Yasuba 1975 PDF
Yasuba 1975 PDF
Yasuba 1975 PDF
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YASUKICHI YASUBA
Almost half a century ago, a bitter debate was started between two
factions of Marxists on the nature of prewar capitalism in Japan. The
debate, which has come to be known as the Nihon shihonshugi ronsa
(the debate on Japanese Capitalism) swelled into the largest, if not
the most significant, controversy in Marxist economics and economic
history in Japan. It affected virtually all Japanese intellectuals, Marx-
ist and otherwise, and has continued into the postwar period. Hun-
dreds of articles and books have been written in the course of the
debate, and at least half a dozen histories' of the debate have been
published.
The two opposing schools in the debate are called kozaha and
r6n5ha. The kozaha, so named because people who first represen
the school published their main views in Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu-
shi k5za (Lectures on the History of the Development of Japanese
Capitalism)2 contended that the basic nature of Japanese capitalism
was determined, around the turn of the century, by a feudal or semi-
feudal agrarian landownership which had been inherited almost in-
tact from the feudal period. Hence, they called for an agrarian
revolution as the first step toward the "true" revolution. Their main
opponents, the ronoha, so called because some of the earlier writers
were associated with the journal Rono, appeared mainly as critics of
the kozaha and insisted that the Meiji Restoration, despite its incom-
63
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64 Journal of Japanese Studies
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Yasuba: Capitalism 65
the wage cost per unit of output. The wage rate per unit of time for a
comparable mix of labor was probably higher in Japan even at that time.
Sakisaka Itsur6, Nihon shihonshugi no shomondai (Shiseid6, 1958), pp. 9-12,
originally published in Kaiz6, October 1935.
5. Sakisaka, p. 58. Statistics were taken from a secondary source. How-
ever, a comparison of official statistics by Ouchi Tsutomu for 1913-14 con-
firms the result. Ouchi Tsutomu, Nihon shihonshugi no nogy6 mondai (Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 1952), p. 173.
6. Yamada, Bunseki, p. 61.
7. Hirano, Kik5, pp. 97-100.
8. Most of the Marxist writers say that more than the entire surplus value
was taken as rent. In the Marxist context this qualification is essential, but
for simplicity it will be disregarded here.
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66 Journal of Japanese Studies
TABLE 1
RENT OR FEUDAL DUE
(Medium-grade paddy field)
Dues or Rent
Note: The first three represent feudal dues and the last three, rent.
Source: Yamada, Bunseki, p. 186. Yamada draws his estimates from a
variety of original sources.
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Yasuba: Capitalism 67
TABLE 2
RENT TiN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
ABOUT THE TIME OF WORLD WAR I
Yen
Per Tan
Japan, 1921
Paddy field (one crop) 31.746
(two crops) 39.597
Dry field 9.710-10.941
Mulberry field 23.275
England, before World War I 2.50
Scotland, 1912-20 2.00
Ireland, 1881-1920 1.80
Germany, 1913 1.92
Austria, before World War 1 2.46
France, before World War I 1.20-1.60
U.S., before World War I 1.00-15.00
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68 Journal of Japanese Studies
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Yasuba: Capitalism 69
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70 Journal of Japanese Studies
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Yasuba: Capitalism 71
not because of the abolition of feudal restriction but because of the autonomous
increase in employment opportunities.
It is possible, as Tsuchiya has partly shown (Tsuchiya Takao, Nihon
shihonshugishi ronshri [Ikuseisha, 1937], Ch. 1), that feudal restrictions had
already been pretty much undermined even during the Tokugawa Period with
the result that there were, at the time of the Restoration, not too many
peasants who were kept in the countryside against their will. See also Thomas
C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan (Stanford University Press,
1959).
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72 Journal of Japanese Studies
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Yasuba: Capitalism 73
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74 Journal of Japanese Studies
One of the reasons why the kozaha thesis attracted such a strong
following seems to have been the existence of feudalistic or com-
munal human relations in the countryside. The modern theory of
dualistic development is capable of incorporating this feature with-
out inviting the difficulties the kozaha had to face. In many ways, the
modern theory, developed mainly by W. Arthur Lewis, Gustav Ranis
and John C. H. Fei,39 appears similar to the kizaha model. As in the
kozaha model, the pre-turning-point phase of the modern theory is
characterized by a pre-modern or communal agriculture contrasted
with capitalistic industry. Also, just as in the kozaha model, agricul-
ture is supposed to provide for industry an unlimited supply of labor
at exogenously determined "institutional wages." The similarity, how-
ever, is skin-deep, since institutionally determined wages in the two
models are very different in nature: whereas they are supposed to be
lower than competitive wages according to the kozaha, they are pre-
sumably higher than competitive wages according to the modern
theory, reflecting the existence of disguised unemployment in agri-
culture.40 It is interesting that Ranis and Fei claimed that the un-
38. Kondo Yasuo, Nihon nmgy6 keizairon (1932) in Konde Yasuo chosa-
kushu, Vol. 4 (Nosangyoson Bunka Kyokai, 1974), particularly pp. 228, 231.
