Defendants' Reply To Plaintiff's Opposition To Dismiss
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiff's Opposition To Dismiss
Defendants' Reply To Plaintiff's Opposition To Dismiss
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19 I. INTRODUCTION
20 Plaintiff fails to provide any jurisdictional basis for his complaint, or to refute the
21 application of absolute judicial immunity to defeat the Motion to Dismiss of the Superior
22 Court of California, County of Santa Clara ("Superior Court") and the Honorable James E.
23 Towery, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara (hereinafter
26 The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars suits for damages
27 brought against state entities, such as the Superior Court, and state officials, such as Judge
28 Towery, in federal court. Further, to rule on Plaintiffs allegations, this Court would need to
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Case 5:18-cv-03915-NC Document 13 Filed 08/14/18 Page 2 of 7
1 re-evaluate Judge Towery's decisions in an underlying state court action, which is prohibited
2 by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lastly, the Younger abstention doctrine bars Plaintiffs
3 complaint, as Plaintiffs family law matter remains pending in the state court. For these
5 Even if Plaintiff could establish subject matter jurisdiction, any cause of action
6 against the Judicial Defendants is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
7 Because Plaintiff cannot cure these defects by amending his complaint, the Judicial
9 amend.
11 A motion to dismiss is appropriate when the district court lacks subject matter
12 jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). Once a party moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter
13 jurisdiction, the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction.
14 Chandler v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff
17 Plaintiff claims that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar his complaint, citing Ex
18 Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908.) Plaintiffs reliance upon Ex Parte Young is misplaced, as
19 that case stands for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against a
20 state official when the plaintiff is requesting prospective injunctive relief. Committee to
21 Protect Our Agricultural Water v. Occidental Oil and Gas, 235 F. Supp.3d 1132, 1160-1161.
22 Ex Parte Young applies when "the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and
23 seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Id. citing Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public
24 Service Com 'n. of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002).
25 Here, Plaintiff is not seeking prospective injunctive relief and admits, in his Opposition, that he
26 has suffered monetary damages of at least $600,000, and that he does not seek to "restrain any
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2 confirm that he seeks only damages, not injunctive relief. First, Plaintiff demands a jury trial
3 (Docket 1.) A jury is not available when a plaintiff seeks an injunction. Hernandez v. County
4 of Monterey, 306 F.R.D. 279, 292-293 (2015.) Second, he alleges a cause of action under 42
5 U.S.C. § 1983, which typically concerns compensatory damages only. See, Carey v. Piphus,
6 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047 (1978) (The basic purpose of Section 1983 is to
8 While Plaintiff requests that this Court transfer his family-law matter to federal court,
9 moreover, this request cannot properly be considered injunctive relief because Plaintiff states
10 that Judge Towery no longer presides over his family law action. (Opposition p. 6.) Plaintiffs
11 allegations solely relate to Judge Towery's purported past, and not continuing, conduct. "Past
12 exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
13 injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." 0 'Shea v.
14 Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496, 94 S.Ct. 669 (1974.) Therefore, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate
15 the present controversy requirement for injunctive relief. Moreover, federal courts do not have
16 jurisdiction over family law claims based upon state law. Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237
17 (9th Cir. 1987) (Federal courts traditionally abstain from hearing cases involving domestic
18 issues.)
19 Lastly, Plaintiff fails to refute moving party's assertion that his claims against the
20 Superior Court are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Nor can he, as courts have firmly
21 established that that state courts are state entities for purposes of Eleventh Amendment
22 immunity. See, Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110
23 (1987.)
25 Plaintiff asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar his complaint because
26 he does not request that this Court alter a judgment or order of the state court. (Opposition p.
27 3.) Plaintiff misconstrues both the relief he seeks and the nature of the Rooker-Feldman
28 doctrine.
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1 Plaintiffs allegations stem from his belief that Judge Towery erred in making rulings in
3 • "Judge Towery consistently ruled against me and violated many Rules of Court
6 3.)
8 1, p.4.)
10 p.5.)
11 These actions do not exist in a vacuum, but as part of the state-court litigation in
12 Plaintiffs family law matter. In order for this Court to determine that Judge Towery deprived
13 Plaintiff of due process, this Court would necessarily need to review Judge Towery's actions
14 and determine his rulings were made erroneously. The Court is not permitted to take such
15 action.
16 As noted by the court in Le/court v. Superior Court, "the district court does not have
17 jurisdiction if it cannot evaluate the constitutional claims without conducting a review of the state
18 court's legal determinations in a particular case." Le/court v. Superior Court, 63 F .Supp.2d 1095,
19 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1999). Therefore, this Court is barred from asserting jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
20 complaint based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the complaint must be dismissed.
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27 III
28 III
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Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
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1 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (citations omitted). As explained by the court
2 in Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F .3d 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001 ):
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DATE: August 4, 2018 BOLD, POLISNER, MADDOW, NELSON & JUDSON
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By: /s/ Sharon M. Nagle
23 SHARON M. NAGLE
Attorneys for Judicial Defendants
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Case 5:18-cv-03915-NC Document 13 Filed 08/14/18 Page 7 of 7
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
USDC-Northern District of CA Case No: 5:18-cv-03915-NC
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I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years, employed in the County of
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4 Contra Costa, and not a party to the within action; my business address is 2125 Oak Grove
16 Ben Zimmerman
501 West Glenoaks Blvd., #604
17 Glendale, CA 91202
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that
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the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on August 14, 2018, at
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Walnut Creek, California.
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