Title Three CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

A. ART. 134- REBELLION/INSURRECTION

B. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6968 (AN ACT PUNISHING THE CRIME OF COUP D'ETAT BY AMENDING ARTICLES
134, 135 AND 136 OF CHAPTER ONE, TITLE THREE OF ACT NUMBERED THIRTY-EIGHT HUNDRED AND
FIFTEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES)

1. Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

FACTS:

In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder. Judge Jaime Salazar issued the warrant of arrest. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts
against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged
against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal.

Contention of Enrile:

Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged
against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against
him is simple rebellion – which is bailable.

ISSUE:

WON the court must abandon Hernandez doctrine (Rebellion can absorb other crimes).

HELD:

No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942)
which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed
with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the
1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised
Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can
change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is
correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only
be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.

2. Umil v. Ramos, supra

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow
man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the
wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a
road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by
the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was
Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by
7the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization.

COA: the b accused contended that his detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against
them are null and void.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he
was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or
in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing
offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well
within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

3. ENRILE VS. AMIN, GR No. 93335 (September 13, 1990)

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Together with the filing of information charging Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder, government prosecutors
filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 (Penalizing
obstruction of apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders). It is alleged that on Dec. 1,
1989 at Dasma Village, Enrile, having reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that Ex-Col.
Gringo Honasan has committed a crime, obstructed, impeded, frustrated or delayed the
apprehension of Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house. Enrile apparently gave
Gringo food and comfort in the Dasma house, despite knowing that Gringo is a fugitive from
justice.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component
element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan.

RESOLUTION OF THE SC: The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case
of People v. Hernandez the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas
corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar. The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to
reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. The
rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. This doctrine is applicable in the
case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance
of rebellion.

4. PEOPLE v. DASIG G.R. No. 100231

FACTS: While on duty, (Private First Class) Pfc. Catamora saw 8 persons, including accused Nunez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad.
Catamora followed the two men, but sensing that they were being followed, the men went to the middle
of the road and engaged Catamora to a gun battle. Catamora then heard a series of shots from the other
group and afterwards, he saw Manatad sprawled on the ground. Catamora sought refuge at a nearby
building from where he saw 2 persons take Manatad’s gun and fired at him to make sure he was dead.
The group then fled the scene.

Later on, after conducting surveillance on the NPA sparrow unit in Cebu City. Rodrigo Dasig and Nunez
were apprehended, and their firearms were confiscated. Dasig confessed in the hospital that he and the
group of Nunez killed Manatad and that he and Nunez were members of the Sparrow unit.

CONTENTION OF STATE: Guilty of murder with direct assault.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he
should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

HELD: Dasig should be prosecuted for rebellion. Appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership
with the Sparrow unit, but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Manatad. The
Sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Manatad was committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. As such, appellant is liable for rebellion
and not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority.

5. People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389

Facts
In this case while off-duty policeman SPO3 JESUS LUCILO was walking along Burgos public
market, a man suddenly fired a gun at the policeman at his waist. The man who shot him had
three companions one of which is LOVEDIORO who happened to be a member of the NPA
army. After the victim had fallen, allegedly 3 of them had fired at the victim 4 times to ensure
his death. After which, they boarded a tricycle and fled.
AC: He said that he did not fire the gun, that he was the only one who served as a lookout in the
liquidation of Lucilo
Issue: whether the crime imposed was supposed to be rebellion?
Held:
No. The crime of rebellion is a political crime, directly aimed against the government to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. From the foregoing, it is plainly
obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crime.
Even if the act complained were committed simultaneously with or in the course of rebellion, if
the killing, robbing or etc. were accomplished for private purposes or profit without political
motivation, it has been held that the crime is separately punishable as a common crime.

C. ART. 137- DISLOYALTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS /EMPLOYEES

D. ART. 138- INCITING TO REBELLION / INSURRECTION

E. ART. 139- SEDITION

• People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 GR No. 17748

Plaintiff/Appellee : The People of the Philippine Islands,

Defendant/Appellant : Graciano L. Cabrera et al.

(SHORT VERSION) Because of certain incidents, the Philippine constabulary and the Police of Manila had
a rough relationship with each other. The constabulary force had grudges against the Police force of
Manila. One night, the constabulary force went to attack the Police force, killing and wounding several
policemen and civilians

. FACTS The Philippine Constabulary has grudges against the police of Manila and they want to inflict
revenge for the following reasons:

On December 13, 1920, a Manila police arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a
constabulary soldier and was allegedly abused by the said policeman. (2) Private Macasinag of the
Constabulary was shot by a Manila police and was mortally wounded. A day after the incident, a rumor
spread among the Constabulary that the Police who shot Macasinag was back to his original duties while
Macasinag was declared dead. There were also rumors that the said shooting was ordered. On the night
of December 15 some members of the Constabulary escaped their barracks through a window (the saw
out the window bars). They had rifles and ammunitions and were organized in groups under the
command of their sergeants and corporals.

