Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
create a website
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory. (2013). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9510.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 4

Citations received by this document

Cites: 43

References cited by this document

Cocites: 68

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection. (2021). Siegenthaler, Simon ; Riedl, Arno ; Dariel, Aurelie.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:130:y:2021:i:c:p:109-130.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Hiring Through Referrals in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection. (2019). Siegenthaler, Simon ; Riedl, Arno ; Dariel, Aurelie.
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019009.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Hiring through Referrals in a Labor Market with Adverse Selection. (2019). Siegenthaler, Simon ; Riedl, Arno ; Dariel, Aurelie.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12287.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Hiring through referrals in a labor market with adverse selection. (2019). Siegenthaler, Simon ; Riedl, Arno ; Dariel, Aurelie.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7610.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. ASPAROUHOVA, E. (2006), “Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments” , Review of Finance, 10, 189– 219.

  2. BOLTON, P. and DEWATRIPONT, M. (2005), Contract Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press).

  3. CAMERER, C.F. (2003), Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  4. CHIAPPORI, P.A. and SALANIÉ, B. (2003), “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work” , in Dewatripont, M., Hansen, L.P. and Turnovsky, S.J. (eds) Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Econometric Society Monographs, Eighth World Congress, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 115– 149.

  5. CRÉMER, J. and KHALIL, F. (1992), “Gathering Information before Signing a Contract” , American Economic Review, 82, 566– 578.

  6. CROSON, R.T.A. (1996), “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study” , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 30, 197– 212.

  7. FEHR, E. and SCHMIDT, K.M. (2006), “The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories” , in Kolm, S.-C. and Ythier, J.M. (eds) Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier) 615– 691.

  8. FISCHBACHER, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments” , Experimental Economics, 10, 171– 178.

  9. FORSYTHE, R., KENNAN, J. and SOPHER, B. (1991), “An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information” , American Economic Review, 81, 253– 278.

  10. FUDENBERG, D. and TIROLE, J. (1991), Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  11. GÜTH, W. (1995), “On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments –A Personal Review” , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 27, 329– 344.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  12. GÜTH, W. and TIETZ, R. (1990), “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results” , Journal of Economic Psychology, 11, 417– 449.

  13. GÜTH, W. and VAN DAMME, E. (1998), “Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study” , Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 227– 247.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  14. GÜTH, W., HUCK, S. and OCKENFELS, P. (1996), “Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study” , Economic Journal, 106, 593– 604.

  15. GÜTH, W., SCHMITTBERGER, R. and SCHWARZE, B. (1982), “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining” , Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 367– 388.

  16. GREINER, B. (2004), “An Online Recruiting System for Economic Experiments” ,

  17. GUESNERIE, R. and LAFFONT, J.-J. (1984), “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to the Control of a SelfManaged Firm” , Journal of Public Economics, 25, 329– 369.

  18. HARSTAD, R. and NAGEL, R. (2004), “Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information on the Side of the Proposer: An Experimental Study” , Cuadernos de Economía, 27, 37– 74.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  19. HART, O. and HOLMSTRÖM, B. (1987), “The Theory of Contracts” , in Bewley, T. (eds) Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Econometric Society Monographs, Fifth World Congress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 71– 155.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  20. HOFFMAN, E., MCCABE, K., SHACHAT, K. and SMITH, V. (1994), “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games” , Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 346– 380.

  21. HOPPE, E.I. and SCHMITZ, P.W. (2013), “Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study” , Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

  22. HOUSER, D. and KURZBAN, R. (2002), “Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments” , American Economic Review, 92, 1062– 1069.

  23. HUCK, S. (1999), “Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Oer Games with Incomplete Information” , Journal of Economic Psychology, 20, 183– 206.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  24. HUCK, S., SELTZER, A.J. and WALLACE, B. (2011), “Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear’ s Model” , American Economic Review, 101, 819– 843.

  25. in Kremer, K. and Macho, V. (eds) Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63 (Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung) 79– 93.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  26. KAGEL, J.H., KIM, C. and MOSER, D. (1996), “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payos” , Games and Economic Behavior, 13, 100– 110.

  27. KESSLER, A.S. (1998), “The Value of Ignorance” , Rand Journal of Economics, 29, 339– 354.

  28. LAFFONT, J.-J. and MARTIMORT, D. (2002), The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  29. LAFFONT, J.-J. and TIROLE, J. (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge: MIT Press).

  30. LEWIS, T.R. and SAPPINGTON, D.E.M. (1989), “Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems” , Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 294– 313.

  31. LEWIS, T.R. and SAPPINGTON, D.E.M. (1997), “Information Management in Incentive Problems” , Journal of Political Economy, 105, 796– 821.

  32. MASKIN, E. and RILEY, J. (1984), “Monopoly with Incomplete Information” , Rand Journal of Economics, 15, 171– 196.

  33. MCKELVEY, R.D. and PALFREY, T.R. (1995), “Quantal Response Equilibria in Normal Form Games” , Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6– 38.

  34. MIRRLEES, J.A. (1971), “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation” , Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175– 208.

  35. MITZKEWITZ, M. and NAGEL, R. (1993), “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information” , International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171– 198.

