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Plots and Motives in Japan's Meiji
Restoration
GEORGE M. WILSON
Indiana University
Like other dramatic and discontinuous historical processes, the Meiji Restora-
tion of 1868 possesses the inherent fascination to sustain yet another rehearsal
of its basic course of events. The present one differs from others in several
ways. It does not center on samurai heroes and villains contesting foreign
incursion. Instead it identifies fully four groups that acted during the late
Tokugawa era, the years 1850-68, known by the generic periodizing word
bakumatsu-"the end of the bakufu," that is, of the shogun's government
situated at Edo. It presents each group according to the experiences and
motives of its members. It points to the interactions between the four narrative
structures, the plots or mythoi, but without homogenizing them into a unitary
historiographical line. It also recognizes the necessary prefiguration of the
historian's field but tries nevertheless to convey the perceived intentions of
the four groups of historical actors.
Using the last decade of the bakumatsu period as an example of an historic
watershed, this essay thus sketches a novel method for appreciating the onset
of large-scale political and social change. The basis of the method lies in
establishing the four mythoi and then narrating these plots or story lines that
historical agents and agencies (human beings and social institutions) experi-
enced during the final years of Tokugawa bakufu control over Japan. Long-
lived as it was, lasting from 1600 to 1868, the Tokugawa era retained its
synchronic unity for some two centuries after the system was fixed. But the
period ended with Japan in profound disarray. It is that ending to which we
will turn our attention.
0010-4175/83/3195-2390 $2.50 ? 1983 Society for Comparative Study of Society and History
407
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408 GEORGE M. WILSON
handed along from the past, data that represent something of the aspirations of
historical actors. The point of this article is to emphasize the differential roles
of interacting groups on the eve of the Meiji Restoration.
In a passage remarkable for capturing the surface contradictions of a time of
confusion, George Sansom observes that during the bakumatsu period "a
fantastic ethos prevails throughout the land." He continues with a catalogue
of the seeming paradoxes that puzzle the retrospective analyst who wants to
understand the era:
The domestic politics of this period were described by more than one contemporary
writer in works with such titles as Yumemonogatari, or Story of a Dream. That, though
not so intended, was a fitting description of the plots and counterplots, the quarrels and
arguments, the confusion between names and things, the misunderstandings and be-
wilderments which characterize this uneasy epoch. It is full of episodes that seem not
to belong to waking life, but have the plausible inconsequence, the unearthly logic, of
events in a dream.
If what Sansom means by all this is that he and others have encountered
difficulty in comprehending the course of events between the arrival of the
American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 and the Meiji Restoration of
1868, then he is surely right. As the bakufu approached what was to be the
end of its time in power, the historian looking backward finds it troublesome
to formulate a coherent narrative. The chronology gets "hot," as Claude
Levi-Strauss would say, because stunning and memorable events follow one
after another with dizzying speed.2
The various ideas comprising the collective ethos of the Japanese who lived
at the time are hard to summarize, harder to analyze, and harder still to
compress into a single orderly system. Victor Turner has persuasively charac-
terized periods such as this as "liminal,"3 pointing out that reason and logic
rarely govern what happens in major historical transitions. More often, myth
works its way to the fore, appealing to the psychological need for stability and
deep-seated truth-a truth more compelling than the superficial facts of exis-
tence, which themselves may well be transitory-shared by elites and masses
alike. "Myths treat of origins but derive from transitions," Turner writes.
"Myths relate how one state of affairs became another . . . how chaos be-
came cosmos."4 And myths reassure people when events threaten the
viability of the social or political order, for myth promises recurrence, the
return of fundamental virtues and heroic action.
No liminal period in world history is more rife with myth and the quest for
redemption than bakumatsu Japan. There are numberless accounts of what
i G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 281.
2 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 259.
3 Victor W. Turner, "Myth and Symbol," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
(New York: Macmillan-Free Press, 1968), X, 576.