They attacked some Manila policemen in these specific instances: (1) On Calle Real, Intramuros, a group
of the Constabulary shot and killed an American Policeman and his friend. (2) The Constabulary
indiscriminately shot at a passer- by, causing a death and wounding most of the passengers. (3) While
riding a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, Captain William E. Wichman (asst. chief of police in
Manila) was shot and killed together with Saplala

ISSUES/HELD

(1) Is there connivance/conspiracy between the accused- YES

(2) Are the accused properly convicted of a violation of the Treason and Sedition Law- YES

RATIO (1) Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part of
the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in
the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to the effect that object. It is incontestable that
all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which was to avenge themselves on the
police force of Manila. A common feeling of resentment animated all.

(2) Sedition, in its more general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. The
Philippine law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in
order to obtain by force of outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting
any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular
government or of a provincial or municipal government. The counsel contested that it is necessary that
the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public functioinary, and what really
happened was a fight between two armed bodies of the Philippine Government. The court held that this
contention is without foundation. The Treason and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the
persons to which it applies. What is important is that there is a public rising to incite or inflict any act of
hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular government or of a
provincial or municipal government. DECISION Judgment affirmed

F. ART. 140- PENALTY FOR SEDITION

G. ART. 141- CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SEDITION

H. ART. 142- INCITING TO SEDITION

1. US v. TOLENTINO : G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906

FACTS:

On 14 May 1903, Aurelio Tolentino and others presented a theatrical work written by the former
entitled, “Kahapon Nayon at Bukas in Tagalog language at the Teatro Libertad in Manila. The piece
contained seditious words and speeches, and scurrilous libels against the government of the US and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands which were uttered during the presentation as if tending to
obstruct the lawful officers in the execution of their offices, instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots and disturb the peace, safety
and order of the community'

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition'

HELD: YES.

The theatrical performance of Tolentino were acts of inciting to sedition'

RATIO:

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time ,place , and manner of its
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and the
government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal object and
intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance to
the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for the secret organigation of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of overthrowing the
present government and setting up another in its stead.

2. Espuelas vs People 90 Phil. 524

(wala po akong mahanap na COA)
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his
picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the
tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in
the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter,
wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the
situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US
and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty
imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written by the accused, cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances,
the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the
reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the
majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and
substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal
courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
repress the evils which press upon their minds.

Eto po ung sulat ni Espuelas na ginawa nea na napublish sa gen. circulation

Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for
I don't need them.

Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide,
I still have the right to burried among Christians.

But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.

My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with
the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.

And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the
Leyte.

Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. lawphil.net

Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.

I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the
world with this dirty government.

I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo (Law of the Knife)all the Roxas
people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.

3. UMIL VS. RAMOS SUPRA ON ART. 142, RPC

Facts: This is a consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests
andsearches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential
information” thatthe authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged,
the rest are chargedwith subversion for being a member of the New People’s Army.

Petitioner: Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he
was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister
Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to
talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men,
headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He
demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to
his request and hurriedly sped away. He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police
District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of
the same morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent
ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he
was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty.
Respondent: The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of
the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to
Sedition).

Resolution: The petitioner was seen gathering drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay
Blvd. and Valencia Street where he was heard to say: “Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang
Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda
hanggang sa magkagulo na.” The police finally caught up with the petitioner and he was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an information for violation of Art. 142 of
the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

II. REPUBLIC ACT NO 10591 OR THE COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS REGULATION ACT
(CFARA)

• DECREE CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL / UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES (P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED
BY R.A. 8294 AS AMENDED BY RA 10591)

• FOCUS ON FIREARMS AS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIMES OF REBELLION, INSURRECTION, SEDITION, OR

ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT

1. People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 225 [G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996]
FACTS:
Case where a dance was held in a basketball court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol, and Quijada kept on
pestering Iroy’s sister and Quijada killed the brother.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicted Daniel Quijada of the two offenses separately charged
in two informations, murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866.

ISSUE: Whether the 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and
the resultant killing into a single integrated offense

HELD:

The 2nd paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said
two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession of firearm with homicide or
murder.” It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of“ to evince an intention to create
a single integrated crime, but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”.

