Interpretation of Statutes

Narendra Dev
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Interpretation of _Statutes
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Narendra Dev
B.SC., LL.M.
Assistant Professor, Department of Law
Govl Law College
.. Morena (M.P.)
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University Book House Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur

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Preface
The subject entitled 'Interpretation of Statutes' can shortly

termed as the grammar of law. This is not the classical grammar
Published by :- ut it is different in the sense that it always endeavours to find ou~
University Book House (P) Ltd. he actual & real intention of the Legislature in enacting the specific
79, Chaura Rasta, Jaipur gislation in question. · Ostensibly, the task was difficult, but the
.. Phone : 0141-2311466, 2313382 diciary ~ade it simple by ~nac~g different rules through its
Fax no. : 0141-4013697 terpretation. Though the subJect 1s not a codified one, yet it has
- .. E-mnil : uni_bookhouse@yahoo.com ~en a concrete shape today through the judicial endeavours.
ISBN : 978-81-8198417-3 Thus, the subject is ve~ ?1uch sensitive, interesting & simple
Frrst Edition : 2017 r ~ose ~ho take a lesser plam m understanding it. ~t is also a great
ractical rmportance & useful for judges, lawyers & students of law
ut a little bit of reasoning are required to get it dearly. Seeing i~
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@ Author •
Lasertype Setting & Printer portance the BO has m ade it a part of syllabus of the universities
Bhumi Graphics & Saloni Offset :':inters, Taipur r LL.B. and LL.M. students all over India.
For these reasons~ I decided to bring a book on the subject
All right reserved. No part of this work may be copted, adapted, a~ridged cJT a simple & lucid language. The success of my efforts will be
tmnslated, stored in wry retrieiJal system, computer system, photograplnc or other easured by the readers of the book. I will keenly await their
systttn or transmitted in any form by any means wl~ther ~lectronic, ~z~dzanica!,
ggestions for making the book more useful .
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copyright Jwlders. M/ s University Book House (P) ~td., Jaipur. At ~is ins~nce, I remember my friends who put forward a
This book is sold subject to the condition 'that'it, or any -part ·of it, shall w steps w1th m~ m my long wake of life. Also, my wife & son, the
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V\7n1P a;ery effort has been made to avoid any mistake or omission, this publica-
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-Narendra Dev
the publishers or printers would be liable in any manner to any person btj reason
Cf any mistake or omission in this publicatiotz or for any action t.aken or omitted to
be takm on atiui:e rendered or accepted an the basis of this work.
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.. Contents
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lnttoduction....................................................................................1-12
Mode of Intepretation .................................................................13-28
Literal Rule: Meaning of Words ................................................29-41
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The Leteral Rule: General Principles ........................................42-54
Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation.................................................. SS-67
Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation ...................................................68-86
.. Mandatory and Directory Statutes and Modification
of I..,anguage to Suit Intention ....................................................87-97
Commencement and Operation of Statutes ..........................98-108
Repeal of Statu.tes .................................~ ..................................] ()9-118
0. Construction of Penal Statute .................................................119-131
'1. Construction of Tax -Statutes ........................................, ......132-138
2. Certa.in Presumption ......................................................•........l39-146
3. Application of Statutes to State .............................................147-152
4. Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation ...............153-170
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Chapter 1
Introduction
(1) Statute
(2) Parts of a Statute
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(3) Classification of Statutes
(4) The Need for Interpr~tation
(5) Interpretation and Construction
(6) The Purpose of Interpretation
(1) STATUTE
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A Statute is a formal expression of the will of thP
legislature. It is rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms
and solemnities like passage in the houses of the legislature
and the assent of the Head of the State.
In. England the expression 'Statute' forn1erly stood
for the whole body of laws enacted by the Parliament in any
, one session. Later on, it became synonymous with an Act of
' Parliament Bacon defines a Statute as 'a law agreed upon by
.. the King or the Queen of England, having legal authority,
the lords spritual and temporal, and the commons, lawfully
assembled, which ganeth strenth and life by the assent royal.1
The triple assent- of the Commons, Lords and the King- is
necessary to breathe life into a statute in England.2
In India, a statute means an enactment of the legislature
made in accordance with procedure prescribed for enactment
of laws by or under the Constitution.
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. • 1. Bacn's : Abridgement, 29
2 Princes' case, (1~) 8 Co. Rep. 1
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Introduction 3
2 Interpretation of Statutes
(a) Classification with reference. to Time of Enactment
(2) PARTS OF A STATUTE
Statutes are sometimes . classified .into old and new
A statute ~ ordinarily, be divided into many
with reference to the time of enactment. Lord Coke divided
COMtiuent parts like:
statute into old and new. Statutes made before the reign of
(i) ~ble Edward m 1
were considered old' or vetera. Those made later
.
(ii) Long Title were labelled as new statutes or 1 nova statute'.
(iii) Short Title Such classification has now lost whatever value it ~y
(iv) Interpretation Oauses be have had earlier. Hoever, occasionally the courts do refer
(v) Titles of Chapters the Time of enactment of a statute in construing it. In Ridge
(vi) Headings Baldwin1 the House of Lords held that a nineteenth century
statute must be so construed as ·to include the requirements
(vii) ~furginal Notes
of natural justice. Similarly, in I<ishan Chand Arora Vs.
(viii) lliustrations
Commissioner of Police,2 the Indian Supreme Court held
(ix) Sections that a statute made in 1866 should not be treated~ in the same
(x) Proviso, Exceptions and Explanations way as one made after the Constitution. The pre-constitution
(xi) Schedules and Forms statute must not be read with an eye on the constitutional
The Sections constitute the principal body of a statute requirements.
formerly the sections together with the provision, exceptions (b) Classification with reference to Extent of Operation
ecplanations, schedules and forms, alone were eonsidered
Enachnents may be classified as public or private, or
.to constitute a statute; Modem writers and courts attach
as general or local.
significant value also to the other parts of a statute enumerated
above. The nattire and value of the various parts of a statute Statutes may apply only to a person or a specific group
in construction shall be considered later. (See Chap:v infra). of persons possessing certain distinct characterstics. Such
• statutes ~e considered private statutes. Statutes- which apply
(3) CLASSIDCATION OF STATUTES to the public at large are called public statutes. The distintion
Statutes may be classified with reference tO. different between public and private statutes is that a public statute is
criteria. The use of a particular criterion is dictated purpose unlimited as regards the persons affected by it, but a 3 private
of classification. Craies1 enumerates six difter criteria of statute is limited in its effect to particular persons.
classification: In England, formerly, the Courts took judicial notice of
(a) Time of enachnent public act but the existence of a private Act had to be proved
(b) Extent of the statute before the Court. In 1850, the Parliament enacted the Lord
(c) Content of the statute Brougham's Act4 which required the courts to take judicial
notice of all acts enacted by the Parliament private or public.
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(e) Methodology of the statute 1. 1964 A.C. 40
2 AIR 1964 S.C. 705
(f) Duration of the statute
3. R.W. London County Council (1893) 2 Q.B. 454, 46:! per Bowan L.J.
1. Craies, Statute Law 55 4. s2and 53 viet c. 63
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4 Interpretation of Statutes • Introduction 5
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In India, 5.114 of the Evidence Act 1872, requires the court to 1
In England the expression declaratory acts' was originally
take judicial notice· of~ the statutes public or private. limited to statutes made for the purpose of clarifying the
Those statutes ~hich apply to all and sundry through
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common law. Blackstone defines as declaratory Act to be one
out the territory, for which the legislature is compentent to made for avoiding doubts and difficulties in cases where the
make laws, are considered general statutes. Statutes applying common law has fallen into dis-use or ~ecome disputable and
only to a defined area are called local statutes. A public Act or to declare what the law is and has been'.1 In contemporary
a private Act may be general or local in its nature. parlance a declaratory statute is one made for the purpose of
(c) Classification with reference to Contents removmg doubts as to the common law or meaning or effect
of any other statute.
In common parlance as well as juridical lenguage,
statutes are frequently classified with reference to the nature Usually a declaratory Act is ehacted to correct so called
of their contents. Thus statutes may be classified as penal, tax, 'Judicial errors'. ln Price v. Bradleyl it was held by the of the
procedural, town-planning, etc. However, such classification Freshwater Fisheries Acts 1878. The Parliament .considered
is seldom exhaustive. this to be an error and in 1886 made a declaratory enactment ·
providing that eels were not freshwater fishes. Similarly the
In England an Index to the 'Statutues in Force' is
az:mually published. It contains a list of all public general Acts 25th amendment to the Constitution of India seeks to correct
classified according to their contents. In India also the Central the so-called judicial errors in construing Arts. 31(2) and 19(1)
and State Government have published collections of statutes, (£) of the Constitution in a series of cases culminating in the
labelled Codes, classified according to their subject-matter. . Bank Nationalization Case.3
The classification with reference to contents of a statute Craies has defined a declaratory Act as:
has some relevance to interpretation of statutes in so far as "an ad to remove doubts existing as to
the courts recognize the existence of certain presumptions the common law or the meaning or effect
depending on the nature of the statute. For example, the of any statute" .4 ·
provisions of a tax statute are to be construed literally and Quoting this with approval the Supreme Court held in
if two constructions are possible the court sould 6hould Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen,5 that an amending
adopt one which limits rather than the one which extends the statute 'which was not enacted to remove any doubt, explain
incidence of taxation any former statute or correct any commission or error ' was
.
(d) Classification with reference to 0 bj ect not a declaratory Act.
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With reference to their objects/the statutes can be The distiriction between declaratory and amending
classified as : acts has practical importance in interpretation of statutes.
(Q declaratory ·~ Declaratory acts are by their very nature retrospective in
(ii) condifying and consolidating operation w~e amending acts are inormally prospective. The
presumption that a statute should be so constnued as not to
(iii) remedial
take away vested rights is not available in case of declaratory
(iv) enabling
1. 1 Commentaries on tlte Laws of England 86
(i) Declaratory- A declaratory statute is made for 2 (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 148
the purpose of removing doubts in respect of existing law. 3. RC. Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 S.C. 564
1. Act IX of 1872 4. Craies, loc. cit., 59
5. A.LR.1960, S.C. 12. 27
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6 lnterp~tion of Statutes
1 Introduction 7
acts. In Fezal Begum v. Hakin Ali a lady had obtained
a declaration from the trial court that her marriage stood (iii) Remedial Statutes- Remedial statutes are intended
dissolved because of her conversion to christiarity. while an to cure the defects and prune the superfluties of existing
appeal against this decree was pending the Dissolution of statute and common law. Balckstone re5bicted the class of
Muslim marriage Act was enacted. That Act provided that remedial. statutes to statutes into two sub-classes : enlarging
mere renunciation of Islam by a spouse would not by it self and restraining statutes. Enlarging statutes were those which
dissolve a marriage. The appella court applied this act to added to the common lStw rights, while, restraining statutes
the pending appeal as the enactntent was a declaratory one were those which curtailed the rights avilable at common law.
and held that mere conversion would not have the effect of The distinc~on is basically relative. What may be enlarging
dissolving the marriage. from one pomt of view may be restrictive from the other.
(ii) Co~difying and Consolidating Statutes- . An ame~~g, curative or validating statute is
Codifying and consolidating statutes are closely related to essentially remed1al m character. While some writers classify
declaratory statutes. A condifying statute is for the purpose them separately this distinction appears to be without
difference.
of declaring the whole law on a particular subject in the form
of a code. A Consolidating Act seeks to bring under one title .A remedial statute is to be li~ally construed without
the provisions contained in a number of statutes. The object stretching the language. Where the language is unambigco!IS
of consolidation is to collect the statutory law bearing upon and capable of only on construction it shou)d not be strettruction
a particular subject and update it so as to constitute a useful the one which patently assists the achievement of the object of
code applicable to the circumstances existing at the time of its the ~ct. must be adop~d. Thus in Jivabhai v. Chhagan1 the
enactxuenl2 1 Supreme. Court held that the benefit of the Bombay Tenancy
In Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers,3 the House and Agncultural Lands Act, 1949 as amended in 1952 were
of Lords has held -that the proper way to deal ~th a codifying available even to a tenant upon whom a notice of terznhta.tion
statute is to take it upon the words it uses. A condifying statute of tenancy had been served prior to the amendment. The Act
is not be construed with the presumption that it is not meant was held to be a remedial one intended to enlarge the rights
to alter the pre-existing state of law. In the instant case..it was of tenants of land, and the language of the enacbnent was
held that the Bill of Exchange Act, 1882 must not be taken as wide enough to cover such a class of tenants.
a mere enactment of the existing law and where its language . . '(iv) E~abling Statutes- Enabling Statutes are those
differed from the existing law the statute must be followed. which make 1t lawful to something which would have been
In case of a consolidating statute also, it )s the othere'":ise unlawful. Thus a statute empowering the state
languages of the statute rather than the nature of the·'statute to acqwre lands belonging to private persons is an enabling
which is material. Where, however, a <:onsolidating statute enactment. These enactments by the very nature need to be
re-produc~ ~e statutes it replaces, without any change ing treated distinctly. In case of an enabling statute it is presumed
~guage, ~t IS to be presumed that the legislature did not that ~ the powers necessary for the performance of the
mtend to mtroduce any change. In case of a consolidating functions conferred by the statute are impliedly conceded.
statute the previous state of the law may also be considered . The Supreme Court has cited with approval the
to ascertain- the intent of the legislature. followmg observations of Craies2 in B.B.L. & T. Merchants
1. AI.R. 1941 Lahore 22. Association v. State of Bombay.3
2 Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick.
1. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1491
3. 1891 A.C. 107
2 Craics, loc. cit., 239
3. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 486
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8 Interpretation of Statutes Introduction 9
One of the first principles of law with to call a statute a perpetual statute is not to say that it can not
regard tp tje effect of an enabling Act be repealed. -
is that when a legislature enables some
4. NEED FOR INERPRETATION
thing to be done it gives power at the
same time by necessary implication to A statute is an expression of the will of the legislature.
do every thing which is indispensable for It shares in common with other media of communication the
the purpose of carrying out the purpose fault of double contingency. Words do not Pass on thoughts
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VIew. of the author and only invite, the reader or . the receiver to
reconstruct them. Difficulties arise at both the ends. The
The Keyword is indispensable. It the Power is not so
author may not adequately express his thoughts or the oher
it can not be implied. In the instant case the Court held that
the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 did not empower the State party may not reconstruct it exactly the way it was intended
Government to fix th~ percentage of bidis which might be by the author, or both the kinds of difficulties may co-exist. In
rejected by the employer, as such power was not indispensable any case the communication is faulty.
to the fixation of a rate of minimum wage in respect of bidi Another difficulty arises as words have many meanings,
workers. Powers under an enabling statute can be implied and the meaning which a particular word carries has to
only if their absence would render the statute a dead latter. determined in the light of its context. Semantic consideraHons
show that. it is impossible for the ordinary meaning of words
(e) Oassification with reference to Methodology to be fixed for all future interpreters. While a word may have
Statutes may be classified with reference to the methods a f~irly ~et_tled core of meaning it is, ordinarily, sorrounded by
used by the legislature to attain its objects. If the Le~lature an mdefinite pen~bral zone that leaves its connotation hazy.
imposes obligation or duties on the persons affected by them Thirdly, while law is static the social milieu in which
the statutes are called mandatory, obligatory or imperative. H it operates is dynamic. The enactments soon outlive the
the statutes impose disabilities they may be called prohibitive. envoirnment in which they were conceived. 'Mush judicial
But, if the statutes enable certain things to be done or omitted ingenuity. is involved in brodging the gap, particularly as it
without imposing obligations or duties, they are called varies inversely with the time lag.
directory or permissive.
· In the common law world. the duty to apply a statut~
The basic distinction is thus between statutes· which devolves on the judiciary. Application involves a duty to
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co_mmand and those which permit. The falure to .comply ·
ascertain the ideas expressed by the statute. The process by
·w1th a command renders the act or omission unlawful or
which the courts discover the intent of the Legislature is called
invalid. An omission to fulfi11 the requirements of a directory
interpretation. .
enactment does not vitiate the act or omission.1
(f) Classification with reference to Duration 5. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
. Satutes are classified as 'tempo~ary' or 'perpetual' Some writers make a distinction between interpretation
wtth reference to their duration. A temporary statute is one and construction. Cooley1 considers interpretation as the
of limited duration. A perpetual statute is one of. unlimited art of finding out the true sens~. of any forms of words. He
duration and continues in iperation till it is repealed. However, distinguishes it from constt:uction as construction is the art
, of drawing conclusions in respect of subjects that are beyond
1. State of U.P. v. Manlx>dhanlal Srivastave, AIR 1957 SC 912 1. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 97 •

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10 Iriterpretation of Statutes
Introduction 11
the direct expression of the text of the law. In other words,
while interpretation is ascertaining the meaning of the statute not have collectively expressed in clear terms their intention
construdion is imaginative extension of the letter of the underlying specific statutory provisions, a general intent or a
statute to situations not covered by it ex-facie. This assumes purpose which is sought to be achieved and a plan by which
that words have a fairly definite meaning atleast to begin with. it is proposed to be achieved can be deciphered from the
In Re: Sea Customs Actl, the Supreme Court, noted provisions of a statute.1
the distinction made by Cooley between interpretation and The other view is that the expression 'intent of the
construdion. It has ~eld that while the task in most cases legislature' is purely a fiction. There is nothing like 'intention
is that of interpretatio~ in appropriate cases the courts may of the legislature'. What really happens is that a statute
have to go further than the text of the statute. is drafted by a handful of persons. It is processed in the
legislature and during its passage there only a majority of the
In modem juristic parlance the two expressions legislature need assent to the bill. Even that majority may not
interpretation and construction are used synchymously. be in agreement about the purpose and scope of the bill or may
Diast is more close to truth when he observes that though not even have consciously considered such questions. Even
there is some distinction between the two it is quite difficult ~ong such legislators as speak out their mind during the
to distinguish them in practice. legislative debates frequent cases of diSagreement about the
The Courts ascertain the meaning of the statute to meaning of the language used in the bill ·are perceivable. An
discover the intent of the legislature and this interpretation apt illustration can be found in the speeches of Pt. Jawaharla1
is hardly a mechanical process of finding word-equivalents to Nehru, Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar and Dr. KM. Munshi
the language of the statute. It involves reconstruction of the on the draft of Art 31 of the Constitution. The three differed
ideas intended to be conveyed by the legislature. It is no less greatly about the scope of judicial review of compensation
constructive an activity then analogical extension of ~tatutues payable for acquisition of pr-...;>erty by the State. Radin,2 Kelsen
to situations not covered by the latter of the law. and many writers of the Realist School therefot:e, subscribe to
the view the expression 'intention of legislature' carries no
6. PURPOSE OF INTERPRETATION •
mearung.
The fundamental rule for interpretation of statutes is 'fhe principle that the statute is to be expounded
that a statute is to the expounded according to the intent of according to the intent of the legislature is in truth nothing
those who made it Coke formulated the rule in the Fourtli more than an indication of the broad framework within
Book of his Institutes and the rule has since been...universal which the judicial task · of interpretation is to proceed. It is
accepted. . . ..·. · only wishful thinking to conceive of legislative intent as a fact
The expression 'intention of the legislature' is however which held that the job of the courts is limited to discovery of
misleading. It may be taken to represent a fact which is non- the rules of law. It is a trite proposition today that the courts
existent There are two schools of thought about the content play a creative role in decision-making. One can no longer
of the expression. The Traditional conservative line is that agree with crawford that to deny the existence of legislative
the expression 'intention of legislature' is a misnomer to the intent is to assert that there is no rule of la-w except such as
extent that it does not rea11y refer to any existing psychological is declared by the courts, and consequently the existence of
phenomenon. It rea11y signifies the purpose behind the legislative intent must be admitted. Such a view merely begs
statute. Crawford, concedes that while the law makers may the question.
1. A.LR. 1963 S.C. 1970
'· 1. Crawford: Statutory Construction 254-5
2 Junsprudence, 105
2 See Radin: A short way with statutes, 56 H.L.R. 338
Kelsen: Caeneral Theory of Law and State, 33 •
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In enacting a statute the legislature undoubtedly has
a surpose and sets about realizing it The identity of the
purpose and the detaiJs of the legislative plan are howe~er to
be gathered by the courts which seek to interpret the law and
• Chapter 2
in doing so they really go from the statute to the legislature
reversing, the whole process. It is the language of the statute
which is expressive of its purpose and plan. Thus it is that Mode of Intepretation
the court insists that the intention of the legislature must be
gathered hom the language of the statute. The courts insist
that no additions shuold be made to its language to effectuate 1. Literal Interpretation
;my so-called intent of the legislature.
2. Golden Rule
Lord Watson, called legislative intent, a 'slippery
phrase' in Solomon v. A Soloman & Co.1 observing that' in 3. Mischief Rule
court what the legislature intended to be done or not to be 4. Beneficial Construction
done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has 5. Equitable Construction
chosen to enact either by expressed words or by reawonable The purpose of interpretation is to discover the
and 'I do not care what their (Legislature) intention was. I meaning of the language used by the legislature in enacting
only want to kno\v what the words mean.' 2
a statute. The initial approach to interpretation of a statute
This principle has been accepted by our Supreme Court is literal where the language is plain and admits of only one
in Kanialal v. Paramidhi.3 There .!t was contended before the meaning the issue of interpretation can hardly arise.1
court ~t the bePefit of the Caleutta ThPka Tenancy Act, 1949
which conferred a privilege against enjectrrtent on tenants of However, in most of the situation the task is not that
certain lands, should also be extended to such tenants who simple. A genuine choice is available among many meaning
had not been actually ejected by against whom a decree for that can be ascribed to words. The reasons for which and
ejection had been made, as the intention of the legislature the extent to which t.l-te courts may depart frcm the primary
was to confer a security of tenure on agricultural tenants. The meaning · of the words used in an enactment, the refore,
Court rejcted the argument holding that the intention of the becomes a vital question. The various modes of interpretation
Legislattue was to be gathered from the words used by it. The essentially reflect the difference in the reason for which
language of the statute in the instant case, the .Cotirt felt, did . courts may depart from the plain. meaning of the words of an
not cover the class of tenants which was seekin protection. · enectment.
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A Written work once created acquired a meaning that
is independent of the motives of the creator Interpretation is •
1. LITERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION
the search for such meaning. (a) Scope
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The ba~ic maxim is Absoluta sententia expositore non-
DOD indiget. It means that unequivocal and unambigous languages
1. 1897 A.C. 22 need no interpretation. Paton considers the literal rule to mean
2 , Let~er of Ju5Xe Holmes, quoted in Frankfurter, Reading of Statutes Essays 1. Maxwell: Interpretation of Statutes 29
in Jurisprudence, ed. '
3. AJ.R. 1957 S.C. 170
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.. . . Mode of lntepretation 15 · •
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14 Interpretation of Statutes trial was adjourned by ony one day with the consent of the
accused.
that if the meaning of an enactment is plain it is to be applied
1 (iii) S. 27 of the Indian Contract Act provides that
irrespective of the consequences.
2 money paid under a mistake would be recoverable. In Sales
Maxwell states the rules in more guarded terms: Tax Officer v. Kanahyalal1 it was held by the Supreme Court
If there is nothing to modify, nothing that money paid under a mistake of law will also be repayable
to alter, nothing to qualify the language under that section.
which the stdtute contains it must be
construed in the ordinary and natural 2. GOLDEN RULE OF INTERPRETATION
meanings of the words and sentences. The golden rule of interpretation permits depar~e
The literal rule has two implications: from the literal meaning of the language of an enactrnent to
(i) Where the language of the enaclntent is clear an? avoid absurdity or inconsistency.
unequivocal the cour~ must not depart fro~ It (a) Origin of the Rule
irrespective of the possible consequences result mg
The rule was laid down for the first time by Lord
from it.
Burton in an Irish case Warburton v. Love-land2 in the
(ii) Even where the lenguage of the ~nactment. may following words: .
admit of more than one meanmg, the literal
In the first instrace:, the grammatical sense
meaning must be preferred unless adequate
of the words is to be adhered to. If that
grounds are found for departure in
is contrary to or inconsistent with any
(i} the history of the enactment or expressed intention, or declared purpose
(ii) the reason for the enaclntent, or • - of the statute, or if it would involve any
(iii) the content of the enactment or absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency,
(iv) the possibility that the literal interpretation the _grammatical sense must then Le
leads to absurd or un reasonable -consequences. modified extended, or abridged so far
asto avoid such inconvenience but no
(b) Examples of Literal Interpretation: .
further. 3
(i) S. 9 of the will Act 1837 required that the testator
This rule was names as Golden rule of interpretation
must sign his "viii in the prosence of at least two \.y.itnesses. It .
oy Lord Wansleydale in Grey v. Pearson.4 There the rule was
washeld by the Probate Division in Brown v. Skiriow that the
t formulated with a little difference: ·
provisions required actual visual presence of the two attesting
witnesses and anything short of that would invalidate the The grammetical and ordinary sense of
will3 the words is to be adhered to, unless that
would lead to some absurdity or some
(ii) Where the Act required a conviction to be made
within a certain period after the commission of the offence, 1. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 135
it w as held in R. v. Bellami4 that the accused could not be 2. (1823) 1 H&B Ir. Vas. 623
3. Id. 648
1. Paton, Jurisprudence -
4. (1857) 7 H.L. Cases 61
2 MaxwelL Joe. cit, 28
~
3. (1902) Probate 3
i. (1823) 1 s & c-soo Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
.. . . •
. ·· Mode of Intepretation 17
this issue as was pointed out by Blackburn J. in Calodonian
repugnance or inco~~ with the v. North British Rly.1
rest of the instrument, m which case the While no hard and fast criteria to determine what is
grammatical and ordinary sense ?f the absurd can be derived from the cases two \tiews have been
words may be modified so asto avoid that convassed in respect of what constitutes absurdity. One view
absurdity and inconsistency, but no further. is that certain presumptions are available in interpreting a
It may be noted that the scope of the rule of narrowed statute and an interpretation which offends against such
in the Gray case. In Warburton departure. is permis~ible on presumptions can be said to lead to absurdity. There is a
grounds of inconsistency with the obj~ or mtent. ~~t m Gray presumption that every offence requires a criminal intent. If
the rule is limited to inconsistency within the proVISion of the the words of a penal statute can fairly yield to more than one
statute. construction the Court, in order to avoid absurdity, would reject
(b) Scope of the Rule a construction that does away with the element of mensrea.
· The golden rule is in a sense a slightly modified Thus, in R. v. Tumer,2 the statute provided for imposition of
vorsion of the literal rule because both the rules require that a sentence of three months imprisonment for employees who
the words of a statute shall, in the first instance, be given their absented themselves from service. The Court held that the
natural and grammatical meaning. However, the golden rule punishment could not be imposed in cases where there was
of interpretation further requires that ~here the ~ords can a lawful excuse for absence as the literal construction woulc~
bear more than one meaning, the meanmg that will load to lead to the absurd consequence of creating a• crime without
guilty intent.
absurdity or inconsistency or repugnancy shall, be avoided.
The grammatical and ordinary sense or words may thus be The other view in respect of absurdity is that it connotes
modified to avoid absurdity, inconsistency or repugnancy nothing but repugnance of in consistency with the other parts
only where the language is not unequivocal. ~ of the statute. Justice willes has observed in ChristophP.rson v.
3
The problem really arises in such cases only where ~e Lotinga, that absurdity should be taken to mean 'something
words used by a Statute are wide and are capable of bearmg which would be so absurd with reference to the other words
different meanings. It is well settled that if the words of a of the statute as to amount to repugnance'. In this form the
statute are dear and capable of only one meaning the court golden rule. of interpretation is reduced to nothing but the
has to give them the same meaning even though it may le~d rule that a statute must be taken as a consistent whole; and
to adsurdity, hardship or inconvenience. For ex~mple, m one part of a statute must not be allowed to constradict other
Commissioner of Agricultural Tax v. Keshav.1 The ·Supre~e parts of the statute. ·
Court has held that where the statute requires that a return of (d) lllustrations
income be signed in case of an individual by the individual
In practice the golden rule has a wide application,
himself, the provisions cannot be construed to permit a return
and is not confined to removal of inconsistencies. In Miller v.
to be filed by the assessee's son on behalf of the assesse.
Solomons} the statute under consideration provided an oath
(c) The Problem of Identifying Absurdity
1. (1881) 6 A.C. 114
The real difficulty arises in finding out what amounts
2 (1 910) 1 K.G. - u
to absurdity. There may be a genuine difference of opinion on 3. (1864) C.P. 121
4. (1852) 7 Ex. 47
1. Al.R. 1950 S.C. 265
.. Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs •

,
18 In~!!~retation of Statutes Mode of lntepretation 19 •
to be taken in the name of King George. It was contended party to the Election Petition if he w~s to be named for corrupt
that since the reign that monarch had come to an end no oath practices as the expresion 'all persons' included a person who
need to taken. The Court held that such construction would was a party to the election petition. The Court rejected this
be absurd. The language should be modified to avoid such construction on the ground that it would be ab$urd to give
adsurdity as the legislature clearly mean that an oath be taken. a party to the petition another chance to explain matters that
In Jones v. Conway W.S. Co., S. 541 of the Public has already been heard.
Health Act, 1876 gave power to a local authority to lay down In Wages Inspector v. Bromhodutt Bharagavan,1 it
water-pipes. It was agrgued that the power to lay pipes could was are before the court the act S.17 of the Payment of Wages
only be used when the authority had already begun supplying Act 1936 provided an appeal only in cases where a claim for
water. The Court rejected this construction, obviously because direction had been disallowed. The Court rejected it on the
it was absurd ro expect the company to supply water first and ground that such interpreta~on would be absurd.
lay down pipes to carry it leter. There is always a presumption No amo.unt of Illustrative dicisionallaw can, however
that the law does not require the impossible. categorically delimit what is absurdity. Lord Green has very
· In Page v. Williams/ the Court held that the phrase rightly called it a very unruly horse, in Grundt v. Great
'continued wil..ful disobedience to lawful commands' in S. Buldem Gold Mines Ltd.2
376(1)(c) of Merchant Shipping Act,1894 should also include
a sigle act of disobedience within its purview otherwise it
3. MISCHIEF RULE
•
•
would mean that there could be no unlawful conspiracy to (a) Scope
disobey as envisaged by the next clause of the subsection, and The mischief rule of interpretation was put forward by
would so give rise to inconsistency. the Exchequer Court, in Heydons Case3 in 1584 and, therefore
In India the golden rule of interpretation has been it is cometin1es called the rule in Heydon's case:
accep~ bl
the Courts. In Empress Mills v. Munic!pal The rule required that for sure and true interpretation
Comnuttee the Supreme Court held that the power given to of all statutes four things ought to be considered.
the municipal Committee to impose a terminal tax on goods 1. What was the common law before the making of
'imported into' or 'exported from' the municipal limits did the Act.?
not extend to imposition of such tax on goods in transit, as
that would lead to absurd consequences. 2. What was the mischief of or defect for which the
common law didn't provide.?
In '!irath Singh v. Bachittar Singh4 the supreme
3. What remedy the Parliament had resolved and
Court collSldered the construction to be put on 5.99 of"Re-
appointed to cure the disease of the common
presentation of People Act,1951. That enactment empowe~ed
wealth.?
~e El~on Tribunal to name all persons found guilty of
mdulgmg the per~ons to be named were to be given a notice 4. What was the true reason of the remedy.?
and an opp?rtunity of explaining their case. It was argued 'The office of the Judge' said Lord Coke, it 'always
that the notice and oppomtunity should also be given to a to make such construction as shall supress the mischief and
1. (1893) 3 Ch. 603 advance the remedy'.
2 (1965) lAll. E.R. 30
1. A.I.R. 1956 M.B. 152
3. A.LR. 1958 S.C 341
2 (1948) tALL. E.R. 21
4. A.I.R. 1955 s.c 830
3. 9 Ex. 709

lo
20 Interpretation of Statutes I
Mode of Intepretation 21
•
I
These obser9atio~ of Lord Coke though made at a

