Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere

Author(s): Evan Charney

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AmericanPoliticalScience Review Vol. 92, No. 1 March1998

PoliticalLiberalism,
Deliberative
Democracy,
andthe PublicSphere
EVAN CHARNEY Harvard University
heorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinctfrom the apparatus of
the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation.
Discourse ethicists and deliberativedemocrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the
manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the
anonymous 'public conversation" of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited
conception of thepublic sphere.For Rawls,public reason, which establishesnormsfor democraticdiscourse,
applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable
distinction between thepublic and nonpublic spheres.I argue that Rawls's more limited "liberal"conception
betterguarantees the heterogeneityof associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his
own principles bypartiallycollapsing thepublic-nonpublic distinctionwithpotentially illiberalconsequences.

he recovery of the public realm" might be an that matter, from the "coercive power" of normative
appropriate way to characterize a recent trend political theory). My purpose is in no way to question
in democratic political theory. Democratic the- the significance of associational life either for the
orists, in the tradition of Tocqueville, now emphasize process of democratic will formation or for its role in
the importance of voluntary associations in civil society instilling the various norms associated with democratic
for the generation of "social capital," that is, the citizenship, that is, its value as social capital. Rather, it
various norms associated with the democratic art of is to argue for the value of a principled liberal distinc-
collective self-rule and decision making (Putnam tion between the public and the private.
1995). Deliberative democrats and discourse theorists What I have in mind here by preserving the public-
emphasize, in the Arendtian tradition, the importance private distinction is not the Arendtian concern that
of a free public sphere, separate from the apparatus of the rise of the social has effaced the distinction between
the state and economy, where citizens can freely de- the public and private and hence the dividing line
bate, deliberate, and engage in collective democratic between the realms of "necessity" and "freedom,"
will formation. Jirgen Habermas and various deliber- reducing political life to a form of "household admin-
ative democrats emphasize the importance of both an istration" (Arendt 1957, 33-49). Nor is it the related
Arendtian public sphere and associations in civil soci- Habermasian concern that the space of democratic
ety. These theorists locate the public sphere not in a decision making has now been "colonized" by technical
common public space, as in the Greek polis, or in a administrative imperatives (Habermas 1985, 1989).
Rousseauan general assembly attended by all citizens, These are legitimate concerns. What I mean by the
both of which are seen as untenable alternatives under private sphere is simply the familiar liberal concept of
conditions of modernity. They locate it within civil a realm of thought and action that is protected from
society itself, that is, within all the manifold forms of the coercive power of the state and that involves the
associational life that comprise civil society in the concepts of limited government, liberty of conscience,
modern democratic state. According to Seyla Benhabib and the separation of church and state. In the "Liber-
(1996, 73-4), the reason a deliberative model of de- alism of Fear," Judith Shklar (1989) identified the
mocracy can dispense with the fiction of a mass assem- maintenance of just such a public-private distinction as
bly is that it locates the public sphere in a plurality of a kind of shibboleth for identifying a "true" form of
modes of association within civil society: "It is through liberalism:
the interlocking net of these multiple forms of associ-
[Liberalism]mustrejectonly those politicaldoctrinesthat
ations, networks and organizations that an anonymous do not recognizeanydifferencebetweenthe spheresof the
'public conversation' results." Benhabib (p. 75) con- personaland the public.Because of the primacyof toler-
trasts this model with the "liberal model" of John ationas the irreduciblelimiton publicagents,liberalsmust
Rawls, for whom the public sphere is located not within alwaysdrawsuch a line. This is not historicallya perma-
associational life in civil society but, rather, within a nent or unalterableboundary,but it does require that
more restricted sphere, including first and foremost the every public policy be consideredwith this separationin
legal sphere and its institutions. mindand consciouslydefendedas meetingits most severe
In this article I shall argue for just such a limited currentstandard.The importantpointfor liberalismis not
liberal conception of the public sphere as presented in so muchwhere the line is drawn,as that it be drawn,and
the work of Rawls. This more limited conception thatit mustunderno circumstancebe ignoredor forgotten
(Shklar1989, 24).
actually better serves to guarantee the autonomy of
associational life within civil society and its indepen- I shall argue that, although this is certainly not their
dence from the coercive powers of the state (or, for intent, some discourse ethicists and deliberative dem-
ocrats are in danger of collapsing this distinction with
Evan Charney is a Ph.D. candidate, Department of Government, potentially illiberal consequences. And I shall argue
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. that Rawls himself ultimately violates his own founda-

