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Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion

Author

Listed:
  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
Abstract
The paper presents a framework where the most important single-valued solutions in the literature of TU games are jointly analyzed. The paper also suggests that similar frameworks may be useful for other coalitional models.

Suggested Citation

  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier, 2003. "Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models: The Lorenz criterion," IKERLANAK 6503, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6503
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    File URL: https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/6503
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-635, May.
    2. Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen & Bezalel Peleg, 2001. "On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 147-165.
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    4. Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997. "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 163, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
    5. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Dutta, B, 1990. "The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(2), pages 153-169.
    7. Bezalel Peleg & Peter SudhÃlter, 1998. "Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 383-411.
    8. Chris Snijders, 1995. "Axiomatization of the Nucleolus," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 189-196, February.
    9. Javier Arin & Jeroen Kuipers & Dries Vermeulen, 2008. "An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 565-580, December.
    10. V. Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 2002. "Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 869-884.
    11. Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
    12. Ruiz, Luis M & Valenciano, Federico & Zarzuelo, Jose M, 1996. "The Least Square Prenucleolus and the Least Square Nucleolus. Two Values for TU Games Based on the Excess Vector," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 113-134.
    13. Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667, Elsevier.
    14. Javier Arin & Elena Inarra, 2001. "Egalitarian solutions in the core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 187-193.
    15. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 185-187.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mathijs van Zon & Remy Spliet & Wilco van den Heuvel, 2021. "The Joint Network Vehicle Routing Game," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(1), pages 179-195, 1-2.
    2. Naber, S.K. & de Ree, D.A. & Spliet, R. & van den Heuvel, W., 2015. "Allocating CO2 emission to customers on a distribution route," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 191-199.
    3. van Zon, M. & Spliet, R. & van den Heuvel, W., 2021. "The effect of algorithm capabilities on cooperative games," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI2021-02, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.

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