4 Ibid.
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 409
happened, concurring in skeletal outline of facts and events but not in what
those facts and events mean. Although the chronology is not in serious doubt,
there are many schools of interpretation, several of them blooming while
others wither, but none convincing enough to close the books. Social scien-
tists disagree about the "revolutionary" character of the Meiji Restoration.
Writers who judge the Restoration a failure, or simply deem it defective,
usually deny that it constituted a revolution. Others who applaud the experi-
ments of the Restoration leaders take refuge in a thesis that the revolution may
have been made from above, by an oligarchy, yet it did do wonders for Japan
and therefore deserves high praise.5
A working historian confronted with the multitude of versions of how the
bakumatsu period proceeded and the Meiji Restoration came to occur must
despair about what any retrospective investigator can really know. Whether
we can draw any valid conclusions at all is a challenging question, and the
issue may turn into one of faith or of ideology. The facts are there, but how
they are strung together is what produces an interpretation. An attempt to
present "just the facts" will fall short of a coherent interpretation and disap-
point even the most rudimentary survey in a history course. In recent years the
social science models developed by Western scholars and the economic deter-
minism that has prevailed among the Japanese have added a wealth of infor-
mation about events and situations but have only muddied the issue of what
the Meiji Restoration finally signifies.
The search for another way to comprehend the bakumatsu years and the
Restoration tends to draw the historian back to first principles, or, quite
literally, to the principals themselves-the actors who took part in the dramas
of bakumatsu Japan. R. G. Collingwood points the way by defining the
objective thus: the historian must remember, Collingwood writes, that an
action is "the unity of the outside and inside of an event," that is, of its
exterior happenings and movements and its interior "thought"; therefore the
historian's "main task is to think himself into this action, to discern the
thought of its agent."6 And Kenneth Burke cautions readers that those who
would understand human motivation must bear in mind "a pentad of key
terms": act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose.7 In short the intent in this
5 For paradigmatic examples in English of these opposing appraisals of the Meiji Restoration,
see Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), ch. 5; and John Whitney Hall,
Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times (New York: Delacorte Press, 1970), chs 11-14. In
English, the most comprehensive treatment of Japan during the mid-nineteenth century is that of
W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972). But see also
the meticulous study of the bakufu's last years by Conrad D. Totman, The Collapse of the
Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868 (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980).
6 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 213.
7 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969),
xv-xvi.
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410 GEORGE M. WILSON
8 H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (New York: Oxford University Press,
1944), 470-71.
9 Joan Didion, The White Album (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 11.
10 Levi-Strauss, Savage Mind, 258. Levi-Strauss regards perceived and recorded history as a
batch of "fraudulent outlines" whose only peculiar characteristic is chronology, i.e., the tem-
poral order or sequence in which events occur (pp. 258-62). "Dates may not be the whole of
history . . . but they are its sine qua non, for history's entire originality and distinctive nature lie
in apprehending the relation between before and after, which would perforce dissolve if its terms
could not . . . be dated." Therefore no history of the French Revolution can give an accurate
impression of what happened, but only a chronologically correct (yet contextually truncated)
account of events (p. 258).
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 411
So it was also with the Meiji Restoration. Many restorations occurred, not just
one, despite the fact that we routinely speak of "The Restoration" as if it
were a uniform process.
Most people have written the history of the Restoration from the standpoint
of the winners, those hardy dreamers who lived out their passionate ambitions
imbued with myths about Japan and its destiny. 1 But the winners were not
alone in living so close to myth. Turner has written that by its nature "lim-
inality is . . . a period of structural impoverishment and symbolic enrich-
ment" when people take stock of their cultural inventory and seize upon
myths that relate to life crises and milieus outside of normal rules and regula-
tions.'2 For such a period, then, I propose to focus on four sets of actors-
four protagonists-who lived four separate story lines that require four kinds
of orientation toward the world with four different ideological outlooks. 13 To
be sure, this scheme excludes some groups, and it also lumps individuals into
groups for purposes of clarity. But the dangers in conducting this exercise are
minimal compared to the advantage of being able to look at the Restoration
through the lenses of a defined set of groups of actors.