The unequivocal intent of the second par of section 1. of PD 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or
murder as a distinct offense penalized under the RPC and to increase the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person.
Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249
of the RPC in such a way that if an unlicensed fiream is used in the commission of homicide or murder,
either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal possession
of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished.

The words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes
of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the RPC is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere
aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in killing
a person.
The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in 1st par of sec 1—reclusion
temporal in its max to reclusion perpetua to death.

P.D. 1866 Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms of Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. WILFREDO FELOTEO [G.R. No. 124212. June 5,

1998]
FACTS: Wilfredo Feloteo was charged with and convicted of the crimes of Murder and Illegal
Possession of Firearm. Feloteo was in his sister's house when SPO2 Adion passed by and invited
him over to the place of Teofisto Alaquin in Nagbaril. They boarded SPO2 Adion's tricycle and
arrived at Nagbaril at about 3:00 p.m. Frank Adion dropped by the house of Alaquin and
borrowed the tricycle of SPO2 Adion. Frank Adion later returned on foot and told SPO2 Adion
that the tricycle's engine broke down so he left it along the road. SPO2 Adion checked on his
tricycle and left behind his armalite rifle. Before leaving, he instructed the accused to wait for
him at Alaquin's house.[7]
After thirty minutes, the accused decided to follow SPO2 Adion. He took the armalite and
walked the road leading to Bintuan. At about 7:00 p.m., he met Sonny Sotto's
group. Theyzigzagged as they walked. In jest, the accused said to Sotto, "Boots, don't get near
me, I'll shoot you." He pointed the armalite to Sotto and pressed its trigger, allegedly unaware
that it was loaded. It fired and hit Sotto. The accused fled but was apprehended by SPO2 Adion
the following day. He told SPO2 Adion that he accidentally shot Sotto.
Feloteo was found guilty as charged.[9] He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion
perpetua, for murder, and imprisonment of twenty (20) years, for illegal possession of firearm.
He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Sotto the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
as civil indemnity.
ACCUSED: According to RA No. 8294, If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
RESOLUTION: Republic Act No. 8294, amended P.D. No. 1866, by reducing the penalties
for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession of firearms.[13] The law now provides:

"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition.- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm such as
rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

***The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41,
.45 and also lesser caliber firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of
two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. - The term unlicensed firearm shall include:

1) firearms with expired license, or

2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime."

Clearly, the penalty for illegal possession of high powered firearm is prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine of P30,000.00. In case homicide or murder is committed with the
use of unlicensed firearm, such use of unlicensed firearm shall be merely considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

Feloteo is hereby sentenced, to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision

correccional, as the minimum term, and eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as the
maximum term.

3. PEOPLE VS NARVASA G.R. NO. 128618

FACTS: On Feb. 6, 1992, Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal (both councilmen of Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan),
acting on report that there were missing carabaos, goats, and pigs, went to Sitio Bugtong, Bani and Sitio Patar, Agno
where they patrolled the area. The two chanced upon the gang of appellants. They were 5 and 3 of them were
armed. Jimmy Orania was holding a .30 caliber carbine, Mateo Narvasa with an M-16, and Felicisimo Narvasa holding
an M-14.

At first, Laderas and Nagal did not mind the gang, but when they came across the policemen SPO3 Primo
Camba and PO2 Simeon Navora, they reported what they saw. The two policemen were also investigating about the
missing animals, and they decided that all of them should track down the goons.

They were near the house of appellant Felicisimo Narvasa when they were met with a volley of gunshots.
SPO3 Camba was hit and later on died. The goons were later apprehended and tested positive for gunpowder burns.

STATE: The trial court ruled that the homicide was merely an element of the illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form; thus, homicide in the present case was taken into account not as a separate crime but as an
aggravating circumstance which increased the penalty for the illegal possession of firearms. Applying People v.
Barros to the proven facts, the trial court imposed upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua. (*note: RP is
deemed included in the term Life Imprisonment. Therefore, the convict who was sentenced to suffer RP is not
entitled to the application of RSL)

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Laderas’ group shot Narvasa’s son. Orania claims he knew nothing and denied
participation in the shooting.

RESOLUTION: RA 8294 has been enacted, which imposes a lighter penalty for the crime. It provides that if homicide
or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered
as an aggravating circumstance and appellants can be held liable only for homicide and penalized with reclusion
temporal (*note: Reclusion Temporal is entitled to the application of ISL). Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, RA 8294 should be given retroactive effect. Thus, the decision was modified finding the appellants
guilty of homicide with the special aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms.

•••••••••••••

(Additional lang, to explain yung resolution)

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In People v. Molina,[32] this Court en banc explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an unlicensed firearm
only an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, viz.:

Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder; appellants should
perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.

Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense.

Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide [33] and penalized with reclusion
temporal.Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,[34] RA 8294 should be given retroactive effect.
4. Advincula vs. CA G.R. No. 131144. October 18, 2000

FACTS:

Noel Advincula, in this petition for review, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals which set aside the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice ordering the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite to file an Information for
Illegal Possession of Firearms against private respondents Amando Ocampo and Isagani Ocampo.

Noel Advincula armed with a bolo, ran after Isagani Ocampo who was able to reach home and elude his
attackers. Amando Ocampo, father of Isagani, then got his .22 caliber gun, and confronted Advincula, who
in turn, threatened to attack Amando with his bolo, thus prompting the latter to aim his gun upwards and
fire a warning shot. He filed a case of Illegal Possession of Firearms against the Ocampos, which was
granted by the Secretary of Justice. Then Ocampo filed a petition for review.

The Court of Appeals found that no charges for Illegal Possession of Firearms could be filed against the
Ocampos for two (2) reasons: First, as to private respondent Amando Ocampo, he had the requisite license
to possess the firearm, which was established by sufficient evidence on record. Second, as to private
respondent Isagani Ocampo, there was no convincing evidence that he was in possession of a gun during
the incident involving him, his father and petitioner, except for the eyewitness account of petitioner and
one Federico San Miguel.

CONTENTION OF ADVINCULA:

The Court of Appeals erred in granting private respondents' petition and in setting aside the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice.

RESOLUTION:

The rule is well settled that in cases of Illegal Possession of Firearms, two (2) things must be shown to
exist: (a) the existence of the firearm, and (b) the fact that it is not licensed. However, it should be noted
that in People v. Ramos, citing People v. Gy Gesiong, this Court ruled: " x x x x Even if he has the license,
he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor."

This ruling is obviously a reiteration of the last paragraph of Sec. 1 of PD 1866 -

Sec. 1. - Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition

or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition x x x x The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside
his residence without legal authority therefor.

The Secretary of Justice, in his contested Resolution, thus made the following findings: Even if Amando
had the requisite license, there was no proof that he had the necessary permit to carry it outside his
residence; and Isagani's plain denial could not overcome his positive identification by petitioner that he
carried a firearm in assaulting him. These are findings of fact supported by evidence, which cannot be
disturbed by this Court.
The requisite evidence for convicting a person of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms is not needed
at this point. It is enough that the Secretary of Justice found that the facts, as presented by both petitioner
and private respondents, would constitute a violation of PD 1866. Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of criminal Informations against private
respondents, and clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant private respondents' petition for
certiorari.

5. People of the Philippines v. Renato Tac-an G.R. No. 76338-39

Contention of the State:

Renato Tac-an is convicted of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition and was
sentenced to death. He was under the influence of drugs and without the license or permit from proper
authorities carried a Smith and Wesson Airweight Caliber 38 revolver and five live ammunitions. On a
class day Tac-an entered his room in the high school building to attend his English class. He placed his
things on his chair and the scrapbook and went to the teacher to raise a question. When he returned
Francis was sitting on his scrapbook before they assaulted each other the teacher and classmates
intervened. Tac-an slipped out of the classroom to get a gun at their house and when he returned, he burst
into the classroom with a gun raised and ask for Francis. He saw him and fired a gun hitting a geometry
bookd and the armchair of Ruel Ungab. Several student jumped forward and rushed to their teacher for
protection. Francis rushed to the door and Tac-an proceeded to the teacher’s platform and fired at Francis
hitting him on the head. Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A
teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis,
approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato
thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his
chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of
Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his
front chest just above the right nipple.

Contention of the Accused:

The trial court erred in not holding PD 1866 as inapplicable and was enforceable only during the
existence of Martial Law.

Resolution:
There is nothing in PD 1866 that suggested that it was intended to remain in effect only for the
duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the
statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of
the state or period of martial law. His claim of self defense is without merit because unlawful aggression
did not exist and the absence of unlawful aggression constitutes the absence of the two other requisites.
The decision was modified, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation and acting under the influence of drug with the use of unlicensed firearm is deleted.
6. MISOLAS VS PANGA
FACTS:
After receiving information from an unidentified informant that members of the New People's
Army (NPA) were resting in a suspected "underground house" the elements of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) raided said house in the early morning. Three persons were inside the house,
Misolas and two women known by the aliases "Ka Donna" and "Ka Menchie" but the women
were able to escape in the confusion during the raid. The house was searched and the raiders
found in a red bag under a pillow allegedly used by petitioner a .20 gauge Remington shotgun
and four live rounds of ammunition. Misolas was arrested and brought to the PC headquarters.
On September 4, 1987, an information charging petitioner with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under Presidential Decree No. 1866 was filed by the provincial fiscal. The
information alleged that the firearm and ammunition were used in furtherance of subversion so
as to qualify the offense under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
ISSUE:
Whether PD 1866 is unconstitutional
HELD:
P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an
imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and
provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would
aggravate the offense. The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an
argument against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. The right against
double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a motion to quash (Sec. 3[h], Rule
117). But, petitioner's motion to quash filed in the trial court did not raise the issue of double
jeopardy because it had not arisen. Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does
arise, P.D. No. 1866 will not be rendered unconstitutional because such is not a ground to nullify
that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to defeat a subsequent
prosecution or conviction for the same offense.