97
Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

tional principles by partially collapsing this distinction kinds of voluntary associations in civil society, such as
with the same consequences. clubs, churches, and universities (Rawls 1971, 520-9).
Paralleling this distinction, Rawls makes a funda-
mental distinction between public and nonpublic "uses
POLITICALLIBERALISMAND PUBLIC
of reason." The nonpublic uses include the "social," the
REASON
"familial," and the "individual" (Rawls 1993, 220).
In Political Liberalism (1993, xvi-xviii), Rawls asks how Most often by the term "nonpublic reason" Rawls
persons in a democratic society whose political culture intends the social uses of reason, and it is in this sense
is characterized by a diversity of opposing and irrecon- that I shall employ the term throughout. These non-
cilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines public reasons are simply the various forms of reason-
can freely endorse a common political regime. In other ing, whatever they may be, that characterize associa-
words, what is the basis of political legitimacy in a tions within civil society. It is, for example, the
pluralistic society? For Rawls, the answer depends reasoning of "churches and universities, scientific soci-
upon articulating a conception of justice that can be eties and professional groups... . Nonpublic reasons
endorsed by the various "reasonable" comprehensive comprise the many reasons of civil society and belong
views in society, that is, one that can be the focus of an to what I have called the background culture in con-
overlapping consensus despite profound disagreement trast with the public political culture" (p. 220). By
on other matters of "ultimate concern." To uncover contrast, public reason is a normative ideal, meant to
such a consensus, the conception of justice to regulate apply in particular to the judiciary and a supreme
society, and the political society regulated by that court-called the "exemplar" of public reason; to
conception, "should be as far as possible, independent political officials when they "speak in official forums";
of the opposing and conflicting religious and philo- to the executive in its public acts and pronouncements;
sophical doctrines that citizens affirm" (p. 9). Among to members of political parties and candidates in their
such conflicting doctrines, Rawls now includes the campaigns; as well as to citizens when they "engage in
liberalisms of Kant and Mill, as well as his own A political advocacy in the public forum" and vote on
Theoryof Justice (1971), seen as fostering certain values issues concerning "constitutional essentials and mat-
(i.e., individuality and autonomy) meant to govern ters of basic justice" (pp. 215-6).
much if not all of life (Rawls 1993, xvi-xvii, 98-100). In In brief, public reason limits, in the specific venues
a society characterized by value pluralism, the values of and circumstances noted above, the reasons invoked in
individuality and autonomy as regulative ideals for all a process of justification or argumentation to those that
of life will not be, and should not be expected to be, an appeal to political values or the values of a "political
ideal for all citizens. According to Rawls (p. 13), what conception of justice," which conception itself involves
distinguishes political liberalism from such "compre- a conception of society as a fair system of cooperation
hensive" liberalisms as those of Kant and Mill, as well among free and equal citizens possessed of certain
as all other comprehensive views, is its limited scope. It basic rights and liberties and entitled to certain basic
applies to a limited public domain-that of persons as opportunities (Rawls 1993, 15-6, 223). The same cri-
citizens-and the values and virtues it invokes are teria that determine what can count as legitimate
meant to apply to persons in their capacities as citizens, reasons for the selection of principles of justice also
that is, to be "political" as opposed to "ethical" virtues ideally determine what can be advanced as legitimate
and to be justified on the basis of certain qualities of reasons in the public sphere: "In justice as fairness,
character necessary for citizens in a democratic regime then, the guidelines of public reason and the principles
(p. 195). of justice have essentially the same grounds" (pp.
All these distinctions, namely, that between a com- 225-6). Because of a presumed divergence of moral
mon public political conception of justice and various and religious interests, the limitations imposed by the
comprehensive views within society, between "politi- veil of ignorance preclude the parties in the original
cal" and "ethical"virtues, between persons qua citizens position from giving as a reason for the selection of a
and persons qua persons, between political values and principle of justice that, for example, it is prescribed in
other values that apply to "all of life," and between the the Decalogue (Rawls 1971, 14, 127, 327). Similarly,
modes of reason appropriate to the public sphere (i.e., public reason in its strictest form precludes appeals to
public reason) and those appropriate to other particular comprehensive moral, religious, or philo-
"spheres," depend ultimately upon one fundamental sophical doctrines in the public sphere (Rawls 1993, 10,
distinction-that between the public and private. Yet, 214-8).1
Rawls (1993, 220) specifically states: "The public vs.
nonpublic distinction is not the distinction between I Rawls (1996) revised his view somewhat in Section 5 of the
public and private." He avoids the locution of a public- Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism. There
private distinction because of the individualistic non- he says that reasonable comprehensive doctrines "may be introduced
associational connotations of the word "private,"main- into public reason at any time, provided that in due course public
taining that "there is no such thing as private reason" reasons, given by a reasonable political conception are presented
(p. 220). The word nonpublic is employed by Rawls sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are
introduced to support" (p. lii). There are many problems with this
most often to denote various forms of association life formulation. By allowing only reasonable comprehensive views into
within society-what in A Theoryof Justiceare called public reason, Rawls adds very little to his original formulation,
''socialunions."These includethe familyas well as all inasmuch as reasonable comprehensive views are defined as those