A full elaboration of this method would yield an extended exercise in
"thick description," a phrase Clifford Geertz borrowed from Gilbert Ryle in
order to characterize the sort of ethnography that exposes the multiple layers
of meaning of behavior when it is seen in its cultural context.14 But this article
will be descriptively lean rather than thick, because its object is to concentrate
on the method, not on the content, of the historical period in question.
By the terms of this method, the protagonists of the several dramas on the
eve of the Meiji Restoration divide neatly into four groups: (1) the Western
envoys and traders, (2) the bakufu and its allies, even when they disagreed, so
that this one group perforce includes both the imperial court and the chief
feudal lords, or daimyo, (3) the followers of popular millennial and other
"religious" movements, and (4) the men who called themselves imperial
loyalists, who finally did "seize the jewel" that was the Meiji emperor and
made the Restoration in his name. Adapting from Northrop Frye, it can be
argued that the foreigners sought reconciliation-on their own terms, of
course-and lived the story line of comedy. Not that theirs was a funny story;
it just turned out right, from their standpoint, because it reintegrated a disor-
dered Japan and made it possible to resume stable trade relations. The other
11 Totman, of course, is an exception to the general tendency to write the history of the
winners. His Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu chronicles the dismal if enlightening human
tragedy that befell the managers of the Tokugawa system despite their best intentions and efforts.
12 Turner, "Myth and Symbol," 576-77.
13 The quaternary scheme presented here derives from Hayden V. White's 1973 article,
"Interpretation in History," in his Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1978), 51-80.
14 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 6-10.
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412 GEORGE M. WILSON
narrative forms or story lines are those of irony on the part of the baku
leading daimyo, of tragedy for the popular movements that were supp
or redirected after the Restoration, and of romance or adventure for t
proclaimed patriots who quested after and finally found the grail th
tokened success.15
Now, these four agents, or groups of historical actors, perceived and ex-
plained their own actions and intentions very differently, in conformity with
their disparate views of the scene in which they acted and with the discrete
purposes that animated them. This is not a formal psychological judgment,
but one based on simple cognition and perception.16 Geertz might say that
their world views conflicted, that the four groups of actors construed sheer
reality in quite different and incompatible ways.17 To hold that they saw
reality in either (1) an integrated manner or (2) a dispersed manner gives us an
analytical handle for comparing the four groups. The use of integration and
dispersion as opposed tendencies among the groups can be summarized thus:
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 413
forever subject to shifts of mood despite their demure and polite external
behavior. The traders who followed the envoys when the commercial treaties
went into effect felt much the same way.
What these foreigners wanted was the ability to deal with Japan unfettered
by concern about personal security or the ramifications of internal Japanese
political disturbances. Theirs was the start of a mission of deliverance: the
best of them-the American consul, Townsend Harris; the English minister,
Harry Parkes; or the French minister, Leon Roches-hoped that the Japanese
government could be induced to bring the country into the community of
civilized nations and end the "barbarism" of ancient ways, which heretofore
had kept Japan in feudal bondage. Ethnocentrists to the core, they encoun-
tered nothing in Japan to jolt their faith in civilization and progress. They
wondered how the Japanese would ever be qualified to pursue these twin
muses of nineteenth-century Western social gospel.
When in 1853 the officials of the Tokugawa bakufu had looked with dis-
favor on Commodore Perry's assertion that Japan must abandon its long
seclusion, he threatened them with the possibility of the destruction of Edo,
which held a large and vulnerable population of more than a million. Perry's
return in 1854 resulted in the hurried signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa,
binding Japan and the United States in ties of mutual "amity and friendship."
