 the command sent from the PML information reference client 2 by radio is analyzed. If it is a read request, the process proceeds to step S102 to activate the tag information management unit 1-1 and read the tag identifier T ID and the one-time password T SEED from the internal memory. Next, T ID and T SEED are returned to the PML information reference client 2 in step S103.
- step S104 the process proceeds to step S104 to start the SEED management unit 1-2, and decrypts the encrypted T SEED notified by the update request command using the S key.
- step S104 T SEED is written into the internal memory of the tag information management unit 1-1.
- FIG. 8 shows a processing flowchart when referring to the tag of the PML information reference client 2.
- 9 shows a process flowchart when the PML information reference client 2 refers to the PML information.
- step S 201 a read command is wirelessly transmitted to the wireless tag 1, and the tag identifier T ID and the one-time password T SEED are read.
- step S202 a user identifier U-ID and a user certificate U-CR are read from the user information management unit 2-1.
- step S 203 a tag reference request message in which T ID, T SEED, U ID, and U CR are set is generated and transmitted to the user authentication server 3.
- step S204 a tag reference response message returned from the user authentication server 3 is received.
- step S205 the one-time password U-SEED notified by the tag reference response message is recorded in the U-SEED cache 2-3.
- step S206 the encrypted TS EED notified by the tag reference response message in step S206 is notified (wireless) to the wireless tag 1 by a notification command.
- step S 207 a read command is wirelessly transmitted to the wireless tag 1, and the tag identifier T ID and the one-time password T SEED are read.
- step S208 the one-time password U-SEED is extracted from the U-SEED cache 2-3.
- step S209 TSEED and U-SEED are supplied to the GA generator 2-5 to generate a group authenticator GA.
- a PML reference request message including the group authenticator GA generated in step S 210 is generated and transmitted to the PML server 4.
- step S211 the PML reference response message sent from the PML server 4 is received and the PML information is processed.
- FIG. 10 shows a process flowchart of the user authentication server 3. This process starts when a wireless tag reference request message is received.
- the user identifier U-ID and user certificate U-CR are extracted from the RFID tag reference request message and stored in the user authentication DB3-1 and compared with the user ID UCR and UCR. Authenticate.
- step S 302 a one-time password U-SE ED is generated using the U-SEED generator 3-3.
- step S303 the tag identifier T ID, one-time password T SEED, U—SE
- a tag authentication request message with ED set is generated and sent to the PML server 4.
- step S304 the tag authentication response message sent from the PML server 4 is received. To do. Then, the encrypted new password set in the tag authentication response message in step S305 is displayed.
- a radio tag reference response message in which T SEED and U—SEED generated in the previous step S302 are set is generated and sent to the PML information reference client 2.
- FIG. 11 shows a process flowchart when the PML server 4 performs tag authentication
- FIG. 12 shows a process flowchart when the PML server 4 requests PML information.
- the process of FIG. 11 is started by receiving a tag authentication request message.
- the tag identifier T ID and one-time password T are sent from the tag authentication request message.
- Extract SEED Tag authentication DB4-5 is extracted with the extracted T ID and T SEED is extracted and compared with the T-SEED of the message.
- T SEED is successful, a new T SEED generator 4-2 is used in step S402.
- step S404 the one-time password U-SEED is extracted from the tag authentication request message and recorded in the U-SEED cache 4-6.
- step S405 the new T SEED is encrypted with the S key recorded in the tag authentication DB, and a tag authentication response message in which the new TS EED encrypted in step S406 is set is generated. Send message to user authentication server 3.
- the process of FIG. 12 is started by receiving a PML information request message.
- the tag identifier T ID and the group authenticator GA are extracted from the PML information request message.
- the U-SEED cache 4-6 is indexed by the T ID extracted from the PML information request message to obtain U-SEED, and the tag authentication DB4-5 is indexed by the extracted T ID. Get T SEED.
- the searched U-SEED and T SEED are input to the GA generator 4-4 to calculate the group authenticator GA.
- step S409 the GA notified by the PML information request message is compared with the calculated GA. If the comparison results match, the process proceeds to S410, and if they do not match, the process proceeds to step S412.
- step S410 PML—DB4-7 is indexed by the extracted T ID, and PML information is extracted.
- step S411 the PML information reference response message in which the PML information is set in step S411 is generated. And send it to the PML information reference client 2.
- step S409 if there is a mismatch at step S409, a process at the time of mismatch is performed at step S412.