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American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 1

In addition to limitations on content, public reason part of the private domain have come to be seen as
incorporates certain limits on method. These involve appropriately regulated by law and, hence, to that
an adherence to general principles of reasoning, crite- extent public, or that matters once considered to be
ria of relevance, and rules of evidence-"accepted appropriately regulated by law are now viewed as part
general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in com- of the private domain. When matters once viewed as
mon sense, and the methods and conclusions of science "private" come to be seen as proper objects of legisla-
when these are not controversial" (Rawls 1993, 224-5). tion, such legislation is itself generally justified in terms
As with the restriction upon reasons, the restrictions on of public-political values. For example, the repudiation
method are meant to provide a public basis of justifi- of laissez-faire economics, upheld by the Supreme
cation accessible to citizens generally: For example, Court in Lochner v. New York (1905), entailed a shift in
revelation would be "ruled out of court" (literally and the view of which practices could be appropriately
figuratively) as a rule of evidence. Thus, public reason regulated by law and thus entailed a corresponding
seeks to create a common ground of public-political shift in the view of the boundary separating the public
justification, which by limiting itself to the values of the and private domains.2 The justification for the subse-
political and ways of reasoning available to citizens quent legal regulation of such practices, however, has
generally can provide an acceptable basis of legitima- been presented in terms of the promotion of the
tion for citizens in a pluralist society. As such, public political values of regulating the health, safety, and
reason is a form of what Gutmann and Thompson economic well-being of the general public, and in this
(1996, 55) have characterized as a principle of "delib- way such regulations have been justified in a manner
erative reciprocity": "When citizens deliberate, they consistent with the limitations of public reason.
seek agreement on substantive principles that can be Does the acknowledgment of a potentially shifting
justified on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons." boundary between the public and private domains
entail, then, that everything is potentially subject to
public determination and legal regulation, as long as a
CONTESTING THE LIMITED PUBLIC justification for such regulation is presented in terms of
DOMAIN public reasons?3 The answer is "no," for a reason
related to the concept of public reason itself: The
Distinguishing the Domains limitations of public reason are in part a reflection of
The first objection I shall consider is that public reason, the limited ends of government. As noted above, for
by attempting to limit the justification for legislation to Rawls the principles of justice and the principles of
an appeal to political values, relies upon a rigid a priori public reason have the same grounds. Since it is
division between the public and private, one in which assumed that persons have diverse comprehensive
the public is defined as that domain of actions seen as (e.g., religious) beliefs that they seek to advance, one
appropriately regulated by principles of justice and the proper role of government is seen as upholding the
coercive power of law. According to Habermas (1995, liberty to exercise such beliefs. In this way, the free
129), such an a priori boundary conflicts with historical exercise of religion remains a "private" right of indi-
experience and with "the fact that the historically viduals (although it is a right most often exercised by
shifting boundary between the public and private individuals as members of various groups). Any at-
spheres has always been problematic from a moral tempt to regulate this "region" of the private domain-
point of view." Similarly, Benhabib (1992, 99-100) that concerned with religious belief and practice-
maintains that "democratic politics challenges, rede- would entail simultaneously a violation of public
fines and renegotiates the divisions between the good reason and a violation of the basic principles of the
and the just, the moral and the legal, the private and liberal democratic state, for it would constitute a
the public." She argues that practices once considered violation of the principles of the separation of church
to be part of the private domain, such as certain aspects and state and liberty of conscience. This does not
of worker-employee relations, are now seen as "pub- mean, of course, that such practices cannot be regu-
lic," in the sense of being viewed as matters of political lated if they are deemed to endanger the health and
justice and as appropriately regulated by law. Con- safety of members of the community or violate their
versely (although Benhabib does not make this point), rights as citizens: Churches can excommunicate here-
some matters once viewed as public in the sense of tics but not burn them at the stake. But the justification
being regulated by law are now seen as part of the for such regulation must itself be presented in terms of
private domain (e.g., contraception).
Yet, the concept of public reason is in no way
2 The shift to which I refer is not the regulation of liberty of contract,
inconsistent with the fact that matters once considered
since private contracts have always been "public" to the extent that
such contracts have been upheld by law. (Similarly, the "free market"
which will support the proper balance of political values and which is not a "private market," to the extent that market transactions are
do not "run afoul" of public reason (1993, 243-4). Only "reasonable" upheld by the coercive power of law and the state.) I refer to the
comprehensive views are allowed into public debate, but before any regulation of practices once genuinely unregulated and hence "non-
debate has occurred, before the "reasonable" balance of political public," such as workers' wages and workplace safety, which subse-
values has been determined, how do we know which comprehensive quently came to be legally regulated "public" concerns.
views are reasonable concerning a given issue? For more on this 3 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising the question of

