This article was downloaded by: [University of Chicago Library]

On: 18 November 2014, At: 08:45

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer
House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Perspectives on Political Science

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vpps20

Liberal Communitarianism as Political Theory

Bradley C. S. Watson
Published online: 01 Apr 2010.

To cite this article: Bradley C. S. Watson (1999) Liberal Communitarianism as Political Theory, Perspectives on
Political Science, 28:4, 211-217, DOI: 10.1080/10457099909602362

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10457099909602362

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”)
contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors
make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability
for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions
and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of
the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of
information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands,
costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or
indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or
systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in
any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Liberal Communitarianism
as Political Theory
BRADLEY C. S. WATSON
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

C ommunitarianism may be understood various-

ly as a political theory, a political movement,
and a political strategy. Those who have been
linked with the label include not only aca-
Clinton. The demics but politicians, including President
communitarian movement. or theory, as the
CISC may be, is nothing if not protean (and enduring). In this
articllt: I examine key works of an eclectic group of theorists
and public intellectuals who can be identified as communi-
by these theorists. In particular I will show how, theoreti-
cally, their accounts of political life collapse into liberalism
as a result of their fundamental premises.

A COMMUNITARIAN RENAISSANCE
Michael Sandel, perhaps the foremost figure in what has
become a communitarian renaissance, has noted that Amer-
icans live some theory all the time.[ For him, and for corn-
tariir,na of one kind or another, including Michael Sandel, munitarians in general, the theory or public philosophy that
George Will, Amitai Etzioni. Michael Walzer. and Charles we live is that of liberal freedom, which purports to offer the
Tiiylor. Each of them argues for what I call a “liberal com- freedom to choose values and the ends of one’s life. It is in
muqitarianism.” They share the view that individuals are this sense that the philosophy can be characterized as one of
con+tituted by a complex set of communal attachments and oficial neutrality on questions of moral good. The philoso-
disp)sitions and that attempts to describe human beings as phy is public insofar as it is widely shared and defines the
outqrowths of an abstract, individualist “state of nature” are parameters of most policy debates. Sandel maintains that
fun1ll:iinentally misleading and doomed to failure. Neverthe- liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans,
lesh, these communitarians wish to teach the intertwined may not agree on the best means to maximize the autonomy
liberal social goods of tolerance, equality, authenticity, and of the individual as a choosing being, but all agree on the
parriicipation in community life. worthiness of the public philosophy itself, for either utili-
(:onimunitwian virtues are not the Aristotelian ones- tarian or idealist reasons. He bemoans liberalism’s under-
courage. moderation, prudence, justice, and so forth-but mining of Americans’ ability even to speak coherently
libc*id ones. These communitarians seek to foster public about self-government and community. Sandel claims that
spirlit and thereby tame the self-interest that liberalism tin- the liberal self is incoherent insofar as it is thought, by the
ahii4:kles. But that public spirit, paradoxically, is directed Kantian liberal, to exist prior to, and independent of, all
1,owIard furthering the relatively unfettered flowering of the concrete encumbrances of moral or political obligation.
individual’s capacities. My intent is to demonstrate the Even those liberals who do not share this theoretical picture
yuiwtic nature of the forms of comniunitarianism posited of the self still claim that, in the interests of social comity,
we must “bracket” our religious and moral convictions
whenever we enter the public square. That is, we cannot let
Hrrudley C.S. Watson is an assistunt professor of political those convictions color debates about public policy, even
scwnre and u fellow in politics and policy at the Centerfor though they generate far greater passion and loyalty than
Eivnomic and Policv Education, Saint Vincent College. He could any public policy.
is [lie aurhor of Civil Rights and the Paradox of Liberal The republican alternative to procedural liberalism has a
Delmocracy(Lexington Books, 1999) and is currently writ- conception of the good life, according to Sandel, and it is the
rn,q about liberal communitariunism. life of a self-governing republic, which includes the attempt
21 I
 2 12 Perspectives on Political Science

