Criminal Law 1 Atty. Padilla Midterms 2013 1
Criminal Law 1 Atty. Padilla Midterms 2013 1
Criminal Law 1 Atty. Padilla Midterms 2013 1
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criminal liability is personal and a "manager" cannot be held liable for acts done
by the "author, editor, or proprietot".
D 16. Rape sought to be perpetrated upon a child of the age of 3 years and 11
months, by reason of whose tender age, it has been suggested lhat penetration was
impossible, atttrougtr physical evidence from an examination of the victim's private
part clearly indicated iepeated efforts to do so, is: (a| frustrated rape; (bf attempted
rape; (cf an impossible crime; (d) consummated raPe.
C L7. That legal cause that acting first and producing the injury, either
irnmediately or by s-etting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chaintf events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the {inal event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
^and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
p"r"o.r responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent
i"r"orr, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
ittjrrty to some person mi[nt probably result therefrom, is called: (af remote cause; (bf
immediate cause; (cf proximate cause; (df efftcient cause'
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D 18. Given that an accused acted under a mistake of fact in committing a
crime, it necessarily follows that: (af he should be acquitted because such a mistake
exempts him from any criminal llability; (bf he can be acquitted upon a showing
that, additionally, his act and intention were lawful; (cf he should be acquitted
because such a mistake shows good faith, thereby negating criminal intent; (dl
he can be acquitted if he establishes that, aside from there being no negligence
or imprudence, both his acts and intent were lawful.
B 19. Should a person otherwise qualified but who admits having violated a
city ordinance on jaywalking and another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only
the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa be disqualified for appointment to the
Quezon City Police Force, as one having had criminal records? (af Yes, because the
term "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments is intended by
the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal or city
ordinance carrying a sanction, even of a nominal fine, to enforce it ; {bf No,
because a violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "crime" must involve
at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, cornrption, malice, or
want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of the public office; (cf
Yes, because a penalty imposed for the breach of a municipal regulation
represents an exercise of the sovereign authority to define crimes and provide
foi their punishment, delegated to a local government; (df No, because the facts
indicate that he only violated the ordinances and not that he has been convicted
of such violations; simply stated, without convlctions there can be no "criminal
record" to speak of.
_B 2t. Dolo means: (af deceit; (bt malice; (cf negligence or impnrdence; (df
voluntary.
_B 22. Where a police officer, pressed for time to arrive at the truth regarding a
mysterious massacr" of ,rr entire ramity in Laguna on account of a deadline set by his
sriperiors who were, in turn, given 24 hours to solve the case by their superiors'
struck an "invited" suspect whom he merely intended to maltreat, by slightly hitting
the ,,invited" suspect with the butt his gun, as a consequence of which, the suspect
died after a few moments, the crime "ottt*itt"d is: (af reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide; (bl homicide; (cf maltreatment of prisoner; (df torture'
_A 29. The provision of Atticle 22, RPC: {al is applicable to appeals and
proceedings for tir. pro*"cution of crimes, such as prescription of crimes
and
penalties because id cannot be denied that the provisions relative to the
irescription of crimes and of penalties are penal laws or form part thereof; lbf is
-proceedings
not applicable to appeals and for the prosecution of crimes' such as
fr"""iiption of criirls and penalties belause the term penal laws embrace only
and providing for their punishment; (cl is not
iiovisiins defining crimespro.u"dirrgs
applicable to appeals and foittre- prosecution of crimes' such as
pii".ription of ciimes and penaltiesr-because the such appeals and proceedings
are matters of criminal procedure, not substantive a statute law;
criminal ldl not
declaring the
applicable to prescriptlon of crimes and penalties because
Prescription of the crime has no other object and purpose than to prevent or
annul the prosecution ofthe offender.
B 24. A presumption of criminal intent arises: (af when an act is voluntarily
executed; (bf when the act executed, which is presumed to be voluntary,
-constitutes a crime; (cl when no negligence or imprudence is shown; (df when
motive to commit a crime ls proved.