  36. MUSSA, M. and ROSEN, S. (1978), “Monopoly and Product Quality” , Journal of Economic Theory, 18, 301– 317.

  37. NOBEL PRIZE COMMITTEE (2007), “Mechanism Design Theory” , The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  38. PRENDERGAST, C. (1999), “The Provision of Incentives in Firms” , Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7– 63.

  39. RAPOPORT, A. and SUNDALI, J.A. (1996), “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Oer Games” , International Journal of Game Theory, 25, 475– 494.

  40. RIORDAN, M.H. and SAPPINGTON, D.E. (1988), “Optimal Contracts with Public Ex Post Information” , Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 189– 199.

  41. ROGERS, B.W., PALFREY, T.R. and CAMERER, C.F. (2009), “Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies” , Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 1440– 1467.

  42. SALANIÉ, B. (2005), The Economics of Contracts (Cambridge: MIT Press).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now

  43. SCHMITZ, P.W. (2006), “Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach” , American Economic Review, 96, 422– 434.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study. (2023). Schmitz, Patrick ; Nieken, Petra.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:26:y:2023:i:5:d:10.1007_s10683-023-09813-x.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study. (2020). Schmitz, Patrick ; Nieken, Petra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15492.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory. (2019). Houser, Daniel ; Fostel, Ana ; Cipriani, Marco.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26469.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Endogenous Leverage and Default in the Laboratory. (2019). Houser, Daniel ; Fostel, Ana ; Cipriani, Marco.
    In: Staff Reports.
    RePEc:fip:fednsr:900.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick W ; Hoppe, Eva I.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:95618.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. Are biased beliefs fit to survive? An experimental test of the market selection hypothesis. (2018). Kendall, Chad ; Oprea, Ryan.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:176:y:2018:i:c:p:342-371.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. (2018). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva I.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:544-564.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model. (2017). Mehta, Nirav.
    In: University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers.
    RePEc:uwo:hcuwoc:20178.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Optimal form of retention for securitized loans under moral hazard. (2015). Dionne, Georges ; Malekan, Sara .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2015_004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Competition in Portfolio Management: Theory and Experiment. (2015). Cvitanic, Jaksa ; Copic, Jernej ; Asparouhova, Elena ; Meloso, Debrah ; Cornell, Brad ; Bossaerts, Peter.
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:61:y:2015:i:8:p:1868-1888.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory. (2015). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:17-33.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. Loss Aversion and the Uniform Pricing Puzzle for Vertically Differentiated Products. (2015). Courty, Pascal ; Nasiry, Javad .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10523.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation. (2015). Wilkening, Tom ; Holden, Richard ; Fehr, Ernst ; Aghion, Philippe.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5300.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Optimal Selling Mechanisms under Imperfect Commitment. (2014). Beccuti, Juan.
    In: Diskussionsschriften.
    RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1401.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Maturity Rationing and Collective Short-Termism. (2014). Milbradt, Konstantin ; Oehmke, Martin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19946.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. Austerity. (2014). Niepelt, Dirk ; Dellas, Harris.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10315.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. The Generalized Informativeness Principle. (2014). Gottlieb, Daniel ; Edmans, Alex ; Chaigneau, Pierre.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10279.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability. (2014). Gottlieb, Daniel ; Edmans, Alex ; Chaigneau, Pierre.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10143.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Delegation and Dynamic Incentives. (2014). Strausz, Roland ; Shin, Dongsoo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4774.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Robust Portfolios and Weak Incentives in Long-Run Investments. (2014). Xing, Hao ; Guasoni, Paolo ; Muhle-Karbe, Johannes.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:1306.2751.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study. (2013). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:44240.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Lucas In The Laboratory. (2013). Zame, William ; Bossaerts, Peter ; Asparouhova, Elena ; Roy, Nilanjan .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19068.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Lucas in the Laboratory. (2013). Asparouhova, Elena ; Zame, William ; Bossaerts, Peter ; Roy, Nilanjan .
    In: NBER Chapters.
    RePEc:nbr:nberch:12923.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. ‘Lucas’ In The Laboratory. (2013). Zame, William ; Asparouhova, Elena ; Bossaerts, Peter ; Roy, Nilanjan .
    In: EIEF Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:eie:wpaper:1314.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Using Nash bargaining to design project management contracts under cost uncertainty. (2013). Tang, Christopher S. ; Lippman, Steven A. ; McCardle, Kevin F..
    In: International Journal of Production Economics.
    RePEc:eee:proeco:v:145:y:2013:i:1:p:199-207.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory. (2013). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9510.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study. (2013). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9287.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Communication and competition. (2012). Zhang, Jingjing ; Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, .
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:econwp:074.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms. (2012). Quelin, Bertrand ; Lumineau, Fabrice.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38362.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Why do firms issue equity? Some evidence from an emerging economy, India. (2012). Bhaduri, Saumitra.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38043.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered. (2012). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:36914.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry. (2012). Groll, Thomas ; Ellis, Christopher J..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:36168.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. The Corporation in Finance. (2012). Rajan, Raghuram.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17760.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. On the Value of Improved Informativeness. (2012). Chaigneau, Pierre.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1205.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information. (2012). Koçkesen, Levent ; Gerratana, Emanuele ; Kockesen, Levent .