39. Arthur W. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies
of Labour," The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 22,
No. 2 (May 1954); Gustav Ranis and John C. H. Fei, "A Theory of Eco-
nomic Development," American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4 (September
1961); John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, "Capital Accumulation and Eco-
nomic Development," American Economic Review, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June
1963); and Fei and Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy:
Theory and Policy (Homewood, Ill., R. Irwin, 1964).
40. Another difference is the assumption about landownership; whereas
in the kozaha model landowner-tenant relations are supposed to be dominant,
subsistence agriculture presumably with a predominance of owner-cultivators
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Yasuba: Capitalism 75
is assumed by the modern dualistic theory. Actually, about half of the land
was under tenancy before World War II and considerably less in the early
years of Meiji. This fact has been considered to be evidence against the k5zaha.
The existence of tenancy is consistent with the modern dualistic theory, so long
as rent is flexible enough. This is particularly likely when owner-tenant
relations are connected with family ties, as was often the case in Japanese
agriculture.
41. Fei and Ranis, pp. 304-05.
42. Yamada, Preface to Bunseki.
43. Ariga, "Nihon noson ni okeru hokensei" (1947) in Ariga Kizaemon
chosakushfi, Vol. 4 (Miraisha, 1967), p. 105.
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76 Journal of Japanese Studies
44. Okochi Kazuo, Reimeiki no Nihon rod5 undo (Iwanami Shoten, 1952),
pp. 6, 10-11; Rod3 mondai (KobundW, 1955), pp. 39, 42.
45. Okochi, Reimeiki no Nihon rod6 undo, pp. 10-11.
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Yasuba: Capitalism 77
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78 Journal of Japanese Studies
Concluding Remarks
Too much theorizing has been done without checking the rele-
vance of underlying assumptions and without specifying alternative
hypotheses. Examining the relationship between alternative models
and posing empirical questions to check the relevance of these alter-
native models are the major tasks to which this paper has addressed
itself.
Some efforts have been made to give tentative answers to these
empirical questions but they should not be taken as anything defini-
tive. Even the k5zaha thesis, at least its reconstructed version, may
be found to have applied in some places, though it will have to be
shown how the system worked, based on empirical studies rather
than by reference to Marx or Lenin. There seems to be a better
chance for the disguised unemployment version of the Ranis-Fei
model to stand up, at least with application to the 1950's. When it
comes to prewar years, however, it will have to compete not only
with an ordinary neoclassical model but also with the subsidized
dekasegi version of the dualistic model.
This paper did not dwell on the intertemporal development of a
number of variables. Unlike in the prewar period of the Nihon
shihonshugi rons5, however, one knows by now at least the general
outline of the tremendous growth of macro-variables over time. It
should be noted, in this connection, that only the relative stagnation
in agriculture, particularly the relative stability of the agricultural
labor force over a long period, makes it worthwhile to examine the
relevance of institutional models, such as the kozaha or disguised un-
employment models. However, one had better be well aware of the
limitations of these models and of the powerfulness of the competitive
model. For whenever the solutions of institutional models are widely
different from that of the competitive model, forces will start work-
ing to bridge the gap. The comparative examination of the kizaha
model with the ranmha model or of the Ranis-Fei model with the
subsidized dekasegi model in this paper should have made this point
clear.
KYOTO UNIVERSITY
that even in 1952, in which agricultural population was much (more than 5
million) larger than the prewar peak, there was no disguised unemployment
in agriculture. Minami Ryoshin, Nihon keizai no tenkanten (Sobunsha, 1970),
Ch. 8, particularly p. 136.
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Yasuba: Capitalism 79
A///,mp 1.
W?
0
Copeitv Mode
A L L B
0 0
DIAGRAM 1
Competitive Model
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80 Journal of Japanese Studies
Japanese industry. Then, the strategy for increasing wages and reducing
rent will be to accelerate industrial development. Land reform will raise
the standard of living of the peasants but will not affect industrial wages
unless a greater incentive pulls up mpa.
In the present kozaha model (Diagram 2), it is assumed that tradition-
bound monopsonistic landowners try to set the rent at a level to leave
only subsistence (w#A) to the peasants. (This does not necessarily maxi-
mize rent.) But before going to this "semi-feudal" kozaha model, let us
show a purely feudal model which is indicated by L1'. A sufficient amount
of labor (AL1') is bound to the land to maximize rent (entire shaded
area), giving peasants just enough (wA) so that "they will neither die
nor live." Of course, rent is higher and the agricultural standard of living
lower than in the competitive solution. It was not indicated in the text, but
it should be clear that industrial, or rather urban, wages (w0'B) are
higher than under competition.
Now, as the feudal bondage is abolished, agricultural labor will move
to industry hoping to improve their economic status. However, if the
agricultural standard of living is pegged by monopsonistic and tradition-
bound landowners at the subsistence level, their efforts will be frustrated.
W0
ca~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~P
A L L L'
1 0 1
DIAGRAM 2
Kozaha Model
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Yasuba: Capitalism 81
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82 Journal of Japanese Studies
W.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~p
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
Wi
A L L. B
0 3.
DIAGRAM 3
Disguised Unemployment Model
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