Mcleod Vs NLRC
Mcleod Vs NLRC
Mcleod Vs NLRC
DECISION
CARPIO, J :p
The Case
This is a petition for review 1 to set aside the Decision 2 dated 15 June 2000 and the
Resolution 3 dated 27 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
55130. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the 29 December 1998
Decision 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 02-
00949-95.
The Facts
The facts, as summarized by the Labor Arbiter and adopted by the NLRC and the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
In his Reply, complainant alleged that all respondents being one and the
same entities are solidarily liable for all salaries and benefits and complainant
is entitled to; that all respondents have the same address at 12/F B.A.
Lepanto Building, Makati City; that their counsel holds office in the same
address; that all respondents have the same offices and key personnel such
as Patricio Lim and Eric Hu; that respondents' Position Paper is verified by
Marialen C. Corpuz who knows all the corporate officers of all respondents;
that the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced if it is used as a shield to
perpetuate fraud and confuse legitimate issues; that complainant never
accepted the change in his position from Vice-President and Plant Manager
to consultant and it is incumbent upon respondents to prove that he was
only a consultant; that the Deed of Dation in Payment with Lease (Annex "C")
proves that Sta. Rosa took over the assets of Peggy Mills as early as June
15, 1992 and not 1995 as alleged by respondents; that complainant never
resigned from his job but applied for retirement as per letters (Annexes "E-
1", "E-2" and "F"); that documents "G", "H" and "I" show that Eric Hu is a top
official of Peggy Mills that the closure of Peggy Mills cannot be the fault of
complainant; that the strike was staged on the issue of CBA negotiations
which is not part of the usual duties and responsibilities as Plant Manager;
that complainant is a British national and is prohibited by law in engaging in
union activities; that as per Resolution (Annex "3") of the NLRC in the proper
case, complainant testified in favor of management; that the alleged
attendance record of complainant was lifted from the logbook of a security
agency and is hearsay evidence; that in the other attendance record it
shows that complainant was reporting daily and even on Saturdays; that his
limited hours was due to the strike and cessation of operations; that as plant
manager complainant was on call 24 hours a day; that respondents must
pay complainant the unpaid portion of his salaries and his retirement
benefits that cash voucher No. 17015 (Annex "K") shows that complainant
drew the monthly salary of P60,000.00 which was reduced to P50,495.00 in
August 1990 and therefore without the consent of complainant; that
complainant was assured that he will be paid the deduction as soon as the
company improved its financial standing but this assurance was never
fulfilled; that Patricio Lim promised complainant his retirement pay as per the
latter's letters (Annexes "E-1", "E-2" and "F"); that the law itself provides for
retirement benefits; that Patricio Lim by way of Memorandum (Annex "M")
approved vacation and sick leave benefits of 22 days per year effective
1986; that Peggy Mills required monthly paid employees to sign an
acknowledgement that their monthly compensation includes holiday pay;
that complainant was not made to sign this undertaking precisely because
he is entitled to holiday pay over and above his monthly pay; that the
company paid for complainant's two (2) round trip tickets to London in 1983
and 1986 as reflected in the complainant's passport (Annex "N"); that
respondents claim that complainant is not entitled to 13th month pay but
paid in 1993 and all the past 13 years; that complainant is entitled to moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees; that all doubts must be
resolved in favor of complainant; and that complainant reserved the right to
file perjury cases against those concerned.
In their Reply, respondents alleged that except for Peggy Mills, the other
respondents are not proper persons in interest due to the lack of employer-
employee relationship between them and complainant; that undersigned
counsel does not represent Peggy Mills, Inc.
On 3 April 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision with the following
dispositive portion:
TOTAL P5,528,996.55
SO ORDERED. 6
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation (Filsyn), Far Eastern Textile Mills, Inc. (FETMI),
Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc. (SRTI), Patricio L. Lim (Patricio), and Eric Hu appealed to the
NLRC. The NLRC rendered its decision on 29 December 1998, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 3 April 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered ORDERING respondent Peggy Mills, Inc. to
pay complainant his retirement pay equivalent to 22.5 days for every year of
service for his twelve (12) years of service from 1980 to 1992 based on a
salary rate of P50,495.00 a month.