to cdfivate moral virtue in citizens. It does not take citizens’ able with the notion that there must be a high wall of s e p -
preferences as givens that are not to be interfered with. It is ration between church and state, and with the religion 01’
;I community that is not beholden to a corrosive individual- secularism that seems to result from, for example, eliminai-
ist ethos, as that ethos is manifested in the U.S. Supreme ing Bible reading in public schools. Indeed,
Court’s rights-based liberalism, the wage labor of corporate
the image of the unencumbered self, despite its appeal, is inatl-
ciipitalisni. and the ideology of Progressivism, which has lit- equate to the liberty it promises. In the case of religion. the lib-
tle tolerance for dispersed, democratic power. eral conception of the person ill equips the Court to secure reli-
It is to this tradition that Sandel claims he belongs; and in gious liberty for those who regard themselves as claimed hy
this sense, some have suggested, he is best described as a religious commitments they have not chosen. Not all relipioux
republican. Ronald Beher,*for example, argues that commu- beliefs can be redescribed without loss as “the product of frce
and voluntary choice by the faithful.” (65)
nitarianism is too easily conflated with the love of Gemein-
. s ~ , ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ties ~ ~pert nse,I noru affective
n i ~ community- Religion is worthy of respect not because of the manner in
whereas Sandel is really concerned with the rational, which it is acquired by the individual, but because of its
republican community of political equals deliberating over relation to the good life, including its ability to cultivate
matters of common concern. And indeed, in his concern for political virtues (66).
dispersed power and informed participation, Sandel is dis- Sandel also criticizes free speech jurisprudence that
tinctly Tocquevilleun. Nevertheless, I believe there are forces the people and their legislators to bracket moral judg-
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

enough manifestations of “affective community,” and enough ments, whether it be over Nazis marching in Skokie, Illi-
rational lacunae, in the thought of Sandel and others that I nois, or the attempt to control pornography within comnw
will continue to use the broader label “communitarian” to nities. This bracketing, according to Sandel, “carries costs
describe them. for self-government. Not only does it underestimate thc
In any event, Sandel claims that the older republican the- good of respect for persons as situated selves; it also pre.
ory can better account for moral and public obligations that vents political communities from acting democratically to
do not arise from autonomous choice or from duties owed realize this good” (89).
by one abstract, autonomous self to others. What, for exam- Insofar as Sandel favors the feminist-inspired Indianapo-
ple, of‘the traditional virtue of loyalty? The exercise of such lis antipornography law, which “connects the speech-intriII-
ii virtue is necessarily grounded in the particular circum- sic notion of injury and the communal description of the
stances of a situated self, an individual who cannot choose injured party” (87), he raises a question that he does not
freely. or will universally, when faced with what he or she answer: Which communities are worthy of special protec-
t’eels to be a unique personal obligation to another individ- tion against the universal norms of liberal neutrality?
ual or group. Should any self-styled group be able to define itself as a
Neither, in an effort to avoid philosophical debate about community? Is this not Gemeinschufi, pure and simple?
the nature of the self, can we simply “bracket” our funda- Very tentatively, Sandel seems to point to a possible answer:
mental moral and political convictions whenever we engage that certain kinds of speech promote genocide and hatred,
the public realm. To do so is to deprive ourselves of what and others promote civil rights. “The difference consists in
we consider most fundamental to ourselves. It is to pretend the content of the speech, in the nature of cause” (90).The
that we are not who we in fact are; that some set of acci- trouble with this thin teleological account is that it is a
dental characteristics ought somehow to be more central, minor, half-page addendum to a major attack on liberal
for the purposes of political debate, than our deepest moral premises. It is nowhere near as developed as it must be to
convictions. In Sandel’s terms, make Sandel’s position fully coherent.
And again, to what extent should a voluntarist self,
we are beginning to find that a politics that brackets inorali-
ty and religion too completely soon generates its own disen- choosing freely its own ends, be interfered with in the name
chantment. A procedural republic cannot contain the moral of community goods? The problem with Sandel’s preferred
energies ofa vital democratic life. It creates a moral void that solutions is that they often seem to amount to little more
opens the way for narrow, intolerant moralisms. And it fails than lamentations over things past, or sympathy for any
to cultivate the qualities of character that equip citizens to
group that, to Sandel, seems worthy of sympathy.
share i n self-rule.?
President Reagan’s resonance, according to Sandel, was
Sandel is not particularly categorical or clear on the ques- in his evocation not of libertarian economics, but of the
lion of how far the moral cultivation implicit in republican- communal values of family, neighborhood, religion, and
ism should extend, or just how illiberal it should be. But he nation. In Sandel’s view, Democrats often seem determined
seems to contemplate a wider space for republican choice, to avoid those communal, moral concerns, to their political
in the name of cultivating virtue and communal norms, than detriment. But what if Reagan had demanded genuine sac-
today’s U.S. Supreme Court would allow; indeed, he finds rifice in the name of those values? For example, in the name
the Supreme Court to be the main expositor of the flawed of the traditional family, Reagan could have used the bully
philosophy of procedural liberalism (28). pulpit to argue for significant, legally binding restrictions
For example, with respect to the freedoms of speech and on homosexual practice. In the name of neighborhood, he
religious exercise, Sandel argues (correctly) that the Bill of could have spearheaded a national effort to weaken the
Rights ”was enacted in part to protect state religious estab- Supreme Court’s considerable restraints on police discre-
lishments from federal interference” (56). He is uncomfort- tion in criminal matters that directly affect the livability of
 -
Fall 1999, Volume 28, Number 4 213