7. RAFAEL BAYLOSIS VS APOLONIO CHAVEZ, GR No. 95136

FACTS: The constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866
is put at issue in the special action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus at bar. That provision
punishes with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, any person who unlawfully manufacturers,
deals in, acquires, disposes of, or possesses any firearm, "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion." The case at bar originated
from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig charging petitioners Rafael
Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together with one Marco Palo, all known high ranking officers of
the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm, the New Peoples Army , with a
violation of PD 1866 on March 29, 1988 in San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines. They have in
their possession – one AK 47 Automatic Rifle with M22N006726 with magazine and 9 rounds
and 3 pieces fragmentation hand grenades without first securing the necessary license or permit
thereof from a competent government authority.

STATE: The mere possession of the weapons (or the unlawful manufacture or assembly
thereof, or dealing in, acquisition or disposal thereof) is also punished by reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua, a penalty higher than that imposed for rebellion or insurrection,
prision mayor,

ACCUSED: They contend that the rulings in People vs. Amado Hernandez (reiterated in some
ten other subsequent rulings), Enrile vs. Salazar, and Enrile vs. Amin — to the effect that the
felony of rebellion defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code cannot, in accordance with
Article 48 of the same Code, be complexed with the offense of murder, homicide, arson, or
other crimes committed in connection with, or on the occasion or in furtherance of, rebellion —
render invalid, as unconstitutional, Section 1 (3) of Presidential Decree No. 1866.

HELD: The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases cited is against attempts to
complex rebellion with the so called "common" crimes committed in furtherance, or in the
course, thereof; this, on the authority alone of the first sentence of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio of said cases is that Article 48 cannot be invoked as the
basis for charging and prosecuting the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., for the
purpose of obtaining imposition of the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum
period (in accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not — indeed they could not and were
never meant to — proscribe the legislative authority from validly enacting statutes that would
define and punish, as offenses sui generis crimes which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may
be viewed as a complex of rebellion with other offenses. There is no constitutional prohibition
against this, and the Court never said there was. What the Court stated in said cases about
rebellion "absorbing" common crimes committed in its course or furtherance must be viewed in
light of the fact that at the time they were decided, there were no penal provisions defining and
punishing, as specific offenses, crimes like murder, etc. committed in the course of as part of a
rebellion. This is no longer true, as far as the present case is concerned, and there being no
question that PD 1866 was a valid exercise of the former President's legislative powers. Thus,
Misolas, to the effect that charging the qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms under
PD 1866 does not charge the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms,
and hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good and correct rule and is applicable
here.

8. People vs. Tiozon G.R. No. 89823

Facts:

One evening while, while the spouses were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened
by the loud knocks on their door; the husband opened the door and saw their "Pareng
Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very drunk,
to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down and the two accused
and victim! Exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her
husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband playing with the
gun, so she took a few steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the
place where her husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left;
five minutes later and or after she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused
knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shoot her
husband she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so
she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law and both of
them proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with
his face up she took her husband’s pulse and when she still felt some warmth on his body,
she sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by
helping them in carrying the victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he
changed his mind and put down the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was
already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter’s help, they were able to
reach the main road; after which, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights;
thereafter, kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused

Contention of the State:

The Court does not give credence to the denial of the accused that he was not the one who shoot the
victim as he was some distance away from the victim answering the call of nature when the victim was
killed. Instead, the Court gives credence to the testimony of the widow that it was the accused whom he
saw in possession of the gun, that it was the accused who was the last person seen in the company of
the victim shortly before the latter died and it was the same accused who lead the policemen in retrieving
the fatal gun.

Contention of the Accused:

He contends that he is not the owner of the said gun, thus a negative results from the paraffin test would
free him from accusation that he killed the victim.

HELD:

The prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no
license to possess or carry the firearm in question; it however, threw the burden on
the accused-appellant to prove that he has that authority. It ruled that

“Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in

the enacting clause by which the offense is described and forbidden, he has the burden of
proving that he is within the exception.