- This process depends on the information disclosure policy of the service and the PML server. For example, the granularity of information disclosure is roughened, or no PML information is disclosed.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram for explaining the tag authentication processing sequence.
- the numbers in parentheses below correspond to the numbers in parentheses in the figure.
- Group authentication function of PML information reference client 2 C2-2 reads radio tag 1, tag information management unit 1-1 of radio tag 1 receives tag identifier T ID and one-time password T
- PML information reference client 2 group authentication function C2-2 is a user information management unit 2
- the group authentication function UAS3-2 of the user authentication server 3 extracts the U-ID and U-CR from the wireless tag reference request message, and extracts the U-ID stored in the user information DB3-1.
- U-SEED generator 3-3 is used to generate U-SEED (S302 in FIG. 10).
- a tag authentication request message including T ID, T SEED, and U—SEED is generated and transmitted to the PML server 4 (S303 in FIG. 10).
- the tag authentication function of PML sano has the tag authentication request message power as well as T ID and T SEE
- FIG. 14 is a diagram for explaining a processing sequence for tag authentication approval.
- the numbers in parentheses below correspond to the numbers in parentheses in the figure.
- T-SEED T-SEED generator 4-2 (S402 in Fig. 11).
- the D information is notified, and the group authentication function PML4-3 associates the USEED with the tag identifier TID and records them in the U-SEED cache 4-6 (S404 in Fig. 11).
- Tag authentication function 4 1 encrypts nT-SEED using the S key.
- the encryption method is given by the following equation, for example.
- P () is a cryptographic function
- G () is a hash function
- XOR is an exclusive OR
- a tag authentication response message including T-ID and P (nT-SEED) is created for the user authentication server 3 and transmitted to the user authentication server 3 (S404 to S405 in Fig. 11).
- Group authentication function UAS3-2 of user authentication server 3 is a wireless tag including T ID, P (nT—SEED), U—ID, U—SEED for PML information reference client 2.
- a reference response message is generated and transmitted (S304 to S305 in Fig. 10).
- PML information reference client 2 group authentication function C2-2 extracts the T ID and U—SEED from the wireless tag reference response message and records them in the U—SEED cache 2-3 (FIG. 8). S204—S205).
- Group authentication function C2-2 of PML information reference client 2 generates a SEED update request command including P (nT-SEED) notified by the wireless tag reference response message for wireless tag 1. (S204 to S206 in Fig. 8).
- the SEED management unit 1-2 of the wireless tag extracts P (nT-SEED) from the SEED update request command, and restores the nT-SEED using the T SEED and S keys.
- the decoding method is given by, for example, the following equation (S104 in FIG. 7).
- nT-SEED P (nT-SEED) XOR G (T—SEED, S key)
- the SEED management unit 1 2 of the wireless tag 1 overwrites the T SEED recorded in the internal memory of the tag information management unit 1 1 with the decrypted nT-SEED (S105 in FIG. 7).
- FIG. 15 is a diagram for explaining a processing sequence of PML information reference.
- the numbers with parentheses below correspond to the numbers in parentheses with arrows in the figure.
- PML information reference client 2 group authentication function C2-2—2 reads wireless tag 1 From tag information management section 1-1 of wireless tag 1, tag identifier T ID and one-time password nT
- Extract EED From the extracted U-SEED and nT-SEED, for example, a group authenticator GA is generated by the following formula.
- GA G (U—SEED, nT—SEED).
- the group authentication function C2-2 notifies the TML and GA to the PML information reference part (S20 in Fig. 9).
- the PML information reference unit 2-4 generates and sends a PML information request message including the tag identifier T ID and the group authenticator GA to the PML server 4 (S210 in FIG. 9).
- PML server 4 group authentication function PML4-3 extracts the tag identifier T-ID and group authenticator GA from the PML information request message, and supports nT corresponding to the T-ID from the tag authentication DB4-5.
- SEED is extracted
- U—SEED corresponding to T ID is extracted from U—SEED cache 4-6
- GA authenticator GA is calculated using GA generator 44, for example, by the following formula.
- GA G (U—SEED, nT—SEED).
- the output result of the GA generator 4 4 is compared with the GA notified by the PML information request message (S407 to S408 in Fig. 12).
- a PML information reference response message including T ID and PML is generated and transmitted to the PML information reference client 2 (S411 in FIG. 12).