America’s neighborhoods. In the name of religion, he could which Sandel hopes to hang all his weighty discontents far
havc confronted the Supreme Court’s establishment clause too thin for the job?
jurihprudence and argued for the right of individual states to George Will, in Srutecrajr us SoulcrU/1,’ concentrates
maintain such religious establishments or practices as they explicitly on the nature of the formative project that Sandel
see tit. Reagan did none of those things, yet one wonders intimates is necessary but does not coherently develop. He,
whether Sandel would have supported him if he had, in pur- like Sandel, sees both conservatism and liberalism march-
suit ot’the ends that Reagan would likely have had in mind. ing to the beat of Hobbes’s individualist drum. The per-
One suspects that Sandel would not have supported many ceived fact of man’s appetitive nature has been transformed.
such illiberal measures, for in his view civic republicanism according to Will, into the moral principle that desires
should be neither exclusionary nor coercive (318-2 1 ), and should be allowed to flourish relatively unimpeded by law
should of course be in the pursuit of civil rights. Sandel or moral constraint (43). America rests on foundations that,
emplrasizes the virtues of dispersed power and local repub-
licaii institutions. What if the above measures had been pur-
sued by state or local governments? Would Sandel then
hitvc been on board? Again, one suspects not, although it is
~.ultto be certain. And it seems that it is difticult for
Santlel himself to be certain, or at least to articulate coher- A re the boundaries
of decent politics
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