Appellee likewise contends that the conclusion of the trial court on the hiding of the gun was based on the
evidence on record; the accused himself testified that he threw the gun on a grassy area. It further argues
that the conclusion of the court on the improbability of appellant's testimony concerning the ownership of
the gun is not baseless; on the contrary, it is the theory of the appellant that it is probable that another
person may have grabbed the gun from the victim that is highly improbable. Since appellant was behind
the victim he could have seen a third person grabbing the gun. He did not testify that he saw one. The
negative result of the paraffin test cannot be singled out to absolve the accused-appellant from liability.
9. People vs Garcia G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
Facts: A surveillance was conducted according to an intelligence report received by the intelligence division that
Eurocar Sales building was being occupied by elements of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
Filipino People (RAM-SFP) as a communication command post.

On november 30, 1989, Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car of the surveillance team, parked the vehicle
around ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building,Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd
and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they
passed by the group, then only six meters away, the Rolando pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. On December 5, 1989, a searching
team composed of Lt. Virgilio Babao as team leader, Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and
elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were
able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the
right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw De Gracia inside the
office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then
present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. The group was able to
confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that Rolando is supposedly a "boy"
therein.

Contention of the State:

Rolando de gracia, Chito Henson, and several john does were charged and found guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, namely Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites,
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each, and One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs, and armed
with said dynamites, ammunition and explosives. Rolando also charged of attempted homicide on the person of
Crispin Sagario who was hit on the right thigh but was acquitted.

Contention of the Defendant:

Rolando contends that he cannot be held guilty of illegal possession of firearms for the reason that he did not have
either physical or constructive possession thereof considering that he had no intent to possess the same; he is
neither the owner nor a tenant of the building where the ammunition and explosives were found; he was merely
employed by Col. Matillano as an errand boy; he was guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano;
and he did not have actual possession of the explosives. He claims that intent to possess, which is necessary before
one can be convicted under Presidential Decree No. 1866, was not present in the case at bar.

Resolution:

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still
be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to
possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of
a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although
there is physical or constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense
committed.

since the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum punished by a special law, in which case
good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.

10. People vs. Garcia [G.R. No. 133489 & 143970. January 15, 2002]
Contention of the State:
Atty. Tioleco was kidnapped while he was jogging alone in the morning. He was abducted using
a blue car. One of them pointed a gun at the victim while the other hit his back and pushed him
into the back seat of the car. He identified the driver as Gerry Valler and on the passenger seat
behing Valler as Roland Ronald Garcia. His abductors took him to a house in Fairview, where
the accused Rogel and Lariba were assigned to watch him. The sister of Tioleco, Floriana
received a phone call from Villanueva demanding three million pesos (P3M) for Tiolecos’s
ransom. Floriana were not able to raise P3M but she told the kidnappers that she only raised
P71,000. They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount, which was
short of the original demand. The PACC operatives arrested Garcia, and Garcia told the police
the location of the hideout where Tioleco is being held captive. When the police discovered the
hideout, Rogel and Lariba immediately ran to a room in the house where several unlicensed
firearms were stored. Both were convicted of Kidnapping for Ransom and Illegal Possession of
Firearms.
Contention of the Accused:
Rogel and Lariba claimed that they were only bystanders in the case. Rogel stated that he was
just a caretaker of the place where Tioleco was detained and that he observed nothing usual
about the incident. In Laribas’ defense, he joins Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was
allegedly at the wrong place at the wrong time for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up
the car of Jimmy Muit. They said that they should not be convicted of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms considering that there is another case-kidnapping for ransom- which they
were penetrating at the same time.
Resolution:
The Court dismissed Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 (illegal possession of firearms) and set aside
the judgment of conviction therein since accused appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel
cannot be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another
crime - kidnapping for ransom - which they were perpetrating at the same time.
Under R.A. 8294, if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be
no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. The language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. The law is clear that the accused can
be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.”
11. PEOPLE VS GARCIA (2000) G.R. No. 102706. January 25, 2000
FACTS: The Provincial Fiscal accuses FRED ORBISO, LEON LUMILAN and ANTONIO GARCIA of the crime of
QUALIFIED ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS USED IN MURDER, in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866. According to the information, the accused, not being authorized or allowed by the law to keep,
possess and carry firearms, Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, and Eliong dela Cruz inflicting upon them
gunshot wounds which directly caused their deaths; and further inflicting on the same occasion gunshot
wounds upon several others.