In Income Tax Commissioner v. Sodra Devi,1 the court
time when legislation w~ exceptional, continue to be useful
took into account the state of prevailing law in interpreting S.
even today particularly because they draw attention to the
16(3) of the Income Tax Act 1922. It held that this provision
history of law and its object and purpose.
was added with the particular purpose of dealing with the
The rule has been re-inforced by the presumption evil of tax evasion through nominial partnership with the wife
that the legislatun: knows the existing state of law. This and should as such be confined only to partnership among
presumption was used by Lord Blackburn in Young and Co. •
spouses.
v. Mayor of Leamington1 to look into the reasons for the In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar,2 the Supreme
introduction of 5.174 of the Public Health Act 1875. The Court Court has examined the history and object of 5.124 A of the
there held that it was made to get rid of certain doubts raised Indian Penal Code 1860, with the purpose of discovering the
by judicial decisions about the capacity of a corporation to . 'mischief it seeks to suppress'. It held that S. 124 A was limited
make a contract. in its application to acts involving intention or tendency to
(b) Dlustrations create disorder, or incitement to violence.
In the Claim of Viscountess Rhondda,2 for a seat in The place of the mischief of rule is, therefore, well
the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor referred to the state established among the recognised canons of interpretation,
of law before the Sex Disqua1ification (Removal) Act 1919 as but it must be remembered that it is subordinate to the nile
an aid to the interpretation of that statute. that where the meaning of the enactment is plain full effect
should be given to such meaning.
In Smith v. Hughes,3 the Court considered the
question whether the prohibition against solicitation of clients 4. BENEFICIAL CONSTRUCTION
by prostitutes in a street extended to cover cases where
prostitutes attracted the attention of persons from windows or (a) The Rule
balconies. It held that the expression covered solicitation from The purpose of law is to secure justice and to that and
a window etc. otherwise the construction would defeat the the court should prefer an interpretation which furthers the
v~ purpo~ of the statute. In order to advance the remedy end of justice. The name beneficial or liberal construction is
enviSaged, m the statute, the court observed, such solicitations given to such interpretation of the statutory language as seeks
must be considered to ~ covered by the expression. to give it the most comprehensive meaning to effectuate its
purpose.
In Bengal Immunity Co. & State of Bihar,4 the court ·
examined the state of law prevailing before the Cons.truction In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Smith} liberal
and held that Art. 286 of the Constitution was adopted for . construction was defined as:
the ~urpose of doing away with the mischief of multiple To give the language of a statutory
taxation and should be accordingly interpreted to supp~ess provision, freely and consciously, its
that mischief. connnrrortiy and generally accepted
1. (1883) 8 A.C. 517
meaning to the end that the most
comprehensive application thereof may .
2.
3.
(1922} 2 AC. 339
(1960) W.L.R 830 -------
1. AI.R. 1957 S.C. 832
4. A..LR 1955 S.C. 661 2 AJ.R. 1962 S.C. 955
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs 3. Tex. 40 S.W. (2d.) 913
•
•
be accorded ·Without doing violence to
any of its terms.~ Mode of Intepretation 23
The term 'beneficial' or 1iberal' construction is
constutely used in opposition to 'strict' interpretation which (i) Statutes conferring Power
stands for plain literal construction of a statute. In essence (ii) Statutes providing Reliefs
the liberal rule is closely aligned to the Mischief Rule since (iii)Statutes for welfare of Labour
the purpose in both cases is to effectuate the purpose of the (iv) Statutes requiring something to be done
statute. Where the courts are faced with a choice between a (v) Statutes relating to jurisdiction of Court
wide meaning which fully carries out the fUrpose of the law,
(vi) Old Statutes.
and a narrow meaning which may not carry it out so fully or
may defeeat it, the Court often choses the former. (i) Statutes Conferring Power-Statutes conferring
powers are sometimes construed broadly so as to incl?de all
(b) Scope of Rule that. which is necessary for the exercise of power.
A distinction is sometimes made for purpose of In A.G. for New Zealand v. Lower Hut City
interpretation on the basis of the nature of the statutes. Thus Corporation. 1 The Private Council held that the power
the Corpus Juris Secundum declares that statutes affecting conferred on a corporation to .build w a ter ·works for supply
public welfare or convenience, rights of citizenship, works of of pure water included within itself the po·wer to add fluroide
public utility, pretection of human life and military power are to such water.
to be construed liberally.2
In Pfizer Corporation v. Ministry of Health,2 the power
Such a list can never be exhaustive, and for that v~sted in any goverllJll~nt department to 'make' use and
reason Sutherland3 is of the view that the choice for a liberal exercise any patented invention for the services of the Crown
construction must depend on four factors: · was construed to include manufacture of drugs for supply to
(i) the state of former law patients under the Government health scheme. The contention
(ii) the persons and rights affected by the statute • that service of the crown should be strictly construed to mean
(iii) the lan~age of the statute only defence was rejected.
(iv) the purpose and object of the ; statute In Mysore S.R.T. Corpn. v. Gopinath} the Supreme
The choice however lies with the Courts. Consequently Court has held that the corporation has the power to applint
clear cut criteria can be formulated to indicate the classes of · servants .and determine the conditions of their service even
statutes or cases in which a beneficial construction would be where no regulation are framed for that ·purpose under the
put on the language of the enactment ·: statute.
.. .. '"
(ii) Statutes providing Reliefs or Exemptions-
(c) illustrations
Remedial statutes are normally construed beneficially. In Re
The tendency to give a beneficial Construction is Clark v. Forbes etc. Ltd.} S.I. of the Limitation Act, 1963, gave
reflected in the attitude of the Courts to the following kinds the power to the Court to extend the period of limitation in
of statutes. cases where the material facts were outside of knowledge of
1. Cited in Bind.ra: Interpretation of Statutes, 425 the plaintiff. The Court held that an extension could also be
2 50 Corpus Juris 605 granted in cases where the plaintiff did not know the identify
3. 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 34
1. (1%4) A.C. 1469
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs 2 (1%5) A.C. 512
, 3. C.A. 1299 of 1967 d. 5.10.1967
. .. Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs •
24 Interp~etation of Statutes
Mode of Intepretation 25
of the defendant and wasted his time in negotiating with In J.F. Stone Lighting etc. Ltd. v. Haygarth,l even a
another person whom he thought to be the occupier' and a worker who had undergone a long technical training was
such liable for damages for injuries caused to him. considered to be engaged in manual labour for the purpose
In Davis v. Harris,1 a statute exempting 'Bedding' of Factory Ac~.
from attachment in execution of a decree was construed to In Regional P.F. Commissioner v. Shibu Metal
exempt the cot also. Works,2 the Supreme Court held that the manufac&.ure of
In Raghuraj Singh v. Hari Kishan,2 the Privy Coucil brass untensils amounted to 'engineering' so as to attract the
held that the relief granted by the U.P. Agricultural Tenants provisions of Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952.
Relief act 1934, in respect of 'any final decree' which had In M.P. Mineral Industries Association v. .R.L.
not been fully satisfied, was also available in a case where a Commissione~ the Supreme Court admitted that statutes
compromise lands to the decree-holder. aimed at realization of social justice should be liberally
In Krishnya v. Seshachalam,3 the statute provided construed but if the language of the statute was unequivocal
relief in respect of debts. The scheme of the Act was to the court could not strech it. Thus it was held in the instant
divide dents in to three classes; debts incurred before Ist case that S. 27 of the Minimum wages Act 1947 could not be
October 1932, debts incurred after 1 October 1932 but before liberally construed as it was capable of b~aring one and only
the commencement of the Act, and debts incurred after one meaning.
commencement of the Act; and for each class of the debts the In B. Shah v. Presiding Officer,4 the Court held that
principles of scaling down were diffeent. No interest was to the word 'week' in the Maternity benefits Act 1961 means
be paid in respect of debts prior to 1 October 1932. In respect seven days without excluding the Su.."lday.
of debts incurred after the commencement of the Act interest (iv) Statute Requiring something to be don~- Whe~e
at the rate of 6V• percent was to be paid. The Suprem~ Court the statute requires something to be done, the requ~rement ts
held that a debt that was incurred before 1 October 1932 but construed broadly and not in any narrow or pedantic sense.
was renewed by a. prumissory note after the commencement
Thus in Lafone v. Smith,5 the court held that the
of the Act should be treated as a debt incurred before 1932 as
statut01y requirement that a newspaper guilty of a _libel
the reduction in respect of such debts was more beneficial to
the debtor. should publish an apology, meant that·the apology be pnn~cd
in a place in the newspaper ~here it ~ould catch the attention
(iii) Statutes for Welfare of Labour- Labour Legislation of the reader. Tucking the apology m some obscure comer
is given liberal construction. In Collamn v. Roberts4 a worker .
would not meet the requirement.
working, partly indoors and partly outdoors was held to be
In Sunrose Ltd., v. Could,6 S. 25(1) of lthe Landlord
working 'in or about a shop' for the purposes of shop Hours
,.nd Tenant Act 1954, provided that the notice of te~a~on
Act, 1892 It is noticeable that the site for outdoor work was at
of lease should clearly show the date on which the te~ation
quite some distance from the shop in which the worker was
employed. would become effective. The Court held that the reqwrement
1. (1%8) A.C. 157
• 2 A.LR. 1%5 S.C. 1076
1. (1900} 1 Q.B. 729
2 A.LR. 194.4 P.C. 35 3. A.I R. 1960 S.C. 1068
3. A.l.R 1965 S.C. 639 4. A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 12
4. (1896) 1 Q.B. 457 5. (1859) M. & N. 735
6. (1%1) 3 ALL E.R. 1142
.. . Mode of Intepretation 27
•
26 Interpretation of Statutes (vi) Old Statutes-The language of a statute is usually
was complied with in the case when the landlord gave notice extended to cover new things which were not know when the
on a printed form, filled in the date, but loft the year colunm statute was made, provided that they belong to the same genus
blank. to which the things enumerated in the statute belong. Thus in
In Mangilal v. Sugan Chand,1 the Supreme ~ourt held Tavlor v. c;;oodwingl bicycles were included in the expression
that S. 106 of the Transfer of property Act 1882 was inten~ed 'carriages' used in the Highway Act, 1835. In Senior Electricity
to confer a benefit on the tenant and should be liberally Inspector v. Laxmi Naryan,2 ~e expression 'telegraph' has
been extended to cover wireless communication.
construed in his favour. A notice not clearly complying with
its requirement of 15days notice would be invalid. 5. EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION
(v) Statutes relating to jurisdiction of Courts- The expression equitable construction is used in
Statutes relating to jurisdiction of Courts have at times been a wider as well as a narrow sense. In its wider m eaning it
liberally construed. Thus in knowles v. Knowles2 the word donotes a liberal construction of the language of the statute
' parents' inS. 26(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 was and is not different from the mode of beneficial construction.
construed liberally to refer to parentage of a child and not to In its narrower sense equitable construction stands
legitimacy. The Section dealt with the power of the Court to ior a m ode of interpretation which has been totally discarded
make orders about a child, the marriage of whose 'parents' in respect of modem statutes. The older statutes were often
was subject to the proceeding before the Court It '\.Vas held laconic. In respect of them it \Vas considered that they extended
that 'parents' means parents in fact. to similar causes not specib~ally mentioned in the statutes.
In R. v. Edmonton Justices,3 the Betting etc. Act, 1963 Lord Coke explainctl the process of equitable
empowered the Court to order forfeiture of a11~g produced construction in his Institutes:3
before the c0urt and shown to relate to an offenct;, under the 'Equity is a consb.uction made by the
Act The Court held that it was not necessary that the thing judges that cases out of the latter of
should be physically produced in the Court An order could a statute, yet being with.Ln the same
be made if the thing was related to such offence and was mischief, or causes of the m aking of the
available for inspection of the Court same shall be within the same rem edy
In Central Bank of India v. Rajgopalan,4 S. 33(2) of that the statute provideth' .
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, gave the labour court a The reasons for th e extension of the letter of the
jurisdiction in cases w:here a workman was entitled to rece~ve statu te w ere: first, that the older statutes were often very
'any benefit capable of being computed in term5 of money'. It concise, secondly, the judges construed them freely p erhaps
was argued that the enactment only covered cases in which for th e reason that the statutes were given their shape by the
the employer admitted his liability. The Supreme Court judges themselves, an d thirdly, lax methods of interpretation
rejceted the contention and held that the jurisdiction of the were commonly is use and the statutes were drafted keeping
labour court included the jw-isdiction to adjudicate on the the in mind. All these reasons have no·~, disappreared. The
claims made by workmen. p olariza tion of functions between the legislature and the
1. AlR. 1965 S.C. 101
------
1. (1879) Q.B.D. 228
2 (1962) 1 ALL E..R. 659 2 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 159
3. (1965) 2 All E.R 750 3. Institutes 402
4. A ,LR. 1964 S.C. 743 .·
28 ·· Interpretation of Statutes
•
judiciary militates against extension of the letter of the statute
by analogy.
The rule in respect of older statutes however still
prevails. Thus in Ridge v. Baldwin,1 the House of Lord held
: that an old statute should be so construed as to include the •
requirement of natural justice in disciplinary actionsas the
statutes in that era were drafted with such presumption.
Chapter 3
An illustration can be drawn from the Prisoners for
Debts Act,1371 which forbade the gaoler of the Fleet Prison Literal Rule: Meaning of Words
from freeing the prisoner till they had paid their debts. The
Act was u nderstood in Platt v. Sheriffs of London/ to extend
to all gaolers. 1. Rules relating to Meaning of Words
•
The rule has not been used in India. The Privy Council 2. Rules relating to Meaning of General words
refused to add to the provisions of the Transfer of Property (a) Nosciture a ~ociis
Act, 1882, in Arif v. Jadunath,3 by analogy. (b) Ejusdem generis
(c) Reddendo Singula Singulis •
ClOD .
1. RULES RELATING TO MEANING OF WORDS
Rule-1: The words of an enactment are to be given their
natural and grammatical meanings
Utiloquitor valgus i.e. the words of an enactment
•
must be understood in their popular sense. In Suttons case1
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs the question was whether exceptions made in favour of
hospitals by the relevant Act in respect of the payment of tax
are available to local institutions which cater to the needs of
•
everybody. It was held that the expression 'hospital' ntust be
considered to be what it popularly meant.
... Sometimes there may be a conflict between the
•
ol)
grammatical and popular meaning of a word. In Ramautar
• v. Sales Tax Offices/ the question was whether the word
' vegetable' would include betel leaves. Grammatically the
word 'vegetable' is wide eneugh to include a betel leaf but
popularly 'vegetable' is not considered to include betel leaf.
The Court held that the word vegetable should be given its
popul~r meaning, and only such things as were produced in
1. (1964) AC.
2 (1550j 1 Plow. 35
1. (1627) 10 Re. 31
3. AJ.R. 1931 P.C. 79
• 2. AJ.R. 1%1 S.C. 1325
•
,
•
30 Interpretation of Statutes Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 31 •
or
kitchen gardenS. farms and were used at the table would be expression trespassers was construed to mean wrongdoers as
the statute was made in the reign of Edward m when trespass
include in its meaning; and so betalleaf was not a vegetable.
So also in Dunlop (India) Ltd. v. Union of India,1 the court was considered a synonym of wrong doing.
gave 'latex' its popular meaning of rebber a.t;td not its chemical Rule- IV: Technical words must be construed in their
meaning of 'resin'. technical sense. ·
Similarly in Me: Boyle v. United States/ the U.S. If an A~t is passed with reference to a particular trade,
Supreme Court refused to include an aeroplane within the business or transaction, and wor~s are used which everybody
meaning of the expression motor vehicle, even though conversant with that trade, business or transaction, known or
etymologically that was possible. The reason was that understands to have a particular meaning,1 then the words
popularly a motor vehicle denoted motor vehicles operating are to be given that meaning.
on the surface of land. The rule will be applicable only if two conditions -are
Rull- D: If a word has an exact as well as a loose meaning, satisfied:
p reference is to be given to its exact meaning. (i) that the enachnent relates to a particular subject;
The presumption is that _the legislature is choosy about and
its words and has used them in their correct and exact sense. . (ii) that the content of such a subject matter is so
If the legislature uses the \vords 'contiguous', it is considered commonly well un derstood that •certain words
to mean ' touching' instead of 'neighbouring' though the word have received a particular significatiqn and are not
contiguous is sometimes loosely used to mean neighbouring, used in their general sense. If these two conditions
e.g.Mayor etc. v. Power Board.3 Similarly where the legislature are satisfied then the words used must be given
uses the words 'fee" and 'tax' in an enactment it is asumed their technical meaning.
that it kn~ws the disti.nctionbehveen the two as was h eld in Section 65 of the Highways Act in England gave to the
Prabhulal v. State of Orissa.4
surveyors the power to 'lep' the trees growing near a highway.
Rule- III! Word must be construed according to it~ meaning The question before the queen's Bench in Unwin v.
at the date of enectment of the statute: Hamson2 was whether this power was confined to cutting the
Lenguage develops with the passage of time and lateral branches of the tree or whether it included the power
therefore, it is possible that there may be significant to cut off the top of the tree also. The Court found that in the
differences in the meaning of words accuring i old and n ew parlance of surveying the expression 'top' the .trees was used
'
enacbnents. Lord Coke laid down that ancient Acts and to m ean attting off the tree. It held that the w ord 'lop' would
grants must be construed iT' the light of the la\Jv .prevailing be confined to Ia teral trimming of the branches of the tree.
at the time when such law was made. 5 However, this rule
Similarly in Ashwani Kumar v. Arvind Bose} a
appears to be confined to old enactments and is n ot extended
qution arose about the meaning of the word 'practice' used in
to contemporary legislation. Thus in Wilson v. Knubley,6 the
Supreme court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951.
1. A.I.R. 1977 S.C 597
This Act permitted Advocates enrolled in the Supreme Court
2 75 LED. 876
':\. A.lR. 1933 P.C. 212
to practice in other High Courts of this country. It was argued
4.. AI.R 1960 Orissa 63 1. J.N.E. Rly. v. Berriman,(1946) 1 All E.R. 255
5. 2 Institutes 2 2 (1891) 2 Q.B. 115
6. (1805) 7 ~ m 3. A.l.R. 1952 S.C. 369
,
•
•
32 Interpretation oi Statutes Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 33

~· ..
before, the Cowt that the word 'practice' only means pleading had made notes of his conversation with the Chairman and
on behaH of the litigant. The court rejected this argument. It Secretary of company at the time when defa!cations made by
held th8t in India by and large the word 'practice', in the the accused, Bhogilal, were discovered. It was argued that
context of the legal profession, included both acting for a client those notes could not be introduced in evidence for purpose
and pleading on behaH of a client and therefore it should be of corroborating the statement of the solcitor under S. 157
given the same meaning in the statute. of the INdian Evide~e Act as they were not made for the
This rule also extends to give a word the meaning it purpose of ~ommunicating information to any other person.
may have received because of settled judicial interpretation or This a.r_gument was rejected. The Court held that the word
legislative. Perhaps the best example of this is the interpretation 'statement' hasbeen used in various sections of the Evidence
of the word 'compensation' in Art. 31 of the Constitution. It Act. In the earlier sections there is no doubt that the word is
has been held by the Supreme Court in the State of West used to mean something that is stated and therefore, the same
Bengal v. Bella Banarajee,l Vairavelu v. Dy.Collector,2 and meaning should be given to it in S. 157 also.
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India,3 that the word 'compensati-n' · In S.V. Parulekar v. D.M. Thana} the question before
has been judicially interpreted in England and India by the the Supreme Court was whether the phrase 'grounds on
Court to mean the 'market value equivalent' of the property which the order has been made' occuring in
acquired by the State, and terefore the same _word in Art. 31 S. 3(3) and S. 7 of the ' Preventive Detention Act 1950,
must be given the same meaning. had the same meaning. The Court held that the context and
Rule V: Same words have to be given the same meaning, purpose of the sections was quite different. .
wherever they occur in the Act unless the context S. 7 was for the purpose of enabling a detenue to
otherwise requires make a representation against the detention and the purpose
There is presumption that if the legislature uses the of S. 3(3) was to let the State Government know the reasons
same words in different parts of the same section or the same for which the power delegated by it has been exercised by a
statute, it intends to give it the same meaning in all <he places. subordinate. Though the same phrase was used in both the
1\.iaxwell considers that it is always a safe rule to call the same sections it did not mean the same thing since the purpose in
thing by t...~e sal?le name. each provision was different.
This presumption is however a weak one and therefore, In Lalchand v. Radhakishan,2 the word 'tenant' in
if there is something in the context of the enactment or in its 5.19 of the slum clearance Act was given the same meaning in
object or purpose, the presumption is displaces; and the same all same sections of S. 19.
word may be given different meaning at different ,places. Rule- VI: When in relation to the same subject-matter
Thus in Bhogilal v. State of Bombay,4 .i t was argued different words are used in the same statute there
that the word 'statement' in S. 157 of the Evidence Act 1872, is a presumption that they are not used in the
means only such written or oral statement, as are made ·in same sense
communication by one person to another. Here a solicitor In Labour Commissioner v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills
Ltd} tne question was whether the expression ' rendered
1. A.LR. 1954 S.C 170
2 A.I.R. 1965 s.c 1017 1
1. A.I.R 1957 : ~
3. A.I.R. 1970 s.c 564
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 7~
4.. A.LR. 1959 S.C 356
3. A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1687

•
34 Interpretation of Statutes Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 35
.. . .
illegal' means the ·same thing as 'held illegal'. S. 42 of the phrases can be read to apply not only to the immediately
'Indusbial Dispittes Act 1948 prohibits the employer from preceeding antecedent but earlier antecedents also.
taking disciplinary a~'"ti.on against a workeman who has Sec. 1. of the Indian Contract Act 1872 provides
participated in a strike which has not been 'rendered illegal'. 'nothing herein contained shall affect the provisions of any
S. 40 of the Act described the conditions under which a statute, A~t or Regulation not hereby expressly repealed, nor
strike became illegle. S. 43 to 45 ga\Ce the power to certain any usage or custom or trade, nor any incident of any contract
authorities to held a strike illegal. The management of the mill not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act'. In Irrawady
h'ld terminated the services of a workman as he had instigated Flotilla Co. v. Bhegwan Das,1 a question arose whether the
a strike whicr was illegal under S. 40. It was argued before qualifying words ·(underllined above) relate to usage or
the Court that the services could not be terminated unless the custom also or were confined only to incidents of a contract. It
strike in which the workman participated was 'held illegal'. It was held by the Privy Council that these words must be read
was submitted that the expression 'rendered illegal' inS. 42 as qualifying only their immediately preceeding antecedent,
meant onlv such strikes as were held illegal by the competent namely 'incidents of any contract' and not the earlier ones like
authoriti~ under S. 40. The Court rejected this contention 1
custom and usage'.
holding that the legislature had used two distinet expressions 1
Art 194(1) of the Constitution provides subject to the
' held illegal' and 'rendered illegal'. The legislature could not
provisions of this constitution and to the rt;1les and standing
be understood to mean the same thing unless the context or
orders regulating the proceedure, there shall be freedom of
the purposeeso required, and consequently the expression
speech in the legislature of every State'. In Re Art. 1432 the.
'rendered illegal' covered a strik~ which was illegal under
question was whether the qualifying words (underlined above)
S. 40 even though it was not held to be illgal by competent
applied only to the immediate antecedent viz., rules and
authorities under Sc. 43-45.
standing orders, or they applied also to the earlier antecedents
The presumption ean howver, be rebutted by the viz.' the provisions of this constitution'. It was held by the
context or purpose of the enactment. For exan1ple, irlBeharilal Supreme Court that the qualifying phrase applied to both the
v. Emperor/ the Court has held that though the Indian Penal antecedents. It was not limited to the immediately preceeding
Code makes 'screening any person from legal punishment' antecedent since the context showed that the qualification was
and saving any person from legal punishment" distinet
11
meant to apply to both the antecedents.

offences under Ss. 213 and 217 and 218, the two expressions
mean the same thing. · 2. RULES RELATING TO GENERAL WORDS
Rule VII! Rule of Last Antecedent. ,. Where an enactment uses words of comprehensive
Where the enactment uses relative and qualifying meaning, their import is not to be cut down. The rule is that
WQrds, phrases and clauses, they are to be applied what is generally spoken shall be generally understood.
to the antecedents immediately preceding such In State of Bombay v. Hospital Majdoor Szbha,3
words it was argued before the Supreme Court that the general
This means that a qualifying phrase refers to the words 'business, trade, undertaking and calling' used in
immediately preceding antecedent. However, this rule is defining 'industry' in the Industrial Dispute Act 1947, should
subject to the context if the context so requires, the qualifying 1. I.L.R. 18 Cal 620
2. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745
1. A.lR. 1949 Bombay 405
3. A.LR. 1960 S.C. 610
•
, Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
.. . . Interpretation of Statutes Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 37
be inte1>reted in. a parrow sense, so as ·to include only such comparatively specific one. This rule is to be used only where
activitiE: ·~ as are pursued with a profit motive. The Court the intention of the Legislature is in doubt. If the language is
rejected this argument holding that in the al·sence of any plain the maxim has got no application .
intention to the contrary it would not restrict the meaning of In Shaw v. Ruddin,l the relevant statute mentioned
general w. •rds useJ in an enactntent. Hackney ~arriages, job Carriages, stage carriages, carts or job
Ho' ·ever, the ambit of meaning may be limited horse. Here the word carts' was taken to mean only such cart~
1
with refere1 .:e to the context. or the purpose of the statute. as were used for hire because the other expressions denoted
Grawford1 1 1dicates four consideration with reference to only vehicle for hire. The Court held that the word cart did
which the na .tral import of general word can be restricted. not include vehicle not used for hire.
These are: Rule 31 of the Rajasthan Rule· of Business .r equires
(1) Purp se of-an enacl!nent proposals for dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement
(2) The Cl 1text of the enactment .. of an officer to be referred to the Govemer.In State of
(3) Unjust, absurd o,r apprehensive nature of the Rajasthan v. Shripal Jain} a question arose whether cases in
conseqt.. 1ces which compulsory retirement was not imposed as a penalty
also needed reference to the Governor. It was held that the
(4) Associan 'of general words with words of specific
import expression 'comp~ory retirement' must be given a meaning
cognate to the other words in the phrase, •namely, dismissal
\'Vhile the firs· three considerations are extensions 1
and removal. As dismissal' and 'removal' were penalties, the .
of the general princip~ " of interpretion and need not be exprE'ssion 'compulsory retirement', in their company, must be
considered, the last one r\ 1uires special consideration because understood to relate to only such cases in which con..?ulsory
it is confuted to the colloca;. ~on of words used in an enactment.
retirement was imposed by way of penalty.
Teh restriction by association limits the meaning of the general
word for the reason that the words are found in association (b) Ejusdem Generis
with words of comparatively specific import. The restriction The rule of Ejusdem generis is that where in a sentence
takes three forms: particular words are followed by general words the general
(a) Noscitur a sociis word should not be construed in their wider sense, but should
(b) Ejusdem generis be held as applying only to objects, persons or things of the
(c) Reddendo singula singulis • same class as ,denoted by the specific words preceding the
general words.
(a) Noscitur a sociis ... .
Justice subbarao has formulated it as follows:
~" Lor~ Macmillan explained the doctring in these wordS; 'When general words follow particular
The ~earung of a word is to be know by the company it and specific words of the same nature,
keeps 2
the general words must be confined
. Where two or more words suspectible of analogous to the things of the same kind as those
?"'-~g are coupled together they are understood to be used specified.3
m therr cognate sense. They take their colour from each other
and the more general is restricted to a sense similar to the
------
1. (1959) lr. C.L.R. 214
2 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1323
1. Crawford Statutory Construction 325
3. K.K. Kochund v. State of Madras and Kerala,
2 Macmillan; of Law and other thing~ 166
A.l.R. 1%0 S.C. 1080, 1103
,
•
•
38 J~~retation of Statutes
Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 39
This doctrine. iS an attempt to reconcile possible
where a general word follows situation is. typically illu:;
incompatibility between· the meaning of specific and general trated by Attomy General v. Brown.1 S. 43 of Custom~:; Act
word when they are used together. It is based on L~e principle
~876, e~powe~ed Her Majesty in Council to prohibit the
that all the words in statute ought to be construed together. rmpvrtation of arms ammunition or gun power or any other
The legislature is presumed not to use superflous words. In goods'. It was held that other goods' meant only goods like
a collocation using specific words as well as general words arms and ammunition.
denoting obja..;:s of the same class, if the general word is
given its full and natural meaning, the specific words would (ii) The specific words must constitute a class -
be rendered superflous since the things which they denote The ejusde~ generi~ z:tle does not apply ~ess the specific
\\rould be included in the meaning of general word. On the words constitute a diStinct genus or class. Perhaps, this can be
other hand, of the specific words are given extensive meaning explained by an illustration mentioned by Justice HidayatuU
the general ·word following such specific words would be in Jagdish Chandar v. Kajaria Traders.2 In an ena~tment
which reads ' books, pamphlets, and other documen ts the
superflous.
words' other documPnts' can be read ejusdem generis because
The rule of ejusdem generis, therefore, accomplishes
the preceeding words cor'-':lt:itute a dass !'a.raely ' documents
the purpose of giving effect to both the particular words
meant for gen eral circulatiort'. On &e other if the sen tence
and the general word. This is done by treating the particular
reads 'newspapers or other dc.lO.unents · likely to convey
words as indicative of the class and considering the general
secrets to the ene.r.-ny' the v . :rd ·o ther documents' cannot be
I
word as extending the provision of the statute to every-thing
read ejusdem generie b~-- ;tse ' newspapers' do not constitute
contained in that class.
a class by themselvc:3.
Sutherland has indicated five conditions for the
In Jagdish Cr,a..'lclra case i t was argued that in S. b9
applicantion of the doctrine:1
of the Partnersrup Act which read 'a claim of set off or other
(i) The enactment contains an enumeration by specific proceedings to enforce a right arising from the contract', the
words followed by a general terin • words 'other proceeding~' must be read ~jusdem generis with
(ii) Such enumeration by particular words constitutes the word claim of set off. The Court rejected this on the ground
a class · that the words 'claim of set off' d id not consitute a class.
(iii) The class is not exhausted by the enumeration by It was may be added that it has been held in Allen
particular words v. Emprson3 that the mention of a single · word v.;ould not
(iv) The specific words as well as the general word co.ru;titute a genus.
constitute species of a distinct genus .. (iii) The Specific Words be not Exhau stive - It is
(v) A legislative intent negativing the application of · essential that the precee4ing specific words. Constitute a class
the doctrine is not mainfested by other provisions but must not exhaust the whole class. Thus in Rex v. Payne4
of the statute the relevant enactment read 'mark does or other disguise
(i) Enumeration by specific words followed by or any letter or any thing.' Here it was held that the word
a general term- A word is considered specific when it 'anything' could not be construed ejusdem generis with the
falls ~thin meaning . of a _second word which may include 1. (1920) 1 K.B. 778 ·
something more besides It. The doctrine applies to cases 2. A.LR. 196-1 S.C. 1882
1. 2 Sutherl and, Statutory construction 400 3. {1944) 1 All. E.R. 344
4. L.R. 1 c.c. R. 21
..
. . .. • •
40 ln~erpretation of Statutes l it~ral Rule: Meaning of Words 41

•
preceeding specific words ' mark or dress' because the specific Homes, it was ht!ld that the word ~all other metals' following
1
words exhausted the whole genus of ~disguise'. the words "coppt r, brass or tin" would not include silver or
Similarly, in State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan,l It was gold siilce such metals were superior in kind. to the metals
argued that in the phrase 'for purpose of a state or any other specifically enumerated in the enactement.
public purpose' the words 'any other public purpose' must (c) Reddendo ·singula Singulis
be read ejusdem generis. the Court declined to do so on the Where there are general words of description following
ground that the preceeding specific words namely 'purpose of an enumeration of particular things such general words are to
State' exhausted the whole genus. be construed distinctively. It the general words apply to some
(iv) Sepecific Words must belong to the Same of the things but not to others the general words are to be
Genera-The doctrine of ejusdem generis is applicable only applied to those thing to which they apply most ar.d no·t to
where specific words c~nstitute a single genera. Where they those thing to which they would not apply.
belong to different genera the rule has no application. Thus it Thus if the enactment reads; If any one shall draw or
was held in Indramni v. W.R. Natu2 that the rule of ejusdem load any sword or gun the word 'draw' shall apply to 'sword'
generis did not apply to interpretation of S. 29 of the Forward and the W<?rd 'load' to 'gun'.2
Contract Regulation Act, 1952 because the specific matters
m\?ntioned did not belong to the same class. ODD
(v) Intention of Legislature-The rule of ejusdem
generis has no application where the context of the enactment
or its purpose and object requires the meaning not to be so
restricted. Where the intention of the legislature is plain, the
words must be given the meaning such intention requires.
In Culley v. Parrison3 the Court refused to restrict the
meaning because looking at the pupose of the Act, the Court
thought that the general word must be given the meaning
•
such intention requires.
In U.P.E.B. v. Harishankar,4 the Supreme Court
observe the rule of ejusdem generis should be confined Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
'
withing narrow boundaries.
A corollary of the rule of 'ejusdem generis' is that in an
enac,.,..tn-tent where specific words prcede the general word, the
general word would not include any object of a class superior
to that indicated by the specific words. Thus, in Casher v.
1. A.lR 195.3 S.C. 810
2 A.I.R 1963 S.C. 274
3. (1965) 2 All. E.R. 264 1. (1831) 9 L.J.KB. 280
4. 1979 S.C. 65 2. Wharton Law Lexicon 850
,
•
.. .. ..
The Leteral Rule: General Principles 43
true meaning of any particular phrase in
the statute the particular phrase is not to
be viewed deteached from its context in
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs the statute it is to be viewed in its whole
•
context, meaning by this as well the title
Chapter 4 and preamble as the purview and the
enacting part of the statute.
The Leteral Rule: The rational of the rule is that it would be unfair to
take any one particular part of the statute and infer fro~ it
General Principles about the intention of the legislature without taking into
consideration the rest of the statute.
In Moyle v. Jenkins,l one section of the statute
1. Statute to be construed as a whole required a notice to be given, and another secti.ion provided
2. AYoidance of inconsistencies that the notice should be served on a person or left with him
The queens Bench construed the two sections together and
3. Expressio Unius est exclus~o alterius
held that the notice must be in writing.
4_ Construction ut res magis valeat quam pereat
In Re Newspaper Proprietor's Agreement/ S. 20 of
5. Presumption against surplusage
the Resistictive Trade Practices Act 1956 gave jurisdiction to
6. Casus omissus the Restrictive Practices Court in respect of any agreement of
which the particulars were re3istered with the Registrar. TI1e
1. STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE
House of Lowis held that after readipg the whole of the Act,
A statute must be construed as a wh ole. In Lhe Lincoln
it was apparent that the agreements referred to in S. 20 of the
CollegE} case Lord Coke has said that a good expositor of a Act were not only existing agreements but also agreements
parliamentary statute should make construction ?n all par:S which had been brought to an end. In this case Lord Evershed
together and not of any one part of the s~~te by ~tself.. ~Ius observed that jn statutory construction ' you should begin at
Institutes he calle~ this method of exposition as ....xpost:m ex
the begining and ~o on till you tome to on till you come to
visceribus actus. Tilis rule of co!lstruction has been vanously
the end, then stop. .
described as ' elementary~ or 'settled rule of statute~.
Our Supreme Court has considered it to be settled rule
In Brett v. Brett/ Sir John Nicholl, Maste~ of Rolls, ~
of interpretation that a statute must be taken as a whole. In
observed: Popat Lal Shah v. State of Madras,4 the court held that the
•
The key to the openin of every law is definition of the term 'sale' in the Madras General Sales Tax
the reason and spirit of the law, it is the Act meant only sales of goods taking place in the Province of
ruumus imponents the intention of the Madras as the title and the preamble of the Act clearly showed
law maker expressed in the law itself that the sales were to be taxed only when they took place with
taken as a whole. Hence to arrive. at the
1. (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 116
2. (1964) 1 All E.R 55 (H.L.)
1. (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 3. ibid
2 (1826) 3 Add. ZlO
4. A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 274
, •
•
.. . .
44 Interpretation of Statutes The Leteral Rule: General Principles 45
1
in the province. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India In Gardiner v. Admirality Commissioners,1 the House
the Suprem Court held that Entry 42 of List III of Sch.Vll of of Dords refused ~ limit by reference to other provisions of
the Constitution must be construed in the light of the various the statute the requtrement of providing safe means of access
provisions of the Constitution enabling the Union to use state to the place of work, incorporated in S. 26(1)" of the Factories
property and as such would include the power to make law Act 1937. It was argued that place of work meant only the
for acquisition of property of a state. plant of the factory, but this was rejected.
The principle applies not only to statutes as a whole 2. A VOIDANCE OF INCONSISTENCY
but also to the different parts of the same section. In State
A corollary of the rule that the statute is to be read
of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwa1,2 a question arose regarding
as a ':hole ~s that. if. different provisions of a statute appear
the interpretation of 5.16(2) of the Essential Commodities
tc be mconsiStent 1t lS the duty of the Court to avoid a head
Orinance, 1955. This was in two parts. The first part of the
on clash. Aiyar J. stated this rule in Devaru Temple case} as
section provided that the orders made under the Essential
follows:
Supplies Act, 1946 ·would be deemed to have been made
under the Ordinance. The second part of the Section provided When there is an enactment two
for continuance of appointments made, or licences permits provisions of which cannot be reconciled
or d.irectio:'..s issued t" nder the 1946 Act. It was held by the with each other they should be so
Supreme Court that thc;.>o.~ :·wo parts \\rere to be read together interpreted. that, if possible, effect should
as covering the orders n1ade an·-1 the administrative action be given to bothe.
taken under those orders. . ~consist~1~cy may be avoided by regarding the
In Gurmej Singh v. Pratap Su~gn_. ~ S. 123(7) of the conflicting proVIsions as dealing with different matters or
situa~ons, Thus in R.V. Forest Justices/ S. 158(2} of the
Representation of t.~e Peoples Act 1951, deemed it to be a
H~u~g Act 1957, empowered a local authoriv; owning
corrupt practice to obtain the assistance of certam classes of
buildmgs to recover possession of its premises by serving a
government servants. Among such class were revenue officers
warrent signed by its housing manager. But, S. 166(2) of the
difineJ in clause (f) of the subsection (2) which read: 'revenue
Act required all written documents to signed by the clerk of
Officers including village accountr.m.ts, such as patwaris,
the authority. The queen Bench held that S. 158 (2) dealt with
lekhpals, talatis vernams and the like but excluding other
a different sistuation to which S. 166 (2) was not applicable.
village officers'. The Court held that a lambardar did not fall
in this class as he was a village officer and the words 'revenue In the Devaru case4 there was an apparant conflict
officer' in the Clause could not be read apart from the words· between the provisions made by Art, 25(2) (b), and Art. 26b
excluding village officers. of the Constitution. Art 25(2) (b) empowered the State of
make a law for opening places of worship to all classes or
The rule must not however, be carried too far. Where
sections of Hindus, Art. 26(b) premitted every religious. In the
the language of the enactment is unambiguous, resort must
instant case the Gaur, Saraswath Brahmins claimed the right
not be had to other provisions of the statute or enactment to
to exclusive worship during a particular festival. They denied
give it a forced or unnatural meaning.
·-
1. (1%4) 2 All. E.R. 93
L AlR. 1963 S.C. 1241 2. Venkatrapna Devaru v. State of Madras, A.l.R. 1958 S.C. 255
2 AlR. 1960 S.C. 47 3. (1%1) 3 All E.R. 1138
3~ A.I.R. 1950 S.C.. 122 4. Supra n. 11