eiit principles on the basis of which he could determine

what would constitute “legitimate” self-government, versus marked out precisely
what would be unacceptably reactionary in late-twentieth-
ccatury America. enough by liberal
hriting in the New Rrpuhlic in 1984,4Sandel indicates
thul “communitarians” would likely favor banning porno-
communitarianism?
graphic bookstores and regulating industrial plant closings
i n the name of community protection. However, as Beiner
note.\, although low, are not solid. Social cohesion in America,
because of the nation’s flawed, individualist founding, takes
qipose we are presented with a local cornrnunity whose way
oi life is not violated but buttressed by pornography. . . . The extraordinary work; it takes statecraft as soulcraft. In par-
ii(rl>eillto community can as easily sanction the desirability of ticular, “we need a public philosophy that can rectify the
p mography as its undesirability. Here again. the communitar- current imbalance between the political order’s meticulous
ian ideal points toward not the repudiation of pluralist liberal- concern for material well-being and its fastidious with-
i w i hut the confirmation of it.
drawal from concern for the inner lives and moral character
Siindel concludes Democrucy ’s Discontent with the fol- of citizens” (65). This is a public philosophy that would
lowing warning, and fond wish: support legislation conducive to nurturing, bolstering, or
altering habits on a mass scale (19-20).
Since human beings are storytelling beings, we are bound to Such a public philosophy is, according to Will, in keep-
whcl against a drift to storylessness. But there is no guarantee
h a t the rebellions will take salutary form. Some. in their hunger
ing with the deepest traditions of America, Such was the
story, will be drawn to the vacant, vicarious fare of confes- morivating sentiment behind the land-grant act that created
w n a l talk shows. celebrity scandals, and sensational trials. America’s vast network of public universities, which were
Others will seek refuge in fundamentalism. The hope of our originally seen as means to inculcate morals as well as tech-
iiiiies rests instead with those who can summon the conviction nical skills. Such a public philosophy would recognize that
itlid restraint to make sense of our condition and repair the civic
I l k on which democracy dependsh
“between compulsion and indifference stands a broad area
of persuasion” (8 I). A public philosophy that attempts to be
Saiidel wants, in short, a liberal communitarianism. He neutral with respect to moral persuasion does so at its peril,
wiirits a storytelling accomplished in the context of a repub- and at the peril of the nation dominated by it.
lican tradition that is now dead or dying. It is perhaps pre- What kinds of laws might such an alternative public phi-
dictable that he opposes the “intolerant moralisms” (322) of losophy generate? Will is cautious, but he points to laws
groups such as the Moral Majority, which, apparently, till that would not ignore the social consequences ot’ individual
1:hc vacuum created by the procedural republic with the behavior, but would indeed focus on those social conse-
wrcing kind of stories. But who is to say-what standards quences rather than the behavior itself. The law should not,
do we use to determine-what constitutes an intolerant for example, treat pornography sales as a purely private
inor;ilisiii as opposed to a genuine, virtuous republican transaction-a question of rights-when the public conse-
coiiimunity‘? Certainly not Sandel. His historical examples quences include “a multibillion-dollar pornography indus-
merely adumbrate a story that must ultimately be told by the try,” the “laceration of sensibilities,” and “dubiety about the
voice of‘a reason that transcends community. very idea of shamefulness” (84-85). Likewise, the law can-
Sandel seems to want a communitarianism that will share not ignore, in the name of abortion rights, the “new casual-
thc Harvarci government professor’s tastes when it comes to ness about the conceiving and disposing of life” and the
u diffuse sovereignty that builds communal ties. But is such “transformed attitudes about sex, and hence about relations
i1 liberal communitarianism possible? Is not the reed on between the sexes” (85).
 214 Perspectives on Political Science

These are perhaps the most controversial aspects of ianism. Hitlerism was a willfulness that supplanted organic
Will’s communitarian sensibilities. Less controversial is his institutions. It was, apparently, unfit for the traditional Ger-
view that the civil rights legislation of the 1960s was intend- many, and Hitler was therefore “a rootless freebooter,” i t
ed not. nierely to improve material conditions for particular “pure radical” (146). Nevertheless, in the end, there are cer-
people, but to force a change in attitudes toward those peo- tain things that, apart from identifiable traditions, appear to
ple in society as a whole. By forcing integration in many be beyond the pale for Will because they offend an enlight-
areas of life, the law sought in effect, and over time, to alter ened view of the self.
morals. Even many liberal individualists who would deny From the point of view of providing social cohesion.
the ability of law to affect morality in the areas of pornog- Will’s analysis raises interesting questions. If America’s
raphy, abortion, and sexual mores, are less inclined to deny social cohesion is to be found in a soulcraft that is not par-
law’s educative function in the area of civil rights. By jux- ticularly reflective of America’s founding, what resonance
taposing the act of moral education inherent in civil rights can it be expected to have? Can one sell Burkean soulcraft
legislation with more controversial claims about pornogra- in Missouri? Surely any effort to promote sympathy with a
phy and abortion, Will effectively undermines the charac- community must rely on something fundamental to that
teristically liberal assertion that the government should not community. Furthermore, in the absence of principles more
and cannot deal with morality to the extent of effecting superintending than Will would like, what exactly are the
moral change through law. limits of prudential judgment? Quite apart from what seems
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