Later Western dealings with Japan also featured heavy reliance on persua-
sion by force. In 1862 several samurai serving the daimyo of the Satsuma
domain murdered an English merchant named Richardson. The British
punished Satsuma with a naval bombardment of its capital, Kagoshima, the
following summer.19 Four Western powers-the United States, Britain,
France, and the Netherlands-sent a joint flotilla to the domain of Choshu in
the summer of 1864. This naval force bombarded the port city of Shimonoseki
to punish Ch6shu authorities who had given orders to fire on Western ship-
ping in a vain effort to "repel the barbarians" after the imperial court at
Kyoto had proclaimed 25 June 1863 as the date when foreign trade must cease
and all foreigners leave Japan.
Parkes and Roches took to forging alliances rather than bombarding ports
as the military strategy of choice for treating with the Japanese. Roches made
overtures to the Tokugawa bakufu; France even loaned money to the Edo
government for military improvements.20 The British hedged but gradually
cast their lot with Satsuma and Choshu, the two southwestern feudal domains
that finally ended the bakufu's dominion over Japanese foreign and domestic
policies. The outcome was probably unchanged by this foreign intervention,
19 On the Richardson affair and its aftermath, see Beasley, Meiji Restoration, 183. 199-200.
20 The French demarche toward the bakufu is covered in English by Meron Medzini, French
Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Bakufu, Harvard East Asian Mono-
graphs, no. 41 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1971), chs 8-15.
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414 GEORGE M. WILSON
though no one should doubt its importance: the Westerners made thems
felt.
By displaying their military superiority over their Japanese hosts, the for-
eigners not only underscored their presence but also tipped their hand.
Whether French or English, pro- or anti-bakufu, the Westerners considered
Japan a small piece in the puzzle of the world's balance of power. The games
they played were ideologically conservative in the extreme, and no wonder:
their purpose was always to protect their own advantage. To assure them-
selves of success, they needed to preserve the status quo. As France saw it,
this meant bakufu hegemony over Japan. Through British eyes the restoration
of stability could better be accomplished by new leaders-but stability was
the coin of the realm for all the foreigners. A Japan in chaos was an impossi-
ble market into which to export and sell foreign goods.
On this point-the protection of stability-the Westerners agreed with the
officials of the Tokugawa bakufu and most of the major daimyo until 1866.
Both the foreigners and the Japanese leaders approached events from a stand-
point of situational congruence: they could live with the status quo if only they
could revive it.21 However they might tamper, neither the foreigners nor the
bakufu and daimyo wanted to forgo Japan's essential stability.
While the Westerners were intent on securing Japan as a trading partner
under duress, the Japanese authorities worried more about internal stability
and its requisite political underpinning. Bakufu officials and leading daimyo
shared a common concern with the status quo, and they made policies meant
to maintain it. An occasional maverick like Ii Naosuke, lord of Hikone and
grand councillor of the bakufu from 1858 until his assassination in 1860,
aimed to turn back the clock and restore a status quo ante that had become too
hard to defend. The point here, though, is that all Japanese leaders favored the
existing political configuration. Their notion of situational congruence varied
in details from domain to domain, and within the chambers and councils of
the bakufu where lesser officials ambitious for power concocted schemes for
maximizing the bakufu's authority. But situational congruence was still to be
its own reward, a fitting objective for politicians to pursue, and a fully
sanctioned one in a Confucian hierarchical political order.
It is true that some Japanese leaders did strive to change the political
system, and this very disposition toward change sets them apart from the
foreigners, who were anxious not to disturb the status quo any more than
necessary to perpetuate their trade advantage. Bakufu and domain officials
played opposing forces off one another in order to disperse threats and resolve
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 415
disputes through subsumption of the conflicting parties into the over-all con-
text. The more they worked at this strategy, the harder it became to keep
things in any kind of order. The best of these Japanese officials were what we
might call "liberal" because of their desire to spread benefits and authority,
thereby co-opting potential opponents into an effective consensus with the
bakufu still at its head. Abe Masahiro had tried this tack while he was chief
councillor of the bakufu from 1845 to 1855, and his successor, Hotta Mas-
ayoshi, followed the same line until Ii Naosuke forcibly intervened in
mid-1858. After Ii's death at the hands of samurai whose lords he had treated
harshly during his so-called Ansei Purge of 1858-59, new bakufu leaders
resumed the strategy of temporizing, consulting, and inviting both court and
daimyo to join new tactical arrangements that begged the question of full-
scale systemic reform.