46 .. .I.n terpretation of Statutes
entry in the temple to .HariJans during the period. There was The Let~ral Rule: General Principles 47
a law made under Art 25 (2) (b) throwing open all temples to provisions of Art. 13. In their opinion it would not have been
Harijans. The Supreme Court held that the conflict between harmonizing but killing the provisions of ArL 13.
two provisions of the Constitution must be reconciled by
giving them a harmonious content so that the right of every 3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
religious denomination was preserved consistently with the This maxim is an application of the literal rule of
policy of opening the templas for harijans. It held that Art. interpretation in a negative sense. It means that the express
26 (b) protected the right of the denomination to worship mention of one thing belonging to a particular class in a
exclusively on particular occasions. statute implies the exclusion of all other things belonging to
Another method of avoiding conflict is to hold that one that class. .
of the provisions is marely an exception to the other which This maxim is a product of logic and common sense.
lays down the general rule. In Gelberg v. Miller,1 S. 54 of the It proceeds on the presumption that what is left unexpressed
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 empowered a constable to arrest by the legislature was not probably intended. Historically, the
without warrant any person obstructing a throughfare. S. 63 maxim was first applied to cases where the statute designated
of the Act gave a similar power to arrest without warrant a a particular remedy for conforcing a newly created right or
person who offends against the Act and whose name and power. Gradually it has come to be extended to all statutes.
address was unknown to the censtable. The Queens Bench The maxim is to be used only as the means of finding
held that S. 54 created an exception to the general rule_in E, 63 out the intention of legislature and should not be used to
and was available only in case of a particular kind of offence. defeat such intention. It is not enough that the express and the
Another example of harmonious construction can implied are merely incongruous, It must be clear that they can
be derived from the Searchlight case2 where the apparent not be intended to coexist. S. 185 of the Matrimonail Causes
conflict between the fundamental right of freedom of..speech Act 1967, gave the courts a jurisdiction to grant declarations of
and expression and the provisions relating to the privileges legitimacy in certain cases. Order 15, rule 17 of the Supreme
of the legislature was resolved by harmoniously construing Court Rules also permitted the Courts to make a declaratory
Art.19 (1) (a) and Art. 194(3) of the Constitution. The reason decree. h1 Aldrich v. Atto1ney General,1 it was held that the
given was that Art. 194(3) was an exception to the general court could n 0t grant a declaration under Rule 17 in respect of
rule incorporated in Art. 19(1) (a). · legitimacy except in cases to which S. 185 applied, as by that
. section the jurisdiction of the .Courts ws limited to a specific
To give a harmonious construction is not to. reduce
class of cases.
any one ot the conflicting provisions to a dead letter. It has .
been repeatedly ass~Ited by the courts that to harmonize is In the Searchlight-2 case it was held by the Supreme
not to destroy. The best examnle of this attitude is to be foimd Court that the express mention of the adoption of privileges
of the House of Commons excluded the presumption that
in the Golaknath case.3 Th~re a majority of the Supreme
the privileges were subject to the fundamental rights as in
Court refused to apply the rule of harmonious construction
England no fundamental rights were avilable.
so as to give the provisions of Art. 368 a preference over the
In Gopalan v. State of Madras} the Supreme Court
1. (1961) 1 All. E.R. 291 • refused to consider that the word 'personal liberty' included
2 MS.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha, A.LR. 1954 S.C. 395
1. (1968) 2 W.L.R. 413
3: D.C.Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.LR. 1%7 S.C. 1217
2 Supra n. 13b
3. A.I.R. 1950 SC Z7
.. . .
The Leteral Rule: General Principles 49
48 · Interpretation of Statutes
the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19 as a specific provision sensible me~g ~ay be given to them. The Privy Council
has observed m Dttcher v. Denison,:1 •
was made for the former in Art. 21 of the Constitution. •
Again in many otht?r cases like Purshotam v. State of One who reads a legal document should
not· without necessity of some ~ound
Kerala,1 the Supreme Court has held that the word 'estate' in
reason impute to its language tautology
Art. 31 v,ould not include anything which is not defined as
or superfluity and should be rather at the
such under the local law prevailing in any area.
out right inclined to suppose every word
. The maxim must however be used cautiously. Lopes intended to have some effect or be some
J. has called it a valuable servant but a dangerous master' use.
in Colquhoun v. Brooks.2 In this case the question was
The application of this maxim in interpretation of
whether earnings of a business carried on in Australia which
statutes is to found in widely diverse fields.
were not brought to England were taxable. The statute made
. an exception in respect of interest on foreign securities not In Day v. Simpson/ the statute prohibited
actually received in England. Reliance was placed on it to performance of plays without a licence. A question arose
show that all other income in a foreign country was taxable. whether the expression 'play' includes a shadow act in which
The court refused this plea on the ground that it acceptance the performers never come on the stage. The Qourt held that
would result in injustice. a shadow act was included as the object of the statute would
An omission may be the_ result of inadvertance or be othenvise defeated.
accident The maxim has no application if it leads to absurd In R. v. Browne} a question arose under S. 15 of
or unjust results. A regard must also be paid to the subject Crimiy Justice Act, 1925. That section provided that in case
matter of the statute in applying this maxim. any member of a jury died or became in capable of continuing
to as a juror because of illnes during the course of trial, the trial
4. UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT could proceed with the consent given in writing 'by on behalf'
A statute should be so interpreted as to make it of the accused. In the instant case the counser for the accused
workable. had given a written consent. Later on the accused contended
Where the language of the enactment is equally open. that the counce! did not act with his court. The Court held
to alternate constructions, the Court should choose that which that the accused would be considered to have consented with
will be consistent with the smooth working of the enactment. the meaning of S. 15 in cases where the court for the accused
The maxim is a corollary of the doctrine of separation gave his consent and the accused did not protest. ·
of powers. The duty of the Court is to give full effect to the In Shanti Prasad v. Director of Enforcement,4 it was
language of the statute. Where rigid adherence to language contended that the expression 'resident of India' inS. 4 of the
will defeat the very object and purpose of the statute, the Foreign Exchange Requlation Act, 1947 should be construed
Court may depart from it to save the statute from being lost. to mean persons actually residing in India. The Court rejected
Thus the maxim creates also an exception to the general this contention on the ground that such a restriction would
rule that full effect must be given to every word of the statute.
It permits the words of the statute to be so construed that a 1. (1857) 11 Moore P.C. 324
2 13 W.R. 748
1. A.LR. 1962 SC 691 3. (1'7o2) : All E.l<. 6:..
•
2 (1889)
, 14 AC. 493 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
4. A.I.R. 1%2 S.C. 1764
.. . . •
SO Interpretation of Statutes · The Leteral Rule: General Principles 51
defeat the purpose of the statute by excluding from its purview In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan,1 the Supreme
acts done by residents of India while they were abroad. Court refused to treat the words 'any other public purpose' as
superfluous inS. 6 (4) (a) of the Bombay Lan~ Requisition Act,
In Kong yee Lone & Co. v. Lowjie,1 the Privy Council 1948. The Act empovered the State to requistition premises
held that a formal contract of sale and purchase of goods was for the 'purpose of a state or any other public purpose'. The
a wagering contract if the real intention of the parites was to Court held that a requisition under the enactment could be
wager and not to sell or purchase. made either for (i) state purpose or (ii) public purpose other
In countries having legislatures with limited po·wers then state purposes.
maxim has another application also. Where a statute is capable In Gurmej Singh v. Pratap Singh,2 the Supreme Court
of bearing two meanings one of which would render it held that S. 127(7)(£) of Representation of the Peop~es Act,
unconstitutional, the courts should lean towards that meaning 1951~ which mentioned both 'revenue, officers' and 'village
which would not have the effect of invalidating the statute. officers' did not use the later words superfluously, and so
An extreme example of this attitude is the opinion revenue officers were different from village officers.
of Supreme Court in Raguba.t: Dyal v. Union of India.2 However, the presumption against superfluity is
The Forward Contract Regulation Act 1952J empowered the rebuttable.
Government to terminate any forward contract on a price to Maxwell says that where no sensible meaning can be
be determined by it The Court observed that the word 'price' given to a word or a phrase used in an enactment or where
should be read as 'fair price' to save the statute from being such meaning would defeat the real purpose of an enactment
held unconstitutional. the court can overlook such a word or phrase.3
Drafting errors may result in superfluity or
5. PRESUMPTION AGAINST SURPLUSAGE
unintelligibility. where the language of a statute in its ordinary
There is a prima facie presumption that the legislature meaning and grammatical ccnstruction leads to a mainfest
does not use superfluous words. Each word in a statute must contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to
be given its ~eaning. some inconvenience or absurdity, or hardship or injustice a
In R. v. West Riding of Yorkshire Justice,3 the Court construction may be put upon the language which n1odifies
refused to budge from a literal interpretation of the enactment the meaning of the word or even the structure of the sentence
even though it meant that an appeal could lie from one quaTter by omitting the surplus words.
session to another (both being Courts of equal status) which In Solmen v. Duncumbe,4 an Ordinance has provided
was extraorlinary. ·• that' any natural born subject of Great Britian or Ireland residing
. . •
4
In Haser v. Ministry of Housing, the provisions gave within the District of Natal shall have the power to meke a will
a right of appeal or in the alternative a reference to the High 'as if such natural born subject wa3 residing in England'.
Court 'according to rules of Court'. The Rule of the Court The obvious purpose of the ordinance was to confer on
only provided for appeal and not fo~ reference. The Court British subject in Natal the power to make a will which was
Only that the words referring to rules could not be treated as not avilable to them under the Roman Dutch law prevailing
superfluous, and hence no reference could be made. •
L I.LR 29 Cal. 461 (P.C.) 1. A.LR. 1955 S.C. 810
2 A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 263 2 Supra n. 9
3. (1815) M & S 493 3. lvfaxwell loc. cit 228
4. " (1962) 3 AU E.R. 943 4. (1886) 11 A.C. 6'ZJ (P.C.)
• •
... .. . •
52 Interpretation of Statutes The Leteral Rule: General Principles 53

•
in that area. However, this purpose was totally defeated by by a special resolution and in certain c~es such resolution
the use of words underlined above in the last part of the required the sanction of the Government S. 90 of the Act,
enaclntent. The effect of these words was to continue the gave the Board a power to suspend the Secretary pending
Roman Dutch law. Therefore, the Court ignored these words the sanction of the Government. In 1933, S. 71 was amended
in applying the enactntent. providing that a resolution dismissing a secretary would
not be given effect till the expiry of the period of appeal or
6. CASUS OMISSUS till the decision of an appeal preferred against the order of
The courts are not at liberty to add to the language of the dismissal. A plain reading shows that the Secretary could not
ena,...cln"""tatt. They may interpret doubtful or obscure language be suspended during the pendency of an appeal against the
in a statute so as to give effect to the presumed intention of order of dismissal. However, the Supreme Court refus~d to
the legislature. But, the courts cannot by construction cure an cover the omission by construction.
omission however desirable it may be. In Nalinakhya v. Shyamsunder,1 the Supreme Court
A case for which no provision is made in a statute is held that an enactment conferring on the Court a Jurisdiction
not to be brought within its purview by the courts merely to rescind or very 'any decree' for recovery of possession,
because there is no good reason to omit it. did not empower the Court to vary or rescind an 'order' for
· . In O'Connor v. Issacs,l the court was considering the recovery of possession. The legislature omitted to provide for
proviso to S. 2 of the Justices Protection Act 1848. That section such jurisdiction case of orders.
p~rmitted a suit !o be brought against a Justice for any ultra A trend of departure can be seen in the optinion ofLord
~act. A proVISo to the section, however, declared that no Denning in Seaford Court Estate Ltd., v. Asher.2 The learned
actio~ ~hall be brought in respect of anything done under any judge said, 'where a defect appears a judge cannot simply
conVIction or order made by the justice unless such conviction fold his hands and bl~e the draftsman. He must supplyment
has been set aside' ~pon appeal. A plain reading of the ·proviso the written words so as to give force and life to the intention
of the legislature'.
showe~ ~t quashing on appeal was a condition precedent
for action m respect of 'conviction' but not for actions against The House of Lords has severely criticised and rejected
orders. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that it soulc the views of Denning J. in Magor etc. v. Newoort Corpn.3
not supply the omission. Their Lordshlps considered that to supply omissions involved
exercise of legislative functions by the Cour~. This opinion of
In R. v. Dyott,2 an interesting situation arose. The • Denning J. has been quoted. by J. Sarkar in Pentish v. Vocra
Poor Rate Act, 1743 required publication of a poor rate in a Mallappa,4 but he was then delivering a minority opinion.
church or chapel. A parish named Hopwees Hays had neither·
The critisism against Lord Denning is based on an
cha~erenor church. The Court held that no poor rate could exploded myth. The courts can and do create law.
be fix:d for such a parish as it could not be published in the
Crawford, howver, notices certain situation in which
prescfibed manner. It realised that there was an omission but
refused to fill it. addition of words is permissible in the procese of construction.
He says that where the alternative lies between supplying
In Hiradevi ":· Distt. Board,3 S. 71 of the Up n· tt by implication words which appear to have been accidently
Board Act provided ~t a Board may dismiss the Se~e::.ry
1. (1956) 2 All E.R. 417 1. (1953) S.C.R. 533 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
2 (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 17 2 (1949) 2 All E.R. 155
3. A.lR. 1952 S.C. 362 3. (1951) 2 All E.R. 839
4.. A.I.R. 1%1 S.C. 1107
- ..
54 ~nferpretation of Statutes
.
omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain
existing words of an me~ it would be permissible to
supply the requisite word.1 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
Obvious omissions and oversights can be cured. Thus
•
in Harrison v. London and Brighton Railway,2 the statute
made the railway companies liable for loss or injury to any
'horse, cattle or other animal carried by them. Its schedule
Chapter 5
fixed the maximum amount of compensation for for various
animals but did not mention any amount for 'dogs'. The Court Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation
held that this was an obvious oversight and the sechedule did
not restrict the generality of the statutory enactment.
In Rev. wainewright,3 the enactment provided that if 1. Title
the protector (guarian) of a settlement should be a 'lunatic, 2. Preamble
convicted felon or infant, the court of Chancery should be a 3. Interpretation Clause
protoctor in place of the 'lunatic or infant'. The enatement 4. Headings
omitted to say anything about the situation in which a 5. Marginal Notes
convicted felon v.ras a protoctor. The Court held that it would 6. Punctt.1ati~n
be v.•ithin its jurisdiction to supply the obvious omission in
7. lliustratioi':s
case of convicted felons.
8. Provisos
In Sirajulhag v. Board,4 the Supreme Court held that
in S. 33 of the Arbitration Act the words 'any party p1ust be 9. Exceptions and Saving Claur..es·
taken to connote any person who was alleged to be such a 10. Schedules
party and it was not necessary that he should really be a party. Intrinsic aids mean such aids to the process of statutory
Similarly in Ramaswamy Nedar v. State of Madras,5 construction as may be found within the four comers of the
. ctatute itself. Th~y are to be distinguished from extrinsic aids
1t was contended that S. 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code
involve a casus omissus as it did not indicate the offence . which refer to matters not included in a statute. The following
are the principal intrinsic aids.
of w?ich a person could be held guilty in an appeal against
acq~~· The Supreme Court held that it would supply the 1. Tfl'LE
onussto~ It further held that the appellate Court 'had the·
Every statute has a short title and a long title. The short
power m such appeals to convict a person of an offence of title is given only for purposes of reference and, therefoure, it
which he was found guilty.
cannot be used as an aid to interpretation of a statute.
The Long title is now considered to be a part of the
ClCJO statute. The older British practice was to have no long title
L Crawford : Statutory construction 269-70 at all. In England, originally, Bills in Parliament were mere
2 (1860) 2 B & 0 122 petitions to the King. They were entered on the records of the
3. (184.3) 1 phil. 2.58 parliament at the end of the session of Parliament together
4. A.lR 1959, S.C. 298
with the King's answer to such petitions. The judges drewup
5. A.LR. 1958 S.C. 56
;
.. . •
56 Interpretation of Statutes Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation 57
these records into statutes and gave them a tiltle. During In Popat Lal Shah v. State of Madras/ the long title
the reign of Henery VI, this practice of introducing oills was of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 described the Act
adopted. to be 'an Act providing· for levy of a general tax on the sale
In the 11th year of the reign of Henery VII the custom of goods in the province of Madras'. The Court held that this
to put a title to the bill cam into being. Because of this back showed that the term 'Sale' was not used in the Act to mean a
ground, for long the title was not considered a part of the transection talcing place outside the Province of Madras.
statute. The Courts held that it could not be taken into Though the title is recognised as a valuahle aid to
consideration. In Clavdon v. Green/ Wills J. observed that the statutory construction it cannot be used to cut down or control
tiltle of a statute simply constituted contemporanea expositio the express provisions of the Act.
i.e. contemporary view about the law, and it was not a part where something is doubtful or the language of the
of the statute. The change in the method of recording statutes statute is ambiguous, a reference can be made to the title to
did not change the value of the title as an aid to interpretation. resolve the doubt or the ambiguity; but where there is no
. It could not give it the importance of a part of the statute. doubt or ambiguity; the meaning of an enacttnent is not to be
However, the fact that earlier judicial decisions in narrowed or restricted with reference to the long title.
England did not treat title a·part of the statute, did not exclude h1 Manoharlal v. State of Punjab/ the long title of
all reference to the long title in interpreting .the statute. Punjab Trade Employees Act, 1940, d eclared : 'An Act to
In Shaw v. Ruddin,2 the question was whether the limit the h ours of \Vork of shop assistants and commercial
1
Dublin Carriage Act, 1835 applied -to carts' used for private employees and to make certain regulation concerning their
purposes. The Court took in to account the long title of the holidyas, ·w ages and terms of service' . It was argued before
Act \'\Thich ·w as An Act to consolidate, the laws relating to
I the Supreme Court that this title showed that the Act was
Hackney and Stage Carriages also Job carriages and horses not m eant to aj_"ply to p ersons who o perated their the title
a..Ttd carts let for hire within the police Distt. of Dublin. Lefroy dould n ot control the plain and express provisions of the Act
C.J., held that the title of the Act showed that the· Act was like S. 7 of it which require every shop to certain closed on a
inten_ded to make regulations with respect to carriages let out prescribed day.
for hire. It would not apply to carts used for private purposes.
2. PREAMBLE
The modern practice is to consider the long title a part
of the statute. Lord Moulton observed in Vacher v. London A preamble is in the nature of a prefactory statement
Society of Compositors.3 •
setting out the reasons, motives or objects yvhich are sought
to be achieved by the statute. The Preamble has the function
The title is part of the Act itself and it. to explain certain facts whiCh need to explained before tl1e
is legitimate to use it for the purpose of
enactinent can be understood.
interpreting the Act as a whole.
In Mills v. Williams,3 Lord H olt held that preamble
. ~India the Supreme Court has recognised the modern was not a part of tl1e statute. On tht> otl1er hand, Lord Coke
practice m respect of the long title. It has held that the long in his Institutes labelled the freamble a::;, 'a ke~· to open the
title is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for
understanding of the statute'.
the purpose of a..~ertaining the general scope of the Act.
1. A.I.R 1953 S.C. 274
1. (1868) L R 3 C.P. 511 2 A.I.R 1%1 S.C. 274
2 (1859) 9 Ir. c. I. R. 214 3. (1704) 6 Mod. 62
3. (1913} A.C. 107 4. 1 Institutes 79a.
,

58 Interpretation
. of Statutes
Intrinsic Aids to interpretation 59
In Stowell v. Lord Eou~ Dyer J. observed. that the
1
preamble was 'a key to open the minds of the makers ot the (ill) If the enacting words of the statute are plain
Act and the mischiefs which they intended to redress'. enough the preamble cannot limit the ambit of
the statute.
In a resent case, At tomey General v. H.R.H.
Augustus,2 House of Lords has discussed elaborately the (iv) Where the enacting part of a statute is cauched
position of as an aid to interpretation and had laid down the in"clear and unequivocal language the preamble
following propositions : cannot control, restiict, qualify, alter, subtract
from, or add to the enactment.
(i) The preamble is a part of the stntute and can be
(v) Where the general terms of the preamble do not
read with other provisions of the statute to find out indicate or cover all the mischiefs which are found
the meaning of words in the enacting provisions. to be provided for in the enacting provisions, the
(ii) That the preamble is not in itself an enacting provisions overide the preamble.
provision and, therefore, does not carry the same (vi) Where the preamble provides for a wider
weight as other enacting provisions of the Act. mischief then the statute in its sections enacts,
fill) The utility of the preamble diminshes inversely the courts are not to give those sections a wider
with the clarity of the enacting provisions. scope than that indicated by thelanguage of the
These propositions have been ~ accepted in India enacting part.
in K.KJ<ochunj v. State of Madras etc. Justice Subba Rao (vii) Where radical amendments aremade in an Act
took it as a well established proposition that the preamble , showing a different intention than that expressed
may be legitimately referred to- in the parent Act the courts cannot refuse to give
. effect to the a1nendments on the ground that the
(i) remove any ambiguity, or
• pre amble has not been amended.
(ii) to fix the meaning of words which may have more (viii) Where the text of the statute can be given many
than on meaning, or different construe tions help may be taken from
(iii) to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope. th preamble for the p~pose cf :Xplaining,
Whenver the enacting part is in any of the aforesaid restraining or even extending the enacting words.
aspects open to doubt reference may made to the Preamble. · (ix) ·Where it is clear that the enactment has used very
4 general language that is to be limited, recourse
In Re Chacko, the following principles haveJ:>een laid
down in regard to the use of the preamble : . . may be had to the preamble for that purpose.
(i) The purpose of a preamble is to indicate L., To summarise, the pramble cannot extend or rest:Jct
the plain meaning of express and unequivocal language of the
general terms the object of the legisla~e in
passing the Act. enactment. It is only in the following two classes of cases that
preamble can be used as an aid to interpretation.
(ii) The preamble cannot be invoked to determine
( j\I Where the text of •the enacbuent is suscep~le to
the validity of the Act
-----
1. (1569) 1 Flow. 353
different con structions.
2. (1957) 1 all. E.R 49 (ii) Where the very general language used .in. an
3. AJ.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 enactment is clearly intended to have a limited
4. (1956) 2 ML.J. 739 effect
,
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•
60 Intetpretation of Statutes Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation 61
In Burakur Coal Co. v. Union of India,1 it was argued indicated. Such, definitions use the words 'means' or 'means
that the power vested in the Central Government by S. 4 and inCludes' to define an expression. Where over a word
of the Coal Bearing Areas (Development etc.) Act 1957, to is defined to 'mean' . something the definition is considered
prospect for coal on any land, was limited to only such lands exhaustive.1 -
as had not been earlier worked for coal, because the preamble An inclusi~e definition is one where the defined word
referred to only unworked lands. The Court refused to limit retains its ordinary meaning but is also extended to cover the
the operation of the Act with reference to the preamble indicated subject matter. Usually, such a definition uses the
because in its opinion the enacting provisions were plain and term 'includes'.2 Similarly, where the definition uses the word
dear, and covered unworked as well as worked out lands. 'denotes', the definition is not considered exhaustive but only
Again in Inder Sing v. State of Rajasthan} it was inclusive.3
argued before the Supreme Court that the power of the Definitions using the term 'i.e. to say' are illustrative in
· Government to exempt any person from the operation of ~ ·eir character; e.g. in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia,4 the Privy
the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance 1949, was Council held that the words 'i.e. tosay' following the word
unconstitutional as the power was arbitrary and no guidance 'land' in List II, Sch. VII of the Government of India Act 1935,
vt'as provided for the exercise of the power. The court referred were merely illustrative and not exhaustive of the scope of the
to the preamble of the Ordinance holding that though the legislative power.
power was expressed in general words it was limited in its Definitions creating legal fictions are also sometimes
operation to the objects enumerated in the preamble and included in a statute.
. Where such
. aldefinition is used the court
·was not arbitrany in its character. Thus the preamble was in is bound to ascertain the purpose for which the ficition is
a sense used to limit the othen4/bP general provisions of the created. It must also imagine the consequences and incidents
impugned ordinance. which flow from the fiction. 5
•
3. INTERPRETATION CLAUSE (b) The Rule
It is common to find in a statute definition of words The g'~eral rule in respect of definitions is that they are
or expressions used in the statute. Usually such definitions read subject to the context. Sutherland says that a definition
are made subject to the context so that a defined expression must be taken to be declaring what may be con1prehended
would bear the meaning given to it by the definition unl~ss within the term when the circumstances require that it should
such meaniitg is repugnant to the context in which the word be so comprehended.6 Thus in V.F.G. Insur~ce Co/ case
is used. Usually such definitions are put together in a single the Supreme Court refused to give the word 'insurance'
section and the section as a whole is called in interpretation the meaning which it definition gave to it in S. 2(a) of the
clause. Insurance Act, 1938. In the contest of S. 3 of the Act the policy
•
(a) Kinds of Definitions of the Act and the nature of the provisions made by S. 33, the
,
definition was inapplicable.
The definitions usually found in statutes may be
classified as exhaustive, inclusive, illustrative or fictitious. 1. Official Assignece v. Basudev, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 723
2 R. v. B.C. Fir & Co., A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 121
An exhaustive definition is one which does not permit 3. Manik Ram v . Emperor, A.I.R. 1%1 Patna 133
the defined word to be taken in any other sense then the one 4. AJ .R. 1947 P.C. 72
1. A L R. 1961 S.C 954 5. Commissioner of Income Tax v . Teja Singh, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 352
2 , A L ~ - 1957S. C. 954 6. 2 Sutherlad, Loc. cit. 222
Also lharhhankar Bagla v . State of M.P., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 307 7. A.I.R. 1%0 S.C.m
Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation 63
This observation has been adopted by our SuJ?reme
In Shamsuddin v. Khusilal,l the court held that the Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ahmad Bhai.1
definition of the word, occupant' in M.P. Land Revenue Code
1
However, in ·England marginal notes have been

did not apply to the word as used in S. 54 of the Code as the considered as an aid for ascertaining the general sense in
context required a different meaning. which words have been used in enactements.
As a general rule the definiti?~ of a term ~~st be In Vonour v. Sellon2 Jessel M.R. referred to the
confined to the particular statute containing such definition. It marginal notes and considered them to be a part of the statute.
should not be extended to other Acts except where such Acts In interpreting the Constitution of India margiD.al
are in Pari materia. notes are considered to provide some clue to the meaning and
4. HEADINGS purpose of the Article. It was pointed out in Bengal Immunity
Co. v. State of Bihar,3 that the marginal notes appended to
The practice or grouping sections under different the articles of the Constitution of India were themselves a part
headings in a statute was first introduced in 1845 in the of the statute because they had been considered and adopted
Consolidation Act. The headings are now treated as parts by the Constituent Assembly. Recently, in Golak Nath case4
of the statute and have the same value as the preamble in the Supreme Court used the martinal note to Art 368 to show
interpretation. that the article was confined to procedure for amendment
In the language of the enacting provision is express of the Constitution and did not provide for the substantive
and unequivocal the headlings cannot be taken into power of Amendment.
consideration to cut down or extend itw ambit. The real The Supreme Court has recently however reiterated its
purpose for which the heading can be used is to show the stand in respect of legislation. It has held in Muslim Wakfs
purpose of the enactment or to explain any ambiguity. Thus Board v. Radha Kishan,5 that marginal notes and chapter
in Bhinka v. Charan Singh,2 the heading of the chapter was headings are not parts of a statute.
iejectment of persons holding land without title. The Supreme
Court therefore held that the provisions od ~. 180 of the U.P. 6. PUNCTUATION
Tenancy Act provided ejectment as a remedy not only against In England, punctuation was not considered a
trespassees on land but also against any other person holding part of the statute because no · punctuation was made. On
land without titlle. ·• the parliamentary rolls on which · the older statutes were
•
reconrded. Since 1850 the statutes are printed on vellum
5. MARGINAL NOTES paper. The modern practice is to punctuate them. However,
•
The marginal notes are not considered to be parts of it is not considered as a part of the enactment. In respect of
the Act because the marginal notes are not put to vote in the the older Acts it is settled that the aid of punctuation cannot
legislature. Lord 1-facnaughten <;>bserved in Balraj Kunwar v. be taken for construction of the statute. In respect of modem
Jagat Pal Singh.3 Acts. Lord Jameison observed in Alexander v. Macenzie,6 that
It is well settled that marginal naote to notice could be taken of the punctuation.
the sections of all Acts of Parliament 1. A.l.R. 1950 S.C. 134
can not be referred to for the purpose of 2. (1876) 2 Ch. D. 522
, construing the Act. 3. AI.R. 1955 S.C. 661
4. A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1241
1. A.LR. 1978 S.C. 17.W 5. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 289
2 A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 960 6. (1947) S.C. (J) 155 (Scot)
3. LL.R 26 AU. 393 (P.C.)
. Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
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M · Interpretation of Statutes Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation · 65
In India also the same practice has been followed. is that but for the proviso the enacting part of the sectio~
In Maharaja of ~urdwan v. Krishana1 Lord Hobhouse would have included the subject matter of the proviso.
held that it was ah error to rely on punctuation in Three types of proviso have be£n identified in
construir'.g an Act of the Legislature. The Supreme Court Khanchand Tika Ram v. State of Punjab.1 They are:
has also considered punctuation to be a minor element in (i) Proviso aimed at excepting certain matters out of
construction of a statute. the purview of the enactment. -
See : Ashwani Kumar v. Arbind Ghosh,2 (ii) Proviso aimed at mere qualification of the purview
· But in some cases reliance has been placed on of the enactment.
punctuation. In Gopalan's case, Chief Justice Kania re~ed on (iii) Proviso in the nature of a saving clause.
the comma used in Art 22(7) in construing that provision. The following rules have been laid down in respect of
7. ILLUSTRATIONS the use of proviso:
The illustrations to a statutory provision are merely (i) A proviso to a particular enactment of a statute only
illustrative and not exhaustive of the scope of the illustrated embraces the field covered by the main provision
enacbnent They are valuable aids to interpretation but cannot to which it is a proviso. It can not be extended
be used to narrow down the scope of the enactment. Example to other provisons made by the statute. Thus in
illustrant non resbingent lege. R.N.Sons v. Asstt. Sales Tax Commissioner} tht:
Supreme Court held that the proviso to Art. 286(2)
In Ariffin's case,3 the privy Council has considered
of the Constitution could not be extended to 0. (1)
the illustrative to be a part of the statute. Perhaps the best
of Art. 286.
example of the effect of an illustration can be found in the
role played by illustration (b) to S. 114 of the Indian Evidence Where a proviso is enacted as an independent
Act,1872 section and not as a part of a single section, this
rule may not apply. Thus, it has been held that the
S. 133 of the Evidence Act declares an accomplice to
proviso enacted in 5.27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
be competent witness and adds that a conviction would not
1872 applies not only to S. 26 but also to S. 24 and
be illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated
25 of the Act.3
testimony of an accomplice. lllus.(b) of S. 114 has been used to
restrict the scope of S. 133. The uncorroborated testimony of (ii) A proviso can be used as an aid in construing
the co-accused is hardly made a basis of conviction. See Bhiva the enacting portion of the section to which it is
v. State of Maharastra.4 appended. The reason is that there is a presumption
that but for the proviso the matter except by the
•
8. PROVISO proviso would have.been covered by the enactment.
A proviso as a general rule is added to an enactments In State of West Bengal v. Union of India,4 the
to qualify or create an exception to the enactment: It is not the proviso to S. 8 of Coal Bearing Areas Development
proper function of a proviso to make any additional provision Act 1956, provided for counsultation with State
m the enactment When on e finds a proviso the presumption Government in case a notification in rspect of lands
1. lL.R 14 Cal. 365 (P.C.) 1. A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 423
2 A.LR. 1952 S.C. 369 2. A.I.R. (1965) ~ ~.C. 765
3. Mohd. S. Ariffin v. FeohooL 431 A. 256 3. State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhya, A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1125
•
4. A.LR.1962 S.C. 599 4. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. U41