In general, Will’s standard for legislative proscriptions to be the still-open question of whether Hitler was a radical
seems to be that they are appropriate where the conduct subverter of German national culture or the logical expres-
being proscribed cannot by a reasonable person be hoped to sion of certain strains of German thought, Will’s analysis
produce a better citizen or more perfect polity (88). does not seem to take quite seriously enough the limitations
Pornography and racist agitation therefore ought not to of tradition as a source of knowability and consistency in
enjoy the same protections as other speech or expression. political questions. Along with Will, or Sandel, few would
Which is not to say that there will invariably be broad and deny that there is a pale beyond which decent politics
comprehensive bans on such forms of speech and expres- should not go. But are its walls sturdy enough, and are its
sion. Rather, Will seems to say only that the political com- boundaries marked out precisely enough, by liberal (or
munity, acting in its own interest and in the interest of the slightly less liberal) communitarianism?
moral betterment of its citizens, ought presumptively to If communitarianism can be seen as a “movement,” then
have the right to impose prudential restrictions that would Amitai Etzioni is its leader. It is not often that an academic
violate the liberal First Amendment standards enunciated sociologist attracts the attention of Time magazine, espe-
by the Supreme Court. cially in the midst of the flurry of coverage surrounding a
Indeed, most of Will’s reasoning seems to be prudential. major event such as the Gulf War.#With the publication of
”All politics takes place on a slippery slope. The most The Spirir qf’ Community? Etzioni cemented his position.
important four words in politics are ‘up to a point”’ (93). It The book is a somewhat unusual blend of scholarship, polit-
i s [or the ends of social cohesion and moral betterment that ical advocacy, and self-promotion. It concludes with a “Re-
Will advocates giving the American polity a much freer sponsive Communitarian Platform” and advice on how to
hand in legislation than it currently has, thanks to the contact the new Communitarian Network and the journal
Supreme Court, or than it thinks it should have, thanks to founded by Etzioni, The Responsive Community. The title
the flawed but dominant public philosophy of liberal indi- of the book’s introduction nicely encapsulates the move-
vidualism. ment’s aspirations: “A New Moral, Social, Public Order-
Is Will’s a conservative communitarianism? Yes, up to a Without Puritanism or Oppression.”
point. In a deeper sense, however, it is liberal in the same In pursuit of this new moral order, Etzioni calls for a
manner as Sandel’s. Will’s abhorrence of “racist agitation” moratorium on the minting of new “rights,” the suengthen-
can be seen to stem from a distinct privileging of liberal, or ing of responsibilities through family and community ties,
Enlightenment, premises, as can his other preferences in and the reining-in of some extant rights, including especial-
their fundamental respect for human dignity. (Sexual mores, ly those related to search and seizure. The sixties, according
for example, have been much looser at various times and to Etzioni, were a time of destruction for old, widely shared
places in Western history than Will would want them to be. values, some of which deserved to be cast aside. The prob-
In this sense, it may be difficult to extract his preferred posi- lem is that they were not replaced by others. And all soci-
tion directly from the historical tradition without some help eties require some group of settled social values. Etzioni’s
from perhaps modern, or at least transhistorical-and communitarians apparently10 do not favor a return to the
arguably nonorganic-standards.) “Leave It to Beaver” family of the fifties; they do favor “a
True, in addition to the policy prescriptions we have seen, communitarian family-one in which both parents are
Will would advocate what he calls a “conservative welfare actively and deeply involved in their children’s upbringing”
state,” relying on an incentive, rather than pure entitlement, (25). What they argue for apparently has “little to do with
structure ( 129). And in general, before advocating any form laws and regulations”; but they favor “learning cardiopul-
of statism, he would ensure that it was “an embodiment of monary resuscitation,”“ They are apparently in favor of lim-
national traditions and values” (144-45). This, he claims, iting the teaching of creationism in schools; they are op-
separates his conservative communitarianism from totalitar- posed to a “Puritanism” that would close abortion clinics
 Fall 1999. Volume 28, Number 4 21s