After an assessment of the evidence, the trial court declared that no proof beyond reasonable doubt
was adduced by the prosecution to justify the conviction of appellants for Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearms Used in Murder. However, the trial court convicted the appellants for Murder, Frustrated
Murder and Attempted Murder

ACCUSED: As to the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearms, no evidence has been adduced to prove the
charge. The guns were never presented. There is no sufficient evidence to prove Illegal Possession of
Firearms. As regards, the conviction on murder and frustrated murder, this will put the accused in
double jeopardy because they have already been acquitted of illegal possession of firearms.

STATE: Acquittal in the charge of illegal possession of firearms does not bar prosecution for murder and
frustrated murder.

HELD: We come to the conclusion, thus, that whether considered in the light of our ruling in Tac-an and
its progeny of cases or in the context of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 to P.D. No. 1866,
the Information charging appellants with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, is
defective, and their conviction for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder, is irregular.

The information charged three crimes and it is not allowed as only one offense should be charged.
Duplicity or multiplicity of, charges is a ground for a motion to quash under Sec. 2 (e), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The accused, however, may choose not to file a motion to quash and be
convicted of as many distinct charges as are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In
the same vein, failure to interpose any objection to the defect in the information constitutes waiver.

The accused were acquitted of qualified illegal possession of firearms, murder, and frustrated murder.

12. People vs. Nepomuceno, 1999

FACTS:
That on or about May 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
private individual not being authorized by law to possess firearm and ammunition, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully keep, carry in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) cal. .38
revolver and one (1) piece of ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess
the same from the proper authorities, and which firearm, the said accused used in committing the crime of
parricide against his legal wife, Grace B. Nepomuceno, to the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs
and/or public interest.
COA:
 He asserts that this Court must allow the benefit of R.A. No. 8294 to take retroactive effect so as
to acquit him of the crime of qualified illegal possession of firearm.
RESOLUTION:
The use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder or homicide is treated as an
aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm is no longer
separately punished. all the elements of the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm were present,
(1) there must be a firearm; (2) the gun was possessed by the accused; (3) the accused had no license from
the government; and (4) homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm.

13. People vs Evangelista, G.R. Nos. 84332-33. May 8, 1996

Facts: Accused here was charged with murder and simple illegal possession of firearms.
Accused here killed someone with a homemade gun. However the court found the accused guilty
of murder and aggravated illegal possession of firearms (weapon used for murder) and sentenced
him to death
Contention of the Accused: Accused cannot be charged with aggravated illegal possession of
firearms.
Resolution: Accused cannot be found guilty of aggravated illegal possession as the information
simply charged simple illegal possession. That an unlicensed firearm was used in the
commission of murder or homicide is a qualifying circumstance. Consequently, it must be
specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death
without violating his right to be informed of the charge against him.
He cannot even be convicted of simple illegal possession as there was no proof that the
gun was unlicensed. The fact that the gun used was homemade does not mean that it cannot be
licensed and therefore it is right for the court to automatically assume that it is unlicensed. Even
if a homemade gun is used, it does not dispense with the required proof that the gun was indeed
unlicensed.

III. HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 (RA 9372)

A. Punishable Acts of Terrorism

B. Who are Liable

C. Absorption Principle in Relation to Complex Crimes

CHAPTER TWO

CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION

I. SECTION ONE — CRIMES AGAINST LEGISLATIVE BODIES AND SIMILAR BODIES

A. ART.143- ACTS TENDING TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY AND SIMILAR BODIES

B. ART. 144- DISTURBANCE OF PROCEEDINGS

II. SECTION TWO. — VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

A. ART. 145 VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

• Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe (G.R. No. L-34022)

FACTS:
Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of
a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest.
COA:
They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the
charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.
HELD:
No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress,
and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional
immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony
and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista
were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore,
Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution.

CHAPTER THREE

ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATION

A. ART. 146 ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES

1. FORMS OF ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY

2. PERSONS LIABLE IN ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY 3. PRESUMPTIONS

B. ART. 147 ILLEGAL ASSOCIATIONS

1. Prohibited Associations

2. PERSONS LIABLE

CHAPTER FOUR
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIANCE TO PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR
AGENTS

A. ART. 152- PERSONS IN AUTHORITY & AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY

• Distinctions between Public Officer, Person in Authority and Agent of a Person in Authority

B. ART. 148- DIRECT ASSAULTS

1. KINDS

2. TWO WAYS TO COMMIT

3. WHEN DIRECT ASSAULT IS QUALIFIED

4. People v. Beltran, 138 SCRA 521 GR nos. –L- 37168-69

FACTS:

The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11, 1972, between 9:00 and 10:00, in
Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the
Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted at them, "Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your
mother). They proceeded on their way and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to
his house he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported the matter. The newly
elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to talk to Delfino Beltran and his
companions to surrender considering that he knew them personally as all of them were once
working for Congressman David Puzon When they came near the compound, they saw appellants
Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez and suddenly there was a simultaneous
discharge of gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, who was with them, cried: " I am already hit,
Daddy." As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both fell down. Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman
Rolando Tolentino also suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped, they decided to bring
Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3) men came out of the Puzon
Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle. They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and
Noling Puzon. Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy Bugarin tried to give
chase. After a while, all the six men returned inside the compound.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Delfino Beltran that he had just acted in self-defense

ISSUE:

Whether there is Direct Assault

HELD:
SC ruled that considering that Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were performing their official duties to
maintain peace and order in the community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of
attempted murder with direct assault on the persons of Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.