The geniuses of this "liberal" approach were Tokugawa Yoshinobu and
Matsudaira Shungaku, who were the lords of Hitotsubashi and Fukui and
direct relatives of the main shogunal line. During 1857-58 they combined to
build a small alliance of influential daimyo and bakufu and court officials who
tried to secure the shogunal succession for Tokugawa Yoshinobu. When Ii
Naosuke's purge blocked this strategem, they awaited another opportunity. It
came in 1862. As advisers extraordinaire they attempted simultaneously to
rebuild feudal morale and to strengthen the bakufu. By ending the feudal
obligation of alternate attendance that forced the daimyo to shuttle between
Edo and their own domains, they saved money for the fiscally pressed daimyo
at home; but their plan backfired as Edo turned into a partially depopulated
city beset by economic depression, which led to an unsuccessful attempt to
reinstitute alternate attendance. By January of 1867, however, Tokugawa
Yoshinobu did become shogun and began to work with ambitious middle-
level officials to maintain the bakufu's supremacy while somehow acknowl-
edging the daimyo's claims of feudal autonomy. The height of this policy was
reached in the fall of 1867. The bakufu announced taisei hokan, a decision to
return governing power to the imperial court. According to this plan, the
shogun would step down and join all the feudal lords in a new participatory
political system based on a council that would "advise" the imperial court on
actual policy formulation. And the Tokugawa house would remain at the apex
of wealth with its landholdings undiminished despite the political change.
This conciliar scheme might have worked if Satsuma and Choshu, acting
through the court on 3 January 1868, had not forcibly restored imperial rule
on their own very different, imperial loyalist terms. But in a fickle age liberal
reformers are always ripe candidates for an unhappy end. Ample resources
and a political culture favorably disposed to compromise are the sine qua non
of liberal politics, and bakumatsu Japan was running short of both. Beset by
external troubles, and pressed to adopt sometimes contradictory domestic
policies, the bakufu and those daimyo who cooperated with it confronted a
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416 GEORGE M. WILSON
problem whose only cure appeared to be the use of force. The liberals did not
want to compel their detractors to support the status quo, yet they were quite
willing to divide and conquer: they would discriminate against feudal lords
who were recalcitrant, even though the ultimate support of all the daimyo was
necessary for the success of the liberal line. Against heavy odds the liberals
made a valiant effort, though it was one they might as well have given up as
hopeless. The problem is nicely demonstrated by a statement attributed to
Tokugawa Yoshinobu in 1863, when the British crisis with Satsuma over
Richardson's murder reached a climax. Nothing can happen, he wrote to the
Council of Elders, that will help the bakufu. If hostilities break out between
Satsuma and Britain, "victory for the English would be a disgrace for the
country, victory for Satsuma a blow to the Bakufu's prestige."22
Nothing could illustrate the liberal dilemma more plainly. Because the
feudal domains were outside the bakufu, the bakufu could not punish Satsuma
for the killing of the hapless Richardson. But because Satsuma was a part of
Japan, Japan as a whole could only lose if Satsuma were injured by the
British, and Japan's loss was necessarily also the bakufu's. For the bakufu
was primus inter pares, first among equals in a feudal order and the source of
authority to which all foreigners looked as they tried to wrench Japan into the
international system they were erecting all around the world.