point and the problem with the definition of a "reasonable" compre- whether a strict conception of public reason is consistent with a belief
hensive doctrine, see my discussion below. that everything is in principle subject to public determination.

99
Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

the limited, that is, political, ends of government.4 desires... . The problem is different, however, where the
Thus, substantive limitations upon the proper ends of public domain is concerned (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
government determine both the limits of the public 1972, 179-80).
domain and the limitations imposed by public reason.
Since public reason itself places a limit on what can be If a church or a university discriminates on the basis of
viewed as a public harm or a public good, it places a race, then it can lose tax-exempt status, the granting of
limit upon what can be a matter for legislation. Salva- such status being seen as an instance of state action and
tion is not a public good; damnation is not a public hence as bringing such institutions into the public
harm, since, in Lockean terms, "the Care of Souls is not domain to that extent (Bob Jones University v. United
committed to the Civil Magistrate" (Locke [1689] 1983, States 1983). Of course, as Douglas's dissent in Moose
26).5 Lodge indicates, the question as to what constitutes
This point leads to the following related objection. state action and hence the "public domain" is a highly
The distinction between the reasoning of associations contested and complex issue. Justice Rehnquist, who
within civil society and the public domain subject to the wrote for the majority in Moose Lodge, rightly noted in
limitations of public reason is an untenable one, inas- another case: "While the principle that private action is
much as many civil associations are also public bod- immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth
ies-such as churches and universities-and therefore Amendment is well established and easily stated, the
must comply with some of the same legal and consti- question whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the
tutional restrictions to which other more obviously one hand, or 'state action,' on the other, frequently
public (i.e., governmental) institutions are subject. As admits of no easy answer" (Jackson v. Metropolitan
Benhabib (1996, 76) notes: "All clubs, associations and Edison Co. 1974, 349-50).
organizations within civil society have charters that can It is not my intention here to enter into a consider-
be subject to public as well as legal scrutiny."A country ation of the complexities of the state action doctrine.
club that discriminates on the basis of race may have to Furthermore, as Cass Sunstein has noted, (1993, 160)
change its charter if it seeks to become a legally the pertinent question is often not whether the state
incorporated entity. From this Benhabib concludes has acted at all-upholding a racially restrictive con-
that "the constitutional-democratic state and the insti- tract or evicting protesters from a mall seem unambig-
tutions of civil society are therefore not as sharply uous instances of state action-"but whether the state
separable as some of Rawls's formulations suggest" (p. action at issue in the relevant case violates the pertinent
76). provision of the Constitution," that is, violates the
While it is certainly true that all such associations equal protection clause or any other constitutional
can be subject to legal regulation, one cornerstone of provision. According to Sunstein, however, his claim
American constitutionalism, the so-called state action that upholding laws of contract, tort, and property
doctrine, depends upon the recognition of a fundamen- constitutes unambiguous instances of state action is
tal distinction between the public and nonpublic "emphatically not that there is no line between public
spheres in this regard. Concerning the importance of and private action, or that private action is constitu-
maintaining this distinction, particularly in relation to tionally restricted," or that "everything is state action"
voluntary associations in civil society, Justice Douglas (p. 159). My point here is not to emphasize that the
wrote in his dissenting opinion in a case in which the boundaries dividing the public and nonpublic in regard
granting of a liquor license to a "whites only" fraternal to associational life are easily determined or uncontro-
organization was found not to constitute state action: versial; rather, what Shklar (1989, 24) said of liberalism
in general applies in this case as well: What is of vital
My view of the FirstAmendmentand the relatedguaran- importance "is not so much where the line is drawn, as
tees of the Bill of Rights is that they create a zone of that it be drawn, and that it must under no circum-
privacywhichprecludesgovernmentfrominterferingwith stance be ignored or forgotten."
privateclubsor groups.The associationalrightswhichour
systemhonorspermitall white,all black,all brown,and all
yellow clubs to be formed.They also permitall Catholic, Public Reason and Civil Society
all Jewish,or all agnosticclubsto be established.Govern-
ment may not tell a man or a woman who his or her There is, of course, another way in which constitutional
associatesmustbe. The individualcan be as selectiveas he doctrine supports the public-nonpublic distinction in
regard to associations within civil society, and these are
4For more on this point and its implications in regard to the the general provisions of liberty of conscience as
establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, see embodied in the First Amendment. Thus, while liberty
my discussion below. of conscience protects the individual from the church-
5 Stating this does not entail that it is illegitimate for the state to take
persons may freely join and leave religious associations
measures to promote in citizens the various political virtues associ-
ated with democratic citizenship. As Rawls (1993, 195) notes: "If a with no loss of civil liberties-it also protects the
constitutional regime takes certain steps to strengthen the virtues of church from individuals, other associations, and the
toleration and mutual trust, say by discouraging various kinds of government. As Rawls (1993, 221) notes, "equally,
religious and racial discrimination (in ways consistent with liberty of liberty of conscience and other liberties such as free-
conscience and freedom of speech), it does not thereby become a
perfectionist state of the kind found in Plato and Aristotle, nor does
dom of association protect churches from the intru-
it establish a particular religion as in the Catholic and Protestant sions of government and from other powerful associa-
states of the early modern period." tions." And from its earliest formulations, the doctrine