- the mobile phone is equipped with a wireless tag reader, and by reading wireless tags for product management of various purchased products, product information, new product information, product version upgrades, product recalls, etc. are provided.
- An example of downloading the URL of the homepage, automatically collecting information about the purchased product and notifying the user is shown.
- FIG. 16 shows a provision image of the information provision service.
- Users purchase CDs, books, bags, and notepads, and read related information by reading wireless tags attached to each product.
- Subscription information is, for example, new information on artists and authors for CDs and books, information on products of the same brand as bags, information on accessories and accessories, and information on accessories and accessories for bags. It is information of supplements such as.
- Such a service has the potential to provide convenience to the user who uses it, but as described above, there is a risk of tracking by a third party.
- Information on CDs and books themselves is harmless, but they give materials that can be used to guess the taste by knowing the titles and authors.
- the wireless tag attached to the product is usually added for the purpose of SCM, and the product management history is recorded in the PML server that stores the product ID information indicated by the wireless tag. Such information may not be disclosed to general consumers.
- a system for writing history information must have a mechanism for verifying whether the system actually handles the object to be registered. Without such a mechanism, it is possible to easily forge history information, and the foundation of anything that looks like a safe product management system service using a wireless tag will be shaken.
- the domain is a manufacturer that performs SCM of merchandise, a distributor domain, a service provider domain that provides services using wireless tags to general users, and only information collection of wireless tags. Distinguish by target non-administrative domain.
- the manufacturer / distributor domain 50 has an SCM trace system 51 for tracing merchandise and an authentication server 52 for authenticating distributors.
- U—SEED SCM and domain information shall be sent.
- the PML server is usually managed for each manufacturer of products.
- PML server 53 of company A with CD sales ability is illustrated as an example!
- Examples of the configuration of the PML-DB 54 of the PML server 53 are a classification that represents the type of an object, detailed information about the object, an information distribution URL that is special information for a sample service, and product management history information.
- G () is the hash function
- TSn is the current RFID tag T-SEED
- SCM is the U-SEED issued by the manufacturer / distributor domain authentication server.
- the PML server 52 calculates the GA from the U-SEED stored in the U-SEED cache 4-6 and the T SEED stored in the tag authentication DB4-5.
- the disclosure policy of permission to refer to and update is applied, and it becomes possible to permit access to the management history in response to access requests for PML information from the domain of manufacturers and distributors.
- the apparatus shown in FIG. 17 is the same as the apparatus shown in the manufacturer / distributor domain 50 shown in FIG.
- the product 61 is obtained by adding the wireless tag 1 of the present invention for SCM, and the SCM trace system 51 corresponds to the PML information reference client 2 described in the principle of the present invention.
- the authentication server 52 and the PML server 53 are the same as described in the principle of the present invention.
- the T ID, T SEED, and S key are stored in the internal memory of the product wireless tag 1 and the tag authentication DB 4-5 of the PML server 53.
- the S key is shared secret information between the wireless tag and the PML server.
- the T ID, T SEED, and S keys are actually a stream of numbers or characters with a cryptographic strength and a bit length determined by the system load, but here a simple abbreviation is used for ease of distinction. It shows with.
- the tag identifier T ID is a unique ID indicating the product 61 (CD in this case), and is expressed as “CD1”.
- One-time password T SEED is a dynamic one-time password for accessing CD1, and is expressed as “DEFAULT” on the assumption that it has never been accessed. Assume that the S key has a value of “KEY1”.
- the SCM trace system 51 and the authentication server 52 have a user identifier U—ID, which is information for authenticating a user, and a user certificate U—CR.
- U—ID is information that uniquely identifies the user, and is represented here as “USER1”.
- U—CR is the user's identity. It is information such as a password indicating that. Here, it is expressed as “PWD”.
- T SEED “ DEFAULT ”is returned.
- U—ID and U—CR of the tag reference request message are extracted and compared with the U-ID and U-CR set in the user authentication DB3-1.
- the authentication server 52 uses the U-SEED generator 3-3 to generate U-SEED, which is a one-time password for reference of the wireless tag.
- U—SEED is also a cipher strength and a stream of numbers or characters with a bit length determined by the system load. Here, it is expressed as “US 1”.
- the authentication server 52 generates a tag authentication request message in which the T ID notified from the SCM trace system 51 and the U—SEED generated in T SEED are set, and sends the tag authentication request message to the PML server 53.