•
66 Interpretation of Statutes Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation 67

owned by the State Government was issued. This Crawford1 says that the dis tinction between an
was taken to show that the enactment was meant exception ·and a proviso, is that the exception operates to
to apply to state owned land also. extend the operation of an enacbnent while a . proviso is a
clause added to an enactmetn for the purpose of acting as
(iii) A proviso cannot be construed as excluding. or
a restraint upon or as a qualification to the generality of the
adding something by implication to the enacting
language of the ·enactment.
part of the provisions.
The practical effect of this difference is to be seen in
In M & S.M. Rly. v. Bezwada Municipality,1 the criminal cases. It is for the prosecution to show that the case
proviso provided for determining the annual value does not fall within the exceptions but it is for the accused to
of certain their capital value. It was argued that show that h e is covered by a proviso.
this method could not be applied to waste lands
A saving clause is a clause which is inserted in the
and as such no tax could be levied on waste lands.
repealing statute in order to protect rights acquired un der the
The Privy Council rejected it holding that the existing law.
proviso could not be used as the basis for implying
In practice much weight should not be given to the
restriction not contained in the main provisions.
distinction between proviso, exceptions and saving clauses
(iv) At times, a proviso is rather redundent as the and each portion of an enactment must be taken as throwing
• 2
enacting part may plainly cover the same ground. light on other parts of the enactment.
in such cases usually the proviso is added as a
matter of abundent caution. 10. SCHEDULES
In Madanlal v. Changdet Sugar Mills Lts.,2 the Schedules are appended to a statute and form part of
proviso contained inS. 76(2) of the Indian Contract it. Usually they contain details and forms for ~orking out. the
Act, 1872 was considered to have been merely
added by way of abundant caution as the main
. policy underlying the enac~ent. The forms. ~troduced tn a
schedule are merely illu~trative and cannot limit the scop e of
provision itself covered the same ground. the main enacbnent. However, there may be cases where a
schedule may contain a substantive enacltnent go~g ~eyond
(v) While the normal rule is that a proviso is not an
the scope of the main section.3 In su0 ~ases ordmarily ~e
independent enacting provision the remay be
provision is confined to the purpose ~~cated by the . mam
circumstances where the proviso in stead of being enactment but if the language is specific and unequtvocal
an exception to another provision may itself be the provision contained in the schedule shall be given eff~t
a fresh enactrnent See : Mohd. Bahai Khan v. irrespective of _the fact that they go beyond the substantive
Collector of Ballia.3 provisions of a statute.
9. EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES DOD
An exception exempts something which would Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
otherwise fall within the purview of the general word'3 of the
enactment.
1. AlR 1944 P.C. 71 1. Crawford, Loc. cit., 891

2 AlR. 1962 S.C. 1543 2 See Behram Khurshid Peshikava v. State of Bombay AJ .R. 1955 S.C 123.
3. (1874) LA 167 3. See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Giltus, {1920) 1 K B. 563
,
.. . . Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation o9 •
purpose and rationale of the enactment. As a matter of

Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs principle such material cannot be used to give meaning to the
language of the statute. Lord Halsbury, has observed in Kilder
v. Dexter} that 'the worst person to construe~(a statute) is the
person who is responsible for its drafting. He is very much
Chapter 6 disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of
the language which in fact has been employed'. Nevertheless,
Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation such material is relevant in determining the circumstance in
which the statute was enacted and the language which was
used in its enactment.
1. Travaux Preparatories Lauterpacht has given three reasons for the attitude of
2. Historical developments the courts in England : First, that the declarations of a single
House of the Parliament do not amount to law; secondly, the
3. Other Statutes
deliberations of the houses were not published till the 18th
4. Contemporanea Expositio century; and finally, to at the courts asserted an independence
5. Stare Decisis from parliamentary control in performance of their functions. 2
6. Other Extrinsic Aids The value of the material varies with its kind and can
\'\1hile the intention of the legislature is to be primarily be profitably discussed with reference to ti1at. The rangs of
gleaned from the language of the statute, the courts can have available material can be divided under following heads :
recourse to certain materials beyond the four comers of the (i) Statement of Objects and Reasons
statute for the limited propose of ascertaining the context in (ii) Speech at the introduction of the Bill
which. the words have been used in a statute. The extrastatptory
(iii) Debates in the Legislature
materials that may be so used are called extrinsic aids to
interpretation Such materials can be conveniently grouped (iv) Reports of Special Commissions
under five heads : · (v) Reports of Legislative Committees
(1) Travaux preparatoires or preparatory material (i) Statement of Objects and Reasons
(2) Historical Facts A statement of objects and reasons is appended to each
(3) Statutes in Pari Materia or Statutes dealing with bill at the time of its introduction in. a house of the legislature.
like matter. • This statement seeks to explain the reasons that have induced
-. •
(4) Contemporanea Expositio the mover to introduce the bill. It also deals with the objects
(5) Stare Decisis which he intends the bill to achieve.
(6) Dictionaries. The statement of objects and reasons is not admissible
for the purpose of determining the intention of the legislature
1. TRAVAUXPREPARATORIES or the meaning of the language used in a statute. It can,
The process of legislative enactment of a statute however, be used for the limited proposes of (i) ascertaining
produces a range of material that can throw light on the
1. (1902) A.C. 474
2. Lauterpacht : Interpretation of Treaties, 48 H.L.R. 549
,
.. . .. •
•
Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 71
the conditions prevailing at the time of the introduction of the
Bill, and (ii) determining the purpose for which 1\e bill was the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill estensibly for •:he
proposed. propose of determing the circumstances- and the p u-rpose
The reason for which the statement of Objects and of the amendment. The inquiry, however, appears to have
Reasons is not admissible as an aid to ascertainment of the exercised quite som influence on the findings of the Court that
intention of the legislature is that the statement merely reflects the provisions of Art. 31A are intended to protect agrarian
reform legislation.
the iotion of the mover of the bill, and during its passage
through the legislature that intent may be modified, lost or InT. manickam & Co., v. Tamil Nadu,1 the statement
was used to determine the nature of the amending legislation.
abandoned.
It was held that the same was merely darificatory. ·
In Ashwini Kumar Ghosh v. Arbind Bose,l reliance
was placed on the statement of objects and reasons of the Bill, The contents of the statement of objects and reasons
which was later enacted as the Supreme Court Advocates c~ot, however, restrict the plain meaning of words used
(Practice in High Court) Act 1951, to show meaning of the by the legislature. Thus in State of West Bengal v. Union of
expression 'pracice' in S. 2 of the Act. Chief Justice Sastri held India,2 the Court held that the Coal Bearing Areas Act, 1967
that the Statement of objects and Reason should be ruled out authorize~ acquisition of lands ovvned by ,, State in.spite of
a categoneal statement to the contrary in the statement of
as an aid to the intention of the legislature : .
objects and resons. ·
(l)here is no guarantee that the reasons
which led to its (bills) introduction and (ii) Speech At Introducti-on of Bill
the objects thereby sought to be achieved A member of the Legislature who intends to move
have remained the same throughout till a bill for consideration of the House has to seek permission
the bill en1erges from the House as an • of the House to move the bill and for. that purpose he may
Act of the legislature, for they do not address the House. The speech made by the mover of a bill
fonn part of the Bill and are not voted at the time of its introduction in the House cannot be looked
upon by members.2 in to as a guide to the intention of t..~e legislature in enacting
Later on, in other cases3 the Supreme Court has strictly the statute. However, like the statment of objects 3Ild reasons,
construed Chief Justice Sastri' s observations in the Ashwini · the speech is admissible only as evidence of the circumstances
Kumar case. The Court has held that the statement of. objects leading to the enactment of a statute. The rule is the same in
and reasons cannot be used to determine the intention of . England as we as in India.
the Legislature, but it can certainly be examined to know In Re Mew/ the presiding judge referred to his own
the circumstances in which the enactment was made. Thus speech made at the time of the introduction of the Bankrupcy
in K.K. Kochuni v. States of Madras and kerala,4 Subba Bill. But, he was careful to observe that he did not do so
Rao J. referred to the statement of objects and Reasons for determine the m eaning of the language used in the statute.
In Assam Railway etc. Co. v. I.R. Commissioners,4 the Privy
1. A.LR. 1952 S.C. 369 Council refused to rely on the speech of the Minister, who
2 Id. 378 moved the Bill, to construe the enactment.
3. State of West Bengal v . Subodh Gopal, AIR 1952 S.C. 92 Express Newspapers
Ltd . v. Union of India, AIR 1958 S.C. 578, Jialal v. Delhi Administration, 1,A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 518
AIR 1962 S.C. 1787 2. A.I.R. 1%3 S.C. 1241
4. -
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080 3. (1862) 31 L.J. Bank 89
4. (1956)A.C. 445 •
.. . .
72 Interpretation of Statutes Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 73

. Similarly in State of W.~. v. Union of India,l the not have agreed with those who did and
Supreme Court held that a sta~ent ~ade by an ~dividual, those who spoke might deffer from each
although a minster, about the mtenti~n _and obJect of the other.
words used in the statute cannot restrict Its ambits so as to However, congressional debates are admissible as
make it inapplicable to acquisition of state-owned lands. evidence of the circumstances in which a statute was made
In Diwan, Bros. v. Central Bank,2 the Speech was and of the evil which it sought to remedy.1 Use may alsn made
used to determine the objects of thelegislation. There the of the debates to show any change in lan~age which was or
question v.~as \vhether the paying capacity of the refugees was was not made.2 In U.S. v. Bhagat Singh the U.S. Supreme
a relevant consideration in determining the court fees, payable Court took into account ·the efforts made in the Cc,ngress to
by them. The statement showed that the same was relevant delete the words 'free white persons' out of the Natt~alization
consideration. ~ Bill. The Court held that the refusal of the Congress to
omit the words, showed that the Act did not permit such
(ill) Debates in the Legislature immigration. It was admitted by the Court in this case that
In England the rule is well settled that a reference the debates furnished no basis for judicial construction of the
to the debates cannot be made to seek the intention of the statute. But it held that the deliberations offered an important
legislature. They can only be looked in to as an evidence of historic incident that could not be ignored in the search for
the circumstances in which the statute was made. In Rex v. true meaning of the word.
west Ridding of Yorkshire Country Council,3 the debates In India, in the older days· the Bombay4 and Calcutta5
in the house of common were considered irrelevant to the High Courts did permit a reference to the debates in construing
interpretation of a statute. An Act is made only witJl the a statute. The Allahabad High Court had taken the opposite
assent of both the houses and the sovereign. What passed view in Kadirabctksh v. Bhawni Pd.6 Later in Advocate
in one house could not be known to the other house or the General of Bengal v. Premlal Mulick,7 the Privy Council
sovreign. (see the observation of Willes J. in Millar v. Taylor.4 held that the debates could not be used for ascertaining the
In United States the earlier practice resembled England. m~aning oi a statute. The Judicial Committee in this case
In United States v. Trans Missouri Freight, Co.5 the U.S. • was considering the Administrator General's Act. It strongly
Supreme Court held that the debates could not control the criticised the Bombay and Calcutta Ffigh Courts for their use
meaning of statute. The reason for this attitude were: ·· of legislative debates.
It is impossible to determine with Our Supreme Court has adopted the rule in Mulick
certainity what construction was put upon Case in a number of cases likeState of Travancor Cohin v.
an Act by the members of a legislative Bombay Co.,8 Ashwani Kumar v. Arbind/ or State of West
body that that passed it by resorting
1.
Mccaffery : Sta tutory Construction 176-77
to the speeches of individual members 2 People v. Dalton, 158 N .Y. 175
thereof. Those who did not speak may 3. 261 u.s. 204
4. Sheik Moosa v. Sheikh Essa, I.L.R. 8 Born. 241
1. Supra n. 7
5. Q.E.V. K.C. Das, I.L.R. 14 Cal. 721
2 Al.R. 1976 sc 1503
6. I.L.R. 14 145
3. (1906) 2 KB. 676
7. I.L.R. 20 Cal. 788 (P.C.)
4. (1769) 4 Burr. 230?
5. 1664 s. 220 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
8. A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 366 •
lo
9. Supra n. 3
.. .. .
• Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 75
1 enactment of a particular statute. Lord 1-lalsbury considered
Bengal v. Union of India. Thus in statutory as well as such reports as the most accurate source of information
constitutional interpretation the debates cannot be considered about the e-yi! which the statute was intended to supress. In
to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Comptoller General,1
inAshwani Kumar Case,2 Das J. adopdte4 the reasoning his Lordship relied on such material in construing the Patertts
given in the Freight Co. Case in United States fordiscarding Act. The Easbnan case was however, dist inguished by Lord
t:eliance on legislative debates. However, reference may be Wright in Assam Railway Co. v. I.R. Commission,2 on the
made by the Courts to debates in the legislature for two ground that the court in the Eastman Case only used the
purpose : First, to show the mischief which was dealt with report to know the circumstances aorrounding the enacbnent.
by the enactntent, and secondly, to show whether a particular Lord Wright further observed that such reports could. not be
lvord or a proposal was up for consideration in legislature. an evidence of the ~terttion of the Legislature because their
Chief Justice Kania in Gopalan v. State of Madras/ mere existence did not show that their recommendations
Justice Bhagwati in E.~ress Newspaper v. Union of India,
4
were accopted by the Legislature. The Indian Federal court
and Chief Justice Subba Rao in Golak Nath,5 case used the has used the White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms
debates to show whether a certain proposition was considered in interpretin§ the Government of India Act, 1935 in Re C.P.
by the legislature. Act XIX 1938.
In Keshavanan'd Bharti v. State of Kerala,6 Chief The Supreme Court held in Mubarak Ali v. State of
Justice Sikri added a third ~se. \!\'here the Court discovers the Bombay• that the report of the India Law Commission on the
meaning of the language it can find satisfaction in the fact that draft Indian Peruil Code can be takert into account only as a
the indicated in the debates. matter of history and not as 41 legitimate guide to the mening
• of the words used in the Iridian Penal Code, 1866.
(iv) Reports of Commissions
The English practice is not to take in to consideration the (v) Reports of Legislative Committee
reports of Royal Commission, leading to particular enacltnents, In England the reports of legislative committees are
in order to as certain the intention of the legislature. Thus in considered ·<>h the s~e footing as debates.. Lord Denning
Katikaro of Buganda v. Attorney General? the Court refused has well summarized the prevailing attitude in Escoigne
to look in to a white paper containing the recommendations Properties Ltd. v. I.R. Commissioners, observing:5
of the Uganda Constitutional Conference to ascertain the We do not look at the explanatory
intention underlying the Order in Council incorporating the memotanda which preface to Bills before
Uganda Agreement · Parliament. We do not have recourse to
On the contrary such commission reports can be looked the pages of Hansard. All that the Courts
into to ascertain the historical circumstances which led to the can do is to take Judicial notice of the
Previous state of law and of other matters
1. Supra n. 3 generally known to well informed people.
2 Supra n. 3
1. (1898) A.C. 571
3. A.l R. 1950 S.C. ZJ
2 (1935) A.C. 445
4. ALR. 1967 S.C. 578
3. A.LR. 1939 F.C. 1
5. ALR. 1967 S.C. 1217
4. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 857
6. Al.R. 1973
, S.C. 1461
5. (1958) AC. 549, 566
7. (1960)3 All E.R. 849
<
76 "Interpretation of Statutes Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 77
However in Beswick v. Beswick,1 Lord Upjohn 2. HISTORICAL FACTS
referred to the r~port of the Joint Conunittee of the P~liament It is permissible to refer to historical facts and
to examine whether its proceedings showed anything that circumstances sorrounding the enacltnent of · a statute · in
could weaken the presumption that the enactment was not construing it. However, such reference cannot override the
intended to change the existing law. He was, however, careful plain anu unequivocal language of an enacltnent It is only
to add that the reference ws not intended to ascertain the where the language is ambiguous that recourse can be had
intention of the legislature; and even then Langan, the editor to history to ascertain the state of law and the object of the
2
or Maxwell, considered the act to be 'quite exceptional'. statute. Such an investigation, said Lord Jesse! inHolmes
The American practice is different. In United States v. Guy,1 enabled the courts to further the intentionof the
the reports of the committee~ are considered more rel~ble Legislature.
and satisfactory source of assiStance. Inlmhoff-Bank Dyemg In interpreting an old statute the historical dimension
Co. v. United States,3 it was held by the Federal Court that . can be of great imporance. Thus in Ridge v. Baldwin,2 the
Committee reports ~ould rightly be regarded as possessing House of Lords added the requirement of hearing to the
very considerable value of an explanatory nature regarding provisions of a statute which empowered the Metropolitan
the legislative intent. Council to dismiss a police constable, even though the statute
In India the English practice is followed. In Gopalans never mentioned it. This was done the ground that older
case4 Grief Justice Kania referred to the proceedings of the statute always presumed that such requirement would be
drafting committee of the Constituent Assembly to ascertain ob~erved. Similarly in in interpreting the British North America
~he circun1Stances in w hkh the adjective 'personal' was Act 1867, the Privy Council in Atlantic Smoke Shop Ltd. v.
introduced in Art 21 of the Cons•~tution to qualify the word Conlon3 has adopted the distinction made by mill between
'liberty'. In Ash\vani Kumar Case, Da-; J made an attempt to direct and indirect taxes on the ground that the distinction
distinghish the observations of Kania C.) . on the ground that was commonly observed at the time of the enactrnent of the
in GopaJan case the drafting committee was an agent·of the Act by political economists.
constituent assembly and perhaps its report ·was admitted The Supreme Court has alsoheld that the prior state
on the ground that the intention of the agent reflected the of law is relevant in determining the meaning of law, the evil
intention of the principa1.5 · sought to be rel}loved, and the process by whiCh the law has
Thus it is settled that the report of committee cannot evolved. Thus in State of West Bengal v. N.N. Bagchi,4 the
control th~ meaning of the enacb;nent but may be looked into Court referred to the history of the constitutional provisions
to examine the sorrounding circumstances, and in construing relating to subordinate judiciary to ascertain the meaning of
the Constitution the reports can be taken as indicative of the expression 'constrol' in Art. 235 of the Constitution since·
the intent of the Framers. InLok Shikshan Trust v. I.T. in its opinion the expression was ambiguous. The Court held
Commission~ Bet J. hold that the reports can be used to find that 'control' included disciplinary proceeding.
out the reasons for an enactment. Reference to the circumstances existing at the time
. of enactntent of a statute does not, however, mean that the
L (1967)2 All E.R. m
2 See Maxwcll Joe. cit, 51
language used should be held inapplicable to later social,
3. 43 Fed. 2830 (2d.)
1. (1817) 5 Ch. D. 901
4. Supra n. 'ZJ 2. 1964 A.C. 40
5. Supra n. 3 3. (1943) 2 All E.R. 393
6. AI.R. lCJT/ S.C. 10
4. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 447
, •
•
.. . .
· Hxtrinsic Aids to Interpretation 79
use of other statutes is that the legislature is presumed to be
political, economic and scientific developments. This applies conversant with the state of existing law. When enacts a number
with particular emphasis to a constitutional statute. In of statutes dealing with the same subject matter there is a further
Attorney General v. Edission ~elephon~ Co., the w~rd
1
presumption that the statutes relating to a single subject matter
~telephone' was considered to be mcluded m the connotation are not intended to be inconsistent with each other.
of the word ' telegraph' used in Telegraph Act 1863, though
telephone was unknown at the time of enacllnent of the statute. The extent of the aid which can be derived from other
In Senior Elecbic Inspector. etc. v. Laxmii Narain Chopra,2 statutes in interpreting a statute depends on the nature of
where the guestion was whether the expression 'telegraph such other statutes. Three distinct groups have been identified
line' in the Indian Telegraph Act 1885, included channels of by Craies,l ·
wireless information, it was argued before the Court that at (a) Statutes in Pari Materia with the statute under
the time the statute was enacted wireless was known and consideration.
therefore, the expression 'telegraph Line' could not include (b) Earlier s~tutes not strictly in Pari materia with
wireless channel Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court the statute under consideration but in some way
observed that unless a contrary intention appeared the words relating to or affecting the same subject matter.
used in an enacLiuent should be so construed as to take in •
(c) Subsequent or later statutes amounting to parliamentary
new facts and situations provided the words were capable of
exposition of the stattite under consideration.
comprehending them.
The need for progressive interpretation of enactments (a) Statutes in Pari Materia
of meet changing situation applies with greater force to Acts are in pari materia with each other if they are s
constitutional interpretation. The celebrated observations of related to each other as to form a system or code of legislation
Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mcculloh in respect of a particular subject matter. ·
v. M;uyland,3 ' we must never forget, that it is a constitution The phrase parimateria has been explained in United
w e are expounding' have been universally accepted. The States v. Bagle BanJ<l by Hosmer J as follows:
Supreme Court of India has also acknowledged the need for a Statutes are in pari materia which relate to
liberal construction of the constitution. Vivian Bose J. observed the same person or thing, or to the same
in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar. class of persons or things. The word pari-
The constitution must in my judgment be.• materia must not be confounded with the
left elastic enough to meet from time. to word similar. It is used in opposition to it
time the altering condition of a changing intimating not likeness but identit}r.lt is a
world with its shifting emphasis and phrase applicable to the public statutes or
differing neP-~.4 general laws made at different times and
in reference to the same subject matter.
3. OTHER STATUTES
Thus all statutes dealingwith licensing of solictors
Both earlier and later statutes are relevant to a limited
have been held to be in parimateria in Davis v. Edmondson.3
extent in interpreting a statute. The rationable behind the
1. (1880) 6 Q. B.D. 244 1. Craies, Joe. cit. 143 ff
2 A.l.R. 1962 S.C. 159 2 (1829) 7 Conn. 457
3. 4 Wheat. 316 •
, 3. (1803) Bos. & P. 382
4. AJ .R. 1952 S.C. 75, 103 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 81
In Bolton corporation v. Owen two .statut~ dea~g ~th
1
held that the Arts. 21 and 31(1) are not in parimateria because
town and country planning were cons~dered m panmat~ they differ in their scope and content ·
In Penn-Taxas Corporation v. Murat, two statues de~g
with the mode of obtaining testimony w~re held to be m Statu.tes inParimateria are to be taken as formingone
system. Lord Mansfield has laid down the rule in R. v.
parimateria. 1
Loxdale, that statutes in parimateria are to be construed
It is not however, necessary that the entire subject
together irrespective of the fact that they have been enacted at
matter of the two statute be identical. Thus in State of Madras
different times or do not refer to each other or even if some of
v. Vaidyath Aiyar,3 the definition of the expression 'shall
them have expired. The aforesaid principle has been accepted
presume' contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been
in India and has been applied in large number of cases. Thus
considered to be in pari materia with the expression 'it shall
in Vidya Chand v. Khubchand, 2 the Supreme Court affirmed
be presumed' inS. 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1~7.
that the Limitation Act, 1908 and Civil Procedure Code 1908,
The two provisions were considered to enact rules dealing
were in parimateria with each other and must be considered
with the same subject matter, viz. burden of Proof. as a single system.
Where an earlier statute is repealed and substituted
by another act which reproduces the language used in the (b) Assistance of Earlier Statutes dealing with the same
earlier statute, the two statutes are considered to be in pari Subject matter.
materia. Thus in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar,4 Art Where the language of a statute is a anbiguous
245 and 246 of the constitution were considered parimateria a comparison may be made with the language of earlier
with SS. 99 and 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935. statutes relating to the same subject. This principal has many
This presumption arises very strongly in case of co.nsolidating manifestations :
statutes as theyprima facio do not intend any change of . (1) If a statute, upo~ ·w hich a particular ~onstruction
intention. Thus in I.R. Commissioner v. Hincho5 Lord Reid has been put by the courts in the past, is re-enacted in the
has held that in construing a consolidating Act reference can same language, it is presUJlled that the legislature in tends no
be legitimatelly made to the earlier enactment it replaces. change in the meaning. The construction must however have
The doctrine of pari materia cannot apply where the been put very clearly on the earlier enactment. A solitary
legislations have a different scope. Thus in State of Punjab decision, particularly if it ~ not of the highest court cannot
v. O.G.B. Syndicate,6 it wa5 held that the Displaced Persons . give rise to such a presumption. Se : Diamond Sugar Mills v.
Debt Administration Act 1948, because the 1964 Act had a State of U.P.3
larger scope and was designed to secure greater advantages An outstanding illus tration of this principle can be
to displaced persons than the 1948 Act. Similarly inK.K. found in the opinion of the Supreme Court in P.L. Dhingra
Kochuni v. State of Madras,7 a majority of the Supreme Court v. Union of India,4 where the provisions of Art. 311 (2) were
1. (1962) 1 All E.R. 101
considered to ba reproduction of the provisions of S. 240)1) of
2 (1964) 2 All E.R. 594 the Government to India a Act 1935, and were construed with
3. AlR. 1958 S.C. 1 reference to them.
4. AlR. 1955 S.C. 661
5. (1960) a All E.R 505 1. (1758) 1 Bcr• :.-.:;
6. , AlR. 1964 S.C. 669 2. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. lOlSO
7. ALR. 1960 S.C. 1080 3. AJ.R. 1%1 S.C. 644
• •
4. A.LR. (1965) 1 S.C. 1017
... .. .
82 · Interpretation of Statutes Exbinsic Aids to Interpretation 83
.
(ii) If a statute uses. expressions that have been used in (i) Where the later statute seeks to amend an earlier
earlier statutes and have as such been judicially construed, the statute or proceeds to declare the meaning of such
presumption is that the legislature does not intend to disturb earlier statute. -
the judicia11y accepted connotation of the expression. (ii) Where the provisions of an earlier act are
Thus in Vijravelu Mudaliar v. Sp.Dy.Colledor,1 the ambiguous, it may be construed with reference to
Supreme Court held that the expression 'compensation' in a later statute provided that the later statute is on
Art 31(2) of the Constitution must receive the same meaning the same subject and is itself free from ambiguity.
as had been judicially given to it for a long time. When an earlier Act is truly ambiguous a later Act may
(iii) Where the legislature has defined certain in certain circumstances serve as a parliamentary exposition
expressions in one statute it is presumed that the expressions of the former
carry the same Lleaning if they are used in a later statute In S.V.P. Cement Co. v. General Mining Syndicate}
dea,inf with the same subject matter. In Knowles Ltd. v. the Supreme Court held that a subsequent statute which
Randr the expression 'agricultural land' in Agricultural amends a parent statute to clarify it, amounts to a parliamentary
Holdings Act, 1948 was given the meaning assigned to it in exposition. ·
the Agriculture Act, 1947. In Smaje v. Baler,2 the Queens Bench in England
(iv) Where a single section of an earlier statute is has held that a stone is not a dangerous weapon within the
incorporated by specific reference in later statute, it has been meaning of the Larcency Act 1916. S. 23(5) of the Fire Arms
held in Ports Mouth Corporation v. Smith,3 that the section is Act 1937 provided that an unloaded fire arm or imitation fire
to be read in the sense it bore in the parent Act. arm shall be treated as a dangerous weapon for purposes
where however, the wliole of an earlier enactment of the Larcency Act. The court held tht an inference can be·
or parts of its are incorporated in a latter statute, the drawn from that the Larcency Act did only refer to weapons
incorporation has been hell to cause a bodily transportation meant for causing injury to human beings.
of such provisions from the earlier to thelater enacllnent. A 4. CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSmO
repeal or amendment of the earlier statutes doesnnot affect the
• Lord <;oke first laid down the principle of
· provisions in-corporated in a later Act. Thus in Ram Swaroop contemporanea expositio with reference to the .Magna Carta.
v. Munshi,4 the Supreme Court held that the repeal of Punjab He was of the opinion thai: such ancient grants and statutes
Land Alienation Act 1900, had no effect on the definition of must be construed with reference to the law as it was at the
agricultural land contained in S. 3(1) of that statute in ·~o far time when the statute or grant was made.
as/the same was incorporated in Punjab Premption Act.
Such contemporary exposition may emerge out of long
(c) Assistance of Later Statutes profession~ us age of Judicial decisions.
Normally a later statute cannot be used as an aid to the Thus in Obion's case,3 the Court of Queen Bench
construction of an earlier one. However, certain exceptions are took into account the practice followed by Inalnd Revenue
recognized : Commissioners for the past sixteen years. InR. v. Cutbush,4
1. A.I.R. (1965) 1 S.C. 1017 1. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2520
2 (1962) 2 All E.R. 926 2 (1965) 2 All E.R. 248
3. (1885) 10 A C. 364 3. (1891) 1 Q.B. 485
4. (1963) S.C.
, 553 4. (1867) L.R. '19 B. 379
.. • Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs

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.. ., .
84 Interpretation of Statutes Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 85

the practice of Judges was taken into consideration for 5. STARE DECISIS
determining the question whether the Co~ had the power
The doctrine of stare decisis requir~s the Courts to
to impose consecutive sentences on a cenVIct InRe. Ford and
follow earlier dacisions regarding the interpretation put on
Tillt the practice of conveyances was considered by Lord
the language of a statute. Three conditions must be satisfied
Jam'es to have become a part of conu:non law. Inspite o~ a
for the application of the doctrine:1
specific prohibition contained in a statute of 1391, barnng
the Admiralility Courts any jurisdiction in contracts entered (i) The statute should be ambiguous;
into on land, it was held inAllesen v. Marsh,2 that because of (ii) A certain construction must have been put on
a long established rule that sea-men could sue in that court the language of the statute by a uniform b9dy of
for contracts made on land, such action would lie. Lord Holt judicial decisions;
justified this view as communis error facit jus. · (iii) Transactions, like property dealings and contracts
The doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio has ·no must have been concluded on the faith of such
application to modem statutes. In Clyde Nayigation T~st~.es construction.
v. laird/ the question was whether the Cylde Navigation Thus in Associated Newspapers Ltd. v. City
consolidation Act 1856 imposed invigation tax on timber of London,2 the House of Lords refused to disturb the
floated in the river Oyde. Such tax was paid without protest interpretation of a statute made in 1767 as ' earlier decisions
from 1858 to 1882, and reliance was placed on this usage had established an immunity from taxation in favour of
for supporting the levy. Lord Watson refused to consider certain properties by such interpretation
the practice relevant on the ground that the doctrine had no However in Pate v. Pate} the Privy Council did not
application to a modern statute. deter itself fromdisturbing a meaning settled for over forty
This views of Lord Watson have been affirmed by the four years as notitles and transactions had come to be made
House of Lords in Campbell college v. Commissioner,4 In on the faith of the interpretation. Similarly where judicial
that case the Court refused to take into account the argument decisions are not uniform or the statute is not ambiguous the
that at the time of the enactment of the statute in 1854 the Courts are not bound to follow earlier interpretation
expression 'charitable purpose' included only charities to In Empress Mills v. Municipal . Committee,4 the
eleemosynary schools and not to any other educational Supreme Court refused to follow various judicial decisions
institution. Thus the use of the doctrine is confined to very bearing on the meaning of the expressions 'exported out or
·~
old and ambiguous statutes. . imported into' on secondly that they had not been acquiesced
In India a the Supreme Court has refused to follow in for any long perioud of time.
the doctrine of contemporanea expositio5 with respect to the
Evidence Act (74) and the Telegraph Act (75) on the ground 6. DICTIONARIES
that the doctrine was not applicable to modem statutes. Dictionaries can be resorted to as aids to interpretation
on the principal that words used in statutes should be taken
to be used in their ordinary sense. Thus in Mcvittie v. Botton
1. (1879) 10 (h.D. 365
2 (1690) 2 Venl 181 1. Senior Election Inspector v. Laxmi Naryan, supra n. 46
3. (1883) 8 A.C. 658 2 (1916) 2 A.C. 429
4. (1964) 1 W.L.R. 912 3. (1915) A.C. 1100
5. Raja'Ram v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 828
4. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 341
corporation} the term 'rubbish' was ~ven its dictionary
n1eaning. In re Ripon Housing Order,2 the word 'Pard'
was interpreted with reference to its meaning in the Oxford
English Dictionary.
In India dictionaries are referred to on the same
principal Thus in Aziz Pasha v. Union of India,3 the Supreme
Court gave the expression 'established' in Art. 30(1) of the
Constitution its dictionary meaning, and held that the Aligarh Chapter 7
Muslim University was not established by a minority.
Mandatory and Directory Statutes
ODD
and Modification of Language t~
Suit Intention
1. Distinction between Mandatory and Directory
Enactments.
2. Attitude of the Court
•
3. Working Criteria for Distinction
4. Modification of Words to suit intention
.. (a) 'Shall' as 'May'
(b) 'May' as 'Must'
(c) 'And' as '0~
1. MANDATORY AND DffiECTORY Er~ACTMENTS