SO ORDERED. 7
John F. McLeod (McLeod) filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied
in its Resolution of 30 June 1999. 8 McLeod thus filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC. 9
WHEREFORE, the decision dated December 29, 1998 of the NLRC is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Patricio Lim is jointly and
solidarily liable with Peggy Mills, Inc., to pay the following amounts to
petitioner John F. McLeod:
No costs is awarded.
SO ORDERED. 10
The Court of Appeals rejected McLeod's theory that all respondent corporations are
the same corporate entity which should be held solidarily liable for the payment of
his monetary claims.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the fact that (1) all respondent corporations have
the same address; (2) all were represented by the same counsel, Atty. Isidro S.
Escano; (3) Atty. Escano holds office at respondent corporations' address; and (4) all
respondent corporations have common officers and key personnel, would not justify
the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
The Court of Appeals held that there should be clear and convincing evidence that
SRTI, FETMI, and Filsyn were being used as alter ego, adjunct or business conduit for
the sole benefit of Peggy Mills, Inc. (PMI), otherwise, said corporations should be
treated as distinct and separate from each other.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of PMI show that
it has six incorporators, namely, Patricio, Jose Yulo, Jr., Carlos Palanca, Jr., Cesar R.
Concio, Jr., E. A. Picasso, and Walter Euyang. On the other hand, the Articles of
Incorporation of Filsyn show that it has 10 incorporators, namely, Jesus Y. Yujuico,
Carlos Palanca, Jr., Patricio, Ang Beng Uh, Ramon A. Yulo, Honorio Poblador, Jr.,
Cipriano Azada, Manuel Tomacruz, Ismael Maningas, and Benigno Zialcita, Jr.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that PMI and Filsyn have only two interlocking
incorporators and directors, namely, Patricio and Carlos Palanca, Jr.
Reiterating the ruling of this Court in Laguio v. NLRC , 11 the Court of Appeals held
that mere substantial identity of the incorporators of two corporations does not
necessarily imply fraud, nor warrant the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that when SRTI and PMI executed the Dation
in Payment with Lease, it was clear that SRTI did not assume the liabilities PMI
incurred before the execution of the contract.
The Court of Appeals held that McLeod failed to substantiate his claim that all
respondent corporations should be treated as one corporate entity. The Court of
Appeals thus upheld the NLRC's finding that no employer-employee relationship
existed between McLeod and respondent corporations except PMI.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Eric Hu, as an officer of PMI, should be exonerated
from any liability, there being no proof of malice or bad faith on his part. The Court
of Appeals, however, ruled that McLeod was entitled to recover from PMI and
Patricio, the company's Chairman and President.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that Patricio deliberately and maliciously evaded
PMI's financial obligation to McLeod. The Court of Appeals stated that, on several
occasions, despite his approval, Patricio refused and ignored to pay McLeod's
retirement benefits. The Court of Appeals stated that the delay lasted for one year
prompting McLeod to initiate legal action. The Court of Appeals stated that although
PMI offered to pay McLeod his retirement benefits, this offer for P300,000 was still
below the "floor limits" provided by law. The Court of Appeals held that an
employee could demand payment of retirement benefits as a matter of right.
The Court of Appeals stated that considering that PMI was no longer in operation, its
"officer should be held liable for acting on behalf of the corporation."
The Court of Appeals also ruled that since PMI did not have a retirement program
providing for retirement benefits of its employees, Article 287 of the Labor Code
must be followed. The Court of Appeals thus upheld the NLRC's finding that McLeod
was entitled to retirement pay equivalent to 22.5 days for every year of service
from 1980 to 1992 based on a salary rate of P50,495 a month.
The Court of Appeals held that McLeod was not entitled to payment of vacation, sick
leave and holiday pay because as Vice President and Plant Manager, McLeod is a
managerial employee who, under Article 82 of the Labor Code, is not entitled to
these benefits.
The Court of Appeals stated that for McLeod to be entitled to payment of service
incentive leave and holidays, there must be an agreement to that effect between
him and his employer.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected McLeod's argument that since PMI paid for
his two round-trip tickets Manila-London in 1983 and 1986, he was also "entitled to
unused airline tickets." The Court of Appeals stated that the fact that PMI granted
McLeod "free transport to and from Manila and London for the year 1983 and 1986
does not ipso facto characterize it as regular that would establish a prevailing
company policy."
