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Information and Delay in an Agency Model. (2006). Drugov, Mikhail.
In: Economics Series Working Papers.
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:298.

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  1. Information and delay in an agency model. (2010). Drugov, Mikhail.
    In: RAND Journal of Economics.
    RePEc:bla:randje:v:41:y:2010:i:3:p:598-615.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. BAGNOLI, M., S. SALANT, AND J. SwIERzBINsKI (1992): ~Intertemporal Self-selection with Multiple Buyers Under Complete and Incomplete Information, University of Michigan Center for Research on Economics and Social Theory (CREST) Working Paper.

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  3. BOLTON, P., AND M. DEWATRIPONT (2005): Contract Theory. MIT Press.

  4. DIxIT, A., AND R. PINDYCK (1994): Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press.

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  7. HART, 0., AND J. TIROLE (1988): ~Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics, Review of Economic Studies, 55, 509-540.

  8. LAFFONT, J.-J., AND D. MARTIMORT (2002): The Theory of Incentives: The PrincipalA gent Model. Princeton University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  9. LAFFONT, J.-J., AND J. TIROLE (1987): ~Comparative Statics of the Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract, European Economic Review, 31(4), 901-926.

  10. STOKEY, N. (1981): ~Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing, Bell Journal of Economics, 12(1), 112-128.

  11. Studies, 57(4), 597-625. SOBEL, J., AND I. TAKAHASHI (1983): ~A Multistage Model of Bargaining, Review of Economic Studies, 50(3), 411-426.

  12. WANG, G. (1998): ~Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, 65, 295-305.

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  23. Information and Delay in an Agency Model. (2006). Drugov, Mikhail.
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