(41 ) The family should be supported by the community been understood” (lo). In this sense, distributions must be
through measures such as parental leave (54-88); yet por- autonomous. The autonomy of spheres, required whenever
nogi.uphy is acceptable when it accords with the values of a (socially constructed) meanings are distinct, makes for
pwticular community ( 5 1-52). Self-centered communities more possible areas of satisfaction for more people than if
that hever their ties to “more encompassing supracommuni- one sphere could dominate all the rest.
ties“ are to be discouraged; celebration of particular cul- Is America too individualist? Yes, according to Walzer, in-
ture$ is not (14740). Hate speech should not be subject to sofar as it is not giving sufficient weight to Americans’ shared
legal or formal sanction but to community outrage and edu- understanding of certain social goods. Some examples: As a
cational efforts ( 192-2061; however, private money in con- liberal democracy, the United States in the welfare sphere
gresbional elections, and political action committees, ought to provide for the needs of its members based on how
should be legally suppressed (235). those members together understand that need, in proportion
TIiis pick-and-choose-your-favorite liberal communitari- to the need, while upholding the equality of all members (84).
an viilues approach, and an oddly apolitical tone, so perme- “The question is, What do the citizens owe one another, given
ate fiitzioni’s book that it is difficult to know what to make the community they actually inhabit?’ (85). In the sphere of
of i t , Etzioni certainly favors a general community spirited- money, redistribution must occur to, among other things,
ness and the social and individual virtues that go along with “sustain the integrity of other distributive spheres-by de-
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

it. hut he has not learned the Aristotelian lesson that ethics priving powerful entrepreneurs, for example, of the means of
is ;I subset of politics. One must ultimately lay down certain capturing political power” (121). Basic education should be
cohtrrent political principles-a coherent political sci- distributed equally and not undermined by a voucher system
encti-to speak intelligently about community “values” and (206-19). Complex equality, that is, equality defined by a
their encouragement. And one must also be able to define, society on a sphere-by-sphere basis-an equality that pre-
in iiiore coherent terms than Etzioni’s, the regime-or vents inequality from being multiplied to other spheres-
“aupacommunity”-that one is talking about whenever the should prevail in a complex liberal democracy.
word “community” is used. Without such a definition, it is In the end, Walzer makes clear that “whether one just
impossible to know the nature of the community that is ulti- society is better than another, I have no way of saying. Is
maltfly to be protected from the excesses of individualism there a particular understanding (and then a particular dis-
or olher forms of self-seeking, and it is therefore impossible tribution) of social goods that is good simply? That is not a
t o k w w what must be done to protect it. question that I have addressed in this book“ (3 12). And
A, more serious account of communitarianism is given by indeed, one should ponder what Walzer’s position would be
Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice.’?He argues for a com- if the United States were better conceived as a liberal, indi-
rnuqitarianism that can provide what might be called posi- vidualist society-wherein social meanings and spheres of
tive freedom. He is a democratic theorist of the distinctly justice are indistinct-rather than a democratic society. The
rnoc(ern variety insofar as he wishes to give priority to egal- consequence, for Walzer, would seem to be that American
itaribin norms. But his definition of equality has to do with society would remain true to this tradition, and just, if it
the distribution of political goods, which themselves are- gave maximum scope to individual aggrandizement, which
aid must be-communal goods. Indeed, it is likely that all would necessarily cross the spheres of justice.
goo& must be: “Some domestic objects are cherished for Finally, let me here give an account of the least-conse-
priciite and sentimental reasons, but only in cultures where quential version of communitarianism with which I will
sentiment regularly attaches to such objects” (7). Therefore, deal. By least-consequential 1 mean only that it is a form of
whiur is available for distribution according to the principles communitarianism that does not necessarily point to any-
of jpstice cannot be a product of free individual choice. thing in particular in the realm of action, even assuming that
Rather, societies as a whole determine what those goods its account of things is correct. Charles Taylor’s essay on
are. what the range of possible choices might be. There can “Atomism”l3has long identified him as an originator of con-
be i i o such thing as true neutrality between ends or goods temporary communitarianism. He presents far more devel-
bec&use only certain ones present themselves in certain oped views in Sources of the Self:14 although the book cannot
societies. And “distributions are just or unjust relative to the be said to be a work on communitarianism per se. However,
s o o ~ dmeanings of the goods at stake” (9). that intimidating tome deals with the nature of the self and
Whether or not a society is too “individualist” (or, put its relationship to the Western intellectual tradition, and
anol her way, lacks appropriate communal norms) and there- therefore has much to say indirectly about the debate
fore too inegalitarian is, according to Walzer, a determina- between liberals and communitarians. Described by review-
tion that can be made only by comparing its practice with ers on its soft cover as “magnificent” and “one of the most
its own internal discourse. The answer depends on the tra- important philosophical works of the last quarter century,”
ditims and narrative contained within that society, and the the book meanders over vast philosophical ground without
degt-ce of deviance, or conformity, of the individualist prac- necessarily breaking any. It has much in common with Walz-
ticeb. And that narrative in turn varies with the sphere of jus- er’s effort insofar as it makes the human being an anthropo-
tice being considered. For example, “Money is inappropri- logical rather than a political animal. Our self-understanding
ate :in the sphere of ecclesiastical office; it is an intrusion is always in the form of a narrative, constructed around our
frorp another sphere. And piety should make for no advan- conception of the good, though it is not a “hypergood” of
tagj in the marketplace, as the marketplace has commonly what Taylor claims to be the Aristotelian sort (66). Accord-
 ’Ih Persuectives on Political Science