The Court of Appeals also denied McLeod's claims for underpayment of salaries and
his 13th month pay for the year 1994. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC's
ruling that it could be deduced from McLeod's own narration of facts that he agreed
to the reduction of his compensation from P60,000 to P50,495 in August 1990 to
November 1993.
The Court of Appeals found the award of moral damages for P50,000 in order
because of the "stubborn refusal" of PMI and Patricio to respect McLeod's valid
claims.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total
award should be given to McLeod under Article 2208, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.
12
The Issues
McLeod asserts that the Court of Appeals should not have upheld the NLRC's
findings that he was a managerial employee of PMI from 20 June 1980 to 31
December 1992, and then a consultant of SRTI up to 30 November 1993. McLeod
asserts that if only for this "brazen assumption," the Court of Appeals should not
have sustained the NLRC's ruling that his cause of action was only against PMI.
These assertions do not deserve serious consideration.
Records disclose that McLeod was an employee only of PMI. 14 PMI hired McLeod as
its acting Vice President and General Manager on 20 June 1980. 15 PMI confirmed
McLeod's appointment as Vice President/Plant Manager in the Special Meeting of its
Board of Directors on 10 February 1981. 16 McLeod himself testified during the
hearing before the Labor Arbiter that his "regular employment" was with PMI. 17
PMI informed its employees, including McLeod, of the closure. 20 PMI paid its
employees, including managerial employees, except McLeod, their unpaid wages,
sick leave, vacation leave, prorated 13th month pay, and separation pay. Under the
compromise agreement between PMI and its employees, the employer-employee
relationship between them ended on 25 November 1992. 21
Records also disclose that PMI extended McLeod's service up to 31 December 1992
"to wind up some affairs" of the company. 22 McLeod testified on cross-examination
that he received his last salary from PMI in December 1992. 23
It is thus clear that McLeod was a managerial employee of PMI from 20 June 1980
to 31 December 1992.
However, McLeod claims that after FETMI purchased PMI in January 1993, he
"continued to work at the same plant with the same responsibilities" until 30
November 1993. McLeod claims that FETMI merely renamed PMI as SRTI. McLeod
asserts that it was for this reason that when he reached the retirement age in 1993,
he asked all the respondents for the payment of his benefits. 24
What took place between PMI and SRTI was dation in payment with lease. Pertinent
portions of the contract that PMI and SRTI executed on 15 June 1992 read:
As a rule, a corporation that purchases the assets of another will not be liable for the
debts of the selling corporation, provided the former acted in good faith and paid
adequate consideration for such assets, except when any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume the debts, (2) where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger
of the corporations, (3) where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation
of the selling corporation, and (4) where the selling corporation fraudulently enters
into the transaction to escape liability for those debts. 26
Here, PMI transferred its assets to SRTI to settle its obligation to SRTI in the sum of
P210,000,000. We are not convinced that PMI fraudulently transferred these assets
to escape its liability for any of its debts. PMI had already paid its employees, except
McLeod, their money claims.
Merger, on the other hand, is a union whereby one corporation absorbs one or more
existing corporations, and the absorbing corporation survives and continues the
combined business.
The parties to a merger or consolidation are called constituent corporations. In
consolidation, all the constituents are dissolved and absorbed by the new
consolidated enterprise. In merger, all constituents, except the surviving
corporation, are dissolved. In both cases, however, there is no liquidation of the
assets of the dissolved corporations, and the surviving or consolidated corporation
acquires all their properties, rights and franchises and their stockholders usually
become its stockholders.
In the present case, there is no showing that the subject dation in payment involved
any corporate merger or consolidation. Neither is there any showing of those
indicative factors that SRTI is a mere instrumentality of PMI.
Moreover, SRTI did not expressly or impliedly agree to assume any of PMI's debts.
Pertinent portions of the subject Deed of Dation in Payment with Lease provide,
thus:
(e) PMI shall warrant that it will hold SRTC or its assigns, free
and harmless from any liability for claims of PMI's creditors,
laborers, and workers and for physical injury or injury to property
arising from PMI's custody, possession, care, repairs, maintenance,
use or operation of the Assets except ordinary wear and tear; 28
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, McLeod did not present any evidence to show the alleged renaming of "Peggy
Mills, Inc." to "Sta. Rosa Textiles, Inc."
Hence, it is not correct for McLeod to treat PMI and SRTI as the same entity.