- the PML server 53 compares the T SEED notified by the tag authentication request message with the T SEED stored in the tag authentication DB. Since the current value of T SEED is “DEFAU LT” and matches, it can be considered that the wireless tag 1 is being referred to.
- the PML server 53 regenerates TSEED to confirm that the SCM trace system 51 is not tracking the information of the latest wireless tag 1.
- the value of T SEED regenerated here is expressed as “TS1”.
- G () is a hash function and XOR is an exclusive OR.
- an SPI Security Parameter Index
- a wireless tag so that an arbitrary method can be selected from multiple cryptographic algorithms. This is also included in the T SEED encryption process.
- the PML server 53 transmits a tag authentication response message in which P (TS1), which is T ID and encrypted T SEED, is set to the authentication server 52.
- the SCM trace system 51 refers to the wireless tag again.
- the PML server 53 releases the access path to the PML—DB 54 to the SCM trace system 51.
- T SEED As described above, in the system using the present invention, in order to refer to the wireless tag, an operation is not possible. Both the current T SEED of the RFID tag, which is a globally changing password, and the U-SEED, which is a one-time password for the user generated as a result of user authentication, is issued and the U-SEED is issued Then, T SEED also changes, and it can be authenticated that the wireless tag and its reference are correctly associated.
- the tag identifier T ID corresponds to the identification information of the claimed item
- the PML information corresponds to the mono identification information
- the one-time password T SEED corresponds to the first value
- the one-time Seward U—SEED corresponds to the second value
- group authenticator GA corresponds to the third value
- wireless tag 1 corresponds to the tag device
- PML information reference client 2 corresponds to the information reference client
- User authentication server 3 corresponds to the authentication server
- PML Sano corresponds to the information server
- SEED management unit 1-2 corresponds to the first value management unit
- U-SEED cache 2-3 is the second
- PML information reference part 2-4 corresponds to the information reference part
- user certificate U-CR corresponds to the user information
- group authentication function C2-2 corresponds to the authentication function part.
- U—SEED generator 3—3 corresponds to the second value generator
- user authentication DB3—1 is the authentication database
- group authentication function UAS3-2 corresponds to the authentication function part
- PML-DB4-7 corresponds to the product information database
- U-SEED cache 4-6 corresponds to the second value storage part
- tag authentication DB4—5 corresponds to the first value database
- GA generator 44 corresponds to the first value generator
- tag authentication function 41 corresponds to the tag authentication function part
- group authentication function PML4-3 This corresponds to the reference authentication function unit.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP05710304.6A EP1850233B1 (en) | 2005-02-17 | 2005-02-17 | Authentication method, authentication system, and tag device thereof, information reference client, authentication server, and information server |
JP2007503524A JP4682187B2 (ja) | 2005-02-17 | 2005-02-17 | 認証システム、情報提供方法及び情報提供システム |
PCT/JP2005/002454 WO2006087784A1 (ja) | 2005-02-17 | 2005-02-17 | 認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ及び情報サーバ |
US11/826,891 US7953974B2 (en) | 2005-02-17 | 2007-07-19 | Authentication method, authentication system, and tag device thereof, data reference client, authentication server, and data server |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2005/002454 WO2006087784A1 (ja) | 2005-02-17 | 2005-02-17 | 認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ及び情報サーバ |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US11/826,891 Continuation US7953974B2 (en) | 2005-02-17 | 2007-07-19 | Authentication method, authentication system, and tag device thereof, data reference client, authentication server, and data server |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2006087784A1 true WO2006087784A1 (ja) | 2006-08-24 |