C 25. The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to the defendant in a criminal
-action for a felony: {af applies only to acts or omissions made punishable under
the RPC, including its amendments, as limited by the use of the term "felony";
(bf does not apply to acts or omissions penalized. by special laws, considering in
particular that, under Article 1O of the Revised Penal Code, offenses punishable
under special penal laws are not subJect to the provisions of the said Code; (cf
applies to acts or omissions penalized, by special laws, considering in particular
that, under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be
supplementary to such special penal laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary; (df applies exclusively to acts or omissions becoming
punishable under any amendment to the RPC.
_B 26. XX, a minor (14 years old) at the time he committed the crime (July 28,
2OO1), is found guilty of robbery with use of force upon things where the value of the
property taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms, without any
.tt".taing mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on ZO lttiy 2OOO, under which XX should be exempt from criminal liability and
should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6
and,2Q of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as The Juuenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, being barely 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime. Can
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nepubtc Act No. otherwise known as The Juuenile Justice and Welfare Act of
ZObO, be given retroactive effect in favor of XX? (af No, the crime was committed on
28 Juty dOOt and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006 and
the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive application; (bl Yes, the
said law should be given ritioactive effect in favor of XX who was not shown to
be a habitual criminal, based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code; (c) No'
since )O( was no longer of the age exempt from criminal liability at the time
Republic Act No. gg14 took effect on 20 May 2OO6; (df No, because XX was
alriady convicted by the trial court of the crime charged at the time Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect.
_A 29. AR, under a claim of ownership, who had wanted the properties taken
out from VL's house. AR had asked his neighbors, DG among them, to assist him in
recovering these properties. Among the properties taken was a wooden bench, which
was found in DG's house. Owing to the prodmity of DG's house to that of VL's, AR
had asked DG that the bench be temporarily left in DG's house until he could transfer
it. Unfortunately, before AR could remove it, VL had already filed a complaint against
them for robbery with the use of force upon things. Under the circumstances, may DG
raise the defense of absence of criminal intent and that he was merely helping AR,
whom he honestly believed to be the owner, take out the properties from VL's home?
(af Yes, his acts were consistent with his assertion that he was merely helping
ii, whom he honestly believed to be the owner, take out the properties from
VL's home and, therefore, DG should not be held answerable for the act charged
absent a felonious intent; (b) No, DG should have known that the bench, being at
VLts home, cannot be taken by them without VL's consent; (cf No, the taking of
the bench was unlawful per se and, therefore, unlawful or criminal intent is
presumed; (df No, he shouid have Iirst verified who actually owned the bench and
is liable for being negligent in failing to do so.
B 31. Section 27(bl of Republic Act No. 6646 provides-: "sEtc' 27' Election
Offenses. - In addition tj the piohibited acts and election offenses
enumerated in
-sections 261 and. 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 887, as amended, the follouing shall be
or
guil.ty of an election o16n"., x x x (b) Ang member o{the board of election inspectors
decreases the uotes receiued bA a
board of canuassers--utho tampers,-arla incleases, or board who refuses, afier proper
candid.ite in ang election or member of the
uotes. x x x'"
ilerificotion and heaing, to credit the correct uotes or deduct suchtampered
Isaviolationof SectiJn 27lblof Rep.ActNo.6646, classifiedunder maluminseor
malum prohibitum? (af It is prohibitwn since the crime is defined in a
^ ^oiu^
penal law; (bf the acts prohifited in- Section 27lbl ate mo,la dn se' for
"p""i.f
otherqrise, even and misiakes committed due to overqrork and fatigUe
would be punishable, "tioo and it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors, while intentionally increasing or
is inherently immoral,
decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate punishable
since it is done with malice and intent to inJure another; (cf crimes
penal Code ate mo;La in se, while those puni.'rhable elsewhere
