research-article

CleanupSpec: An "Undo" Approach to Safe Speculation

Authors:

Gururaj Saileshwar,

Moinuddin K. QureshiAuthors Info & Claims

MICRO '52: Proceedings of the 52nd Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture

Pages 73 - 86

https://doi.org/10.1145/3352460.3358314

Published: 12 October 2019 Publication History

Abstract

Speculation-based attacks affect hundreds of millions of computers. These attacks typically exploit caches to leak information, using speculative instructions to cause changes to the cache state. Hardware-based solutions that protect against such forms of attacks try to prevent any speculative changes to the cache sub-system by delaying them. For example, InvisiSpec, a recent work, splits the load into two operations: the first operation is speculative and obtains the value and the second operation is non-speculative and changes the state of the cache. Unfortunately, such a "Redo" based approach typically incurs slowdown due to the requirement of extra operations for correctly speculated loads, that form the large majority of loads.

In this work, we propose CleanupSpec, an "Undo"-based approach to safe speculation. CleanupSpec is a hardware-based solution that mitigates these attacks by undoing the changes to the cache sub-system caused by speculative instructions, in the event they are squashed on a mis-speculation. As a result, CleanupSpec prevents information leakage on the correct path of execution due to any mis-speculated load and is secure against speculation-based attacks exploiting caches (we demonstrate a proof-of-concept defense on Spectre Variant-1 PoC). Unlike a Redo-based approach which incurs overheads for correct-path loads, CleanupSpec incurs overheads only for the wrong-path loads that are less frequent. As a result, CleanupSpec only incurs an average slowdown of 5.1% compared to a non-secure baseline. Moreover, CleanupSpec incurs a modest storage overhead of less than 1 kilobyte per core, for tracking and undoing the speculative changes to the caches.

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Cited By

Yu FTang ZLi XFan Z(2024)LeakageFreeSpec: Applying the Wiping Approach to Defend Against Transient Execution AttacksProceedings of the 21st ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers10.1145/3649153.3649202(276-284)Online publication date: 7-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649153.3649202
Marinaro TBuiras PLindner AGuanciale RNemati HQuek TGao DZhou JCardenas A(2024)Beyond Over-Protection: A Targeted Approach to Spectre Mitigation and Performance OptimizationProceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3634737.3637651(203-216)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3634737.3637651
Mosier NNemati HMitchell JTrippel C(2024)Serberus: Protecting Cryptographic Code from Spectres at Compile-Time2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00048(4200-4219)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00048
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Index Terms

CleanupSpec: An "Undo" Approach to Safe Speculation
1. Computer systems organization
  1. Architectures
2. Security and privacy
  1. Security in hardware
    1. Hardware attacks and countermeasures
      1. Side-channel analysis and countermeasures

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cover image ACM Conferences

MICRO '52: Proceedings of the 52nd Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture

October 2019

1104 pages

ISBN:9781450369381

DOI:10.1145/3352460

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MICRO '52: The 52nd Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture

October 12 - 16, 2019

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Yu FTang ZLi XFan Z(2024)LeakageFreeSpec: Applying the Wiping Approach to Defend Against Transient Execution AttacksProceedings of the 21st ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers10.1145/3649153.3649202(276-284)Online publication date: 7-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3649153.3649202
Marinaro TBuiras PLindner AGuanciale RNemati HQuek TGao DZhou JCardenas A(2024)Beyond Over-Protection: A Targeted Approach to Spectre Mitigation and Performance OptimizationProceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3634737.3637651(203-216)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3634737.3637651
Mosier NNemati HMitchell JTrippel C(2024)Serberus: Protecting Cryptographic Code from Spectres at Compile-Time2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP54263.2024.00048(4200-4219)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP54263.2024.00048
Pashrashid AHajiabadi ACarlson T(2024)Efficient Detection and Mitigation Schemes for Speculative Side Channels2024 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS)10.1109/ISCAS58744.2024.10558385(1-5)Online publication date: 19-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCAS58744.2024.10558385
Kim TRudo DZhao KZhao ZSkarlatos D(2024)Perspective: A Principled Framework for Pliable and Secure Speculation in Operating Systems2024 ACM/IEEE 51st Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)10.1109/ISCA59077.2024.00059(739-755)Online publication date: 29-Jun-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISCA59077.2024.00059
Chen YHajiabadi ACarlson T(2024)GADGETSPINNER: A New Transient Execution Primitive Using the Loop Stream Detector2024 IEEE International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA)10.1109/HPCA57654.2024.00013(15-30)Online publication date: 2-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCA57654.2024.00013
Mosquera FEkanayake AHua WKavi KMehta GJohn L(2024)SecurityCloak: Protection against cache timing and speculative memory access attacksJournal of Systems Architecture10.1016/j.sysarc.2024.103107150(103107)Online publication date: May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sysarc.2024.103107
Daniel LBognar MNoorman JBardin SRezk TPiessens FCalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)PROSPECTProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620638(7161-7178)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3620237.3620638
De Meulemeester JPurnal AWouters LBeckers AVerbauwhede ICalandrino JTroncoso C(2023)SPECTREMProceedings of the 32nd USENIX Conference on Security Symposium10.5555/3620237.3620589(6293-6310)Online publication date: 9-Aug-2023
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Aimoniotis PKvalsvik AChen XSjälander MKaxiras S(2023)ReCon: Efficient Detection, Management, and Use of Non-Speculative Information LeakageProceedings of the 56th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture10.1145/3613424.3623770(828-842)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3613424.3623770
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