The same dilemma became more acute later when the bakufu twice tried to
punish Choshu because it practiced radical policies that infuriated some for-
eigners and some Japanese, but most of all because these policies threatened
bakufu authority. First in 1864 in response to the imperial court's wishes, then
again in 1866, the bakufu mobilized troops and mounted punitive expeditions
against Choshu. In 1866 the bakufu forces were repulsed, to the very great
embarrassment of the whole political system, which depended on ultimate
bakufu military supremacy within Japan. Yet far from calming the fears of
other domains, this pair of assaults on Choshu sparked the far greater fear
among the daimyo that if the bakufu had dared to move against Choshu, it
might soon attempt to make their own feudal autonomy an anachronism.
Satsuma therefore came to rethink its traditional cosy relationship with the
bakufu; in 1866 it decided to make common cause with Choshu in a secret
new alliance whose existence eventually made possible the coup d'etat of 3
January 1868-the Meiji Restoration in its classic form. All the complexities
of this political situation were well understood by the bakufu, whose officials
possessed the greatest familiarity with the outside world and had even estab-
lished schools and offices for analyzing the sources of Western military,
political, and economic strength. But the 1860s in Japan were to witness a
massive outburst of simplistic yet powerful emotional distress at the condition
of the country. And this outburst was finally directed against the bakufu,
despite its wealth of knowledge and information.
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 417
The great simplifiers had taken the field. It was a time when many complex
truths would be ignored in favor of noble motives and heroic deeds. As
William Thompson has said of the Irish revolutionaries of 1916, "the agents
must be great simplifiers if they are to rise to the purity of heart that is to hate
one thing";23 or, we might add, to love one thing, such as the cause of
imperial loyalism in Japan. But simplification was not confined to the samurai
elites or to purely partisan politics.
The common people of course constituted the bulk of Japan's population of
some thirty-five million, and as an undifferentiated mass they came to stand
on grounds just as situationally transcendent as those of the most dedicated
anti-bakufu imperial loyalist samurai. But the common people are not prop-
erly described as an undifferentiated mass. Many millions felt little or nothing
in direct response to the troubled times. Their lives continued more or less
without change. Other millions, however, searched for new ways to cope with
the perverse present, for novel behaviors that might afford the hope of a better
future.
23 William Irwin Thompson, The Imagination of an Insurrection: Dublin, Easter 1916 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 242.
24 Murakami Shigeyoshi, Kindai minshu shukyo shi no kenkyu, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Hozokan,
1963), 91.
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4I8 GEORGE M. WILSON
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 419
tered the sect as an unorthodox variant of Shinto, a status it did not escape
until the era of religious freedom that followed World War 11.30 The triumph
and the millennium had failed. And Tenrikyo was never the only target. All
the mass religious movements were viewed with disfavor by the Meiji govern-
ment in Tokyo (the new name for Edo). So were mass movements of people
for any purpose, whether religious, such as the pilgrimages, or economic, as
with the rural uprisings, or social in nature.
Ee ja nai ka celebrations in the cities also wound down after the new
government came to power in January of 1868.31 This strange antinomian
phenomenon, in which the urban masses flouted prevailing mores and ex-
pressed contempt for existing institutions of law and order, appeared late in
the summer of 1867 and totally ceased by the following spring. The celebra-
tions, often likened to spontaneous carnivals, began near Nagoya, then spread
from Yokohama and Edo in the east through Kyoto, Osaka, and Hiroshima in
the west, right across Japan's widest belt of urban population density. The
carnivals started when pieces of paper bearing the names of Shinto deities
(ofuda) fell out of the sky on surprised-and "charmed"-downtown urban
populaces. Launched by persons unknown, these religious talismans were
distributed far too widely and spontaneously to have resulted from a political
plot, even though the city crowds clearly favored the anti-bakufu forces over
the representatives of the old order.32 The recipients of these tokens of good
fortune from on high quickly got together to hold parties, feasts for relatives
and friends, and above all dancing and singing orgies that ran on through day
and night and clogged the central districts of major Japanese cities.