under the Revised of Act
are m6rla prohlbtta, hence, the acts prohibited-in Section 27pl Republic
(df the'acts prohibited in Section2Tlbl of Republic
No.6646
^r. ^n,tiprohibli.a,
Act No. 6646 raU wittrin the category of mala.prohiblta since the law does not
crimes'
expressly require the element of ciiminat intent in defining said
C 92. The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence
Article 308,
to
in
under
constitute the erements of the crite-of qualified theft defined of personal
-relation to Article 310, both of tft" Revised Penal Code: (Ll the taking
propertg - as shown by the fact that petitioner,- as collector
for Mega Foam' did not
appropriated it for
remit the customer,s check payment to trer employer and, instead, to Baby Aquino' as
herself; (2) said propertg belonged to another - the check belonged
done uith intent to gain
it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking utas shown by the fact that
further
- this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and
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the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-1aw; {4) it uas
done uithout the ouner's consent - petitioner hid the fact that she had received the
check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the
company; (5) it uas accompli.shed uittnut the use of uiolence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things - the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by
the customer, as she was known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it utas done
with graue abuse of confidence - petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection
of payments from customers. Is the accused guilty of qualified theft? (af Yes, but only
in the attempted stage; (bf Yes, but clearly, it was fnrstrated; (cf Yes' the theft
was consummated and qualifted by abuse of confidence; (df No, he is only guilty
of an impossible crime.
_B 33. Where the offender was apprehended afier setting fire to some rags and
jute sacks soaked in kerosene oil and placed near the partition of an inhabited house,
Lnough to start fire in said partition, and the fire is immediately put out, what is the
stagJof execution of the c.i*" (of arson)? (af the crime would only be attempted
since no part of the house itself had begun to burn when the offender is
"tson
apprehended and the fire is immediately put out; (bf the crime committed is
frustrated arson, the offender having performed all the steps conducive to the
burning of the house, but, notwithstanding these acts, he did not accomplish the
crlminal act which he had intended to consummate by reason of causes
independent of his will; (cf the crime of arson was already consummated, since
the frre has, at least started and burned some rags and jute sacks; (dl he is guilty
of an impossible crime, his timely apprehension having rendered arson legally
impossible of accomPlishment.
_C 94. Is it correct to say that crimes punishable under special penal laws may
be classified, according to their stage of exlcution, as consummated, frustratedare or
attempted? (af Yes, b"ecause the lrovisions
-clefined of the Revised Penal Code
applicable suppletorily to crimes under special penaf statutes; (bf No,
crimes under special- laws have no stages of execution; (cl punishableIt dependsr t-he
under
controlling consideration aPpears to be whether or not offenses no' Art'
special laws would admit apptication of such classification; (df Definitely
punished under
6 of the Rev. pen. Code hatng been held inapplicable to offenses
special laws in People os. Fet7tg1ndo Gonzalesr 32 Phil. 3O7, and in the earlier
case of tlnited Stcrtes as. Ba"sa' 8 Phil' 89'
_D 38. Where the decision in a criminal case had long become final when a new
law was enacted, under whose provisions the penalty for the crime of which the
accused was convicted was lowered, then - (af such decision may no longer be
altered or modified, by way of exception to the nrle on retroactivity of penal laws
when favorable to the accused; (bl the convict, if not a habitual criminal, may be
released on petition for holbeas cofpus, (cf the convict would be entitled to
release even if ne is a habitual delinquent; {df the convict should be released
after undergoing imprisonment properly imposable under new law provided he is
not a habitual delinquent.
_D 40. Where the only fact proven is that the accused shot another person with a
firearm, while the latter does not complain of having suffered any injury' the criminal
liabitty of the accused should - ("i be fimited to attempted physical injury'
obviously because no injury was inflicted nor uras intent to kill indicated; (bl be
for atteipted homicide as intent to kill may be inferred frominthe fact that a
pefson sh-ot another with a firearm, albeit he 4id not succeed inflicting any
injury; (cf be liable only for alarm and scandal; (df be liable for the crime of
discharge of firearm.