5. People vs. Dollantes GR No. 70639 June 30, 1987

FACTS :

On the evening of April 21, 1983, Marcos Gabutero, barangay captain of Brgy. Maglihe, Tayasan,
Negros Occiental, was delivering a speech to start a dance. The accused Pedro Dollantes went to the
middle of the dance floor, making a dance known as “nagkorantsa”, branded a hunting knife and
challenged everyone to who was brave among the people present. Gabutero took notice of this and
admonished Dollantes to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance. Dollantes, however, stabbed him in
the left arm. The party of Dollantes then proceeded to take turns on stabbing Maglihe.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE :

The trial court found that the party of Dollantes was guilty of conspiring with each other for the
crime of direct assault against Marcos Gabutero.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED :

That the trial court erred in finding them guilty of direct assault as Gabutero was not in the
exercise of his official functions.

HELD :

Yes. Since Dollantes was in the act of pacifying Dollantes who was causing trouble in the dance hall at
the time of his death, there is no question that he was killed in the performance of his duty. In the case
of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to
enforce the laws and ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the
enmity of his people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault
upon a person in authority."

C. ART. 149- INDIRECT ASSAULT

D. ART. 150- DISOBEDIENCE TO SUMMONS ISSUED BY THE NAT'L ASSEMBLY, ITS COMMITTEES OR
SUBCOMMITTEES, BY THE CONST. COMMISSION, ITS COMMITTEES, SUBCOMMITTEES OR DIVISIONS

E. ART. 151- RESISTANCE & DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS OF SUCH
PERSON

1. ELEMENTS OF RESISTANCE & SERIOUS DISOBEDIENCE

2. ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE DISOBEDIENCE

3. Distinguish Direct Assault and Resistance

CHAPTER FIVE

PUBLIC DISORDERS

A. ART. 153- TUMULTS & OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER

B. ART. 154- UNLAWFUL USE OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION & UNLAWFUL UTTERANCES

C. ART. 155- ALARMS & SCANDALS

• Definition of CHARIVARI

D. ART. 156- DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS

• ALBERTO VS DELA CRUZ G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980

FACTS:
Orbita was prosecuted for violating Art. 156 of the RPC by helping Denaque, a prisoner,
to escape while working on the guest house of the provincial jailer, Gov. Cledera. During trial,
counsel filed a motion to include the names of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda, Assistant
Provincial Warden, in the criminal charge against Orbita, believing that the two also helped and
connived in the escape of the prisoner. Respondent judge directed the petitioner (fiscal) to
conduct further investigation. Petitioner found no cause to charge Gov. Cledera and Lt.
Esmeralda. However, upon filing of Orbita of an MR, the respondent judge ruled otherwise and
ordered the inclusion of the names of the two in the criminal charges. Petitioner filed for recourse.

ISSUE:
WON Gov. Cledera and Esmeralda may be prosecuted for the escape of Denaque under
Article 156 of the RPC.

RULING:

NO. Offenses under Art. 156 of the RPC may be committed in two ways: (1) by
removing a person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by helping such a
person to escape. To remove means to take away a person from the place of his
confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person released. To help in
the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished that
person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate
his escape.

The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes
from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of
prisoner defined and penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.
Cledera as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Esmeralda is the assistant provincial
warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156
of the Revised Penal Code.

A. ART.157- EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

CHAPTER SIX

EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

1. CIRCUMSTANCES QUALIFYING THE OFFENSE

2.Tanega vs. Masakayan G.R. No. L-27191

Facts:
Adelaida Tanega Tanega was found guilty of slander. She was sentenced to 20 days of
arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. Court of First Instance of Quezon
City said that execution of the sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion,
execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour,
petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to
issue a warrant for her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was
never arrested.

Contention of the accused:

(December 10, 1966) She can no longer be arrested because the penalty has prescribed.
Resolution:
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final
judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he
evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.7 This must be so. For,
by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping
during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take
place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence.
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final
sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.