"Ee ja nai ka" is the phrase that concluded every verse of the improvised
songs to which the merrymakers danced. Usually without political meaning,
these verses were occasionally directed against usurious rice and sake mer-
chants or others whom the crowds disliked. Sometimes a verse castigated the
foreigners, whose economic intervention had disrupted many local commer-
cial routines in the port cities where overseas trade was beginning. But nor-
mally, the phrase "ee ja nai ka" was just a linking stanza, a means of
assuring the crowd that the jollity of the moment would continue as new songs
were sung and more fun would be had by one and all.
Students of ee ja nai ka acknowledge its importance in perpetuating the
mood of yonaoshi yearning that marked the pilgrimages, the rise of new
religions, and the bitter rural and urban riots of the middle 1860s. Ito Tadao,
30 Joseph Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History (New York: Columbia University Press,
1966), 221, and n. 85.
31 For ee ja nai ka in general, see Takagi Shunsuke, Ee ja nai ka (Tokyo: Kyoikusha, 1979).
32 Ibid., 210-13. I know of no postwar historian who regards ee ja nai ka as the result of a
conspiracy. While the prewar scholar Tsuchiya Takao in 1931 called ee ja nai ka "the nonsense
in Restoration history," even a critic like Toyama Shigeki, who plays down the significance of ee
ja nai ka, admits that it was a popular and widespread phenomenon. See Nishigaki Seiji, Eeja nai
ka: minshu und6 no keifu (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Oraisha, 1973), 252; and Toyama Shigeki, Meiji
ishin to gendai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 103.
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420 GEORGE M. WILSON
33 It6 Tadao, "Ee ja nai ka," in Yonaoshi, Sasaki Junnosuke, ed., Vol. 5 of Nihon m
rekishi (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1974), 312-13, 327-28. A table of the frequency of rural
appears on page 328.
34 Ishin no gekid6, Vol. 7 of Kyoto no rekishi (Tokyo: Gakugei Shorin, 1974), 1
35 Ibid., 186.
36 Ibid., 360.
37 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 89-90, holds that the relation between the two concepts
of ethos and world view is one of mutual confirmation: "In religious belief and practice a group's
ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally
adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is rendered
emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly
well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life."
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 421
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422 GEORGE M. WILSON
39 "Tora hachigatsu Koishikawa," in Bakumatsu hishi shinbun kaiso, Meiji Bunka Ken-
kyukai, ed. (1934; rpt. Tokyo: Meicho Kankokai, 1968), 269-71.
40 Tanaka Akira, Meiji ishin, Vol. 24 of Nihon no rekishi (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1976), 28.
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 423
to implement its proposals. The manifesto was traditional in that the Confu-
cian phrases for order and good government appear, but it was revolutionary,
too, in its insistence on a utopian transformation that would redeem a desper-
ate situation at home as well as abroad.41 The two worried authors, who
called themselves Okawabe Chikara and Takeda Shuunsai, wanted more than
anyone could then achieve. Neither the old nor the new regime could fulfill
such hopes immediately. The demands expressed in the text resemble the
dreams of millenarian commoners who would later be discouraged by the new
government. The quest-romance symbolized by these two Koishikawa writers
never reached fruition. Yet some of their ambitions for Japan finally did
become the grandest achievements of the Meiji oligarchs, such as the expan-
sion of overseas trade, termination of the unequal treaties, and especially "the
enrichment of the country and strengthening of the military" (fukoku kyohei).
Probably the makers of the manifesto never survived the turmoil of 1866-69;
certainly no one ever came forward claiming to be Okawabe or Takeda. And
even if they did indicate an allegiance to the bakufu in their words, their
sentiments put them in the camp of the simplifiers and sloganeers who sought
Japan's redemption in the emperor's name.