    In: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
    RePEc:koc:wpaper:1208.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Competition among officials and the abuse of power. (2012). Priks, Mikael.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:3:p:425-438.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings. (2012). Schelker, Mark.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:150:y:2012:i:1:p:27-49.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. Using Choice Experiments to Investigate the Policy Relevance of Heterogeneity in Farmer Agri-Environmental Contract Preferences. (2012). Vedel, Suzanne ; Broch, Stine .
    In: Environmental & Resource Economics.
    RePEc:kap:enreec:v:51:y:2012:i:4:p:561-581.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure. (2012). Wu, Steven ; Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6304.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Product Market Efficiency: The Bright Side of Myopic, Uninformed, and Passive External Finance. (2012). Noe, Thomas ; Rebello, Michael J. ; Rietz, Thomas A..
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:58:y:2012:i:11:p:2019-2036.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Competition in Portfolio Management: Theory and Experiment. (2012). Cvitanic, Jaksa ; Copic, Jernej ; Cornell, Brad ; Bossaerts, Peter ; Asparouhova, Elena ; Meloso, Debrah.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:438.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment. (2012). Schmitz, Patrick ; Nieken, Petra.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:1000-1008.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. AIDE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT ET INFORMATION ASYMÉTRIQUE : UNE ANALYSE PRINCIPAL-AGENT. (2011). Le Texier, Thomas ; Gordah, Maher ; Letexier, Thomas .
    In: Region et Developpement.
    RePEc:tou:journl:v:34:y:2011:p:163-180.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities. (2011). Wirl, Franz ; Helm, Carsten.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:old:dpaper:336-11.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. How Unjust! An Experimental Investigation of Supervisors Evaluation Errors and Agents Incentives. (2011). Rizzolli, Matteo ; Reggiani, Tommaso ; Marchegiani, Lucia .
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6254.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Intermediaries, transport costs and interlinked transactions. (2011). Lefèvre, Mélanie ; THARAKAN, Joe .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8615.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Standardized Enforcement: Access to Justice vs Contractual Innovation. (2011). Perotti, Enrico ; Gennaioli, Nicola.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8478.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment. (2011). Schmitz, Patrick ; Nieken, Petra.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8241.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection. (2011). Wambach, Achim ; Mimra, Wanda.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3412.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Delegating to a Powerless Intermediary: Does It Reduce Punishment?. (2011). Grossman, Zachary ; Oexl, Regine .
    In: University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt0119d201.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  51. Altruism and Career Concerns. (2010). Shchetinin, Oleg.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0427.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  52. Corporate governance in the multinational enterprise: A financial contracting perspective. (2010). Jindra, Bjoern ; Dietrich, Diemo.
    In: International Business Review.
    RePEc:eee:iburev:v:19:y:2010:i:5:p:446-456.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  53. Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?. (2010). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7976.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  54. Human Resource Management and Productivity. (2010). van Reenen, John ; bloom, nicholas ; VanReenen, John .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7849.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  55. Satisficing Contracts. (2009). Bolton, Patrick ; Faure-Grimaud, Antoine .
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14654.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  56. Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments. (2009). Schmitz, Patrick.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7584.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  57. The Organization of Firms Across Countries. (2009). van Reenen, John ; Sadun, Raffaella ; bloom, nicholas.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7338.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  58. The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures. (2009). Schmitz, Patrick ; Hoppe, Eva.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7331.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  59. Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d’Agence Hiérarchique. (2009). ROTA GRAZIOSI, Grégoire ; Dequiedt, Vianney ; Geourjon, Anne-Marie ; Rota-Graziosi, Gregoire.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1047.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  60. Mechanism design with collusive supervision: a three-tier agency model with a continuum of types. (2008). Suzuki, Yutaka.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d80022.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  61. Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study. (2007). Sloof, Randolph ; Praag, Mirjam ; van Praag, Mirjam.
    In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050026.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  62. Anreize für Weitsicht und Wiederwahlschwellen: Wege zur besseren Demokratie. (2007). Gersbach, Hans.
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:8:y:2007:i:4:p:389-397.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  63. Extension of Labor Contracts and Optimal Backpay. (2006). Danziger, Leif.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2366.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  64. Les Diary methods : présentation et cas dapplication dune méthode de collecte de données basée sur la tenue dun journal personnel. (2006). Nasr, Mohammed Ikram ; Roussel, Patrice ; Conway, Neil ; Sassi, Narjes.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00096927.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  65. Consumer Lending When Lenders are More Sophisticated Than Households. (2006). Inderst, Roman.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5410.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  66. Protecting Savings: Do We Need a Supervision Authority?. (2005). giuli, francesco ; Manzo, Marco .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp84.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  67. Public-private partnerships: contract design and risk transfer. (2005). Legros, Patrick ; Dewatripont, Mathias.
    In: EIB Papers.
    RePEc:ris:eibpap:2005_005.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  68. Too much cocited documents. This list is not complete

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2024-11-28 04:05:06 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.