100
American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 1

of the separation of church and state has been invoked issue does not concern law, that is, the use of the
as a way to protect the autonomy of churches, as well as coercive power of the state. Churches are voluntary
individual liberty of conscience, from governmental associations: Those dissatisfied with the policies of a
intrusion.6 given denomination are free to engage in public pro-
The doctrine of the separation of church and state test, leave the faith, join another denomination, or
means that churches and other religious associations establish one of their own.
have a protected domain of "nonpublic" reasoning Even if public reason allows for flourishing debate in
subject neither to the coercive legal power of the state civil society, what if the debate does concern a matter
nor to anything like the limitations of public reason- for legal regulation? Are not many of the most bitterly
construed as a normative ideal, not a legal requirement contested issues in our society today precisely of this
(Rawls 1993, 213, 220-2). Such a domain constitutes sort? Here it is important to stress the limited role of
the "internal life" of religious associations. Members of public reason. Rawls (1993, 215) says that in addition
a congregation will normally appeal to the "whole to particular venues associated with governmental
religious truth" as they see it in regard to most matters, power and governmental officials, public reason holds
and this includes political matters. Appeal is made to for citizens when they "vote in elections when consti-
criteria of truth and rules of evidence specific to their tutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at
faith, for example, to the divine nature of a text or a stake" and "when they engage in political advocacy in
prophet or to divine revelation. Of course, religious the public forum." While he says that it holds for
beliefs and practices may be exposed to criticism by members of political parties and candidates and for
others within civil society; they may become part of a groups who support them, is anything more implied by
larger "public" debate. Such beliefs and practices may his description of the "public forum"? I think that in
themselves be influenced by debate in civil society and addition to such unambiguously political forums as the
respond to changing societal and cultural norms. In this platforms of political parties, public reason can reason-
regard, Benhabib (1992, 65) notes how the "private and ably be applied in those venues where debate or
public languages of morals intertwine, and how the advocacy occurs on matters of potential legislation
conventional, religious private morality of individuals concerning citizens in general and the arguments-the
and sects gets infiltrated and influenced by the post reasons invoked-are intended to apply to any and all
conventional morality of the liberal democratic state." citizens. Obviously, what I have just described would
It is certainly not my intent to deny the reality of this include some but not all media; it would not include
process. The internal life of religious and other associ- religious television programs or religious newspapers
ations is rarely hermetically sealed from the outside or journals. But it would apply to members of any and
world and the surrounding civil society (although some all religious associations when, for example, they ap-
sects do strive to preserve their "traditional"ways and pear on the local news to advocate for or against
to insulate themselves as far as possible; see the legislation.
well-known case Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972). Debates This may seem like an overly subtle and potentially
concerning, for example, the ordination of women, the illiberal application of the principle. Certainly, free-
marriage of priests, the doctrine of papal infallibility, dom of expression places no legal restrictions upon
and a host of other issues "religious" in nature can and forms of argumentation in the media or any other
do become topics of debate in civil society, involving public venue. Here it should be emphasized that the
interdenominational dialogue, the media, and the par- question is not one of law. Public reason is a self-
ticipation of any and all associations and individuals imposed principle, a "duty" of civility and reciprocity,
who feel that they have a stake in the matter. Here, too, no more subject to legal enforcement than duties of
nothing like the limitations of public reason are appro- politeness or etiquette. In Kantian terms, it is a duty
priate. Feminists-Catholic or not-may attack the associated with the doctrine of virtue, not the doctrine
doctrine of the Catholic church concerning the ordina- of right: "The system of the doctrine of duties is now
tion of women by appealing to whatever principles they divided into the system of the doctrine of Right (ius),
wish, and the church may respond, as it has responded, which deals with duties that can be given by external
by appealing to its particular understanding of religious laws, and the system of the doctrine of virtue (Ethica),
doctrine and a given religious tradition. Debates of this which treats of duties that cannot be so given" (Kant
kind may be unabashedly partisan in the sense that [1797] 1991, 185). The difference is that, for Rawls, the
appeal is appropriately made to sectarian religious duty of adhering to public reason is meant to involve a
principles which may not constitute acceptable reasons more limited political rather than an ethical virtue
for others. In debates of this kind, however, what is at (both, however, are moral virtues-the political is a
subset of the ethical/moral).
6
The problem with this, according to Thomas Mc-
See, for example, the doctrine of "evangelical separation" associ-
ated primarily with Roger Williams, according to whom "worldly Carthy (1994, 52), is that "political discussion would
corruptions ... might consume the churches if sturdy fences against have to be radically transformed whenever the venue
the wilderness were not maintained" (Howe 1965, 6). Yet, Williams changed in relevant ways, even if the very same people
also thought it was possible for religions to accept a certain amount were discussing the very same issues." But, he contin-
of state aid without state control, so his view has been characterized
as one which saw the state as properly fostering a climate conducive ues, "can individuals reasonably be expected to divorce
to all religions and allowing for the existence of various forms of de their privateand publicbeliefs"in such a way as not to
facto establishment (Howe 1965, 11-2). appealto the whole truthas they see it? In contempo-

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Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