Respondent corporations assert that SRTI hired McLeod as consultant after PMI
stopped operations. 29 On the other hand, McLeod asserts that he was respondent
corporations' employee from 1980 to 30 November 1993. 30 However, McLeod
failed to present any proof of employer-employee relationship between him and
Filsyn, SRTI, or FETMI. McLeod testified, thus:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
Can I answer it this way, sir? There is not a valid contract but I was
under the impression taking into consideration that the closeness that
I had at Far Eastern Textile is enough during that period of time of the
development of Peggy Mills to reorganize a staff. I was under the
basic impression that they might still retain my status as Vice
President and Plant Manager of the company.
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
So, there is proof that you were in fact really employed by Peggy Mills?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
I have no document, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
A No, sir.
A No, sir.
Q And what about respondent Eric Hu. Have you had any contract of
employment from Mr. Eric Hu?
A Not a direct contract but I was taken in and I told to take over this
from Mr. Eric Hu. Automatically, it confirms that Mr. Eric Hu, in other
words, was under the control of Mr. Patricio Lim at that period of time.
It is a basic rule in evidence that parties must prove their affirmative allegations.
While technical rules are not strictly followed in the NLRC, this does not mean that
the rules on proving allegations are entirely ignored. Bare allegations are not
enough. They must be supported by substantial evidence at the very least. 34
However, McLeod claims that "for purposes of determining employer liability, all
private respondents are one and the same employer" because: (1) they have the
same address; (2) they are all engaged in the same business; and (3) they have
interlocking directors and officers. 35
While a corporation may exist for any lawful purpose, the law will regard it as an
association of persons or, in case of two corporations, merge them into one, when
its corporate legal entity is used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine
of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. The doctrine applies only when such
corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, 37 or when it is made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues, or
where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where
the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation. 38
Here, we do not find any of the evils sought to be prevented by the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil.
Respondent corporations may be engaged in the same business as that of PMI, but
this fact alone is not enough reason to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. 40
In Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union v. Calica, 41 the Court ruled, thus:
In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of
Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade the
application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent
Company. While we do not discount the possibility of the similarities of the
businesses of private respondent and Acrylic, neither are we inclined to
apply the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting the relief sought. The
fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are
related, that some of the employees of the private respondent
are the same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services
to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical plants, offices and
facilities are situated in the same compound, it is our considered
opinion that these facts are not sufficient to justify the piercing of
the corporate veil of Acrylic. 42 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the fact that SRTI and PMI shared the same address, i.e., 11/F BA-Lepanto
Bldg., Paseo de Roxas, Makati City, 43 can be explained by the two companies'
stipulation in their Deed of Dation in Payment with Lease that "simultaneous with
the dation in payment, SRTC shall grant unto PMI the right to lease the Assets
under terms and conditions stated hereunder." 44
As for the addresses of Filsyn and FETMI, Filsyn held office at 12th Floor, BA-Lepanto
Bldg., Paseo de Roxas, Makati City, 45 while FETMI held office at 18F, Tun Nan
Commercial Building, 333 Tun Hwa South Road, Sec. 2, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. 46
Hence, they did not have the same address as that of PMI.
The only interlocking incorporators of PMI and Filsyn were Patricio and Carlos
Palanca, Jr. 47 While Patricio was Director and Board Chairman of Filsyn, SRTI, and
PMI, 48 he was never an officer of FETMI.
Eric Hu, on the other hand, was Director of Filsyn and SRTI. 49 He was never an
officer of PMI.
At any rate, the existence of interlocking incorporators, directors, and officers is not
enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction, in the absence of fraud or
other public policy considerations. 53
I n Del Rosario v. NLRC , 54 the Court ruled that substantial identity of the
incorporators of corporations does not necessarily imply fraud.
On Patricio's personal liability, it is settled that in the absence of malice, bad faith,
or specific provision of law, a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities. 55
Personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when (1)
they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of
bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of
interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons;
(2) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having
knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their
written objection; (3) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable
with the corporation; or (4) they are made by specific provision of law
personally answerable for their corporate action. 57
Considering that McLeod failed to prove any of the foregoing exceptions in the
present case, McLeod cannot hold Patricio solidarily liable with PMI.
The records are bereft of any evidence that Patricio acted with malice or bad faith.
Bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith does not connote bad
judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious wrongdoing. It means breach of a known duty through some ill motive or
interest. It partakes of the nature of fraud. 58
In the present case, there is nothing substantial on record to show that Patricio
acted in bad faith in terminating McLeod's services to warrant Patricio's personal
liability. PMI had no other choice but to stop plant operations. The work stoppage
therefore was by necessity. The company could no longer continue with its plant
operations because of the serious business losses that it had suffered. The mere fact
that Patricio was president and director of PMI is not a ground to conclude that he
should be held solidarily liable with PMI for McLeod's money claims.
The ruling in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC , 59 which the Court of Appeals
cited, does not apply to this case. We quote pertinent portions of the ruling, thus:
"Any person violating any of the provisions of Article 265 of this Code shall
be punished by a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos and/or
imprisonment for not less than one (1) day nor more than six (6) months."
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law.
Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be
presumed to be the employer, being the "person acting in the interest of
(the) employer" RANSOM. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally,
not to say even criminally, liable for non-payment of back wages. That is the
policy of the law.
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can
have devious ways for evading payment of back wages. In the instant
case, it would appear that RANSOM, in 1969, foreseeing the
possibility or probability of payment of back wages to the 22
strikers, organized ROSARIO to replace RANSOM, with the latter
to be eventually phased out if the 22 strikers win their case.
RANSOM actually ceased operations on May 1, 1973, after the December
19, 1972 Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations was promulgated
against RANSOM. 60 (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule is still that which can be deduced from the Court's
pronouncement in Sunio vs. National Labor Relations Commission;
thus:
We come now to the personal liability of petitioner, Sunio, who was made
jointly and severally responsible with petitioner company and CIPI for the
payment of the backwages of private respondents. This is reversible error.
The Assistant Regional Director's Decision failed to disclose the reason why
he was made personally liable. Respondents, however, alleged as grounds
thereof, his being the owner of one-half (1/2) interest of said corporation,
and his alleged arbitrary dismissal of private respondents.
Thus, the rule is still that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only
when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific
provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities. Neither Article 212 (c) nor Article 273
(now 272) of the Labor Code expressly makes any corporate officer personally liable
for the debts of the corporation. As this Court ruled in H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc.
v. Marina Properties Corporation: 63
We concur with the CA that these two respondents are not liable. Section 31
of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides:
The personal liability of corporate officers validly attaches only when (a) they
assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation; or (b) they are guilty of
bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs; or (c) they incur conflict
of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or
other persons.
The records are bereft of any evidence that Typoco acted in bad faith with
gross or inexcusable negligence, or that he acted outside the scope of his
authority as company president. The unilateral termination of the Contract
during the existence of the TRO was indeed contemptible — for which MPC
should have merely been cited for contempt of court at the most — and a
preliminary injunction would have then stopped work by the second
contractor. Besides, there is no showing that the unilateral termination of
the Contract was null and void. 64
McLeod is not entitled to payment of vacation leave and sick leave as well as to
holiday pay. Article 82, Title I, Book Three of the Labor Code, on Working Conditions
and Rest Periods, provides:
Also unavailing is McLeod's claim that he was entitled to the "unpaid monetary
equivalent of unused plane tickets for the period covering 1989 to 1992 in the
amount of P279,300.00." 69 PMI has no company policy granting its officers and
employees expenses for trips abroad. 70 That at one time PMI reimbursed McLeod for
his and his wife's plane tickets in a vacation to London 71 could not be deemed as an
established practice considering that it happened only once. To be considered a
"regular practice," the giving of the benefits should have been done over a long
period, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. 72
In American Wire and Cable Daily Rated Employees Union v. American Wire and
Cable Co., Inc., 73 the Court held that for a bonus to be enforceable, the employer
must have promised it, and the parties must have expressly agreed upon it, or it
must have had a fixed amount and had been a long and regular practice on the part
of the employer.
In the present case, there is no showing that PMI ever promised McLeod that it
would continue to grant him the benefit in question. Neither is there any proof that
PMI and McLeod had expressly agreed upon the giving of that benefit.
McLeod's reliance on Annex M 74 can hardly carry the day for him. Annex M, which is
McLeod's letter addressed to "Philip Lim, VP Administration," merely contains
McLeod's proposals for the grant of some benefits to supervisory and confidential
employees. Contrary to McLeod's allegation, Patricio did not sign the letter. Hence,
the letter does not embody any agreement between McLeod and the management
that would entitle McLeod to his money claims.