DISTINCTION
The difference between a mandatory and directory
... enactment is really one of 'effect' of the enactment. Non-
Compli with a mandatory enacnnent renders the transaction
or procesing to which it relates void and inteffective. A
directory enactment requires only substantial compliance and
the fcrilur to comply with it does not result in nullification of
the transaction or proceedings to which it relates.
1. (1945) 1 KB. 838 2. ATI"ITUDE OF THE COURTS

2 (1939) 2 KB. 838 In determining Whether a given enactment is
3. A.LR. 1967 S.C. mandatory or directory the language of the enactment has
no decisive value. The intention of the legislature is to be
88 Interpretation of Statutes Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 89
'
gathered in the light of the ~ature, design, and possible effects and scope must be taken into consideration to determine
of the enactment The Study of decision material reveals no whether the enactment is mandatory or directory.
golden thread. Lord Campbell rightly remarked in Liverpool Halsbury makes,1 a distinction between certain types
Borough Bank v. Turner,1 that no universal rule c~uld be of penalties. In his opinion if the penalty is rcurrent i.e. it is
laid .down to distinguish between mandatory and directory imposed again and again, or if it is imposed for the protection
enactments. of the public at large, the enactrnent is mandatory. 3ut if
the penalty is onlY' imposed once, or is imposed only for the
3. WORKING CRITERIA FOR DISTINCTION protection of public revenues, the enactment is only directory.
While no out and dry tests are available to distinguist
In Manila! v. Syed. Ahmad,2 the Supreme Court held
between mandatory and directory enactments, a few principle that the Provisions of Order 21, Rule 82, 85 and 86, of the Civil
can be deduced from the mass of case law to serve as intellble Procedure Code were mandatory. Rule 82 required a purchaser
criteria for that distinction : of immovable property, sold in execution of a decree, to pay
(a) Where the enactment expressly provides that the 25% of the purchase price immediately after the auction. R. 85
failure to comply with the enactment would invalidate what required the balance of price to be paid within fifteen days of
was done or omitted under it, the enactment is considered the auction. Rule 86 provided for forleiture of the deposit and
•
mandatory. resale of property in case of non-payment of price~ The Court
In Pate v. Pate,2 the Privy Council held that the held that the effect of R. 86 was to wipe out the sale altogether
provisions of clauses 2 and 21 of Ceylon Ordinance were of and as such Rules 82 and 85 were held mandatory.
a madatory nature because they prescribed that certain form In Maqbool Ahmad v. Onkar Prasad,3 the Privy
should be observed in transfe,rring .properties and declared Council held that the provisions of the Limitation Act were of
that the failure to observe them would invalidate the transfers. a mandatory chc.~acter asS. 3 of that Act required the Courts
In Kamraj Nadar v. Kunju Thevar,l the Supreme to dismiss any proceedings instituted after the expiry of the
Court examination the nature of S. 8~ of the Representation period of limitation.
of the Peoples Act 1951. That enactrnent provides that all the In Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner,4 the Supreme
candidates other than the petitioner, who contest an election, Court held that S. 18(2) of the U.P. Sugar Factories Control
shall be joined as respondents to an election petition in respect Act, 1938 was directory even though noncompli~ce ·with it
of that election. S. 90 (3) of the Act required the Election was punishable with fine. The provision required the occupier
Tribunal to dismiss a petition in case of failure to do so. of a sugar factory to enter into an agreement in the prescribed
The Court held that the provisions of S. 82 were mandatt5ry form for purchase of sugar eane. The Court held that the mere
as failoure to comply with it reulted in nullification of the ·provision for penalty for non-observance without any further
proceedings. co.:lSequences \.Yould not make the enactment mandatory. A
(b) Where the enactment expressly provides for substantial compliance would be sufficient.
consequences resulting from a failure to comply with it, but (c) Where the enactment is couched in negative words
such consequences do not amount to nullity the nature of the it nom1ally considered mandatory.
enactment is not necessarily mandatory. Its object, purpose 1. 8 HaJsbury : Laws of England 141
1. (1860) 30 L.T. Ch. 379 2 A.l.R. 1954 S.C. 349
2 {1915) AG. 11100 3. A.I.R. 1935 S.C. 85
3. AI.R. 1958 S.C. 687 4. A.I.R. S.C. 1417
•
•
.. . . Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 91

90 Interpretation of Statutes court took into consideration the Rules framed under the Act.
In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi,1 the Suprente It held that Rule 80 required the notice to be served within
Court considered S. 5(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, sev~ days of the retrenchment and as such th~ requirment of
1947 That enactment provided tht the offence of criminal notice was only a subsequent condition and not a condition
misconduct undet the Act, 'shall not' be investigated by a precedent to retrenchment.
•
police Office below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent Thus the use of negative words does not necessarily
of Police. The Court held that the premptory language of that the enactment is mandatory, and the words used must
the enacLinent showed that it was mandatory. The Court put in their context and examined in the light of the pur and
also observed that use of such language showed that the policy of the enactment.
legislature had a definite policy in mind. In this case it held (d) Where the enactment is couched in affirmative
that the policy was to secure civil servents against harassment words may be mandatory if the words are absolute, explicit
at the h ands of minions of the police force since the statute and emptory so as to imply a negative. The operation of this
now treated such offences as cognizible. · ciple is illustrated by the following 3 classes of cases:
In Jetumall Bhojraj v. D.O. Railway,2 the Supreme (i) Bacon1 has observed :'if affirmative statute which
Court held that S.77 of the Railway Act, 1890 was mandatory. is introductive of a new law directs a thing to be done in a
The section provided that 'no suit' would be entertainable certain way, that thing shall not, even if there be n o negative
against the Railways for loss of goods if a notice was not given words, be done in any other way'. ·
to the Railways within six months. Two reasons were given. In Stradling v. Morgan,2 the court held that the Wales
First, that the enactntertt was put in the negative. Secondly, Act 1542 which required all actions under a statute to be
the provisions was intended to protect the Railway against brought before justices of Glc.morgan was mandatory.
fradulen and ficticious claims. In Pir Bux v. Mohd. Tahir} the Privy Council held
The principle is however not universal and various that the provisions of the Transfer of property Act, 1882,
exceptations to it have been recognized from time to time. · relating to the mode of certain alienations of property like
sale, mortgage, gift, etc. were mandatory.
In Catterall v. Sweetman} a statute which declared
that no marriage should be solemniZed unless the parties In Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor,4 the Privy Council
signed a declaration, was held to be directory. The statute did held that 5. '14 of the Criminal Procedure Code which
n ot provide that non-compliance with the requirement would provided the mode of recording a confession was a mendatory
• •
invali date the marriage. prOVISIOn.
..,
In Journalists Union v. State of Bombay,4 the Supreme (ii) A corollary of this principle is that where a statute
Court h eld 5. 25(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act to be director confers powere which are to be exercised on certain conditions
the power can n ot be exercised on certain conditions the p ower
even thou gh it was couched in the negative. That enactment
can not be exercised unless those conditions are fulfilled.
provid ed that no workman '\<Vould be retrenched unless three
conditions were satisfied : Clause (c) declared tht one of the Thus a statutory corporation can exercise only such
conditions was that a notice e served in the prescribed for on powers as are vested in it by express \Vords or necessary
the appropriate government In arriving at this conclus the 1. Bacon ; Abrd d gement, quoted in Craies, loc.cit.264
1. A.lR. 1955 S.C. 1% 2 (1560) 1 Plow. 199
2 AJ.R. 1%2 S.C. 1879 3. A.J.R. 1934 P.C. 235
4. A.LR. 1936 1>.C. 253
3. (1845) 163 E.l<. 1047 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
4. A.LR._l264 S.C. 1617
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92 ··Interpretation of Statutes Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 93
implication. InWenlock v. Dee Co.1 the House of Lords held of a partnership should be signed by all the partners, was
that where a corporation was authorized to borrow on a mandatory, because such registration conferred special
particular rate of interest it could not borrow m oney otherwise. benefits on the partnership.
In Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board,2 the (e) Ordinarily the use of the verb 'shall'.indicates that
Supreme Court held that the Board could not impose a tax the enacbnent is mandatory, but existence of 'shall' is not
without first publishing the tax proposals, as the enabling decisive. (see irifra section 4(a))
statute so required. . In B.V.P.,1 the Court has held that the requirement
In Collector of Monghyr v. Kesheb Chandra,3 the that the Court 'shall' not make any divorce or nullity decree
Court was considering absolute unless it is satisfied that proper arrangement has been
mad~ for the custody of- children of such marriage, imposed
S. SA of Bihar Private Irriaation Works Act, 1922.
by the Matrimonail Proceedings Act, 1958, is mandatory. ·
The Act empowered the Collector to cause the landlord to
In State of U.P. v. Baburam Subbarao J.,2 the Supreme
repair damaged irrigation works after notice and inquiry. S.
Lourt has held that a statute using the word 'shall' is prima
SA permitted the Collector to dispense with the inquiry if
facie mandatory.
for reasons to be recorded in writing he was of the opinion
Where 'shall' is used in conjunction with 'may' as
t.hat the delay in repair would adversely affect the lands. The
' may and shall' or as 'shall and lawfully may' the enactment
Court held that the obligation to record the reasons in writing
is undoubtedly mandatory. The reason, as expla,ined by Lord
was mandatory becau~t> reasons formed the foundation of his Breugham in Queen v. Alloopro,~ is that in such cases 'may'
po\ver. The failure to recr~rd the reasons would invalidate the is taken as grant of power and sh:1ll is taken to indicate a duty
exercise of power by the Collccto_ . to exercise such power. Similarly where the enactment uses
(iii) Another corpollary of the un e principle is that 'shall' with respect to certain matters and uses 'may' as to
where a statute confers lights, privileges or b~noJ"i ts' on persons others, 'shall' indkates a mandatory requirement.
subject to the efulfilment of certain preliminary requirements, (f) Ordinarily, the verb 'may' indicates the d irectory
the require1nents have a mandatory character. nature of an enactment, but it is not decisive. Th(3re are cases
!n Now to11- v. Cowise,4 the Court h eld that the where 'may' is considered to import an obligation and these
require.rnent of the Copyright Act, 1734 that the prints of shall be considered below in Section 4(b). Apart from them,
a paten ted design should bear the year in which it was ' may; primarily connotes a directory enactment.
first printe:d together with the name of the propritor, was Thus in Annison v. District Auditor,4 the Local
n1a11datory, because the requirement \Vas a pre-con4!tion of Government Act, 1933 provided that the tribunal'may' relieve
the special rights conferred by the Acl . a p erson of the surcharge imposed on him. The Court held
that the enactment imposed no obligation.
In Steel Brothers v. Commissioner of Income Tax,5
In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar,5 the Supreme
the Supreme Court h eld that the requirement under the
Court observed that the word 'may' prima facie connoted an
Income Tax Act, 1922 that the application for registeration ' power.
enabling and permissive·
1. (1885) 1 A.C. 354
1. (1%1) 2 All E.R. 3%
2 A.LR. {1965) 1 S.C. 895
2 A.t.R. 1961 S.C. 751
3. A.LR 1%2 S.C. 1694
3. (1847) 3 M.I.A. 488
4. (18"..7) U Moore 457
4. (1%1} 3 All E.R 914
5. A..LR 1958 S.C. 315
5. A. I.R. 1963 s.c. 1088
•
•
94 ·· · · Interpretation
. of Statutes
.
4. MODIRCATION OF LANGUAGE Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 95
The criteria used to distinguish mandatory and In Satpal Dang v. State of Punjab,1 the Supreme Court
directory enactments also provide classical illustrations of has held that the provisions of Art. 199 (4) of the Constitution,
the modification of statutory language by Courts. Thus in which required that every money bill'shall be endorsed' with
many situations 'shall' is read as 'may' and 'may' is read as a certificate by the Speaker, are only directory since to hold
'must'. The language of the enactment has no decisive weight. them mandatory will give rise to serious public inconvenience.
The object of the statute, the nature and purpose · of the In Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.,2 the Supreme
enactment, the degree of inconvenience to people resulting Court has held that the provisions of Art. 234 which require
from its construction one way or the other, the relation of the Governor to consult the High court in appointing members
the provision with other provisions in the statute, and such of subordinate judiciary are mandatory as th~y are designed
other consideration as may arise in a particular case, all are to to preserve judicial independence. ·
be taken into account. No uniform principles can be derived •
from the decisional law. (b) 'May' as 'Must'

While 'may' ordinarily indicates discertion, in the
(a) 'Shall' as 'may'
following circumstances it is taken to impose a duty.
In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava,1 the
Supreme Court has onsidered the meaning of 'shall' in (i) Where a power is conferred on a public Officer for
Art 320 (3) (c) of the Constitution which requires that the the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are
Government 'shall' cousult the Public Service Commission on specially pointed out and the legislature also indicates the
all disciplinary matters affecting a civil servants. conditions in which such persons are entitled to call for the
exercise of such power, the enaclntent it mandatory.
The Court held that the requirement was only ·
directory. It gave three reasons : First, that the context of The above principle was laid down by Lord Cairns in
the provision showed tht it was not mandatory because its Julius v. Bishop of Oxford.3
proviso contemplated tht exceptions could be made by rules In Govind Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh,4 the C.P.
in certain classes of cases. Secondly, the advice of the Public and Berar Revocation of Land Revenue Exemption Act, 1948
Service Commission was not binding and non-complaince abolished revenue exemption enjoyed by certain persons on
with the enactment could hardly be said to have nullifying payment of compensation. S. 5(3) of the Act provided that the
effect. Thirdly, all clauses of Art. 320 used the word shall, Government 'may' make a grant of money to ~ertain classes of
and if all of them were treated as mandatory it would lead to persons. The Supreme Court held that though the enactment
general inconvenience as it would even affect appointments. used the word 'may' the power of the State Government was
In Banwarilal v. State of Bihar} S. 59(b) of the Mfues · coupled with a duty because it was menat to be exercised for
Act, 1952 which declared that the Govt. 'Shall' censult the the benefit of particular persons under specific conditions.
Mining Board before framing regulations under the Act, In Textile Commissioner v. Sagar Textile Mills,5
was held to mandatory, in view of the object of the statute clause 20 of the Textile Control Order provided that the
and other provisions of the statute which empowered the Commissioner may issue certain directions and may fix the
Government to frame regulation without such consultation in
case of an emergency. . 1. A.I.R. 1%9 S.C. 903
2 A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1987
1. A.LR 1957 S.C. 915
3. (1885) 5 A.C. 214
2. A.LR. 1961 S.C. 849
4. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1222
,
5. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1516
•
•
96 .. · ·Interpretc.tion of Statutes Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 97
•
period of operation of the directions. T'ne Supreme Court held was held by the Court that on a literal reading the enactment
that as the directions were justified by certain exigences it would lead to the absurd result that a person was punishable
was necessary that they were revised from time. to time. The under the enacbnent only when he had both abetted and
Commissioner is under a duty to fix their duration so the verb participated in preparation for any effence. -Therefore, 'and
'may' he read as 'must'. 1
should be read as or' so that both abetment and 'preparation'
(ii) Where the object of the power is to confer a legal · taken alone would constitute the offence.
right the enactment is mandatory. In Re Mills} where S. 26(2) of Bankruptcy Act 1941
In Alcock etc Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority,! provided that the Court could suspend the discharge of
a bankrupt or' r equire him to co~ent to a judgment to be
1
the P.rivy Council has held that the power that a Revenue
Authority 'may' State a case for the opinion of the High Court entered against him. The Court held that it can make both the
on a question of law is coupled with a duty. types of orders together.
(iii) Where the enat.hnent confers a jurisdiction on the In Gopalan v. State of Nadras} the supreme Court
court the word 'may' will be construed as 'shall'. held that in Art. 22 (7)(a) which declared that the Parliament
In Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar,2 it has been held could by law prescribe the drcumsances under which, and the
that the power conferred on the Court by S. 11 of Probation of class or classes of cases in which a person equid b e detain
Offenders Act 1958, that the Court 'may' make an order under preventively for more than three months, and' should be reati
1
that Act, is coupled with a duty to make such an order where as 'or' so that the law could prescribe either the circumstances
the case falls \vi~ that Act or the classes of cases.
The reason for this principle is that in case of judiciary Recently, however, this has been overruled, in S.N.
the legislature uses 'may' out of sheer courtsey. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal} where the Suprem e Court
(c) 'And' as 'or' and Vice versa held that the disjunctive could not be substituted for the
• conjunctive. .
In ordinary linguistic usage 'and' is conjunctive and
'or' is a disjunctive but at times it may be necessary to. read In State of Bihar v. ~.H. Rey4 the Supreme Court
1 1
'and' as 'or', or or' as and' to effectuate the intention of the was considering the definition of 'coal mine' in S.2(b) of the
legislature. Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act 1948. The
In R.V. Newbould,3 the Queeens Bench held ijlat enactment provided: 'Coal mine means any excavation where
the expression local and public authorities in Prvention any operation for the purpose of obtaining coal has been or is
of Corruption Act 1916, should be read as local or public being carriedon, and includes all works, machinery .... in or
authorities' otherwise the intention of the legislature toocover · adjacent to or belonging to a coal mine'. The Court held that
1
both local as well as public authorities would be def~ated. the or' was to be read as 'and' otherwise it would mean that
In R.v. Oakes,4 the Official Secrets Act provided for machinery not owned by the owner of the mine would also be
punishment of anyone who adis and abets and does any act included in the Coal mine, which would be absurd.
preparatory to the commission of any offence under the Act. It
(JCJO
1. AJ.R 1923 P.C 138 1. (1966) 1 All E.R. 516
2 Supra n. 24 2. A.I.R. 1950 S.'- 27
3. (1962) 1 All. E.R. 693 3. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1425
4. (1959) 2 All E.R. 92 4. A.I.R. 1966 1 S.C. 1995
•
. .
.. . . Commencement and Operation of Statutes 99
•
•
2. PROSPECTIVE AND RETOSPECTIVE LAWS
•
Statutes may affect either future, or both past and
future transctions. A statute which effects only the transactions
occuring after its commencement is called prospective.
• A retrospective law, has been defined by Cooley, as
"one which reaches back to and gives to a prior transaction
Chapter 8 some different legal effect from which it had under the law
when it took place".1 .
• Commencement and Operation of Legislature can legislate either prospectively or
retrospectively. The power to make retrospective law may
Statutes however, be constitutionally limited. The constitution of United
States prohibits the enactment of ex-post facto legislation.
A distinction must however made between
1. Commencement retrospective and expost-facto ~tatutes. Every expost-facto
2. Prospectivity and Retrospectivity statute is retorspective but only a few of the retrospective
3. Presumption against Retrospective Operation statutes are statutes expost facto. .
4. Rebutting the Presumption Chose J. has identified four types of expost facto laws
in Calder v. Bill.2
1. COMMENCEMENT 1. Every law that makes an action done before the
Till1793, the rule in England was that if no date was passing of the law and which was innocent when
fixed for the commencement of a statute it would come into done, criminal and punishes such action.
force on the first day of the Parliamentary Session in which it 2. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it
\\·as passsed. The House of Lords recognized this rule 1n 1772 in groater than it was when committed.
Attorney General v. Panter.1 On 1793, the Parliament enacted 3. Every law that changes the punishment that the
a statute, called Acts of Parliament (Commencement) Act, lavv' annexed to the crime when it was committed.
1793. It provides that unless any other date of commencement 4. Everly law that alters the rules of evidence and
had been fixed, an act would come into operation on the date ·receives less or different testimony than required
it has received the Royal assent • at the time of commission of the offence in order to
In India the same rule has been adoptd . by S.S of convict the offender.
the General Clauses Act, 1898. Therfore, Acts made by the Except the laws falling in the above classes a
Parliament come into operation on the date they rece~ve the retrospective Ia:w is not treated as an ex-post factorlegislation.
assent of the President except in those cases where some other In India Art. 20(1) only prohibits the first and third
day is fixed either by ~t statute or by any other statute. type of above mentioned legislations.
Similar provisions have been made by the varions State Retrospective statutes must however be distinghished
General Oauses Act in respect of different States where a day from such prospective statutes which partly draw upon facts
is fixed for commecement of a statute it is considered to have
come into operation from the very first moment of that day. 1. cooley Constitutional Limitations m
2. 1 E.D. 648
1. (lm) 6 Bro. P.C. 486
•
. .
100 Interpretation of Statutes Commencement and Operation of Statutes lof
antecedent to ·llieir. commencement but essentially ·operate only prospective though the statute drew upon antecedent
only in respect of future transaction. In R. v. Inhabitants facts.
of St. Mary,1 the statute provided that a widow should
not be removed fron1 parish for a period of twelve months 3. PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROSPECTIVE
after the death of her husband. The Queens Bench held OPERATION
that the protection ·w as avilable to such widows also whose S!nce the Legislature is presumed not to intend that
husbands had died before the commencement of the statute. which is unjust, statutes are construed as prospective unless a
It observed that such construction would not give the statute retrospective unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. The
a restrospective operetion. The Statute operated in future principle is tht a statute is not be construed to be retrospective
though a part of the requisites for its action were drawn from so as to impair vested rights or Obligations except where the
the past. In R. v. Vine, 2 a statute prohibiting issue of licence to statute plainly provides otherwise Wright J. has . observed
sell liquor to persons convicted of serious offences (felonies), in Re v. Achlumney,l that if the enactment is expressed in
was considered to apply to cases where the convictions were language which is fairly capable of either interpretation it
made before the commencement of the Act. ought to be construed only as prospective. Maxwell states: It
In Re A Solicitors Clerk,3 the Solicitors (Amendment) is a fundamental a rule of English law that no statute shall
Act 1956, permitted disqualification of clerk to a solicitor to be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a
act as such if he '"'as convicted of larceny. It was argued that construction appears very clearly in terms of the Act or arises
the anactment could not be used to disqualify a Oerk who by necessary and istinct implication.2 •
was convicted of Iarcenv before the commencement of the
J
The presumption therefore is that a statute is not
Act. The court held that the statute merely drew upon facts intended to operate retrospectively unless such intention
antecedent to its commencement for its operation. It was not is shown either expressly or by necessary implication. A
retrospective as the disqualification only operated in future. It corollary of this presumption is that an enactment is not
did no t affect anything done by the Clerk in the pa!'t Merely presumed to have a greater retrospective operation than its
because some of the facts on which the disqualification is language renders necessary. TI1e presumptions, however, only
in1posed are drawn from a period antecedent to the Act, the arise in respect of statutes taking away or impairing vested
Act does not become retrospective. rights acquired under existing.Iaws, or of statutes which create
Similarly, the Supreme Court refused to consider new obligation, duties or dis-abilities in respect of transaction
certain provisions of the Bombay Police Act as retrospective. S. or considerations past and closed.
5 F of that Act enabled the Commissioner of Police to require a Recently the Supreme Court observed in Mohd. Rashid
person convicted of certain offences to leave Greater Bombay. Ahmad v. State of U.P./ perhaps no rule of construction is
It was held in State of Bombay v. Vishnu Ramchandra,4 th·a t more firmly established than this that retrospective operation
the Act would not become retrospective merely because the is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right
removal could be brought about even for convictions made or obligation other than as regards the matter of procedure
before the enactment of the statute. The operation itself was unless that effect can not be avoided without doing violence
1. (1848) U Q.B. 120
to the language of the enacbnent.
2 (1875) 10 Q.B. 195 1. (1898) 2 Q.B. 547
3. (1957) 1 W.LR. 1218 2 MaxwelL Joe. cit. 215
4. A.LR. 1961 S.C. 307 3. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 592
•
... .. Commencement and Operation of Statutes 103
102 Inttrpretation of Statutes
. . Similarly, inDoolubdas v. Ramlal,l an act invalidating
The application of these presumptions can be seen in
wagenng contracts was denied retrospeetive effect.
the light of the followeing classes of statutes:
A distinction must here be made between a law
(a) Statues Affecting Vested Rights having ~etrospective eff~~ and a law which seriously affects
statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as the performance of eXISting contracts. During war a law
to respect vested rights. The operation of this principle is may prohibit trading with the enemy and as such frustate
ffiustrated by the approach of the courts to the following all existing contracts with enemy aliens. Such a law is not
kinds of enactntents. · retrospective. It affectsecontracts which were made before
the enactment of such a law but it only operates on future
(i) Statutes regarding Succession- There is a prima performance.
facie presumption that statutes changing rules· relating to
succession whold not apply to cases where succession has (iii) Statutes Mfecting Right to obtain a Remedy-
The right to obtain a remedy in respect of a cause of action
already opened and will not divest the estate from persons
which ~as already accrued ~ treated as a vested right. A
in whom it has vested. In Lala Dunichand v. Anarkali,1 the
statut~ IS not presumed to take it away urless it does so in
Privy Council advised that the Hindu Law of Inheritance express words or by necessary intendmeJlt. This approach is
Amendment Act, 1929 was not applicable to cases. Where the ~emonstrate~ by the ~ttitude of the courts in respect of the
female o·wner died before the enactment of the Act. Similarly, nght to continue pending proceedings and the right to file an
Sec. 14 of the Hindu Bucession Act has been considered in apreal.
Kotturuswami v. Veeravva,2 to be inapplicable to alineations Pending Proct:cd.ines : In Moon v. Durden/ a statute
made by a female Hindu prior to the enacb:nent of the Act prohibited recovery of betting debts. The Court held that it
In Mohd. Abdus Samad v. Qurban Hussain,3 ·the did ~ot apply to such cases where an action for recovery was
Oudh Estate Act 1869 was held not to divest a person pending before the court. Again, in Smithies v. National
of the inheritance which had vested in him prior to the Union of Operative Plasterers/ the court held that the Trade
commencement of the statute. Disp~tes Act 1906, which prohibited courts from entertaining
(ii) Statutes Regulating Alienation of Property And any action in tort against trade unions, did not prevent the
Contracts-Statutes prescribing formalities for transfer of courts from dealing with actior:s pending before them.
property of laying down the law relating to contracts are Similarly the Supreme Court has held in Madras
presumed not to have a retrospective effect. Thus, the Transfer Province v. Basappa,4 that the statutory prohibition in respect
of Property Act, 1882 has been held, in Namdeo v. Narbada of suits for setting aside or modifying sales tax assesments
Bai,4 not to affect leases executed prior to the Act. In Ahmad enacted by an amendment to the statute in 1951, did not
Raza v. Abid Husain,5 an oral mortgage made prior to the
prevent the Court from deahng with the pending proceeding
in that respect.
commencement of the Transfer of Property Act was held
valid. The Act did not invalidate it. (iv) Right to File an Appeal- The right of .appeal has
been regarded as a vested right. It is not a mere matter of
1. ALR 1946 P.C. 173
1. (1850) 5 M.I.A. 109
2 ALR.1959S.C.577
2 (1848) 2 Ex. 22
3. lL.R 26 All119
3. (1909) 1 K.B. 310 ,.
4. AlR. 1953 S.C. 228
4. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1873
5. I.LR 38 All, 494 (P.C.)
• • · -~
•
104 ·· · Interpretation of Statutes Commencement and Operation of Statutes 105

procedure. In respect 'Of statutes regulatin? appeals there ~s a In K.E. Chak o v. P.F. Investment Co} the Supreme
prima facie presumption that the sta~te xs ~o~ retr~spective. Court held that the Kerala Land Reforms Act does not bar
The Courts have Laid down the followmg pnnc1ples m respect disposal of pending appeals.
of statutes regulating appeals : Again in State of Bombay v. Mfs. S.G. Film Exchange,2
Firts, that the legal pursuit of a remedy through suit, the Supreme Court held that a statute increasing the amount
first appeal and second appeal are really steps in ~ s~g~e of court fee payable in respect of filing of an appeal would
series of proceedings. They all are connected by an mtrms1c not be applicable to appeals in proceedings begun before the
unity, and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding. commencement of such an Act. Justice S.K. Das surr..marized
the law as:
Secondly, the right of appeal is not a mere matter of
procedure but is a substantive right. (A)n impairment of the right of appeal by
putting a new restriction or imposing a
Thirdlv, the institution of the suit carries with it the more onerous condition is not a matter of
implication that allrights of appeal availabel at that time are procedure only, it impairs or imperils a
·preserved to the parties there to for the rest of the career of the substantive right and an enactment which
suit. does so is not retrospective unless .i t says
Fourthly, the right of appeal to a superior court accrues so expressly or by necessary intendment.3
•
to the liti~t
0
from the date of which the suit is filled and is to Use of express language has the effect of waiving
be go1:emed by the law prevaHing on that day. the presumption against defeating the right of appeal. The
Fithly, such vested right of appeal can only be taken same effect can arise by necessary implication. Thus, where
the Court to which appeal could be made is.. itself abolished,
away by the express language of an enactment or by language
the statute is by necessary implication retrospective, Thus in
which necessarily implies the abrogation of the right to appeal. Canada Cement Company v. Montreal East Corporation,4
•
The leading case on this issure is Colonial Sugar the right of appeal was extingwshed as the court of appeal
Refining Co. v. Irving} There a statute had brought to an end itself was abolished.
the right to file an appeal to the Privy Council from a decision But if along with tl1e abolition of the Court of appeal
of the High Court of Australia. The Privy Council held that an another forum for appeal is created, the statute does not
appeal could be validly brought in actions co1nmenced before destroy the right of apReal in pending cases. Thus jn Daji
the enactment of the statute. Saheb v. Shanker Ra o, 5 the Supren1e Court held that the
The principales laid down in the above case wer~ abolition of the jurisdiction of Privy Council to hear appeals
from India did not take away the right of appeal as another
adopted '\1\~ith approval by the Supreme Court m
Garikapati
forum for appeal, viz. supreme court, was provided by the
v. Subbiah Choudry/ The Court held that the requirements
statute.
of valuation in Art, 133 of the Constitution for civil Appeals
(v) Right to Finality of Proceedings- A Final order
were not applicable to cases there the right to appeal to the
confers a vested right. A statutory change brought about
Federal Court or Privy Council had accrued prior to the
commencement of the Construction. 1. A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2610
2. A.I.R. ~ 965 S.C.
3. Id. 984-85
1. (1905) AC. 319 • 4. (1922) I.A.C. 249
2 A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540 5. A.l.R. 1956 S.C. 29
• ·· · · Interpretation of Statutes
106
. · ~umed not to oive rise to any fresh right Commencement and Operation of Statutes 107
subsequently, 1S pre., o-
of appeal or review. • • 1 Code enabling the accused to give evidence was proceedural in
In Delhi Cloth Mills v. Income Tax Conus~toner, character and soverned trials instituted before the amendment
an amendment in 1926 gave a right to appeal ag~t the was made..
. f th High Court in a reference made to 1t by the In Abdul Karim v. Dy. Custodian} the Supreme Court
Judgment
. .
o e th · h t
Th Privy Council has held that e ng t o
conurusstoner. e · h c t held that an amendment to the administration of Evacuee,
appeal was not available in cases decided by ~e Hig our Property Act empowering the Cusdotian to recover moneys
before the amending statute came into force. payable to him as arrears of land revenue was only procedural
in character. It applied to proceeding pending at the date of
(b) Statutes imposing new Duties, Obligations or •
the amendment. .
Disabilities hili · (ii) Statutes of limitation- The rule relating to
Statutes imposing new duties, obligtions, or disa ties procedural laws is also applied to statutes of limitation. They
are presumed to be only prospective. are considered to be procedural in nature. The statutes of
In Re Brandon's Patent} it w~. held a statute limitation are ordinarily considered retrospective irrespective
r iring bills of sale to be registered Within seven days of of the time when the cause of action arose. ·
~ execution did not appll to bills executed before tlle This however does not m ean that if the right to bring
commencement of the statute. . . . . 4 an action has become time barred it can be revived by a
Similarly statutes imposing fiscal or penalliabthhes change in law, since in such, cases a vasted right accrues.2
are presumed not to be retrospective. In respect of statutes fixing a period of limitation
there is however an interesting exception. If the new s tatute
(c) Statutes dealing with procedure . extends the period of limHa u.on, the advantage accures to all
(i) The basic principle is ~t no o~e has a v~sted n?ht actions. Where the p eriod is reduced the law would apply to
in procedure. The rule ~aw distinctly lcnd down for the first only such prior causes of action as may be brought within the
time in Wright v. Hale.~ period now prescribed. It will not bar an action with resp ect
In Attorney General v. Vemazza, a sta~te o~~ling
6
to which the period now prescribed is past. In resp ect of such
the High Court to pass others prohibiting a vexatious litigant causes of action the earlier p eriod of limitation will operate.3
from continuing the proceedings, was ~eld ~o ~mpower the Thus if the p eriod of limitation is reduced from
Court to pass such an order in proceedings msti~!ed before nine years to six years say in 1979, the reduction would be
the enactment of the statute. . appliable to all causes of action whether arising b efore or after
In Anant Gopal v. State of Bombay, the S~preme
7 the reduction. But for these actions which had arisen before
Court held that an amendment in the Criminal Proceedure U1e reduction and could have become time barred because of
the redu ction in the p eriod e.g. an action arising in 1972, the
nine year p eriod would aperate.
1. A.l.R. 1927 P.C. 242
2 (1884) 9 A.C. 589 (d) Declaratory Statutes
3. Income Tax Officer v. Habibullah, AIR 1%2 SC 918
A declaratorv Act n1ade to remove doubts abou t
4. W.R.F. D. Co., v. State of Madras, Air 1962 SC 1753 J
the existing s tate of law is u sually held to be retrespective