rary pluralistic democratic society, however, people do and not simply, for example, the members of one's own
often tend to adhere to something like the limitations church or synagogue or association within civil society.
of public reason-or come to adhere to them-when As to what will count as a good reason for all citizens
engaging in political advocacy in the particular limited in regard to political matters, it seems clear that
forums mentioned above. The reasons may be simple principles specific to one's comprehensive view will not
prudence, that is, a desire to win over a larger constit- be acceptable reasons to others holding different views,
uency, an obvious objective when one speaks in forums and the process of thinking of what would count as
directed to the "public at large." A politician in a good reasons for all is in part, already, a process of
religiously pluralist district, state, or country would be adhering to the limitations of public reason. But in
ill advised to argue in support of a given piece of dialogue within a religious association, one would
legislation on the grounds that it is concordant with or expect an appeal to shared principles specific to a given
supported by a particular religious doctrine, for the comprehensive view and not generally shareable by all
obvious reason that if her goal is to convince others to citizens. What is being argued for here might be
support the legislation, then she should offer to them termed a conception of a limited public domain, ap-
reasons that they might reasonably be expected to propriately subject to something like public reason or
accept. Furthermore, the offering of reasons specific to general principles of reciprocity, within a larger public
a particular religion could be construed as not respect- domain composed of associations in civil society, ap-
ing the religious differences of those of other faiths.7 propriately not subject to such principles (so that it
And if her reasons are moral and not prudential, then makes no difference whether one calls the internal life
she will be motivated by a principle of reciprocity to of such associations "nonpublic," "private,"or another
seek a common ground of reasoning with others, to "region" of the "public" domain).
offer reasons that constitute a common currency of In fact, Benhabib (1993, 42-3) points to exactly this
debate in a pluralist society, that is, political reasons. kind of distinction between the reasoning "internal" to
For example, in the public arguments of religious a given association and that which governs dialogue
opponents of abortion over time, a shift is noticeable with citizens at large in the context of political debate.
away from particular religious appeals to arguments in She considers the case of a Mormon traditionalist,
terms of political values, that is, the "rights" of the convinced of the moral correctness of the practice of
fetus and the state's interest in preserving life.8 polygamy on the basis of "the dictates of the teaching
While deliberative democrats have expressed con- of Joseph Smith." She then asks if such a Mormon
cerns about what they see as the overly restrictive could imagine a situation in which she had to justify to
limitations of public reason, they often embrace prin- others who are not Mormons the morality of such a
ciples of reciprocity that are almost indistinguishable. practice. The political parallel of this thought experi-