McLeod cannot successfully pretend that his monthly salary of P60,000 was reduced
without his consent.
McLeod testified that in 1990, Philip Lim explained to him why his salary would
have to be reduced. McLeod said that Philip told him that "they were short in
finances; that it would be repaid." 76 Were McLeod not amenable to that reduction
in salary, he could have immediately resigned from his work in PMI.
McLeod knew that PMI was then suffering from serious business losses. In fact,
McLeod testified that PMI was not able to operate from August 1989 to 1992
because of the strike. Even before 1989, as Vice President of PMI, McLeod was aware
that the company had incurred "huge loans from DBP." 77 As it happened, McLeod
continued to work with PMI. We find it pertinent to quote some portions of
Apolinario Posio's testimony, to wit:
Q You also stated that before the period of the strike as shown by
annex "K" of the reply filed by the complainant which was I think a
voucher, the salary of Mr. McLeod was roughly P60,000.00 a month?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as shown by their annex "L" to their reply, that this was reduced
to roughly P50,000.00 a month?
A Yes, sir.
Q You stated that this was indeed upon the instruction by the Vice-
President of Peggy Mills at that time and that was Mr. Philip Lim, would
you not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Of your own personal knowledge, can you say if this was, in fact, by
agreement between Mr. Philip Lim or any other officers of Peggy Mills
and Mr. McLeod?
Q In other words, Mr. Witness, you mean to tell us that Mr. McLeod
continuously received the reduced amount of P50,000.00 by signing
the voucher and receiving the amount in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you remember, Mr. Posio, was there any complaint by Mr.
McLeod because of this reduced amount of his salary at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you also stated that the reason for what appears to be an
agreement between Peggy Mills and Mr. McLeod in so far as the
reduction of his salary from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month was
because he would have a reduced number of working days in view of
the strike at Peggy Mills, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that this was so because on account of the strike, there was no
work to be done in the company?
A Yes, sir. 78
Q Now, you also stated if you remember during the first time that you
testified that in the beginning, the monthly salary of the complainant
was P60,000.00, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of the long period of the strike, when there was no work
to be done, by agreement with the complainant, his monthly salary
was adjusted to only P50,495 because he would not have to report
for work on Saturday. Do you remember having made that
explanation?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. 79
Since the last salary that McLeod received from PMI was P50,495, that amount
should be the basis in computing his retirement benefits. McLeod must be credited
only with his service to PMI as it had a juridical personality separate and distinct
from that of the other respondent corporations.
Since PMI has no retirement plan, 80 we apply Section 5, Rule II of the Rules
Implementing the New Retirement Law which provides:
With McLeod having worked with PMI for 12 years, from 1980 to 1992, he is
entitled to a retirement pay equivalent to 1/2 month salary for every year of service
based on his latest salary rate of P50,495 a month.
Moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless,
malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. 81 From the records of the case, the
Court finds no ultimate facts to support a conclusion of bad faith on the part of PMI.
Records disclose that PMI had long offered to pay McLeod his money claims. In their
Comment, respondents assert that they offered to pay McLeod the sum of
P840,000, as "separation benefits, and not P300,000, if only to buy peace and to
forestall any complaint" that McLeod may initiate before the NLRC. McLeod
admitted at the hearing before the Labor Arbiter that PMI has made this offer —
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
The question I want to ask is, are you aware that this amount was
offered to you sometime last year through your own lawyer, my good
friend, Atty. Avecilla, who is right here with us?
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
And, of course, the reason, if I may assume, that you declined this offer
was that, according to you, there are other claims which you would
like to raise against the Respondents which, by your impression, they
were not willing to pay in addition to this particular amount?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. ESCANO:
The question now is, if the same amount is offered to you by way of
retirement which is exactly what you stated in your own Position
Paper, would you accept it or not?
WITNESS:
Not on the concept without all the basic benefits due me, I will refuse. 82
ATTY. ROXAS:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ESCANO:
WITNESS:
ATTY. ROXAS:
Q You mentioned that you were offered for the settlement of your
claims in 1994 for P840,000.00, is that right, Mr. Witness?