ing to Taylor, the self is always situated in moral space. “We Taylor’s communitarianism, or more properly, his em-
are all framed by what we see as universally valid commit- phasis on a thickly constituted self, so quickly merges with
ments (being a Catholic or an anarchist. . .) and also by what individualist liberalism that it is hard to notice the not-so-
we understand as particular identifications (being an Armen- hostile takeover. If the liberal critic is right, the communi-
ian or a Qudbecois)” (29). The self is always constituted in a tarian side of the academic debate of which we have been
framework that has some reference to morality, or the good. speaking must be wrong; alternatively, it must lose almost
Our identity is that which confers importance on certain all its force. And in society at large, the “conservative” or
things such that the “notion of an identity defined by some “communitarian” side of the culture wars must be not only
inere de facto, not strongly valued preference is incoherent” wrong but, in some important sense, un-American. I believe
(30). We are not selves in a biological, or even natural sense, neither of these conclusions to be correct.
but in the sense in which things have significance for us (34),

CONCLUSION

U
What seems to be needed is a more coherent form of
t ility itself presupposes communitarianism than has been presented to date. All of
those whom I have characterized as communitarians have
some understanding
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014

- one important thing in common. They do not claim an ab-

solute status for the content of their narrative. They claim
of the human good. only that it is necessary to counter the excesses of various
forms of liberalism and to cement a decent set of civic ob-
ligations in a culture otherwise incapable of such virtue.
With the probable exception of George Will they are, in their
historicism, modernists to the core. Yet they are uneasy with
which in turn relies to some extent on the language that we what liberal modernism, particularly its American variant,
have come to accept-the “language and vision of others” has unleashed. They wish for communities to have the right
(37). Thus according to Taylor even the heroic Socrates, to tell certain kinds of stories, because human beings find
although transcending Athenian opinion, still existed in a such stories useful or inevitable, and even have an inextin-
web of discourse shared by other philosophers. The Enlight- guishable need for them. Their understandings of the kind of
enment and the Romantic, expressivist turn in Western his- story that the American community tells are remarkably
tory have made us what we are now (393). In the end, those similar, though not identical. They are similar enough to
“cultural transformations” have resulted in a substantial provide a foundation on which an essentially decent liberal
degree of consensus: politics-desired by all of the communitarians-can rest.
We agree surprisingly well, across great differences of theolog- Contemporary communitarianism is a response, or a set
ical and metaphysical belief, about the demands of justice and of responses, to a constitutive world that cries out for syni-
benevolence, and their importance. There are differences, pathy. Yet the communitarian responses are themselves
including the stridently debated one about abortion. But the problematic insofar as they cry out more for utility than
very rarity of these cases, which contributes to their saliency, is
truth. But utility itself presupposes some understanding of
eloquent testimony to the general agreement. To see how much
our consensus embraces, we need only compare any strand in the human good, else how could one say what is useful?
our culture with basic beliefs held earlier and outside it. (515) And without a telos more fixed than the communitarians