5. (1860) 9 W.R. 157
6. (1960) A.C. %5 1. A.l.R. 1964 S.C. 1256
7. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 916 2 Ramayya v. Lakshmayya, A.l.R. 1942 P.C. 54
, 3. Raja of Pittapur \·. G.V. Subba Rao, A.LR. 1916 Madras 912
.. . .

unless othernrise provided. In Central Bank of India v. Their
Workmen,1 the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1956
was not held retrospective as it was not a declaratory statute.
•
{e) Remedial Statutes
A remedial statutes a will not be considered Chapter 9
retrospective marerly bacause a part of the requisites for its
operation are drawn from ·a period antecedent to it. Thus in Repeal of Statutes
Lane v. Lane2 the statute permitted married woman to obtain
an order if the husband was persistencly cruel to her. This was .
held to include acts of cruelty committed before the passing of 1. Forms of Repal
the Act. 2. Criteria For Implied Repeal
4. REBU'ITING THE PRASUMPTION OF 3. Consequences of Repeal
PROSPECTIVITY A legisla.ture can repeal any law whi~ it has the power
The presumption against retrospective operation to enact. No legtslature which is sovereign can bind itself as to
can be rebutted either by express language or by necessary the course cf future legislation. Therefore, it is free to repeal
implication. any law enacted by it earlier.
The necessary implication can arise from consideration
of t..he language in the light of the subject and object of the Act 1. FORMS OF REPEAL
A postponement clause, which has the effect of posponing the A statute may be repealed either expressly or impliedly
operation of the statute or a part of it is taken as a indication Express repeal .n1eans repeal by a latter distinct and repealing
of the retrosp~ctive operation of the statute particularly \vhere enactment. It IS not necessary to use a particular form of
it occurs in a statute of limitations. :vor~s to ~ring about an express repeal. The usual formula
In Sree Bank Ltd. v. S.D. Roy and Co.,3 the Supreme IS : IS or are hereby repealed', or 'shall cease to have effect.l
Court held that the view of the large scale malprectices in Occasionally, .the legislature does not indentify the statutes
banking and the need to control it, the Banking Compani~s repealed, and instead introduces a general provision to the
Act. 1959 should be considered retrospective. _Here the ~ourt effect: ~11 provisions inconsistent with the Act are hereby
I
took into account the purpose of the enactment and the evil it
repealed . Such language creates uncertainty and the Courts
sought to meet. are to examine in each case whether a given earlier statute is
ODD repealed for inconsistency or not.
Implied repeal takes place when a later eanactment
is incoru;istent and irreconcilable with the provisions of an
earlier enactment. If an earlier Act and a later Act can not
stand together the later Act repeals the former.
1. AIR 1960 S.C.R. U
2 , (1961) 3 All E.R. 834 1. Dr. Foster's case, {1615) 11 Co. Rep. 566
•
3. AJ.R. 1966 S.C. 1953 •
•
I<.epeai of Statutes 111
(ii) Whether the legislature intended to lay down an
exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter
110 Interpretation of Statutes replacing the earlier law?
2. CRITERIA FOR IMPLIED REPEAL . (iii) Whether the two laws occupy the same field?
•
The courts lean against implied repeal. There IS _a The matter in each case is one of construction and
presumption that no repeal v.ras intended. Every effort _ts comparison of the two Acts. It is imposible to deduce from
to be made to read the conflicting statutes s? a~ to av_o1d the decisional law any hard and fast criteria for indentification
·
mconsts· tency. Only if 110 harmonious construction . IS possible . of situations in which two enactments may be said to be
the later enactment prevails as the latest expression of the will incompatible with each other. Neverthless, the following
of Parliament. principles may be perceived :
Repeal by necessary implication can be inferred only (a) Where the earlier statute and the later statute
when the provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent with the conflict with each other in quality, i.e. where one is in the
provisions of an earlier act that ~e ~o c~ not stand t~gether. affirmative and the other is in the negative about the sam~
The rationale underlying this pnnaple 1s that the legiSlature thing, the later statute repeals the former. ·
is presumed to kno"v the existing state of law and does not
Thus in Read v. Storey} the e~lier sta~tute exempted
intend to create confusion on the statute book.
sales of a certain kind of beer from licensing, but a later statute
Contrariety between statutes may how~ver arise _in required all vending of beer to be done only under a proper
many ways. Coke indentifies two kinds o_f c~nflicts .= co~ct license. It was held that the later statute repeals the former.
in quality and conflict in matter. A conflict m quality ~IS~
where one· statute savs yes and the other says no. Conflict m Similarly in · Re. Drummond} the earlier statute
matter arises where both the statutes are in the affumative but prohibited sale of land by a married women without the
make mutually exclusive provisions. prior consent of her husband. It was considered to have been
repealed by a later statute enabling a married women to sell
Dr. Lushington in his opinion in The India1 has all her immovable property.
indicated three circumstances in which any two statutes may
be considered to be in conflict with each other: (b) The later statute does not repeal the former statute
even when one is affirmative and the other -negative, if the
(i) Where the provisions of the prior statute are wholly
former is a particular statute and the J~ter is a general statt;~.te.
incompatible with the subsequent statqte.
'Generalia specialibus non derogant': general provisions do
(ii) If the two statutes taken together would lead to not abrogate particular provisions.
wholly absurd consequences.
Three conditions must be satisfied for the operation of
(iii) If the entire subject matter of the earlier statute is
this principle : . .
taken away by the subsequent statute.
(i) The earlier enactrnent must deal with particular
In Municipal Committee Palai v. T.J. Joseph/ the matters. ·•
Supreme Court has adopted for purpose of reped the test
·w hich is applied for determining repugnancy among laws (ii) The later enactment must be couched in a
undet: Art 254 the Constitution. The test requires the court to language general enough to comprehed within
consider: 1. (1861) 6 H & N 433
, (i) Whether there is a direct conflict between the two 2 (1891) 39 W.F. 445
•
_ _ _ _..A,p_ro_visions?
1. (1864) 33 L.J. Adam. 193 • Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
2 A. I R. 1%3 S.C. .1870
Repeal of Statutes . 113
.
112 ·· · · Interpretation of Statutes
general rules of evidence applicable to trials of all offenc~s.
itself the particular matter dealt with by the earlier The statute was clearly intended to lay down a single set of
enactment. rules of evidence for all criminal trials.
(iii) The language of the later enactment must be In Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. v. I.T. Commissioner}
capable of reasonable and sensible application the Supreme Court held that a particular law conferring
without being extended to the matters particularly
immunity from taxation of the cement Company was repealed
dealt with by the earlier enactment. by a later general statute, namely, the Ordi
In Seward v. Veracruz,1 the House of Lords held that
(d) Where the earlier statute is general and the later
the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 w_ere particular
statute is particular, the later statute has the effect of repealing
provisions dealing with special types of clauns for fatal
injuries. They were notimplicity repealed by the enactment of the former to the extent of incompatibility but no further.
the Admirality court Act, 1861 which was a general by ships 'Genralibu specialia derogant' : the special derogates from
in the Court of Admirality. . the general.
In New Castle v. Morris,2 the House of Lords held In Hall v. Arnold,2 an earlier statute enabled a Court
that an earlier enactment conferring an immunity upon certain or Summary Jurisdiction to make a reference to a higher cour'"
specific persons in respect of arrest for bankruptcy, was not in cases tried summarily. A later statute, Friendly Societies
impliedly repealed by a la~er enactment providing for arrest Act, provided that in respect of proceedings under it the
of bankrupts. decision of the court of Summary Jur~diction would be final.
In Municipal Committee Palai v. T.J. Joseph} the The Kings Bench held that in respect of matters arising under
Municipal Act empow~red the local authorities to fix the places the later statute it impliedly repealed the earlier one.
which could be used as bus stands in municipal areas. The In Official Receiver v. Abdul Shakoor,3 the Supreme
Motor vehicles Act, enacted nine years later, gave the power to CourtS. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which dealt
desigmte bus stands to the Government, The Supreme Court with a particular matter, derogates from the evidence Act,
held that the earlier enactr:nent being a particular one was
1872. Thus in a proceeding to which the later enacbnent was
not repealed by the later which was general. The later statute
not applicable, the presumption contained in S. 114 of the
gave power to fix bus-stops in any area while the earlier one
only related to bus-stands in municipal areas. Evidence Act applied.
•
(c) If the general statute enacted later shows a clear (e) If the earlier and the later enactment both are in
and manifest intent to supercede the particular statute enacted affirmative there is contrariety in matter. The later does not
earlier, it shall be deemed to have beeri..repealed. ordinarily repeal t,;e former unless the later statute mainfestS
In Charnock v. Merchant,4 · the Queens Bench held a clear intention to do so.
that the special rules of evidence contained·in various statutes In Muir v. Hore,4 a later statute authorising trial by
for trial of particular offences, were repealed by the Crinu~l court of quarter sessions was not held to repeal on earlier one
Eviuence Act, 1899, enacted later even though it laid down providing for trial by Queens Bench.
1. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 816 •
L (1.884) 10 A.C. 59 2. (1950) 2 K.B. :::'
2 (1870) E.R. 4 H.L. 661 3. A.l.R. (1965) S.C. 920
3. Supra n. 3
4. (1877) 47 L.J.M.C. 17
4. (1900) 1 Q .B. 41
...
114 Interpretation of Statutes Repeal of Statutes . 1~5
In T M:I-S. Bradari v. Improvement Trust,l the enactment, the offender is liable to be punished under any of
Supreme Court held that the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice
1947 was not repealed by the East Punjab Damaged Areas for the same offence.
Act, 1949, as they both contained affirmative provisions which 3. CONSEQUENCES OF REPEAL
did not conflict with each other.
In Harishohandra v. State of Madhya Pradesh,2 the (a) Common Law Principles
Supreme Court held that a leter control order made under the Act Common Law Repeal has the effect of complitely
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946, impliedly wiping out the statute off the face of the statute book as if the
repealed an different provisions. The Court further observed same was ne.ver enacted save for transaction past and closed.
that even if the provisions has been identical the later would All p~osecutions an~ pending proceedings come to an end.
have repealed the former order since that must have been the Thus m R. v. Morris the accused was charged of an offence
rationale of remaking the order. u~der a sta~te that was repealed during the pendency of the
tr1al. The Kings Bench held that the proceedings could not the
(f) Where a later statute described as an offence any
continued after the statute was repealed.
act or ommission which is already treated as an offence by
an earlier enactment, and imposes a different punishment or Another consequence of repeal at Common Law was
prescribes a different procedure, the later Act implies repe~ that it resulted in the revival of the law prevailing at the time·
of the commencement of the statute which stood repealed.
of the former.
In Fortescue v. Bethnal Green/ the General Paving (b) Statutory Control of C'?nsequences of Repyai
(Metropolis) Act, 1817, penalised putting a hoarding on a In England the consequence ensuing from repeal of
street without a licence. The Metropolitan Management Act, statutes are noew regulated by specific statutory provisions.
1855, enacted a similar prohibition with severer penalities. S. 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 provides:
The Queens Bench held that the later Act repealed the former. Where this Act or ·any Act passed after
In Zaver Bhai v. State of Bombay,4 the Supreme Court the commencement of this act repeals any
held that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, other enactment, then, unless the contrary
implied repealed the earlier Bombay Act on th~ same subject, intention appears, the repeal shall not
as it provided for greater penalities for the same offence. (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time
In Om Prakash v. State of U.P.,5 the Supreme Court . at which the repeal takes effect; or ,
has held that the aforesaid principle has no application when (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so
the offence described in the later Act is not.. the same as repealed or any thing done or suffered under any
described in the earlier Act.. •
enactment so repeale~; or
S. 26 of the General Oauses Act provides that where (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability
an act or omission constitutes an offence under tWo or more acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enacnnent
so repealed; or
1. A.LR. 1963 S.C. 976 (d) affence any penalty, forfaiture or punishment
2 ALR. 1965 S.C. 932 incurred in respect of any offence committed
3. (1891) 3 Q.B. 170 against any enactment so repealed; or
4. AJ.R. 1954 S.C. 752
5. ALR. 1957 S.C. 458 1. {~ 1 B. & Ad. 441

... . ..
116
. · Interpretation of Statutes Repeal of Statutes 117
(e) affect arl.v investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy As regards savings of rights, the courts have made
in respeCt of any such right, privilege, obligation, a distinction between acquired right and the mere hope of
liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as acquiring a right.
aforesaid; A mere right to take advantage of the provision of the
and any such investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy may repealed statute is not treated as an accured right. But it the
be instituted continued, or enforced, and any such penalty statute confers a right, it will be considered as an acquired
forfeiture, or punishment may be· imposed as if the repealing rights. Thus in Sakha Ram v. Manik Chand} the right to
Act had not been passed. S.6 of the General Claused Act, 1898 be deemed a "Protected tenant", within the meaning of the
reproduces the above quoted provision, in respect of Ge~eral repealed statute, conferred on a tenant holding land for a
Acts or Regulations, and the General Clauses Acts of vanous specified number of _years, was considered on acquired right
states also adopt them. as the requisite duration of time was complete before the
Thus the common law principles in regard to repeal. On the contrary in Abbott v. Minister of Land,2 it was
consequences of repeal of a statute stand abrogated. R.e peal held that the right to an exercise an option given a quarantee
now, broadly speaking, does not have the affect of- to make purchase of crown lands adjoining his lands, did not
(i) reviving the law prevailing before the amout to an acquired right in such lands, ii the option was
commencement of the repealed statute; not exercised before the repeal of the enabling enactment.
(ii) opening transactions past and closed; The distinction between the Manik Chand case and
(iii) preventing the commencement or continuation the Abottcase is that in the former case the status had accured
of investigation or proceeding in respect of the without it being necessary on the part of the tenants to do
enforcement of any right, privilege, ob ligation or anything more. In the Abottcase the grantee had to de certain
liability penalty, forfeiture or punishment; or things and meet certain conditions before he could obtain the
(iv) abrogating any right, privilege, obfigation or right to purchase the lands. In other words, while in Manik
Chand case the right had vested, in the Abott case it was
liability which had accured or had been acquired
or incurreds before the repeal of the statute. I?erely a right to take advantage of the statute.
Chief
•
Justice Sinha has held in the Manik Chand case
(c) Extend of Statutory Control that the Abott case is only an authority for the proposition
Since the savings introduced by the enactment are that a mere right existing at the ~ate of a repealing statute to
available only in respect of rights (including privileges) and obtain later on an advantage of the provisions of the repealed
liabilities (including obligations forfeitures and· penalties) . statute is not an accrued right.
which have been acquired or have accrued before the repeal, The distinction petween the right to obtain the right
the most vital question is about the time when a right can be and the right itself has been further enaborated in a couple of
said to have been acquired or to have accrued, or a liability English cases. In Director of Public Wor~s
can be said to have been incurred. v. Ho Po ~ant the enactment permitted a lessee to
In respect of incurring liability for offences it has been recover possession of the leased premises if the Director of,
held in Bennett v. Tatton} that a person can not be prosecuted Public Works had granted him a rebuilding certificate. In the
for an offence under an enactment which was in force when instant case, the Director had given to the lessee a notice of
the offence was committed but which has been later repealed.
1. A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 354
2. (1895) A.C. 240 •
1. (1918) 88 LJ.KB. 313
3. (1961) 2 All E.R. 721
his ir.tention to ·gr.ant a certificate. But~ before the ~ertificate
'
could be granted various conditions ha,d to be fulfilled and
ere that could be done, the enacbnent was repealed. The Privy •
Council held that the result of the notice of intention by the
Director was merely to create a hope. Co~equently, the right
to obtain possession under the repealed enactment was saved.
•
In Free Lanka Insurance Co.Ltd. v. Rana Singh} Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
the Privy Council held that the right ~onferred on a pa:son
injured in a motor accident, against the msurers of the vehicle, Chapter 10
was saved even after the repeal of the enactment conferring
such right, as a right had accrued. Construction of Penal Statute
A distinction has to be made between investigation to
detemine whether a right ought to be given or not and an
investigation to determine the extent of the right. 1. Penal Statute
In the former case what a person has before· the 2. Strict Construction
conclusion of such investigation is a mere hope. Irl the later 3. Implications of strict Con3iruction of Penal
case a right has accrued to him though its exact extent is yet Statutes •
to be determined. Repeal quashes all hopes but preserves all
4. Means Rea in Statutory Offences
rights.
The savings of existing rightS and liabilities provided 1. PENAL STATUTE W.~ANING
· in 5.6 of the General Oauses Act and other similar statutes A penal statut~~ is -~ne which provides for imposition
is subject to a contrary intention expressed in the repealing of any penalty for an offence against the Stdte. If the sanction
Act. If the repealing Act so provides either expr~sly or by imposed by a statute consists in punishment of the offender
implication, the exception would not be available. Thus in culd not mere redre::;s to the aggrieved, the statute shall be
Indra Sohan Lal v. Custodian Evacuee Property,2 it was held classified as a penal statute.
that the Evacuee Property Act, 1950 clearly showed that 5.6 Some difficulty in distinguishing penal statutes from
of the General Oauses Act did not apply to the repeal of the other statutes is causeri. in two classes of cases. Certain acts are
Evacuee Property Ordinance. The reason was that the Act enforceable by a civil remedy in the form of penalty forfeiture
specifically provided for cases in which the previous law was or disability. These statutes do impose a penalty but they are
or was not to apply. It further declared that anythiiig done ?r essentially remedies of a civil nature. secondly, where the
omitted under the Ordinance would be deemed ·to have been statute imposes a penalty for something which is not a crime
done or omitted under the Act. This showed a clear intantion it is not to be considered a penal statute. In English Law a
to by-pass the savings contained in 5.6 of the General Clause distinction is m a de betvveen a criminal enactment and a penal
Act. statuted. While all statutes which impose a penalty may be
called criminal enactments, a penal statute is one which relates
ClOD
to offences against the body politic. However, the distinction is
1. (1964) 1 All E.R 457 often lost sight of as would appear from the diffeJent opinions
2 A.LR. 1956 S.C 71
handed down in the House of Lords in L.N.F.R. v. Berriman.1
There the Court was considering the nature of the Railway •
1. (1046) 1 All E.R. 255

•
•
.. . .
120 . Interpretation of Statutes Construction of Penal Statule 121
Employment (Prev~tion of Accide~ts) Act, 1900. The ru~e the operation of the statute to cases which clearly fall both
made under the Act required the Ratlways to observe certain within the spirit and the letter of the law.
precauionary measures for the protection of their workmen.
A violation of the rules was punishable under the Act with 3. IMPLICATIONS OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
a fin~ of 50. Lord simmords and Lord Macmillan considered Penal statutes were construed strictly in former times
the enactment to be a penal statute as it prescribed a penalty. when the number of capital offences was very large. This
but, Lord Prater refused to consider the statute penal merely rule was invoked to minimize the rigour of criminal law.
because it prescribed for imposition of penalty. It exhibited a preference for personal liberty enabli...1g the
In Rosenbaum v. Burgoyne,1 the test adopted is court to resolve every doubt in favour of the accused Such
whether the statute enforced obedience to its commands was the attitude of the courts that a statute which provided
by punishing the offender and not by merely redressing an punishment for stealing of 'horses' had to be atnended in
individual who may have suffered. the reign of Edward I so as to include the theft of a single
horse also. The courts refused to include the singular in the
In Tola Ram v. State of Bombay,2 the Supreme
plural. Anotl1er reason for which the courts insisted on strict
Court considered an enactment relating to land lord tenant
construction of Powers. It is for the legiSlature to define a
relationship as penal where it provided for punishment of a
crime and prescribe its punis11n1ent.
lanlord who obtained a premium for grant or renewal of a
The rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes has ,
lease.
however, a limited application in the present era. Its contents
2. STRICT CONSTRUCTION and limits can be summarised in four propositions which are
Penal statutes arE: to be construed strictly. Strict disc-ussed below with their relevant examples.
construction means a construction by which nothing will (a) No case shall fall within a penal statute which does
be included within the scope of the statute that does not not comprise all ~1-te ele1nents which constitute the offence as
come dearly within the meaning of the language used by it. defined by the Statute. Thus if the prohibitory v.rords do not
Crawford? says that in strict construction the language of cover cert~in activities in their ordinary meaning they will
the statute must be given its exact and technical meaning. not be extended by construction to cover such activities on
No extensions are to be made on account of implications or considerations of policy. No act is to be deemed criminal
equitable considerations. Sutherland4 is of the view that strict unless it is clearly made so by the words of the statute.'1
construction requires that everything shall be excluaed from In Rex v. Tichner/ the Coventry Act capitally punished
the aeration of the statute, if it does not clearly come within the infliction of certain injuries with malice a fore-thought,
the scope of the language used. and by lying in wait. The court held that the statute would
Strict construction is to be contrasted with liberal not apply to cases where the injuries were not casused after
construction. Uberal Construction involves enlargement or 'lying in wait' with the intention of committing them.
restriction of the letter of the statute so as to accomplish the In L.N.E.R. v. Berriman,3 the Rules required that the
intended purpose more effectively. Strict construction limits railway Co. should arrange for persons to give wanling of
1. (196-1) 2 All E.R. 988
any approaching train to workmen engaged ii t re-laying or
2 AJ.R. 1957 S.C. 496 1. Maxwell, Joe. cit 239 •
3. Cra~ford : Statutory Construction 449 2. {1790) East P.C. 39R
4. 2 Sutherland : Statutory Construction 39 3. supra n. 1
.. . .
122 Interpretation of Statutes Construction of Penal Statute 123
window with a price tacket. Chief Justic~ Parker observed that
•
repairing the permanent way. In the present case the Railway
Co. had failed to provide for such a warning system for the shopkeeper was not guilty of the offence under the said
its employees engaged in cleaning and oiling a machinery statute ~ he had simply exposed for sale, and not offered it
between the railway lines. Consequently, certain workers for sale. Thus the words 'offer for sale' were read in a narrow
were injured. The Court held that the company was not liable sense to cover .only such cases where a Person s·gnifi·
1 ed t o
to pay the finP. because the injured workers could not be said ano ther his willingness to sell such a knife.
to have been engaged in repairing the track. In its ordinary In Rosenbaum v. Burgovne,1 the Betting and Gaming
meaning repairing does not include cleaning or oiling. Act ~~60, provided that apperson who allowed the dub
In Sales-Matic Ltd. v. Hinchcliffe,1 the statute made prenuses to be used for gaming by means of a machine which
a declaration that all lotteries were unlawful. No punishment mvol~ed a stake of more than 6 pence to 'play it once' would
was provided. The court held that the statute did not make be guilty of an offence.
conduct of a lottery an offence. . . In the pr~sent case the machine could be played by
In R. v. Williams,2 the court held that a driving ~erting one com of 6 pence, or maximuJ.Il of five of such
licences could not be cancelled under the Road Traffic Act coms one after the other at any one time. The court held
1930, in a case where the accused was found guilty of stealing that no offence was committed because the words useby the
a car, as that punishment could only be imposed for 'taking statute were doubtful and should be construed in favour of
and driving away' a car. the subject. As the minimum stake required was only one coin
h1 Tolaram v. State of Bombay,3 the statute provided of 6 pence the statute was not contravened.
for punic;hmei1t of landlord who received any sum of money In King v. Republic of India,2 S. 19 of Bombay Rent
or consideration other than rent in respect of 'grant: of a lease etc. Control Act 1947, provided for punishment of a tenant
of any premises. In the instant case the landlord had received ~ho received any sum of consideration for relenquishing
a payment in consideration of an oral agreement to grant a his tenancy. It was held that his provision did not apply to
lease of a building under construction. The court held that the tho~e ca.ses ~ere antenant assigned his lease ~o a third person.
enactment applied to cases where the lease is granted and not Relinqwshment was strictly construed to mean surrender in
to cases where a mere promise to grant a lease was made. fevo~ of the landlord and did not cover alienation to a third
person.
(b) If words of a penal statute are reasonably eapable
of having a wider as well as a narrower meaning, the courts In Shanti Pd. Jain v. Director of Enforcement/ S.
would lean towards the narrower meaning. Every doubt is to 4(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, prohibited
be resolved in favour of the accused. · persons 'residing in India to buy, sell, borrow or lend foreign
In Fisher v. Bell,4 the Restriction of Offensive \A/eapons exchange to any person in a foreign country. In this case smne
Act 1959, provided for punishment of any person who 'salls German firms had paid foreign currency in the account of
or offers for sale' a knife of a particular d escription. In this Mr.~~ in a German Bank. This dealing was subject to the
case the shopkeerper displayed such a knife in his shop conditions that the account could be operative only for the
payment of price of new machinery purchased by Mr. Jain
1. (1959) 1 W.L.R. 1CD5 from thosP. firms after obtaining import licence from Indian
2 (1 %2) 3 All E.R 639 1. (1964) 2 All E.R. 988 (HL)
3. (1%2) supra n. 3 2 A.LR. 1952 S.C. 165
4. (1961) 1 Q.B. 394 3. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1764
•
.. . . Construction of Penal Statute 125
Wanchoo j. speaking for a majority of the Court held
Government The Supreme Court held tht no offence was the expression 'in any manner dealing with' should not be
committed because the deposit was a contingent deposit narrowly cons~ed and was not confined to dealing in course
establishing no relation of debtor an a creditor between Mr. of actUal importation of goods. Attempt to purchase such
Jain and the Gem1an Bank. No interest in the money passed goods also amounted to dealing.
• to the accused. In Bowers v. Gloucester Corportion,l the statute
In Dilip Kumar v. State of M.P.,1 the Supreme Court
empowered the corporation to cancel a driving licence if the
held that S. 303 of the Indian Penal Code applied only to cases
driver was convicted for the 'second time of any offence'. It
where the murder is committed by an accused who has been
was argued that the expression requries the second conviction
sentenced to life imprisonment by a court of final appeal. It
to relate to the same of fence for which the first was made.
would not include a convict who can or has made an appeal
The, court rejected it as it would defeat the object of the Act.
against such sft.ntence.
In Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration 2 the
(c) If the words of the statute, in their ordinary ' '
signification, have a wider meaning which also fits in with Supreme Court considered the meaning of the word
the object or policy of the statute, the words will be given 'abandoned' inS. 418 of the Delhi Municipal Act, 1957. The
such wider meaning irrespective of the fact that in some other enactment empowered the Corporation to impound cattle
context the words may 'bear a narrower meaning.
1
abandonP-d' in a public place or street It was held by the court
th~t the word 'abandoned' should begiven its wider meaning
In Elmdene Est;: ic~ Ltd. v. White/ the landlord Tenant
of I' unattended'. It should not be restricted to its narrower
Act, 1949, punished any p~rson who required any premium to
sense of 'ownerless', since the narrow meaning would defeat
be paid in respect of grant of ten~h~LJ'. In this case-the landlord
had offered the tenancy to person on ti~c conditipn that such the object of the Act. .
person gave discount of 500 on its market value The Court In R.. v. Hall} the court held that in S. 13 Sexual
held that this amounted to a premium, because the Act did Offences Act, 1956 which provided that it was an offence
not require fl:te premium to be paid to the landlord or his for a man to commit an act of gross indecency \vith another
agent only. It is to be noted that the Act defined premium to man, the" preposition 'with' must be understood in its wider
include any other pecuniary consideration in addition to rent.
I signification of 'against' or 'directed towards'. It must not be
In Assistant Collector, Customs v. Sitaram,3 S. 167 ~ken to mean 'with the consent of'.
of_ th~ ~ Custom Act, 1878, provided for ·punishment, In M.V. Joshi v. M.V.shimpi,4 the 1ule made under
\Vlth ~p~onment or fine or both of any person who was the Food Adulteration Act, 1954,defined 'butter' to mean, 'the
knmV1:1gly many manner dealing with smuggled goe ds. product prepared exclusively from the milk or cream of cow or
. In the instant case the accused went to a park with the buffalo or both'. The question before the Court, was whether
mtent to purchase smuggled gold from another co-accused, butter prepared from curd would also be 'butter' within the
b~t before the goods could pass or the price was paid, they meaning of the statute. The court held that it would be so
\\.ere apprehe~ded. The question was whether the accused because the words w~re clear and plain and included soured
was guilty of m any manner dealing with' smuggled goods. milk of cream.
1. (;~b3) 1 All E.R. 437
1 A~LR. 1976 S.C. 133 •
2. A.I.R. 1%5 1 S.C. 871
2. (1960) All E.R. 300 •
3. (1 %3) 2 All E.R. 475
3. A LR. 1966 S.C. 955 4. A.I.R. 1%2 S.C. 1494
•
.. . . can create an offence of strict liability to constitute which
measrea{ would not be a necessary element. In Sherras v. De
126 Interpretation of Statutes Ru~en, th.e question was whether S. 16 of the Licencing Act
In State of Gujrat v. Chaturbhuj, the Supreme Cou~t
1 which purushed any who supplied liquora to any constable
held that for purpose of the suppression of Immoral Jraffic on duty, required a guilty intention or not. The facts in this
Act, an oeder authorising all magistrates to try such offences case showed tha~ the constable had removed his armlet which
fulfils the statuary requirment of 'specially empowered. was ait indication that he was not on duty though actually the
(d) If the literal meaning of the word. of the word of constable was on duty. It was held in this case that even in
the statute produces an unintelligible or absured result but absence of words in the enactment which could have shown
the statute read as a whole gives out its meaning dearly, that a guilty intent was required, the act would not be an
effect will be given to that meaning by curing a mere defect in offence without such intent.
2
pharseology. This rule, however, does not mean that the court Wright, J., in this case indicated three classes of
would supply omissions. cases in which the legislature normally enacted an absolute
In Rex v. Oakes} S. 7 of Official Secrets Act, 1928 prohibition dispensing with the elements of guilty intention
provided for punishment of attempts abetments or preparations These were:
commit an offence under the Act. However, its language was (i) acts which are prohibited in public interest under a
defective as one part of it read 'Aids or abets and does any penalty e.g. food adulteration, or ·
•
act preparatory to the commission of the offence. Literally this . (ii) public nuisances, or •
would have mean that an abettor was not quilty unless he had (iii) proceedings which are really a summary mode of
done an act preparatory to the offence. This was absurd, and enforcing a civil right, e.g. maintenance of wife or
there fore, the court read 'and' as 'or' implying that abettors . children.
as well as persons preparing for an offence under the Act,
· The courts have leaned against absolute prohibitions
both, were guilty. ..
and ther~ is a prima-facie presumption that the legislature
In Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C. Thaper,3 S. 76
does not mtend to create an offence without the requirement
of the Mines Act, 1952, provided that where for any ·offence of mensrea
under the Act the owner of a mine could be punished and
1
such mine was owned by a firm or a public company, anyone' . Where a penal statute is silent about mensrea, the
of the partners or directors could be punished. In this case courts pr~sume that it is impliedly required except where a
the question arose whether the expression, 1 anyone' meant cont:ary mtention. is ~ith~r expressly declared or impliedly
I everyone' or only one'. The Supreme Court h~ld that though
1
manifested For quit sometime however a feeling ws generated
the expression 'anyone' is capable of both· the meanings ·in that the presumption is on a decline. But in Bim Chink Aik v
R 3 th . ,.
different context yet looking at the object of the statute it . · : pnvy Council reaffirmed it laying down two conditions
should be considered to mean every one". m which the presumption as to mensrea may be rebutted :
(i) ~ stz:ict ~ability is required to give practical effect
4. MENSREA IN STATUTORY OFFENCES to the leg~slative mtention, and (ii) the accused has had
. . It~ a fund~tal principle of criminal law that guilty
mtention lS an essential ingredient of criminal liability : actus 1. (1895) 1 Q.B. 918
2 id. p. 921
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. However, the legislature
3. (1963) 1 All E.R 223
1. 1976 S.C. 1697
2. (1959) 2 All E.R. 92 Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
3. A.LR. '\961 S.C. 838 •
•
--------------------------~-: _____
1\f r Construction of Penal Statute . . . _. . . 129
128 Interpretation of Statutes •
In Nathulal v. State of M.P.,l the provisions o£5.7 of the
some o rtunity of furthering the o~rvance of statutory
mre!::ts· Thus in the instant case tt was held th~t ~e
~ could not be guilty of violating an order prohibting
Essential Commodities Act, 1965 pebalised trading in essential
commodities except under a licence required under the rules.
In this case the accused had applied for a_licence and year after
his entry in SingaPore when such order had not been brought
year he was sending returns to concerned authorities under
to his attention. the mistaken belief that the licence had granted. The refusal
Similarly in R.v. Cugullere,1 knowledge wa~ implied was also never conununicated to him. these curcumstances
into the statutory definition of ~ offence. constituted by the Suprem Court refused to hold him guilty. It held that
possession of any offensive weapon m a public place. though the enactinent in '\<Vords did not required a guilty
In Warner v. Metropolice Commissioner} the statute intent, the same was implicitly required. Subbarao J. went
declared 'it shall not be lawful for a person to have in his further to state that merely because the purpose of a law \vas
possession any dangerous drug'. A majority of the House to promote welfare activities or eradication of grave sodal evil
of Lords held that these words created an absolute liability. it would not be presumed that no means rea was required.
No knowledge was required on the part of the accused to Only where the object of the statute would be defeated, the
constitute the offe.ice. Lord Morris and Lord Wilberforce Courts can exclude the requirement of means rea by necessary
relied only on the anambiguous nature of the language. Lord implication.
Guest and Lord Pearce took into account the purpose of the · In Sarju pd. v. State of U.P.,2 it was held by the
statute to supress a social mena. Lord Reid dissented holding Supreme Court the guilty intent was not a requisite element
that no reasons had beeil shown to displace the presumption of an offence under the Food Adulteration Act and the courts
of the requirement of mens rea. would not imply such element because the law has bee11
In Sweet v. Parsley/ the House of Lords unanimously enacted in the larger interest of maintenance of public helath
held that the requirment of mensrea was implict in the offence and the languge used was wide enough to cover every person
of being concerned in the management of premises used for whether he has a gulity intent or not.
smoking cannabis. The court took into account the language In State of Maharasthra v. M.H. George/ the Supreme
of the statute, the history of legislation and the hardship likely Court has held that mensrea is not a requisite element for an
to be caused by construing the enactment as an absolute offence against the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
prohibition. Lord Reid has laid do\yn that besides the language It convicted the accused where he was in possession of gold
of the statute the·following circumstances must be considered. contrary to the Reserve Bank notification of which he claimed
(i) Subject matter of the Act to have no knowledge. The reasons given.by the court were
•
·- (ii) Whether public interest re_a lly requires that to that to imply the requirment of mensrea would defeat the
prevent the guilty from escaping even.•innocent purpose of the law to control smuggling of gold. Subba Rao
persons should be prevented from proving their
J. dissented on the ground that in his opinion the object of
•
mnocence. legislation would not be defeated. Thus so far as the criterion
. went the court was unanimous. It held that the requi."'lllent
(iii) Every unjust conviction causes a loss of public of mensrea is to be implied in a penal statute unless to do so
confidence in the administration of justice. would defeat the very object of the statute.
1. (1961) 2 All E.R. 343 1. A.J.R. (1966} : S.C. 43
2 (1968) 2 All E.R. 3356
2. A.I.R. (1961) S.C. 634
3. (1968) 2 All E.R. 337
3. A.I.R. (1965) 1 S.C. 722