The struggle that culminated in the Meiji Restoration consumed many of
these loyalists, victims of bakufu or daimyo justice, or targets of the over-
simplifying zealots known as shishi within their own loyalist ranks. Yet those
who lasted out the struggles were the ones who inherited the realm. It was not
easy, however, to reimpose order amid such chaos.
Although the survivors did manage to restore order, they paid a high price
to do so. They mortgaged the future of Japan to their own ability to imagine a
reconstruction program. As simplifiers themselves, even the best of them
were disinclined to be generous. They came down hard on internal dissent,
because they distrusted the diversity that they themselves had helped to sow,
and they feared proposed solutions that were mutually conflicting. The situa-
tion they transcended was also one they overcame-by destroying it-and
they were left holding the empty bag. It was up to these loyalist survivors to
fill that bag, and they did not long countenance the menacing residues of other
situationally transcendent forces, such as the followers of Tenrikyo or the
makers of rural uprisings.
It is the common people that other treatments of the Meiji Restoration have
often overlooked. Their rebellions, cult behavior, pilgrimages, and carnivals
do not lend themselves to the kind of neat causal explanation that most
historians normally seek. Documentation is scanty and incomplete, much of it
nontraditional in nature. The letters, memoranda, and state papers prepared
by the well-educated leaders of this era do not accord much space to the
41 Tanaka Akira, "Bakufu no tokai," in Kinsei 5, Vol. 13 of Iwanami koza nihon rekishi
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 344.
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424 GEORGE M. WILSON
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 425
44 The imperial loyalists were adventurous romantics who expended immense efforts to build
an empire. It would therefore be interesting to apply Martin Green's method of linking adolescent
reading habits with adult political activities in the British Empire to the data of Meiji Japan. See
Martin Green, Dreams of Adventure, Deeds of Empire (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
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426 GEORGE M. WILSON
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PLOTS AND MOTIVES IN JAPAN'S MEIJI RESTORATION 427
carry the investigator toward a holistic view of the problem. If the narrativ
divides to accommodate the motives of four separate groups of actors, i
reunites in the holism of the structuralist perspective.46 The transdisciplinary
potential of this method can allow historians to examine the face of bakumatsu
Japan and the Meiji Restoration as a whole-as a configuration or gestalt. Th
negative side of this totalization process is that no scheme or intellectual
system can comprehend all of the transformations that the system is capable of
generating. The wily Kurt G6del, engaging the Principia Mathematica o
Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, demonstrated by using the
terms of their own brilliant system that its axioms could not yield all of the
theorems and propositions that are compatible with it.47
A like conclusion applies to history, that inexact discipline, where accident
and circumstance play a necessarily more prominent role than they do in the
mathematical sciences. No deductive scheme can, by the use of logic alone,
produce all of the truths or suggest all of the action permutations that may
arise from its principles. Nor can the method proposed in this essay-to view
the watershed years of bakumatsu Japan through the stories of four groups o
protagonists-succeed in revealing all the plots and motives that contributed
to the history of the Meiji Restoration, its prelude, or the novel coda that
followed it. But the method can provide a new perspective on the.interaction
between the chief historical agents on the scene at the time. And it can help t
illuminate some of their seemingly confused acts and purposes.
46 My sense of structuralism generally follows the summary by Jean Piaget more than that of
Peter Caws. Both are clear expositions of a movement whose "movers" refuse to acknowledg
their likenesses, and both are prescient about the intellectual development of structuralism acros
many disciplines during the 1970s. Both identify linguistics as the source of inspiration for
structuralism. But Piaget stresses the holism of structuralist systems in their synchronic approac
to problems, whereas Caws emphasizes the patterns of binary opposites, polarities, and comple-
mentarities that are often employed to explicate structuralist arguments. See Jean Piaget, Stru
turalism, Chaninah Maschler, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Peter Caws, "Structural
ism," Dictionary of the History of Ideas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), IV
322-30.
47 See Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel's Proof(New York: New York Unive
Press, 1958), 3-6, 98-99.
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