Consider, for example, Benhabib's (1996, 71-2) de- ment concerns the recent example of those Mormons
scription of what is involved in articulating a view "in who have begun, as Benhabib phrases it, "to go public,"
public": seeking legal protection for the practice of polygamy:
The veryprocedureof articulatinga viewin publicimposes The fundamentalistMormonshave their privatereligious
a certain reflexivityon individualpreferencesand opin- beliefs, but in the public arena of the liberal democratic
ions. When presentingtheir point of view and positionto state, they are using the secularlanguageof moral toler-
others,individualsmustsupportthemby articulatinggood ance, and the recognitionof the civil rightsof dissenting
reasons in a public context to their co-deliberators.This groups and minorities-they wish to be acceptedby the
process of articulatinggood reasons in public forces the state as "practitionersof a differentlifestyle,"accepting
individualto thinkof whatwould count as a good reason therebythe legitimatepluralityof lifestylesin the liberal
for all. state (Benhabib1992, 65).
Note this description presumes that the reasons evoked Here a distinction is drawn between the "public arena"
must be reasons acceptable for "all,"where "all" seems and the "private religious beliefs" of Mormons. But as
to imply something like citizens generally, that is, Benhabib undoubtedly would acknowledge, these pri-
citizens with potentially diverse comprehensive views vate beliefs are in fact associational beliefs, just as the
Mormons themselves are an association in civil society,
7The religious appeals of some abolitionists are often cited in the same civil society whose associations are said to be
discussions about the limitations of public reason (Galston 1991, 115; privileged by a deliberative model of democracy (Ben-
Holmes 1988; Sandel 1994). First, the value being evoked-the basic
equality of all persons-was a political value, not only embodied in habib 1996, 73). Hence the public domain is here
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution but also a characterized in just the restricted Rawlsian sense for
central component of political debate from the time of the pre- which I have been arguing. First, the debate on the
Socratics onward. The abolitionists were appealing to religious legal status of polygamy concerns legislating on a
beliefs to support a known political concept. Second, the idea of the
equality of persons could hardly be said to be specific to a given faith
matter of "constitutional essentials." Second, the af-
in the way that, for example, the idea of the Trinity is. fected group is engaged in advocacy in the public
8 See, for example, the reasons invoked by Cardinal Bernadin (1986) domain by pressing its case in terms of political values
in an article in which he argues against a right to abortion. His and political principles, that is, it is addressingits case to
argument is presented in terms of the political values of public peace, citizens at large. But one would not expect the Mormons
the preservation of human rights, and accepted standards of moral
behavior in a community of law. Rawls (1996, lvi) cites this article as to apply the same principles or to argue in the same
an example of an argument against abortion that does adhere to the terms within their associations. There one might expect
principles of public reason. them to invoke the religious authority of Joseph Smith