•
- .. Construction of Penal Statute 131
130 . Interpretation of Statutes
•
Under the Indian Penal Code the general doctrine of In Emery v. Nolloth,l the statute provided for
mensrea has been displaced by specific enumerating of the punishme~t of the licence who knowingly sells liquor in
co~tra~ention of th~ Act. It was held that sale of liquor to
mental element required to constitute an offence, words like
knowwingly, voluntarily, dishonestly, intentionally etc. are child m contravention of the Act made the licencee liable
used to show the element of guilty intent. This enumeration even though the liquor was supplied by the bar-man and the
displaced the need to employ the doctrine of mensrea, but if licence had no personal knowledge. The reason was that in
hardly means that the doctnne of mensrea has no application cases where a person delegates his own authority and puts
to the Indian Penal Code. someone else in charge he had permitted or suffereed the
wrongful act knowingly.
One asrect of doctrine of mensrea is that criminal law
does not imputevicarious liability. Prima facie a master is not In Vane v. Yiannopoulous,2 the House of Lord
to be .made criminally responsible for the acts of his servants expressed its dissatisfaction with the doctrine of delegation
but as Atkin J. has observed inMousell Bros. but refused to upset it as it had been established for too long
v. LN. E. Railway Co.1 the legislature may prohibit a time.
an act or enforde a duty in such a words as to make the
(J(J[J
prohibition or the duty absolute so that the master would be
liable even if the act is done by the servant. Thus in State of
Gujarat v. K.M. Bhikalal,2 the Supreme Court has helt that
lor an offence under S. 92 of the Factories Act a master is
~ble ev~ though the act was commited by his servant and Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
Without his knowledge or permission.
Vicarious liability can be imputed in those cases where
the things prohibited are such as would frequently be done by
the servant or a~ent and the legislation does not require any
mental state to be proved to constitute a crime. This is done
on the ground that to hold otherwise would defeat the law. •
. . . E~~ where a mental element is required vicarious

liability IS unput~ in cases where the master may be said to
have .delegated ~ Fction or wilfully dose his eyes. Thus in
M~ms v. Collins, a Bar maid supplied liquor to a constabl~
while he was on duty, though she did not know that he was
on duty. The licencee for the bar was held guilty f f~c
of 1 · li o an o J.ence
supp ymg quor to a constable on duty and the requirme t
of mensreaf was not implied as that would have defeated ;e
purpose o the law.
1. (1917) 2 K B. 836
2. Al.R. 1964 S.C. 1893
1. (1903) L.O. K B. 264
3. (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 292
2. (1964) 2 All E.R. 8..~
.. •
•
, .. ' Construction of Tax-
.. Statutes ., . .. • .' • . 133,
•
(a) A: tax statute cannot on equitable considerations
be extended to subjects not clearly covered by the
words of the enaclntent - .
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs (b) If the language of the enactment is susceptible to
·two meanings, the one favourable to the assessee
Chapter 11 is to be preferred.
(c) There is a presumption against double taxation of a
Construction of Tax - Statutes single transaction.
(d) Where the language of the enactntent is plain and
unambiguous the Courts cannot restrict its scope
1. Strict Construction of Tax-Statutes with reference to any considerations of injustice,
2 Principles of Constr':lction hardship or inconvenience.
3. Doctrine of Substance (e) The principle of strict construction is primarily
limited to the charging section of the statute. .
1. STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF TAX-STATUTES
A person has no inherent liability to pay a tax. The (2) PRINCIPLES
•
OF CONSTRUCTION
liability arises only by an rmposition made by a statute. As (a) No extension by Analogy
statutes imposing liabilities are to strictly construed, the A matter not covered by the terms of a tax enactment
Courts require tax-statutes to be couched in clear and express is not to be brought within its ambit. It is for the legislature
terms. . to devise the net of taxation. The Courts will not extend it on
The principle of strict construction of tax statutes, as considerations of equity by analogy.
in case of penal statutes, means nothing more than a literal •
In Higgs v. Olivier} an actor had entered into an
reading of the text of the enactments. The language of the
enactntent is to be given its plain meaning: it can neither agreement with a producer to the effect that the actor would
be extended nor restricted with referance to any supposed not play. role in any film produced by any body other than
intention of the legislature. . that producer for a period of eighteen months. A sum of
15,000 was paid as consideration for this promise to the actor.
The emphasis on literal interpretation in case of
The question was whether this money constituted, 'profits of
Tax-Statutes is a double edged weapon. On the one hand,
lt prevents the extension of the ambit of the enactment by a profession or vocation' within the mearting of Income Tax
analogy. ~ the ~ther, it ~abies the Court from mitigating Act, 1952. The Chancery Division held that the payment did
any M:~hip or mconveruence that may arise. If something not constitute profits of a profession as the payment was not
falls Within the net of the tax-statute it is not for the Court to made as a matter professional fees.
provid~ a reli.ef. The ~tatute is to be taken literally irrespective In Thomas V. Income Tax commissioner} the assessee
or considerations of mconvenience, hardship or injustice. had transferred certain assets to a lady. He later on married her.
The rule requiring strict construction of tax-statutes is The question was whether income accruing from such assets
reflected in the following principles of construction used by could be added to the total income of the assessee. S. 16(3) (a)
the Courts in respect of tax statutes. 1. 1952 Ch. 311 .
2 A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 587
•
•
(ill) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 premitted the autho?ties to -
include in the income of the assessee any in~om: denved by Construction of Tax- Statutes 135
his wife from assets 'transferred directly or mdrrectly to the
if the enactment imposes double taxation in clear and express
wife'. The Supreme Courts held that the enactment had no
words, the Courts cannot help but enforce it. But where the
li tion to a situation where the assets were \l'ansferred
app ca th d 'wif ' and language is ambiguous Courts lean against double taxation.
before marriage. The enactn1ent used e wor e
that word could not be construed to include a lady who later The existence of this presumption was recognised by
theHouse of Lords in I.R.C. v. F.S. Secu.rities Ltd.1 and by the
became a wife.
High Court of Nagpur in Ahmadji Bhai v. State of Madhya
(b) Presumption in favour of the Assessee Pradesh.2
Where the terms of an enacbnent imposing a tax are
(d) Courts not to restrict the ambit of the law for
· fairly susceptible to two constructions, the one which favours
considerations of equity.
the subject is to be adopted.
In Kirkness v. John Hudson and Co.,l the plant of If the language of the enactment is plain, the principle
the respondent was compulsorily acquired ~y the State. S. 17 of strict construction does not require the courts to restrict
of Income Tax Act provided that a balancmg charge could the ambit of the provisions with reference to possible
be levied when machinery or plant was sold for a sum in consequences.
excess of its written down value. The charge was levied on In Farmers Machinery Syndicate v. Shaw} certain
the compensation paid to the company. The Court used the farmers joined together to form a syndicate to operate a
presumption to hold that 'sale' in this enactment should be factory for drying grains. They purchased and installed the
construed to exclude compulsory sale. It held that-the charge machinery. A trust was created to manage it and the land
could not levied on the amount received as compensation. on which the plant w~ installed also vested in the trust A
In Income Tax Commissioner v. Karamachand question arose whether the plant was liable for payment of
Pren1chand Ltd,2 the question related to the ambit of the 'rate' under the Rating and Valuation Act, 1928. S. 2(2) of
third provisoS. 5 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. This the Act' exempted from rate assessment such buildings as
proviso excluded income profits or gains of business arisfug were occupied together with farm land and were used for
in any part of India to which the Act did not ~xtend. The agricultural operations on such land. The Courts held that the
respondent claimed that his losses arising in B_a roda (an area . exemption was not available in respect of the plant because it
to which the Act did not extend) should be taken into account. was occupied by the trust managing committee which had no
The supremE:: Court held that as the matter was debatable a farm land and as such it was not occupied together with the
construction favouring the assessee was to be adopted, and as farm lands, nor was it used in connection with agricultural
such the losses should be taken into account. operations on such lands.
(c) Presumption against Double Taxation In C.A. Abraham v. Income Tax Officers,4 it was
There is a presumption that the legislature does not held by the Supreme Court that legislative enactn1ents
intend to tax the same transaction more than once. Of course aimed at meeting the evil of tax evasion were often drawn
in comprelesive language. It was not for the Courts to
1. (1955) 2 All. E.R 345 restrict their operation for considerations of hardship and
2 A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1173.
1. (1%4) 2 All. E.R. 691 •
•
2. A.LR. 1953 Nagpur 29.
• •
.. 3. (1961) 1 All E.R. 285
·- -'-·
136 Interpretation of Statutes Construction of Tax - Statutes 137
inconvenience. In the instant case the Court held that the 5. 18A(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, required an
power to make assessment in case of a discontinued business assessee to pay interest on the sum of tax found due from
included the power to impose a penalty on the assessee. him between 1st January of the year in which tax was paid
up and the date of regular assessment, in the situation where
The same principle is used by the Courts to requirs
the assessee paid an advance tax and his estimated tax was
that those who claim exemptions under a tax-statute must less than 80 percent of the actual tax due from him for that
establish them. period. Subsection (8) provided for payment of interest in
1
In Income Tax Commissioner v. Ram.krishna Deo, cases where no payment of tax was made in accoradance with
the question was who had the burden to prove that the subsection(6). InGursahai v. Income Tax Commissinner,1 the
inc'Ome was agricultural income and was exempt from levy of question was whether S. 18A (8) was applicable to a case where
income tax. The Supreme Court held that the burden lay on an assessee was liable to pay advance tax but had not paid it.
the assessee. Literally construed, the enactment would not h'lve covered
the case but the Supreme Court held that tht! provisions
(e) Limitations of Rule of Strict Construction made by S. 18A(8) were related to machinery of-collection of
The Principle of Strict construction is basically limited taxes and not to levy of a tax, and such an enactment must
to charging sections of the tax-statute. The Courts have made be so constreed so as to make it workable and not so as to
a distinction between the imposition of liability to pay tax and defeat it. Similarly in Murari Lal v. B.R.Vad,2 'The Supreme
Court refused to extend the doctrine of strict construction to
the machinery for collection of tax. The provisions relating
assessn1ent of tax on firms after their dis0lution.
to imposition of liability are to be strictly construed; but the
provisions creating the machinery for tax-collection should be (3) Doctrine of Substance
construed ut res magis valsat quam pereat. The Court will In a few cases it has been held that in construing a tax
construe enactments relating to machinery of collection so as statute., the Courts should take the substance of the transaction
into account and should not limit themselves to the from of
not to defeat the intention of the legislature. Once the liability
the transaction. ·
is incurred the statute should be construed so as ••
to make it
\\-·orkable. This ~ttitude has been severely criticised by Courts
is England and India. In Inland Revenue Commissioner
In Allen v. Trehearne,2 S.45(5) of the F~nce Act, v. Duke of West-minister.3 Lord Russell observed that the
1927 provided that in case an assessee ceased to hod office doctrine proceeded on a misunderstanding of observations
during an assessment year, he would be liable to pay tax on made in some earlier cases. If something did not fall within
the amount of emoluments received between 6th April of the letter of the tax enactment it would not be brought
that year ~d the date on which he ceased to be employed. into it by analogy or by a reference to the substance of the
The question was whether this enactment was applicable to a transaction. The Privy Council accepted with approval these
case where the assessee died without receiving the sum due views in Bank of Chattinad v. Income Tax Commissioner.4
as emoluments. The Court held that the provision should The Supreme Court has also adopted this stand in Fernandez
~ v. State of Kerala.5
be broad!~ construed as it only dealt with the machinery of
tax collection. It construed the enactment to include not only 1. A.I.R 1963 S.C. 1062
•
payments received but also payP"tents due to be received. 2 1976 S.C. 313
1. ALR. 1959 S.C: 239 3. (1935)
2 (1938) 22 Tax cases 15 . 4. AI.R. 1940 P.C. 183
r. .
..
•• 5. A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 657
Interpretation of Statutes
138 • • 1
•
In Potts Executors v. IndlandRevenue Comnus~toners,
the House of Lords refused to consider sums, pru.d by a
corporate body at the request of the assessee to third person, Chapter 12
as payments made in substance to the assessee.
In Banarsidas v. Income Tax Off:icer,2 the Supreme
Court refused to apply the doctrine of substance. There the
Certain. Presumption
question arose in respect of S. 34 of the Income Tax Act~ 1922.
That enacbnent confers the power upon Income Tax Officer to
assessment if any income has escaped asessment. 1. Presumption Against Exclusion of Jurisdication
~f:r :'e Income Tax Amendment Act 1959 provided that of Courts.
a notice issued for assessment of income under S. 34 .of the 2. Presumption Against Extra Territorial
Principal Act would not be invalid merely becaus: 1t was Operation. .
· ed after the time period of eight years prescnbed for 3. Presumption Against Contravention of
lSSU • th
reopening of assessment had expired. In the mstant case e International Law.
notice was issued within that time period. The Court held While most of the principles of interpretation of
that it would not go to the substance to say that 'issued' and statutes can be and are stated as presumptions, and need not
~served' were not the same thing, but where the words of the be discussed separately, a few of the presumtpion require
Act were clear and validated such notices it will give effect to distinct treatment. these are:
them. 1. Presumption against exclusion of juridiction of Courts
The doctrine of substance has however a limited
connotation also. It means that the court 'Will examine the 2. Presumption against extra-territorial operation
true legal nature and effect of a transaction and will not be
3
3: Presumption against breach of !ntemationallaw
deceived by forms. Thus in Re. Hanns-worth, the Chantery
Division held that it would not limit itself to a11.examination
1. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXCLUSION OF
of the deeds, but will look at the true legal na~e and eff~t of JURISDICTION
transaction to determine whether it amounted to a purchase There is a presumption against exclusion of the
within 5.3(1) of the Finance Act, 1894. · jurisdiction of ordinary courts of law, civil of criminal. Such
4 exclusion can only be brought about by express language of
In Commissioner of Customs v. H.G. Kewley, the
Court held that the word furniture in the Finance Act, 1958 necessary implication. For the same reason statutes excluding
included parts of furniture. Simply becasue furniture parts jurisdiction of ordinary courts are strictly construed.
ready to ba assembled were imported did not mean that This attitude of the courts originated in the keen
furniture was not imported. comptition amon·various courts in England in the m edieveal
period. In th~ modem era, it now rests on the inclination of
000 the courts not to disturb the settled state of law a..nd deny
1. (1951) 1 All E.R. 76
access to the citizens to courts of law. •
2. A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1742
3. (1967) 2 All E.R. 249 •
4. (1965) 1 All E:R. 929 .
. • ..
~------r .
140 Interpretation of Statutes Certain Presumption 141
The application of these principles is illus-:rat~d ~Y. cases .

where jurisdiction is conferred on an administration authoritv
to confer a right or impose a duty in a given situation two
~
involving difftrent formula for exclusion of the JUriSdiction of

questions arise :
Courts.
(i) Who was the jurisdiction to determine whether
(a) Statutes creating special remedies that situation exists-the courts or the adminstrative
Where a statute simply creates special remedies it authority?
is not ordinarily presumed to take away the then available (ii) Can the Courts correct errors of jurisdiction of the
remedies. adminstrative authority?
In Earl of Shaftesbury v. Russell/ the statute 'The learned judge has held that in the absence of any
conferred a jurisdiction on commissioner of Taxes to bear express provision e jurisdiction in respect of the first question
matters relating to attachment of property for nonpayment of vested in the courts. But even if such jurisdiction was vested
tax. The Court held that it did not deprive the common law in the aministrative authority, the pres.u mption is that the
courts from trial of an action for illegal distress. Courts have the power to correct errors of jurisqiction of such
In Magiti Sasmal v. Punjab Bissoi,2 the statute administrative authority.
provided for all matters arising between landlord and tenants In R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal,1 the statute declared
to be tried by the Collector. The Supreme Court however, held a decision of the tribunal 'final'. The Queens Bench held that
that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to determine whether "final' only meant that there was no appeal against it. It did
the landlord-tenant relationship was not so taken away. not mean that a writ of certiorari would not lie to correct
• e!'!'ors of jurisdiction.
tb) Statutes Attaching Finality T1J Administrative Findigs
Various formulae are used by tJ• ! draftsmen to oust In Pyx Granite Co. Limited v. Minister of Housing '
the jurisdiction of the Courts. Thus the ~tatute may declare, and Loc~ Government} the statute declared that the decision
the decision of an adrrJnistrative body as 'final', conclusive, or. of the Minister shall be 'final'. The House of Lords held that it
that it' shall be called in question in any court of law, or that was open to the Courts to issue a writ of certiorari to correct
'no suit shall be brought to set aside or modify' it, or that it errors of jurisdiction.
'shall be conclusive proof or' something it determines. In Deshika Charyulu v. State of . L\ndhra
. Pradesh,3
These formulae only restrain the courts from exarniriing. the statute declared that the decision of the tribunal shall be
the merits of an admimistrative determination; They dcrnot take :final' on the question whether a plot of land was held on
away from the Court the jurisdiction to examine the legality mam tenure. It further provided that the decision could hot
of the de::ern'lination. Irrespective of legislative declarations if be questioned in a court of law'. The Supreme Court however
~e .authority has exceeded against the principles of natural ~el.d ~t recourse to Civil Courts was open on questions of
JUStice, or has acted malafide, the Courts can interfere. JUI~diction and the declaration of finality applied only to the
ments of the Case.
The recent statement of Diplock J. in Anisminic Ltd. v.
The Foreign Compensation Tribunal,3 is a classic elaboration In Lilavati Bai v. Bombay,4 the statute provided that
of the attitude of the courts. His Lordship has held that in cases a declaration made by the State Government under it that the
•
1. (1823) 1 L }. (OS.) K.B. 202 1. (1957) 1 All E.R. 796
2 ALR. 1962 S.C. 547 2 (1959) 3 All E.R. 1
• 3. ~J.R. 1964 S.C. 807
3. {1967) 3 AU E.R 986
• 4. A.I.R. (1957) S.C. 521
142 · Interpreta on o flfti
be
building was to requisitioned for a public purp~ would be
1conclusive proof of of the existence of such pu~Iic purpose.
1
Certain Presumption 143
The Supreme Court held that even such a declaration could be
challanged before a court on grounds a malafide. · such tax. The remedy given in the statute excluded the
jurisdiction of ordinary Courts.
(c) Exclusion of Jurisdiction
(i) Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the C?.urts can be 2. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
brought about by (i) express language or by (n) necessary OPERATION
· implication. The presumption is that a legislature does not design its
An example of such necessary implication is to be legislation to operate on subjects beyond its territorial limits.
found in statutes which create a new liability or confer a new The presumption may be rebutted either by express words or
right and prescribe a special and particular remedy for the by necessary implication. The object, subject matter and the
same. history of the enactment, are also relevant in considering the
In
Wolverhamption New Water Works. v. territorial limits of the operation of the statute.
Hawkesfor~1 Willes J. observed: In Rosseter v. Cahlmann,l the statute prohibited
Where a liability not existing at common the sale of liquids by any other measurment save imperial
law is created by ·a statute which at the measure. The court held that this prohibition die not apply
same time gives a special and particular to sale of palm oil by a British subject under a contract which
remedy for enforcing it, the remedy required the oil to be measured and delivered in Africa, as the
provided by the statute must be followed, statute ws presumed not to operate extra-territorially.
and it is not competent to the party t<;» In Tomalin v. S. Pearson and Son Ltd.,2 a British
pursue the course applicable to cases of workman was employed by a British contractor to work in
the second class. Malta, and brought a suit for damages under the Workman's
In Barraclough v. Brown,2 the statute permitted the Compensation Act 1906. The Court held that the statute was
•
under taking to remove a vessel that has sunk in the river not meant to Operate extra-territorially ·and did not apply to
Ouse if the owner of the vessel failed to do so. The undertaka-s accidents happening in ~alta.
could recover form the owne.r the expenses of removal of the In State of Bihar v. Charusildasi,3 the statute applied
ship in a court of summary jurisdiction. The Hou~ of Lords . to all religious trusts in the state if any part of the trust
held that a suit before ordir ny law courts for such recovery property was situated in Bihar. The Supreme Court held that
did not lie as the statute not only created a right but also the statute only operated on religious trusts situated in Bihar
provided a remedy and the two could not be dissociated.
and not on trusts situated in any other state.
In Firm Radhakishan v. Ludhiana Municipality,3
The nature and subject matter of the statute is an
the statute provided for imposition of terminal tax by
important consideration in the operation of the presumption
municipalities and laid down a procedure for it. The Supreme
of territorial operation. A statute providing for punishment
Court held that no suit could lie against an order imposing
of crimes or dealing with immovable property isprima facie
1. (1961) 3 All E.R. 446
territorial in operation as both mese matters are considered to
2 (1897) AC. 615
3. 1963 S.C. 1547
.... ~
be essentially 'local' in character. •
'
1. (1853) 8 EX. 361
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs 2 (1909} 2 KB. 611
, 3. A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1002
.
Certain Presumption 145
144 ·· · · Interpretation of Statutes
The presumption against extra-territoriality can be
In Ma~h~od v. A.C New South Wales, the statute
1
rebutted by express language. In Theopltile v. Solictor
made by the legislature of New South Wales provided for General} the Court held that the Bankruptcy Act, 1914
punishment of bigamy. The Privy Council held that the statute operated extra-territorially because the expression 'dentor'
did not apply to a second marriage contracted anywhere was defind so as to include a foreigner who committed an act
beyond the state of New South Wales, as all crime was local of bankruptcy in a foreign country. S. 4 of the Indian Penal
2
In A.G. for Alberta v. Huggard Assets Ltd., the Privy Code expressly gives the Code an extra territorial operation
Council held that a British statute of 1660 abolishing military in two classes of cases : (i) where the crime is committed by
tenures of land did not apply to Canada. a citizen of India in any place outside India, and (ii) a crime
· In Freke v. Lord Garbery,3 the Court held that where is committed by an y person on a ship or air-craft registered
the land was ~ituated in England it could only be alienated in India wherever it may be. These express woeds rebut the
in conformity with the law relating to transfer of immovable prsumption.
property in England. The presumption against extra-territorial operation can
4 also. be negative. by necessary implicati<?n. Such implication,
In Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain, the Supreme
Court held that the provisions of S. 188 of Criminal Procedure among other tlungs may arise out of the subject matter of
Code, 1898, did not apply to a person who was not a citizen the statute. Thus, statutes creating disabilities for marital
of India. In this case the accused was carrying on business in relationship are presumed t::> operate extra-territorially. In
Multan. As Multan became a part of Pakistan he left it and Brook v. Brook} the House of Lords held that the Marriage
came to India in November 1947. Before leaving for India he Act 1835, was applicable to all marriages. celebrated any
allegedly stole and dic;posed certain goods pledged by him where. The reasons were that to confine such statutes within
with the Central Bank and kept in the Bank's godowns. After territorial limits would mean that a marriage that was invalid
his arrival in India the accused was prosecuted fbr offences in one country would be valid of the parties married in an
committed in Pakistan. The Court held that while the offences other country and so the purpose of the statute would be
were committed the accused was not a citizen of India and no defeated.
•
prosecution could be launched against him for those offences
3. PRESUMPTION AGAINST A VIOLATION OF
even if he later on acquired Indian citizenship since crime was• INTERNATIONAL LAW
essentially local in character.
It is presumed the legislature does not intend to offend
In Income Tax Commissioner v. Malayalam
against established principles of International law. The Courts
Plantation,5 the Supreme Court held that S. 77 . of the Estate ,
will avoid a construction that gives rise to such inconsistency
Duty Act,. 1953 did not operate extra-territorially. That ~ection
except where they are compelled by express words or by
empowered a person required to pay estate duty in respect of
necessary implication to do otherwise.
any property to alienate such property. The Court held that
property of a person domiciled in a foreign country could not In Madazo v. Willes,3 the Court held that the statute
be s ""ld under that section. permitting capture of ships engaged in slave-trade did
not app!y to foreign ships, as that would be contrary to
1. 1891 A.C. 455
international Law. ·
2 (1953) A.C. 420
3. (1873) LR 16 Eq. 46 1. 1950 A.C. 1Ff •
,
4. A.lR. 1955 S.C. 36 2 (1861.) 9 H.L.C. 193
5. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 161 3. (1820) 3 B and All 35~
Find More at
.. https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
•
In Sharif v. Azad,1 the Queens Bench, held that the
expression 'exchange contracts' in Bretton Woods Agreements
Order in Council 1946, should be liberally construed with
regard to the object of the Agreement to protect the currencies
of the parties to the Agreement.
An important application of this presumption against
Chapter 13
in consistency with international law is to be perceived
in exclusion of foreigners from the ambit of statutes. This Application of Statutes to State
exclusion is based on the respect to be paid to sovereign rights
of othe states.
In Ex parte Blain,2 the Court held that the Birtish bank 1. Presumption of Crown Immunity
ruptcy statutes did not apply to foreigners committing acts of 2. Extent of the Rule in Engiand
bankruptcy outside England. 3. Application of the Presumption in India
In Nachiappa v. Subramanian,3 the Supreme Court
held that Courts in India could deal with claims regarding 1. PRESUMPTION OF CROWN IMMUNITY
immovable property situated in Burma. In English law there is a presumption that no statute
binds the Crown unless it is expressly named therein, or is
Recendy Chief Justice Sikri in Keshvanand Bharti v.
State of Kerala,4 recongnized the existence of the presumption referred to by necessary implication. Plowden
against inconsistency with international law and referred to J.J. has explained the basis of the rule inWilliam v.
the Declaration of Human Rights to show the basic nature of Berkley,1 the 'King, when be assents to a legislation, does not
the gurantee of fundamantal rights. mean to prejudice himself or to bar to himself his liberty and
privil~ges.
This rule is said to have· originated in the Royal
•• prerogative. However, there is a consensus among
contemporary jurists that the rule of construction and is not a
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs . part of the Royal prerogative.
• .· Early English writers like Lord Coke and Bacon
Jlnrucated three Classes of statutes which bind the Crown
·without specifically naming it. These are mentioned in
Magdalen College Case: 2
re
.
1. Statutes for maintenance of religion, learning and
poor
2. Statutes for suporession of wrongs
.... •
~ 3. Statutes that tend to carry out the desires of a
1. (1967) 1 Q .B. 605
~ounder or donor
2 (1879) 12 Ch. D. 522
3. AlR. 1960 S.C. 3(]7 ;. (1562) Plowd 223, 240
4. A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (1510.11) · 2. (1615) 11 Co.· Rep. 66b
Application of Statutes to State 149
These general exceptions have not been a~proved by control of the Minister of Transport. Its purpose ws to provide
the courts or by later writers, not have they been diSapproved. for carriage of goods and transport of passengers. The Court
held that. the functions of the -Commission were purely of a
2. EXTENT OF RULE IN ENGLAND commercial nature and the sort of general control vested in the
(a) Who can claim exemptions- The protection of the Minister was not sufficient to render the corporation a servant
rule is available in England to three classes of persons : of the Crown Similarly in British Broad-Casting Corporation
v. Johns.1 The B.B.C. was not treated as a servant or agent of
(i) The Sovereign the crown as broadcasting was not a govermental function.
(ii) Servants or agents of the Crown acting in the
course of employment (b) Conditions of Non-Availability
(iii) Persons who, though they are no.t strictly speaking Statutes can bind the Crown in two class of cases. First,
servants or agents of the Crown, are for limited where the statute expressly refers to the Crown. Secondly,
purposes considered similar to them. where there is a manifest intention to iilclude the Crown. The
In the third class are included such persons who are implication can arise a from the language of. the Statute. Thus
independent of the control of the Crown. They perform regal in Stewart v. Conservators of River Thames/ the statute
or governmental functions such as administration of justice which exempted from imposition of all taxes was considered
and maintenance of law and order. Thus in Mersey Docks v. to bind the Crown by necessary implication.
Camero~1 it was held that where property was occupied for TJ:epresumpti~n has come in for severe criticism by
a public purpose fa11ing within the province of govermental modem JuriSts. Glanville Williams has rather gone to the
functions the occupires would be considered a servant. of the extent of stating that in view of the extension in ambit ui state
Ct0\\.'1\.. The rationale of the rule is that the activities of such functions in contemporary society the presumption should be
angencies are such as fall within the province of govermental that the Crown is bound by a statute.3
functions. The nature of functions and not the control exercised
by the crown is the criterion for exemption.
3. APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN INDIA
The Principle laid down in Mersey Docks case has · ~p to 1_967, it was. considered that the presumption of
been followed in later cases. Thus Justice of Peace,2 Custodian Crown. :unmuru~ was avail~ble to the state in this country also.
of Enemy Property} Army drivers,4 and the AssoCiation The Pnvy Co~cil had applied the rule to the interpretation of
for raising a Territorial Armf have been considered to be statutes m Indta. The Bombay Municipal Act 1888, authorised
similar to servants of the Crown asthey perform govermental the commissioners to carry water pipes under and land. It
functions. was held by the Bombay High Court to apply to government
owned lands also. The court held that the legislation could
In Tamlin v. Hannaford,6 that inununity was claimed
.not operate with reasonable efficiency if such lands were
for the Transport Commission. This Commission was created excluded.
under the Transport Act 1947, and was under the general
The Pri~ Council over ruled it in Bombay Province v.
1. (1865) 11 H.L.C. 443
2 Coomber v. Berkshire Justice,(1883) 9 A.C. 61
Bombay Corp. holding that the Crown could not be bound by
3. Bank Voor Handel v. Hungarian Adm., (1954) 1 All E.R. U69 1. (1964) 1 All E.R. 923
4. Cooper v. Hawkins (1901) 2 KB. 164 2 (1908) 1 K.B. 893 •
5. londo n Territorial Association v. Nichols, (1948) 2 A. 11 E.R. 157. 3. Williams : Crown Proceedings Act 187
6. (1949) 2 All E.R 3'Zl 4. A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1355
•
Application of Statutes to State
•
151
In Supdt. & L.R. of State of West Bengal v. Corporation
of Calcutta,1 a full bench of the Supreme Court reconsidered
150 Interpretation of Statutes the position. A majority held presumption in respect of crown
immunity is not available iri India. Chief Justice Subba Rao
a statute except where such an inference was either expressly has given three reasons :
provided or had to be necessarily implied. . (i) The presumption is a part of the common law of
The Supreme Court considere~ the qu.estion of England It is not a rule of substantive law but merely
rule for the first time. InDuedor of a principle of construction and cannot as such fall
aw~oo li ti Of this . 1
Rationing and Disbibution v. Corporation ~~ Calcutta. within Art. 372. It can not be said to be 'law in fore~'
Here the question was whether a sta~te requmng p~rsons at the commencement of the Constitution
storing rice to obtain a licence was applicable to the Duector
(ii) The principle has not been applied to large areas
who was storing such grains on behalf of the Government of in this country. The arious ·high court decisions
West Bengal. A majority of the ~upr~e Com:t considered turned principally on the terms ot the statute.
that the rule relating to presumption of unmuruty of Crown
was recognised in this country also and was applicable to (iii)Finally, in his !opinion there are many reasons for
the State even after the commencement of the Constitution. which the rule should not be adopted : It has not
become the law of land. It is against the rule of
It held that the Director was entitled to claim immunity as he
law. It will introduce conflict and discrimination.
was performing. sovereign functions. Wanchoo J., howe~er,
entered a strong diss~t in this case. He observed that m a . ~rhus it lvas held tha ~ the rule of construction presuming
country where the rule of law prevailed the State as well as lliUI\umty of the state c.f the state should not be applied for
citizens should be bound by the la~. No one was above the conshuing statutes in India.
law and should not be presumed to be so. Shah J. dissented from th~ majority opinion particularly
The rule in Director of Rationing case was followed on the ground that the rule on construction excluding the
in later La.ses.The cotrrts drew a distinction between sovereign Cro~ had been recieved this country as early as 1726 and
(regal) and non-sovereign functions. In many cases it was has smce become a part of the 'law inforce' at the time of the
•
held that the presumption did not arise ~here what was commencement of the Constitution and is continued under
being performed on behalf of the statue was not a .•regal th~ Consti~tion by virtue of Art. 372. Finally shah J. disagreed
function. InState of Bombay v. Hospital Majdoor Sabha,2 With the vtew that the principle resulted in diserimination.
the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, was considered applicable The rule laid down in the Legal Remembrancer case
to State maintained Hospitals. In this case the Supreme was affirmed unanilnously in Union of India. v. Jubbi.2 There
Court has held that sovereign function are such functions as the question was whether the tenanst of lands held by Union
no private citizen coundertake, and the presumption would of India in the State of Himachal Pradesh can claim the benefit
be available only in respect of such functions. Again, in of the Big Landed Estatesaand Land Reforms Act 1953. It was
Union of India v. Ladu Lal Jain.3 The Supreme Court held contended that the statute did not bind the state as it was
that the state was bound by the Civil Procedure Code. It not expressly made applicable to it. The statute conferred the
distinguished the Director's case on the ground that that case s~atus of ~privileged tenants' on tenants occuping land for a
related to sovereign functions of the state. The availability of gtven penod.
the presumption in respect of commercial activities was not 1. A.l.~. (1966) 1 S.C. 997
considered the reat. 2 A.I.R. (1968) 1 S.C. 360
1. A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1355
2 A.LR. 1960 S.C. 610 •
3. AJ.K 1963 S.C. 1681
152 Interpretation of Statutes •
The Court held:
The hormal construction that an
enactatent applies to citizens as well
as to the State unless it expressly or by
necessary implication exempted the State Chapter 14
from its operation, steered clear of all
the anamolies and is consistent with the
phillosophy of equality enshrined in the Special Features of
Constitution. The position now, therefore,
is that a statute applied to state as it
Constitutional Interpretation
does to a citizen unless it expressly or by •
necessary implication exempts the state
1. Doctrine of Liberal Interpretation
from its operation.
The Court analysed the statute holding that the 2. Doctrine of Progaressive Interpretation
paramount object of the statute is to abolish big landed 3. Construction ut res magis
estates and alleviate the conditions of the occupancy tenants 4. Mandatory and Directory Provisjons
by conferring on them preprietary rifhts. In this c"ntext it 5. Doctrine of Pith and Substance
would be difficult to assume that it soughtto exempt the state 6. Doctrine of Colourable Legislation
and discriminate between tenants of the Union of India and
tenants of individuals. Therefore, it can be taken as settled 7. Doctrine of Implied Powers
that a statute in India is applicable to a State unless the same · 8. Directive Principles as an Aid to Interpretation
.
is excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Such. A written canstitution shares with statutes the general
necessary implication may arise in those cases where the terms principles of ir.:erpretation. However, certain features of
of the statute are such that it can not be meant to apply to the contitutional interpretaion required special consideration.
state, e.g. A Statute which provide only imprisonment as a
penalty as it does not prima fade apply to the State becuase the 1. THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
State cannot be imprisoned. But there imprisonment is only an The Constitution is not to be interpreted in any narrow
alternative sentence, there would be no necessary implication or pedantic manner. Marshal C.J. of the U.S. Supreme Court,
exempting the State. This in t."le Legal Remembrancer case has observed in the famous case of Mcculloh v. Maryland}
the Supreme Court held that asS. 218 of the Municipal Act that it must never the forgotten that it is a constitution that is
1951 provided imprisonment as a penalty. It was therefore being expounded. In the same way the Privy Council has held
implicity not applicable to the State. in A.G. for ontario v. A.G. for Canada} that in interpreting
Similarly where the penalty is a fine which goes to th~ British North Atnerica Act, which is a constituent or
state treasury it can be inferred that it does not apply to the organic statute, the construction which iq most bE>nificial to the •
State because it .:annot be assumed that the statute provided widest amplitude of powers must be adopted. TI'e Australian
for the ridiculous thing that the state should pay itself.
1. (1819) 4 Wheaton 316
2 (1912) A.C. 571
OClO
High Court has observed in A.G. tor
Ne~ S?uth Wa.les v.
Brewery Employees Association, that ~. mterpr~tin~ a
Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation 155
in it. In State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara,l the Supreme Court
constitution the Court must remember that 1t lS a cons~tution,
a mechanism under which laws are to be made and lS not. a has observed that the most liberal construction should be
mere Act which declares what the law is. The Federal Court m put upon the l-vords, so tht the same n1ay have the widest
India has exten.ied the same approach to the interpretatio~ of amplitude. In Navin Chandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner
the Government of India Act, 1935 in Re C.P. Motor Taxation of Income Tax,2 the Supreme Court refused to confine the
Act} It has also been adopted by our Supreme Court. meaning of the word 'income' to the sense given to it in British
legislative practice, and held that the word 'income' would
The contrast between statutory and constitutional
include capital gains in item 54 of List of the Constitution.
interpretation is most effectively brought out in the following
observation of Viscount Sankey in Edwards v. Attorney (b) Use of Extrinsic Aids
General3: In Constitutional interpretation comparatively greater
There are statutes andstatutes, and strict reliance is placed on travaux prepratories. In Gopalan's
construction deemed proper in the case Case} Kania C.J. took into account the report of the drafting
for example, of a penal or taxing statute committee of the Constituent Assembly in interpreting the
or one passed to regulate the affairse word 'personal liberty' in Art. 21 In K.K. Kochuni v. State
of an English parish, would be often of Madras,4 Subbarao J. took into account the Statement
subversive of Parliaments real intent if of Objects and Reasons of the Fourth Amedment to the
applied to (a constitution). ., Constitution in construing Art. 31 A of the Constitution
A Spirit of liberal interpre~tion infuses judicial to confine its protec~tion to agrarian reform legislation. In
construction of constitutional instruments. Many Sundramari¥ Co. v. Andhra Pradesh,5 the Supreme Court
manifestations of it are to be found in the judicial attitude. A took into account the history of the provisions in interpreting
few examples will be enough to bring point home. Art 286. In 'the recent case, Keshava Nand Bharti v. State of
(a) Interpretation of Legislative Entries
• Kerala,6 the most extensive use has been made extrinsic aids
and legislative history. However, lip service is paid to the rule
The entries in the various lists of Sechedule YII of
that the aids are not be referred to determine the meaning of
the Constitution are not definitions of the power,. but are
an expression but only its context.
only names of subjects assigned to a legislature. The pow.e r
conferred by them is considered plenary in its quality. For this (c) Use of Intrinsic Aids
reason the entries are construed liberally. As in case of extrinsic aids so also in the case of
Thus it has been held that the items in the legislative intrinsic aids, the Courts place greater reliru.,ce an intrinsic
lists in the Vll schedule of the Constitution must not be aids in constitutional interpretation. Thus, use has been made
interpreted in a narrow or restricted sense. Each general word of marginal note in the Golak Nath case/ in construing Art.
should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters
which can fa....Uy and reasonably be said to be comprehended 1. AJ.R. 1951 S.C. 318
2 A.LR. 1955 S.C. 58 •
1. (1908) 6 C.LR. 469 •
3. A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 27
2 AJ R. 1939 P.C. 1 •
4. A.l.R. 1960 S.C. 1080
3. (1930) A.C. 124
.. 5. A.LR. 1958 S.C. 468
Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs 6. A.LR. (1973) 2 S .C. 1462
7. A.I.R. (1967) 2 S.C. 1643
156 Jnterpretation of Statutes
has ~alle~ it the docbine of generic in terpretation. More
368 of the Constitution. The Preamble to the Constitution has ~orestght:m. the ~ture of !judicial statemenship is required
been u sed in R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, by the Su.pr~e
1
m constitutional mterpretation. The Courts must consider
Court to hold that in a polity conunitted to the r~ahzation the P.olicy implica~~ns of the proposed construction of any
of those great ideals gambling could not b~ constdered to constitutional provtston and must look back to its meaning at
constitute ' trade' within the meaning ·of Art. 19(1) (g) of the the time of the adoption of the constitution.
Constitution. In State of Madras v. Ganon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.}
(d ) While the courts have used the principles of
~e Suprex_ne Court reco~ed the doctrine of progressive
ejusdem generis or Noscitor a sociis at ~es in. inte~reting
mterpret~tion. However, 1t held that the expression 'sale
the Constitution their use is generally avotded. It ts constdered
of goods had . a well settled meaning' in legislative usage
that this is contrary to the principle of liberal interprestati0n.
and must be gtven the same meaning in Entry 48 of List II
In State of West Bengal v. S.S. Baitley)~ the Supreme Court ". enk atr~a Aiyar
.
applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to interprettion of J. observed that the doctrine of progressive.
~terpreta~ton ?nly meant that the changing circumstances
the terms 'rights, liabilities and obligations' in Art. 9 of India
illustrate illummate the full import of the words. It did not
Indept.~dence Order, 1947.
alter the meaning of a word.
The principle of liberal interpretation is, however, not
lo be used to interpret the Constitution in the light of any so 3. CONSTRUCTION Uf RES MAGIS
call~d spirit or tl.cory c' constitution. Thus in State of Bihar The Constitution is to be read as a whole and is to
~·. Kameshwar Singh/ ~c Supreme Court denie~ an appeal be made workable. The ut res magis V~leat ~ua.mpereat
n~de tv it in the name 01 tlle spir) of the Constitution. N ever
rule applied with equal if not greater force to constitutional
fut- I~, in construing the Constitutit)~, regard must be ba d interpretation. The Supreme Court in Golanknath case} has
of the ideals- informir.g it Thus it has ce-en held in R.M.D.C.
frowned upcn the tendency to treat Articles, ca1d at times
case that in vrew of the lofty ideals of Constitution gambling even clauses of certain Articles, as complete and exhaustive
cannot be regarded as a trade. Codes. Each provision of the Constitution must be read in the
2. THE DOCTRINE OF PROGRESSIVE
•4
context of the whole of the document.
INTERPRETATION . Thus in Re. C.P. and Berar Motor spirit Taxation, 3
A Constitution is not a transient document. It is desi case the Federal Court limited the meaning of ' Excise' in List
to last a long time. The ordinary rule of interpretation that I to ~n1~ tax on 'n1anufacture or production of goods' because
terms of a statute must be ~ven the same meaning as had to gxve It an extensive m eaning w ould seriously jeopardise the
at the time when the statute w as made, has n o application power of the provinces to impose tax on sale of goods.
to it Though the terms of the Constituticn do not under go In Devau Temple Case,4 the conflict between the
any ~ange and the nature of the grant of power must always proviso to ~rt. 25 (2) and Art. 26 was harmonized by excluding
remam ~e same, the extent and ambit of the · power may the operation of the former on occasions of d enominational
grow \o\TJt.h the progress of civilization so as to include such significance.
developments as may occur from time to time. Prof. Wynes
1
-
A.LR. 19:>/ S.C. 82
1.
2
A l R. 1258 S.C. 560
supra n. 10
•
2 AJ.R 195-l S.C. 193 3. supra n. 4