_C 46. Not a requisite for an impossible crime: (af that the act performed
would be an offense against persons or propert$ (bl that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either lnadequate or
ineffectual; (c) that there be damage to persons or inJury to property; (dl that the
act was done with evil intent.
_A 47. The wound inflicted, treacherously, by X on Y was not the kind which
could have caused her death as, in fact, she was confined at the Medicare Hospital for
only one (1) day. Can it be argued that X should be convicted of frustrated, not merely
attempted, murder? (a) No, the crime of murder ls undoubtedly only in the
attempted stage, no fatal wound having been inflicted on Y; lbf Yes, because
murder, after all, was in the heart of X, only he failed to accomplish it; (cl Yes, if
the wound was inflicted by means which would have caused death' even lf death
did not in fact result; (df Yes, because of treachery.
_C 48. When is theft considered to have gone beyond the attempted stage? (a)
when the offender is placed ln a posltlon to dispose of the thing taken, even lf
only momentarily; (bf ;when the offender, after the taking, becomes entirely free
to enJoy the thing taken; (cf when the offender obtained physlcal possession of
the thing taken, such taking being motivated by intent to gain; (d| when' after
the taking the thing, the offender has carrled it away.
_B 49. In a disco pub, full of civilians, SPO2 X, who was then together with R,
accosted the victim, SGT Y, why he had in his possession a firearm. SGT Y identified
himself saying "I am MIG' and when SGT Y was about to get his wallet on his back
pocket for his ID, SPO2 X anticipated that the victim was drawing his firearm on his
waist prompting said policeman to shoot the victim. SGT Y died as a consequence of
the bullet wound he sustained. Can SPO2 X be absolved from criminal liability on the
ground of mistake of fact? (af Yes, although SGT Y was, in fact' just about to get
his wallet on his back pocket for hls ID, SPO2 X anticipated that he was drawing
his firearm on his waist, prompting him to shoot the victim by mistake; {b) No'
those circunstances blone would not lead a reasonable and prudent person to
believe that SPO2 X's life was in peril and, thus, his act of shooting SGT Y
constitutes clear negligence; (cl Yes, SGT Y's actions were aggressive enough to
appear that he was going for his gun and, therefore, SPO2 X could not be faulted
f6r responding in defonse of himself; (df Yes, the situation must be seen from the
way itlppeared to SPIO2 X, who clearly felt his life was ln danger as the person
he was talking to was reachlng for his waist where he had his firearm.
C 50. While a dance party was going on, the victim, FC got hold of the
microphone and announced a special dance number for some persons. The special
-dance number did not push through because MS, who was then the barangay captain
of Kabulukan, prevented the music from being played and said over the microphone
that the announcement made by the victim, who incidentally was his lanmpadre, is
foolish, then punched the victim on the face. Instead of retaliating, the victim just
uttered, " Pare, whg do ute haue to quarrel this?" Again, MS threw another punch at the
victim. Thereupon, MS's son, BS, struck the victim with a kamagong cane, hitting the
latter on the forehead which caused him to feel dizzy and to fall down. With the victim
already down, MS, using a hunting knife, his other son RS, using a pinuti, and his two
(2) other sons, BS and RB, both using kamagong canes, took turns in striking the
victim. Thereupon, MS stabbed FC thrice while both BS and RS stabbed FC once,
using tlre weapon called pinuti. Can conspiracy be inferred from the acts of MS, BS,
RB and RS? (af Yes, conspiracy may be inferred where the apparently separate
acts are linked together, and the separate isolated acts can well conjure to a
common design geared towards a common criminal purpose; (bf Yes, the very
essence of conspiracy is that it exists where the separate acts committed, taken
collectively, emanate from a concerted and associated action, albeit each
circumstance, if considered separately, may not show confabulatlon; (cf No, the
Iiast sequence of unexpected events leading to the killing of the victim elicited
the spontaneous, though erroneous reactions of the three; (dl It depends on
whether their apparently separate acts were triggered by prior or evident
deliberatlon and carrled out in futtherance of a common design.
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