seem comfortable with, they are always faced with a
What Taylor gives us is, in the last analysis, another form rejoinder that is unanswerable in a crucial sense: Useful
of liberal communitarianism. We are selves constituted in for what?
such a way as to make all or most of us sympathetic to those Present-day communitarians are those who lament the
things around which liberals would hope to find consensus. losses associated with liberalism, without-for good rea-
Given Taylor’s apparent confidence in the present level of son-wishing to impose over liberalism a classical or
social consensus, it would perhaps be churlish to ask him medieval framework. Nevertheless, this reluctance is at the
for his view of the increasingly divisive “culture wars” rag- root of the communitarian conundrum. Correcting this core
ing in American society. Taylor concentrates instead on the defect of communitarianism is by no means an easy task,
sources of such consensus as does exist because “[hligh and indeed it may be an impossible one, without explicit
standards need strong sources” (516). But does he concen- recourse to some version of a natural right, natural law, or
trate quite enough? natural rights theory.
Although Taylor does not say it, the notion of a self exist-
ing in a neutral framework seems in most cases to be prob-
NOTES
lematic. Unless, of course, the neutral framework is the very
thing that socially constitutes the self or, alternatively, that The author wishes to express gratitude to the John M. Olin Foundation
defines a self-conception of autonomy. And there would of New York, which has generously supported his work on cornrnunitari-
anisrn, including this article and his book in progress. Parrrdoxes qf Coni-
then seem to be no defense against a liberal critic’s charge munity: is a Liberul Communitarianism Possible .7
that this is precisely how the self is constituted, at least in 1. Michael Sandel, Democracy’s Disconfenr (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
the United States. vard University Press, 19%). ix. This book builds on the critique of liber-
 Fall IOOY, Volume 28, Number 4 217

alism. iwticularly as espoused by John Rawls, that Sandel launched in ualism Draws Fire from a New Intellectual Movement that Re-emphasizes
Libc~rudmiund the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer- Social Obligation,” Time, 25 February 1991, 71.
sity P r w . 1982). 9. Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: The Reinveritiori of Amer-
2. Ronald Beiner, What‘s the Murrer with Liberalism? (Berkeley: Uni- ican Society (New York: Touchstone, 1994).
versit) t i t ’ California Press, 1 9 9 2 ~33-38. 10. I say “apparently” because Etzioni takes it on himself‘to speak for
3 . Jiindel. Democrucy ‘s Discoritmt. 24. the movement and, when he does so, he can be somewhat ohlique.
4. .Michael Sandel, “Morality and the Liberal Ideal: Must Individual I I . Ibid., 39. Elsewhere, he seems to favor the law’s ability to express
Rights :Betray the Common Good?” New Republic. 7 May 1984. values and encourage conduct.
5. Ikiner, What’s the Matter with Liberalism? 31 n. 31. 12. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense .f‘ Plur.rrlisni and
Eyuity (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
7. George El Will, Storecraft CIS Soulcraji: What Government Does 13. Charles Taylor, “Atomism,” in Powers, Possessirins, and Freedom,
(New k d i : Simon and Schuster. 1983). Will is one of America’s best- ed. Alkis Kontos (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1079).
knowii critics of liberal individualism and a political theorist by training. 14. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Sew The Making of Modern Identity
R. Walter Shapiro, “‘AWhole Greater than Its Parts? American Individ- (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19x9).
Downloaded by [University of Chicago Library] at 08:45 18 November 2014