•
3. A.LR. 1952 S.C. 252 4.
_____________·, Find More at https://t.me/LawCollegeNotes_Stuffs
•

be doubts are likely to arise about their ambit and scope and
158 Interpretation of Statutes some amount of conflict and overlapping is inevitable.
In the Searchlight case,1 conflict between Arts. 19~1) . The courts have realised that different aspects of life
(a) and 194 (3) was resolved by treating the later as a ~p~1al in a society are not so isolated from one another as to make
provision and giving it precedence in ~tters of publication possible a mechnical application of the division of powers.
of the proceedings of the Houses of Legtslature. In case of conflict the courts apply the doctrine of ~ith and
4. NO DISTINCTION TO BE DRAWN BE1WEEN Substance to determine the validity of the legislation.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISION The doctine of pith and substance means that if an
Since the Constitution is the fundamental law of the enactment substantially falls within the legislative powers
land the general view is that its provisions should be regarded expressly conferred by the Constitution on a legislature, the
. as mandatory wherever such construction is possible. ~rofi enactment will not be held invalid merely because it incidently
Cooley, Prof. wynes and other writers are of. ~e same. vtew. encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. In other
However, in every constitution there are pvosxvtons which can words, it means that the vires of a legislation must be made
not be judicially enforced. In their case perhaps the distinction dependent on the true mture and character of the legislation.
between mandatory and directory may be relevant. A legislation is not invalid merely because it incidently affects
In interpreting the Indian Constitution, the Supreme a matter out side the authorised sphere of the legislature
Court has made a distinction in some cases between mandatory which made it. Where the legislature is empowered to make
and directory provisions. This in State of U.P. v. Man-Bodhlal a law in respect of prevention of contagious diseases, a law
Shrivastava,3 it was held that the provisions of cq,nsultation providing certain precautions for the protection of the health
with the public service commission in Art. 320(3) are directory. of the people from dangers arising out of a unregulated
Similarlyin State of Punjab v. Satpal Dang,4 it was held that supply of milk is valid even though it may have the affect
the provisions r~ating to certification the speaker of a money of totally stopping the milk trade. In Gallagher v. Lynn} the
bill were only directory. Privy Council held that law of the aforesaid nature was in
Thus it is clear that ·while the basic p1inciples of pith and substance a law relating to· public health.
stab.ltory construction apply to constitutional interpretation
The doctrine of pith and substance has been developed
they acqurred in the process a depth and aspect quite fore~g
by the Privy Council basically with reference to the Canadian
to statutory construction.
Constitution. It was used for the first time in Russel v. Queen}
5. THE DOCTIUNE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE where the Privy Council observed that the true mature and
Where the constitutional document divides powers (as character of the legislation in the particular instance under
happens in a federal constitution) among legislatures having discussion must always be determined in order to ascertain
p lenary powers, it is inevitable that questions regarding of the class or subject to which it realy belonged.
tency of such legislatures t..; make particular laws arise for This doctrine has been extended by the Privy Council
determination. However, exhaustive the enumerations may to interpreatation of the Australian Constitution as well as to
the Government of India Act, 1935. •
1. ~ 15.~1.Sharma v. S.K. Sinha, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 395
2 Cooley: Constitutional Limitations 1. (1937) A.C. 863
Wynes : Legi3lative Exl-utive and Judicial powers in Australia, 2 (1882) 7 A.C. 863
3. A l.R. 1957 S C. 912
4. A.LR 1969 S.C. 908
•
• Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation 161
lnterpretaUon of Statutes The principle has been applied by our Supreme Court
160 b th Federal Court
in in~!::e~:.:.A%t;~~.yln ;ubramaniayan to the mterpretation of the distribution of the legislative
powers under the Constitution. In State of Bombay v. F.N.
Balsara,1 the State legislation imposing prohibition on sale,
MuttuswanL the court obserVed· . e to storage or consumption of liquor was held valid even though
It must inevitably happen from tim .
time that legislation though rurporting in respect of foreign liquor it incidently encroached ppon the
d 1 .th a subject in one list touches power of the Parliament to make law with respect to imports.
~~':subject in another list and the In order to determine the pith and substance of an
different provisions of the ~actment enactment several tests have been formulated. The foremost
be so drearly inter twmed that consideration is the purpose of object of the legislation as
:!d adherence to a strictly verbal distinguished from its effect'i. In Kishori v. The King,2 the
interpretation would result in ~ lar~e Federal Court has held that object of the regislation is this
number of statutes being declared mvalid context means the point of view of the legislature in making
····· hence the rule has been developed the Act. It must be ascertained on a consideration of the entire
by the judicial Committee where by provisions of the Act. The title of the state is not conclusive.
the impugned statute is examin~ to as
In Huddart Parker v. The Conunon Wealth} the Privy
certain its pith and substance or Its true
council has held, that the validity of the Act does not depenu
nature and character for the p~ose .of
on the label it ~ears. In Amarsingh v. State of Rajasthan,4
determining whether it .is ~egisla.tion w;th •
espect to matters in this list or m that. a law providing for esumpiion of jageers was held by the
Th~e observations of. Gwyer C.J. were quoted ~th Supreme Court to be a law relating to acquisition of property
even though it was callled 'Resupmption of Jageers Act'.
. Prafulla Kumar v Bank of Commerce, Khulna. In
~r~: ~e Court was considering the validity of the Bengal The object of the legislation must be distinguished
Money Lenders Act, 1940. This Act regulated the amount of from its socio-economic effect. Thus in A. G. for Saskatchewan
interest and principal recoverable bY_ a mo~ey lende: on lo~. v. A.G. for Canada,5 the Privy Council refused to consider a
'~foney lending' was an item in LISt n m resp~t of ~hi~h · law regulating the rate of interest on agricultural loans as a
only provincial legislatures co.ul~ make law. Prom:ssory law relating to agriculture even though it has shown that the
notes were, however, included m Item 28 of Federal List, on law was beneficial to farmers.
which only was Federal Legislature could have made law. Where the law relates in pith and substance to a matter
Therefore, it was argued that the Act, in so fa: as it affected fa1Iing within the competence of the legislature its incidental
money lending by promissory notes was ultravu:s the Ben?al encroachment on a matter not included within its competence
legislature because it enchroached on the federal hst The Pnvy does not invalidate the law. In Krishna. v. State of Madras,6
Council held that in pith and substance the subject matter of the Supreme Court has held that the degree of invasion is not
the law was money-lending and its incidental encroachment
on a matter in the federal list would not invalidate the law. 1. supra n. Sa
•
The court also took into consideration the fact that to exempt 2. (1949) F.C.R. 650
money leanding by promissory notes might defeat the purpose 3. (1931) 44 C.L R. 492
-l. Alii 1955 ~.L. 9.'1
of tt 2 Act. 5. (1949) A.C. 110
1. (1940) F.C.R 188. 6. A.I.R. 1956 Madras 368
2. Al.R.. 1947 P.C. 60
~--
'
-·
162 Interpretation of Statutes -
case the legislature 'had increased the amount of agricultural
decisive. It may be one of the elements in determining the real
income ~ with retrospective effect. It was argued that that
object of the legisiation. was done. to .reduce the amount of compensation to be paid
In determining the pith and substance regard must also to ex-zarmndars. The court held that even if that was so, the
be had not only of the object of the enactment but also of the law was not made in colourable exercise of power since the
means which are adopted to achieve that object. In Rallaram legislature undoubtedly had the power to make such a law.
v. East Punjab,1 the Federal Court did take in to ac~ou:'t
. The doctrine of colourable legislation essentially
the means adopted by the legislature. There the provmaal
legislature had imposed a text on property in Urban are~s applies .to th~se cases where a legislature has limited powers.
which was to be calculated on the basis of annual value of the where tt legtslates on a matter not within the scope of its
competence the power is said to be exercised colourably.
property. It was held by the Court that the tax was not tax on
income as it did not take into account the actual income Had In state of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh} the question
the law done so, it would have been invalid because taxation was whether the legislature of Bihar could make a law
on income was a matter beyond the competence of provincial ac~uiring ~roperty of Zamindars and laying down principles
legislature. with a destgn to reduce the amount of payable compensation.
In Tikaramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh} a statute Ss. 4(5) and 23(£) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, provided
enacted by the state legislature to regulate supply of. sugar for deduction of half of the arrears of rent and cost of works
cane to sugar mills was considered by the Supreme Court of ben~t in determinin~ compensation. The Supreme Court
to deal with 'production and sitribution of goods' on which held smce these deductions had no corelation with actual
the legislature had the power to make law. Its incidental expenses or arrears, the legislation was a colourable exercise
encroachment on sugar industry, which was a topic for of power.
exclusive fedrallegislature. In K.T. Moppil Nair v. State of Kerala 2 the Kerala
legislature had made a law imposing a unifo~ tax of Rs.
6. DOCfRINE OF COLOURABLE LEGISLATION 2/- per annum per acre. It was much in excess of the annual
The doctrine of colouable legislation means that a income froin such lands. The inevitable result of such taxation
legislature with limited po\\7ers cannot, under the guise or . would be confiscation of lands. The Court has h eld that the
pretence of excercise of its own powers carryout objects which powe.r to tax is not a poWer to destroy and cannot be so
are beyond its powers. It is based on teh maxim that what exercised at to cause confiscation of property.
cannot be done direectly cannot also be done indirectly. Any · . In Jaora .sugar Mills v. State of Madhya Pradesh,J
legislation ostensibly made in exercise of a power conferred certam state legtslatures had enacted laws to impose a cess
by the Constitution but in truth and fact not falling within on sugar came supply to sugar mills. These laws were
the content of that power is a colourable legislation. InGajpati held ultravires the stte legislature by the Supreme Court.
Narain Deo v. State of Orissa,3 our Supreme Court has held There after, the Parliament enacted a statute to validate the
that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve ~positions retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that tllis
~y question about the intention of the tegislature. If it did not amount to a colour able exercise of power since the
IS competent to pass a law, the same would not be invalid
validation was witltin the competence of the Parliament It fell
rnarely because of the bad intention of the legislature. In this within the residuary powers. .
1. (1948) F.CR. 2f1J 1. supra n. 12a •
2 A.LR. 1956 S.C. 676 2. A.J.R. 1961 S.C. 252
3. A.LR. 1953 S.C. 375 3. A.LR. (1966) 1 S.C. 416
•
.
•
•
164 Interpretation of Statutes Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation 165

Thus the doctrine of colourable legislation is ~ssential~y · Ramkrishna v. Municipal Committee,1 the Supreme Court
a doctrine of legislative competence. H the legtslature IS held that the doctrine had no application to the Indian
competent to enact of law, the enactment can never be Constitution, and could not be used to augment the powers of
considered to constitute a colourable exercise of power· one legislature at the expense of another.
7. DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED POWERS The rejection of the doctrine of implied powers in
The doctrine of implied powers is ?ased on ~e n1~ the domain of constitutional interpretation in India does noi
Quands lex aliquid concedit cenceder v1de turet illud sme however, mean that the legislative powers are to construed
quo res ipsa ease n on potest. This means 'who ever grants a in any narrow or pendantic sense. As has already been n ot
thing is deemed also to grant all that without which the grant in connection with the doctrine of liberal construction to the
itseU would be of no effect'.
Constitution, the various entreis in the legislative are to be
As a maxim of interpretation of the constitution it construed so as to include all that is incidently and ancillary
to the exercise of such powers. The legislatures have aplenary
has been frequently u sed in United States and has resulted
in vast expansion of the powers of the federal government. power to legislate on the items contain in tlle respective lists.
In Mculloh v. Maryland,1 th e question was whether the They include everythings necessary for the exercise of the
Congress has the power to incorporate .a ~· Banking was power. Thus in Edward Mills Co. te of Ajmer,2 the Suprem e
not an item enun1erated among the legtslative powers of the Court held that the power to make law included the p ower to
Congress. However, Congress was given the power to make delegate to the executive power to make rules.
laws 'necessary and proper' for the execution of the legislative The doctrine of implied powers has also application in
pm•:ers of the Congress. The U5. Supreme Court reliea on statutory interpretation. Where a duty is imposed or a wer
this (:lause to hold that establishment of a bank was w ithin is conferred on an authority by a statute, it is assure that all
the powers of the Congress. Chief Justice Marshall observed auxiliary and incidental powers necessary for the discharge
: 'Let the end be legistimate. Let it be within the scope of the of such duty or exercise of such power, are also granted. The
constitution, and all means which are appropirate, which criterion for this grant is that the existed of the incidental
are plainlt adopted to that end, which are not prohibited power should be so necessary that in it absense the grant itself
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitutiol}~ are would be a dead letter.
constitutional. Thus in B.B.L. & T. Merchants Association v. State
The Mcculloh case formed the cornerstone of later of Bombay,3 the Supreme Court held that the p ower to five
extension of federal legislative powers. The U.S. Supreme percentage of rejection of bidis could not be implied in p ower
Court further held in United States v. Fishers} that they to fix minimum wage for bidi workers. The reasons that
Congress could make a law in exercise of the ' necessary and without the former p ower also the later could be ensed .
impllied' powers not only where such law was 'indispensible
but also where the exercise of such power was 'conducive' to 8. DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AS AN AID IN
the making of laws an enumerated subject. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The doctrine of implied powers h as however little (a) The Directives
a,r~lication to a constitution like ours which meticulously
Part IV of the Constitution enumerates certain
divtded powers between the Centre and the States. Thus in
1.
2
supra n. 1
2 Cranch 358
...
principles under the h eadirig 'Directive Principles of State
1. ALR. 1950 S.C. 11
2 A.LR. 1955 S.C. 25
'
.
•
3. A.J.R. 1%2 S.C. 486
. enforceable through, courts Spe(ial Features of Constitutional Interpretation 167
Policy' These prinoples are not f th
· , fund ental in the goverance o e (b) Statu~ and Role of the Directives
:~. =e;~:n:::s upo~e State the duty to apply these The directives are not mere ornamental surplusage or
principles in makeing laws. political slogans. It is true that the do not confer legal rights it
The Directive Principles encompass v~o~s aspects of legal rights be take in the narrow sense of rights enforceable
.
soo~nomtc
. life and can be conveniently dtVIded m three through Courts. Nevertheless, they are meant to and do impose
groups: duties on the State. The duties are not enforceable. through
(i) A large number of the directives e~visage r~org Courts, but are not for that reason devoid of all sanction.
anization of the economy on prinoples o~'?ously The demand for fundamental rights in this country
drawn from the liberal humanitanantrad!tion of during the British rule had both a positive and negative
litical philosophy. In this groupfa~ Articles .38, dimension. The plitical parties not only sought guarantees of
~ 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, and 47re~~ectivel~ dealing non-interference against the state, but. also canvassed the need
with the duties to promotea sooa1 order informed to impose particular obligations on the State for the common
by social and economicjustice (Art. 38), ass~e good. In fact the positive dimension was ptore predominant.
a distribution of materialresources and avotd It constituted a serious stumbling block during negotiations
concentration of wealth tosubserve common with the British dwing the thirties.
good (Art 39(b) and (c), assureadequate means The framers of the Constitution were almost unanimous
of livelihood. Art 39(a), equal payfor equ~ work about the desirability of imposing certain postitive obligations
(Art 39(d), avoid exploitation ofall and particularly on the State. They howe\1·.2r hesitated about the enforceability
the young, arising out of want(Art. 39(e)., and of such obligations through law courts particularly because
(f), assure right to work, educationand. public the perfom1ance of ::!Uch obligations needed vast resources.
assistance for unemployed Art. (41),secure JUSt and The Framers were afraid that the resources-might not be
human conditions of work (Art. 42),secure a living available. The problem was solved by the Sub-Committee
\\rage Art. 43, secure free andcompulsory education on Fundamental Rights by adopting a distinction between
for children (Art. 45),promote educational and • justiciable and non-justiciable fundamental rights. The later
economic interests ofweaker seetions of the ca:ne to be labelled Directive Principles by the Drafting
Community (Art. 46), raisethe level of nutrition, Committee. Thus th~re was envisaged by the Framers an
and statndard of living andpromote public health intrinsic unlty and has mony amon the Fundamental Rights
(Act. 47), . and the Directive Principles.
(ii) A few directives are specially designed to The Courts however failed to realize the close relating
perpetuate the traditional ideals of this country between fundamental rights and directive principles. In State
imposing duties to strive for organization of village of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorariranjnam,1 the Supreme
panchayats (Art 40), peohibit slaughter of cows, Court held that the Directive Principles were to conforme and
calves and other milch cattle (Art. 48), and protect run subsidiary to fundamaental rights.
monuments and objects of national importance. This finding of the Supreme Court had an essentially
(iii) A small group of directives seek to serve the ideal limited character. It must be read in the light of the face
of a State organized on the principles of equality of the case. The State of Madras had fixed the perecntage
and rule of law, and imposes the duty to secure a seats a for each community in professional · colleges. This
uniform civil code, (Art. 50) ; security (Art. 51). challanged on the ground that it offended against .Art. 290 •
of the Constitution. Theat clause guaranteed a fundamental
1. A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 226
Special r e4ftures of Constitutional Interpretation 169
Interpretation of Statutes
168
The 25th An1endment to the Constitution gave primacy
. ht gainst discrimination on grounds of caste in matters of
~~~~~i~on to state aided educational institutions. ~e State to directive" principles contained the Art. 39(b) & (c) over the
fundamental rights in Arts. 14, 19 & 31.
posed the tition on the ground that the reservation ~as
~de to pro~te the educational interessts.of ~eaka: ~tion
0 The 42nd amendment to the Constitution adding Art.
of lthe community in accordance with the dll'ectiv~ prmc1ples. 31 C increcases greatly the value of directive princirles in
Thus there \Vas a dirct conflict between two. pro~10~ o~ the so far as it saves any law made in implementation .t hereof
Constitution as fundamental right and a ~ectiye p~clple. from being declared void for contravention of fundamental
The Court harmonized it by reducing the dir~tive pnnaple rights contained in Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
to the level of subservience of fundamen~ ~g~t. In domg It substitutes for subservience laid down in the Champakam
this it was undoubtedly influenced by the u1stifiaa?le nature case, a limit 'ascendancy' of directive principles over certain
of fundamental rights. However, the myop1c rea~g of the fundamental rights.
Court injured the basic unity of Cle Fundamental Rights and · The 45th Constituion Amending Act seeks to limit this
the Directive Principles. overriding effect to Art. 39(b) & (c). ,
The Rule laid in Champakan case was reiterated again
and again. With the passage of time court realize~ ~e its (c) Value of Directive in Interpretation of Constituion
observations in that the case has discounted the credibility of The directive principles are part of the text of the
Directive Principles. In later cases the Supreme Court ~as ~ed Constitution. And like a statute the Constitution has to be
to confine its observations inChampkam case to situations read as a \Vhole. Wherever the language is ambiguous, resort
·w here irresoluble conflicts existed between fundamental can be had to the directive principles to determine the intent
rights and a directive principles. • of the Framers of the Constitution.
h1 Re : Kerala Education Bill,1 the Supreme Court This use of the directive principles is illus treated by
held that the courts .c ould not entirely ignore the directive a nwnher of cases, and three aspect of it have come to fore :
principles in determining the scope and ambit of fundamental (d) Directives as guide to scope of Fundamental Rights
1
rights. The Courts should rather adopt the principle of
harmonious construction and should attempt to give affect to Reliance has been frequently placed on directive
principles to determine the scope of 'fundamental rights.
both as much as possible'. ••
The rule in Champakm case still floats up occa~ionally In State of Bihar v. Kamesh\-'lar Singh} the Supreme
as for instance in the Golaknath,2 case, where the majority Court referred to the directive principles to construe the
1
considered that the directive principles ought to be implemented entession public purpose' in Art. 31 and held that acquis of
only in a way as did not offend against the guarantee of zamindari being made to implement the directives ce in Art.
fundamental rights. However, the complementary character 39 (b) & (c) was for a public purpose.
of directive principles is well settied, e.g. in C.B. Boarding & In Bijay Cotton Mills v. State of Ajmcr/ the held
Lodging House v. State of Mysore,3 the Supreme Court has that the directive principles constitute a rel consideration in
observed that on the ·whole there is no conflict between the determining 'vhether a restriction law was in the interest of
provisions contained in Part ill and IV of the Constitution and the general public. In that the court h eld that -1 law made
they are complementary and supplementary to each other'. . to implement the direct secure . a living wage to all, was in
the interst of public witlrin the meanmg of Art. 19(6) of the
1. AJ.R 1958 S.C. 956
Constitutes.
2. supra n. 10 1. supra n. 34
3. AJ.R. 1970 S.C. 2042 2 A.l.R. 1955 S.C. 33
•
•
.
•
•
uo ~pEetalion of Statutes
ti\ R.M..D. v. Union of India,1 the •
Coull hM held that a law DU\de to implement directive
a teaSQDable reatxiction within the meaning of
19(6).
OJ) Dilectives as Aid in Determining meaning of expres
ill tlti CoDStitatioo
The dilec:tive principles can also be referred to Courts
ill 61\ding out the meaning of expression used Constitution in
provisions other than those dealing who fundamental rights.
. In State of West Bengal v.. N.N. Bagohi,2 the Court
to the directive relating to separation of executive from the
•
Judidary to construe the texnt'control' in It held that 'Control'
must be considered to include on disciplinary matters so as
to secure independence ciary (rom executive interference, and
ensure separative executive from the judiciary as envisaged in
Art 50.
(c) Directives as aid in determining the scope of legislative
power •
Since the directive principle enjoin duties upon statute,
they constitute important refrents in considred the scope of
legislative powers. Of · course, as held F.N.Balsara case} •
they cannot be used to create legislative power where the
Constitution denies it, but they are relevant in determining
the ambit of the various entri the legislative lists.
••
Thus, in the Balsara Case, the Supreme Court r~fe to
Art 47, to hold that 'liquor' in Ent 8 of List II, in not confined
to alcholic drinks generally used as a liquid but also included ·
any liquid containing alchoL
[J[J[J
•
1. supra n. 11 • .• .
2. supra n. 5 a
3. A.I.R. (1966) 1 S.C. W
•
•

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Narendra Dev

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University Book House Pvt. Ltd., Jaipur

The subject entitled 'Interpretation of Statutes' can shortly

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• convicted after the expiry of such period even though the

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These obser9atio~ of Lord Coke though made at a

32 Interpretation oi Statutes Literal Rule: Meaning of Words 33

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meant to apply to both the antecedents.

40 ln~erpretation of Statutes l it~ral Rule: Meaning of Words 41

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SO Interpretation of Statutes · The Leteral Rule: General Principles 51

52 Interpretation of Statutes The Leteral Rule: General Principles 53

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However, in ·England marginal notes have been

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66 Interpretation of Statutes Intrinsic Aids to Interpretation 67

1. AlR 1944 P.C. 71 1. Crawford, Loc. cit., 891

purpose and rationale of the enactment. As a matter of

72 Interpretation of Statutes Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 73

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84 Interpretation of Statutes Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation 85

1. MANDATORY AND DffiECTORY Er~ACTMENTS­

1. (1945) 1 KB. 838 2. ATI"ITUDE OF THE COURTS

.. . . Mandatory and Directory Statutes ... 91

from the decisional law. (b) 'May' as 'Must'

104 ·· · Interpretation of Statutes Commencement and Operation of Statutes 105

the existing s tate of law is u sually held to be retrespective

108 Interpretation of Statutes

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1. (1046) 1 All E.R. 255

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. . . E~~ where a mental element is required vicarious

The application of these principles is illus-:rat~d ~Y. cases .

involving difftrent formula for exclusion of the JUriSdiction of

2 AJ.R 195-l S.C. 193 3. supra n. 4

Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation 159

164 Interpretation of Statutes Special Features of Constitutional Interpretation 165

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1. MANDATORY AND DffiECTORY Er~ACTMENTS