Family
ID=36916200
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2005/002454 WO2006087784A1 (ja) | 2005-02-17 | 2005-02-17 | 認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ及び情報サーバ |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US7953974B2 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP1850233B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP4682187B2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2006087784A1 (ja) |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2022113589A1 (ja) * | 2020-11-27 | 2022-06-02 | ソニーグループ株式会社 | サーバ、端末装置、情報処理プログラム、管理システムおよび管理方法 |
WO2024096001A1 (ja) * | 2022-11-04 | 2024-05-10 | ミート株式会社 | アクセス制御システム、アクセス制御方法及びアクセス制御プログラム |
Families Citing this family (18)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US9614772B1 (en) | 2003-10-20 | 2017-04-04 | F5 Networks, Inc. | System and method for directing network traffic in tunneling applications |
CN101120351B (zh) * | 2005-02-18 | 2010-10-06 | Rsa安全公司 | 派生种子的分发方法 |
GB0504573D0 (en) * | 2005-03-04 | 2005-04-13 | Firstondemand Ltd | Traceability and authentication of security papers |
WO2007024828A2 (en) * | 2005-08-23 | 2007-03-01 | Soft Resources, Llc | Authentication protection apparatus and method |
WO2007077601A1 (ja) * | 2005-12-28 | 2007-07-12 | Fujitsu Limited | タグ認証システム |
US8935762B2 (en) | 2007-06-26 | 2015-01-13 | G3-Vision Limited | Authentication system and method |
WO2009079734A1 (en) * | 2007-12-20 | 2009-07-02 | Bce Inc. | Contact-less tag with signature, and applications thereof |
WO2009097577A1 (en) | 2008-01-30 | 2009-08-06 | Neology, Inc. | Rfid authentication architecture and methods for rfid authentication |
US9832069B1 (en) | 2008-05-30 | 2017-11-28 | F5 Networks, Inc. | Persistence based on server response in an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) |
WO2010069033A1 (en) | 2008-12-18 | 2010-06-24 | Bce Inc | Validation method and system for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions |
WO2010069034A1 (en) | 2008-12-18 | 2010-06-24 | Bce Inc. | Processing of communication device signatures for use in securing nomadic electronic transactions |
US8799754B2 (en) * | 2009-12-07 | 2014-08-05 | At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. | Verification of data stream computations using third-party-supplied annotations |
US8874914B2 (en) | 2010-02-05 | 2014-10-28 | Accenture Global Services Limited | Secure and automated credential information transfer mechanism |
US9628875B1 (en) * | 2011-06-14 | 2017-04-18 | Amazon Technologies, Inc. | Provisioning a device to be an authentication device |
EP3108403A1 (en) * | 2014-02-21 | 2016-12-28 | Sony Corporation | Detection of unauthorized tags |
CN104519066B (zh) * | 2014-12-23 | 2017-11-28 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | 一种激活移动终端令牌的方法 |
US10887095B2 (en) * | 2017-12-16 | 2021-01-05 | Nicira, Inc. | Allocating security parameter index values using time-based one-time passwords |
CN110012048B (zh) | 2018-11-22 | 2021-11-12 | 创新先进技术有限公司 | 信息识别码生成方法、装置、电子设备及计算机存储介质 |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH01124781A (ja) | 1987-11-10 | 1989-05-17 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | スキッド磁力計 |
JP2004070463A (ja) * | 2002-08-02 | 2004-03-04 | Sony Corp | 情報処理システムおよび方法、情報処理装置および方法、記録媒体、並びにプログラム |
JP2004309836A (ja) * | 2003-04-08 | 2004-11-04 | Sony Corp | 情報提供システム、情報提供方法及び携帯無線通信端末 |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5657388A (en) * | 1993-05-25 | 1997-08-12 | Security Dynamics Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for utilizing a token for resource access |
JPH10124781A (ja) | 1996-10-18 | 1998-05-15 | Fujitsu General Ltd | 迷子監視システム |
JPH11126186A (ja) * | 1997-10-22 | 1999-05-11 | Sony Corp | コンピュータシステム、及び記録媒体 |
US8745715B2 (en) * | 2003-04-16 | 2014-06-03 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Password-based authentication system and method in group network |
JP2004334330A (ja) * | 2003-04-30 | 2004-11-25 | Sony Corp | 端末機器、提供サーバ、電子情報利用方法、電子情報提供方法、端末機器プログラム、提供サーバプログラム、仲介プログラム、及び記憶媒体 |
-
2005
- 2005-02-17 JP JP2007503524A patent/JP4682187B2/ja not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2005-02-17 EP EP05710304.6A patent/EP1850233B1/en not_active Ceased
