research-article

More than Privacy: Adopting Differential Privacy in Game-theoretic Mechanism Design

Authors:

Philip S. YuAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), Volume 54, Issue 7

Article No.: 136, Pages 1 - 37

https://doi.org/10.1145/3460771

Published: 18 July 2021 Publication History

Abstract

The vast majority of artificial intelligence solutions are founded on game theory, and differential privacy is emerging as perhaps the most rigorous and widely adopted privacy paradigm in the field. However, alongside all the advancements made in both these fields, there is not a single application that is not still vulnerable to privacy violations, security breaches, or manipulation by adversaries. Our understanding of the interactions between differential privacy and game theoretic solutions is limited. Hence, we undertook a comprehensive review of literature in the field, finding that differential privacy has several advantageous properties that can make more of a contribution to game theory than just privacy protection. It can also be used to build heuristic models for game-theoretic solutions, to avert strategic manipulations, and to quantify the cost of privacy protection. With a focus on mechanism design, the aim of this article is to provide a new perspective on the currently held impossibilities in game theory, potential avenues to circumvent those impossibilities, and opportunities to improve the performance of game-theoretic solutions with differentially private techniques.

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Zhao YDu JChen J(2024)Scenario-based Adaptations of Differential Privacy: A Technical SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/365115356:8(1-39)Online publication date: 26-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1145/3651153
Shen YShepherd CAhmed CShen SYu S(2024)SGD3QN: Joint Stochastic Games and Dueling Double Deep Q-Networks for Defending Malware Propagation in Edge Intelligence-Enabled Internet of ThingsIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.342023319(6978-6990)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3420233
Sun HZhu TLi JJi SZhou W(2024)Attribute-Based Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on GANsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.330559121:4(2376-2393)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3305591
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Index Terms

More than Privacy: Adopting Differential Privacy in Game-theoretic Mechanism Design
1. Security and privacy
  1. Human and societal aspects of security and privacy
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design

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Published In

cover image ACM Computing Surveys

ACM Computing Surveys Volume 54, Issue 7

September 2022

778 pages

ISSN:0360-0300

EISSN:1557-7341

DOI:10.1145/3476825

Editor:
Albert Zomaya
University of Sydney, Australia

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Copyright © 2021 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 18 July 2021

Accepted: 01 April 2021

Revised: 01 April 2021

Received: 01 November 2020

Published in CSUR Volume 54, Issue 7

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Cited By

Zhao YDu JChen J(2024)Scenario-based Adaptations of Differential Privacy: A Technical SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/365115356:8(1-39)Online publication date: 26-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1145/3651153
Shen YShepherd CAhmed CShen SYu S(2024)SGD3QN: Joint Stochastic Games and Dueling Double Deep Q-Networks for Defending Malware Propagation in Edge Intelligence-Enabled Internet of ThingsIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.342023319(6978-6990)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3420233
Sun HZhu TLi JJi SZhou W(2024)Attribute-Based Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on GANsIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2023.330559121:4(2376-2393)Online publication date: Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2023.3305591
Zhou WZhu TYe DRen WChoo K(2024)A Concurrent Federated Reinforcement Learning for IoT Resources Allocation With Local Differential PrivacyIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2023.331211811:4(6537-6550)Online publication date: 15-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/JIOT.2023.3312118
Zhang XCai YLiu FZhou F(2024)How to dissolve the “privacy paradox” in social networks? A game approach based on privacy calculusKybernetes10.1108/K-03-2024-0544Online publication date: 11-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.1108/K-03-2024-0544
Li JLu L(2024)A Novel Differentially Private Online Learning Algorithm for Group Lasso in Big DataIET Information Security10.1049/2024/55532922024:1Online publication date: 24-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1049/2024/5553292
Das SMishra S(2024)Advances in Differential Privacy and Differentially Private Machine LearningInformation Technology Security10.1007/978-981-97-0407-1_7(147-188)Online publication date: 2-Apr-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0407-1_7
Xu HZhu TZhang LZhou WYu P(2023)Machine Unlearning: A SurveyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/360362056:1(1-36)Online publication date: 28-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3603620
Zhu TYe DCheng ZZhou WYu P(2023)Learning Games for Defending Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber SystemsIEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems10.1109/TSMC.2022.321186653:4(2410-2422)Online publication date: Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSMC.2022.3211866
Monteiro DYu YZisman ANuseibeh B(2023)Adaptive Observability for Forensic-Ready Microservice SystemsIEEE Transactions on Services Computing10.1109/TSC.2023.329047416:5(3196-3209)Online publication date: Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TSC.2023.3290474
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