A During that period in time, while the petition in this case was ongoing,
we already filed a case at that period of time, sir. There was a
discussion. To the best of my knowledge, they are willing to settle for
P840,000.00 and based on what the Attorney told me, I refused to
accept because I believe that my position was not in anyway due to a
compromise situation to the benefits I am entitled to. 83
Hence, the awards for exemplary damages and attorney's fees are not proper in the
present case. 84
That respondent corporations, in their appeal to the NLRC, did not serve a copy of
their memorandum of appeal upon PMI is of no moment. Section 3 (a), Rule VI of
the NLRC New Rules of Procedure provides:
Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. — (a) The appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal . . . and proof of service on
the other party of such appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
The "other party" mentioned in the Rule obviously refers to the adverse party, in
this case, McLeod. Besides, Section 3, Rule VI of the Rules which requires, among
others, proof of service of the memorandum of appeal on the other party, is merely
a rundown of the contents of the required memorandum of appeal to be submitted
by the appellant. These are not jurisdictional requirements. 85
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55130, with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the
retirement pay of John F. McLeod should be computed at 1/2 month salary for every
year of service for 12 years based on his salary rate of P50,495 a month; (b) Patricio
L. Lim is absolved from personal liability; and (c) the awards for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees are deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
3. Id. at 329-330.
5. Id. at 158-165.
6. Id. at 167-168.
7. Id. at 202.
8. Id. at 224-225.
9. Id. at 226-250.
21. Rollo, p. 242; TSN, 18 March 1997, pp. 19-22, 26-27; TSN, 26 August 1996, p.
24.
23. TSN, 15 April 1996, p. 31. See rollo, pp. 156 and 157.
26. PNB v. Andrada Electric & Engineering Company, 430 Phil. 882 (2002).
27. II J. Campos and M.C. Lopez-Campos, The Corporation Code: Comments, Notes
and Selected Cases 440-441 (1990 ed.).
34. Gerlach v. Reuters Limited, Phils ., G.R. No. 148542, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA
535; Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 360 Phil. 881 (1998).
35. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
36. Martinez v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 131673, 10 September 2004, 438 SCRA
130.
37. Jardine Davies, Inc. v. JRB Realty, Inc ., G.R. No. 151438, 15 July 2005, 463 SCRA
555; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 415 Phil. 538
(2001).
38. Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union v. Calica , G.R. No. 96490, 3 February 1992,
205 SCRA 697.
39. Lim v. Court of Appeals , 380 Phil. 60 (2000); Del Rosario v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 85416, 24 July 1990, 187 SCRA 777.
40. Complex Electronics Employees Association v. NLRC, 369 Phil. 666 (1999).
41. Supra.
44. Id.
53. Jardine Davies, Inc. v. JRB Realty, Inc., supra note 37; Velarde v. Lopez, Inc ., G.R.
No. 153886, 14 January 2004, 419 SCRA 422.
55. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , 416 Phil. 774 (2001); Complex
Electronics Employees Association v. NLRC, supra note 40.
57. H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 147614,
29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 428; Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol , 448 Phil.
643 (2003); Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos,
supra.
67. The pertinent portion of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the
13th Month Pay reads:
"Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 851 is hereby modified to the extent that
all employers are hereby required to pay all their rank-and-file employees a
13th month pay not later than December 24 of every year."
Before its modification by the aforecited Memorandum Order, P.D. No. 851
excludes from entitlement to the 13th month pay those employees who were
receiving a basic salary of more than P1,000.00 a month. With the removal of the
salary ceiling of P1,000.00, all rank-and-file employees are now entitled to a 13th
month pay regardless of the amount of basic salary that they receive in a month if
their employers are not otherwise exempted from the application of P.D. No. 851.
(Emphasis supplied) aEDcHI
70. TSN, 10 December 1996, pp. 21-22 and 68; TSN, 26 August 1996, pp. 66-67.
71. TSN, 10 December 1996, pp. 68-70; TSN, 26 August 1996, p. 17.
72. See Philippine Appliance Corporation (PHILACOR) v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No.
149434, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 525.
81. Philippine National Bank v. Pike , G.R. No. 157845, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA
328.
84. Special Police and Watchmen Asso. (PLUM) Federation v. NLRC , 344 Phil. 384
(1997).
85. Del Mar Domestic Enterprises v. NLRC, 347 Phil. 277 (1997).