- 2005-02-17 WO PCT/JP2005/002454 patent/WO2006087784A1/ja active Application Filing
-
2007
- 2007-07-19 US US11/826,891 patent/US7953974B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH01124781A (ja) | 1987-11-10 | 1989-05-17 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | スキッド磁力計 |
JP2004070463A (ja) * | 2002-08-02 | 2004-03-04 | Sony Corp | 情報処理システムおよび方法、情報処理装置および方法、記録媒体、並びにプログラム |
JP2004309836A (ja) * | 2003-04-08 | 2004-11-04 | Sony Corp | 情報提供システム、情報提供方法及び携帯無線通信端末 |
Non-Patent Citations (4)
Title |
---|
D. HENRICI ET AL.: "Sicherheit und Privatsphare in RFID-Systemen", DFN-ARBEITSTAGUNG, vol. 18, 1 June 2004 (2004-06-01) |
D. HENRICI; P. MÜLLER: "Hash-based Enhancement of Location Privacy for Radio-Frequency Identification Devices using Varying Identifiers", PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND IEEE ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS, 14 March 2004 (2004-03-14), pages 149 - 153, XP010689745, DOI: doi:10.1109/PERCOMW.2004.1276922 |
KINOSHITA S. ET AL.: "Low Cost RFID Privacy Hogo Hoho", TRANSACTIONS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING SOCIETY OF JAPAN, INFORMATION PROCESSING SOCIETY OF JAPAN, vol. 45, no. 8, 10 August 2004 (2004-08-10), pages 2007 - 2020, XP003000742 * |
See also references of EP1850233A4 * |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2022113589A1 (ja) * | 2020-11-27 | 2022-06-02 | ソニーグループ株式会社 | サーバ、端末装置、情報処理プログラム、管理システムおよび管理方法 |
WO2024096001A1 (ja) * | 2022-11-04 | 2024-05-10 | ミート株式会社 | アクセス制御システム、アクセス制御方法及びアクセス制御プログラム |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
US7953974B2 (en) | 2011-05-31 |
JPWO2006087784A1 (ja) | 2008-07-03 |
US20070262852A1 (en) | 2007-11-15 |
EP1850233B1 (en) | 2017-07-05 |
EP1850233A4 (en) | 2012-06-20 |
JP4682187B2 (ja) | 2011-05-11 |
EP1850233A1 (en) | 2007-10-31 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP4682187B2 (ja) | 認証システム、情報提供方法及び情報提供システム | |
Chen et al. | Conformation of EPC Class 1 Generation 2 standards RFID system with mutual authentication and privacy protection | |
US8931689B2 (en) | Systems and methods for anti-counterfeit authentication through communication networks | |
JP4897704B2 (ja) | データ交換の制御 | |
CN105915332B (zh) | 一种云存储加密及去重复方法及其系统 | |
JP4797026B2 (ja) | 認証方法、認証システム、及びそのタグ装置、情報参照クライアント、認証サーバ | |
US7548152B2 (en) | RFID transponder information security methods systems and devices | |
JP5401507B2 (ja) | 無線識別システムを利用した購買された品物の情報確認方法、その記録媒体及びそのシステム | |
US20080059797A1 (en) | Data Communication System, Agent System Server, Computer Program, and Data Communication Method | |
CN108370314A (zh) | 使用数据的安全存储和检索的装置 | |
WO2013002833A2 (en) | Binding of cryptographic content using unique device characteristics with server heuristics | |
Dimitriou | rfidDOT: RFID delegation and ownership transfer made simple | |
CN108924137A (zh) | 一种物联网环境下的隐私保护方法和系统 | |
CN109492424A (zh) | 数据资产管理方法、数据资产管理装置及计算机可读介质 | |
WO2022206453A1 (zh) | 提供跨链隐私数据的方法和装置 | |
JPH07123086A (ja) | Icカードを利用した著作物通信管理システム | |
JP2005148982A (ja) | ユーザ認証方法、ユーザ情報取得装置、認証サーバ装置、ユーザ情報取得装置用プログラムおよび認証サーバ装置用プログラム | |
CN115694921B (zh) | 一种数据存储方法、设备及介质 | |
WO2011058629A1 (ja) | 情報管理システム | |
JP2008011092A (ja) | 暗号化コンテンツ検索方式 | |
Chuang et al. | Constructing effective lightweight privacy protection in RFID-based systems | |
JP2005051614A (ja) | 情報管理システム、キー配信サーバ、情報管理方法、及びプログラム | |
JP2008090424A (ja) | 管理システム、管理方法、電子機器、およびプログラム | |
JP5177053B2 (ja) | サービス提供システム、サーバ、ゲートウェイ、ユーザ装置およびサービス提供方法 | |
Chen et al. | A secure RFID deactivation/activation mechanism for customer service and consumer shopping |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application | ||
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2007503524 Country of ref document: JP |
|
REEP | Request for entry into the european phase |
Ref document number: 2005710304 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 11826891 Country of ref document: US Ref document number: 2005710304 Country of ref document: EP |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 2005710304 Country of ref document: EP |
|
WWP | Wipo information: published in national office |
Ref document number: 11826891 Country of ref document: US |