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and his interpretations of the Bible. In such a venue, access to all." Second, many of these associations have
invocations of that kind are reasonable and satisfy a "hierarchical" or "authoritarian" structures of dis-
principle of reciprocity within a given association. This course that do not meet such deliberative ideals as
is precisely Rawls's (1993, 220) point in stating that the absolute symmetry and equal opportunity to initiate
reason of associations in civil society "is public with discourse and problematize matters. In regard to the
respect to their members, but nonpublic with respect to concept of the public sphere as an embodiment of
political society and to citizens generally." Arendtian freedom, Dana Villa (1992, 713) has re-
marked: "Not only coercion and violence, but all
relations of hierarchy are excluded from this sphere."
The Significance of a Limited Public Sphere
Yet, the modes of discourse or conversation in a
Deliberative democrats who privilege associations church or synagogue, for example, often involve defer-
within civil society may well reject any distinction ence to the judgment and authority of individuals
between the "internal life" of associations within civil occupying certain roles, such as a priest or a rabbi.
society and associations viewed as participants in a Some matters are often steadfastly denied a problem-
wider public political debate addressed to all citizens. atical status among participants in the "conversation,"
In this regard, Benhabib (1996, 76) maintains: "To say for example, whether a text is the word of God or
that when in civil society these individuals and associ- whether God exists (although, of course, these matters
ations are governed by one kind of reason, a nonpublic also may come to be seen as problematical).
one, but that they have to respect the limits of public Third, and perhaps most significantly, according to
reason once they enter the political arena is inade- Benhabib (1992, 42-3), discourse ethics presupposes a
quate, for civil society is also public." I have already "postconventionalist moral system" characterized by a
noted how Benhabib herself appears to draw just such "moral reflexivity"-the ability to question radically all
a distinction. What I would like to consider here are procedures of justification, including its own, and the
the dangers of failing to draw it. requirement that the validity of normative practices be
Consider, for example, some of the general princi- demonstrated with reasons that others who are not
ples of discourse ethics as laid out by Habermas (1990, members of one's way of life can accept or find
86), what he terms the "universal and necessary com- convincing. As such, moral postconventionalism is dis-
municative presuppositions of argumentative speech." tinguished from moral conventionalism, based neither
These require that every subject with the competence upon the ability to offer reasons acceptable to all nor
to speak and act be allowed to take part in the upon the radical questioning of its own justificatory
discourse; everyone is allowed to question any asser- procedures. For Benhabib (p. 43), moral reflexivity and
tion whatever, to introduce any assertion into the moral conventionalism are not compatible, although
discourse, and to express his attitudes, desires, and the rights associated with communicative ethics in a
needs (p. 89). According to Benhabib (1996, 78), "the deliberative democracy would certainly not interfere
deliberative model of democracy presupposes a dis- with the practices of such "conventional" associations
course theory of ethics," which incorporates two basic (to the extent that they do not infringe upon the rights
elements of Habermas's "ideal speech situation": All and liberties of others). But the problem here concerns
are "equally entitled to take part in those discourses locating the "moral conversation" of a deliberative
which are to determine the norms that are to affect democracy within civil society, which presumably
their lives"; and "each individual has the same symmet- means within as well as between civil associations, when
rical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, civil society is itself composed of numerous associa-
to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the tions that practice "conventional" morality. To the
conversation, and so on." These Benhabib terms, re- extent that discourse ethics privileges voluntary associ-
spectively, principles of universal moral respect and ations in civil society, should such associations be
egalitarian reciprocity. As has been noted, for Ben- expected to live up to a "postconventional" ideal of
habib (1996, 80) the "public sphere is introduced as the discourse ethics, and should they be judged by its
embodiment of discursive democracy in practice," standards?
where the public sphere is defined as being composed Perhaps only certain associations are meant to be
of all the manifold associations within civil society. members of the "anonymous public conversation"-
If we consider some of the general principles listed those which in some ways meet the demands of a
by Benhabib as underlying the validity claims of a discourse ethics. Benhabib (1996, 73) says that the
deliberative model of democracy-participation gov- procedural specifications of the model of discourse
erned by norms of equality and symmetry, equal rights ethics "privilege a plurality of modes of association in
to interrogate and question topics of conversation, no which all affected can have the right to articulate their
prima facie rules restricting the identity of the partici- point of view." There is some ambiguity in this speci-
pants or the agenda-then it is clear that many of the fication. Does it mean that only those associations are
most important associations comprising civil society do "privileged" in civil society "in which all affected can
not come close to fulfilling these requirements. First, have the right to articulate their point of view"? The
associations within civil society often have a highly associations listed as being privileged by the discourse
selective membership, a point Benhabib (1996, 76) model are said to "range from political parties, to
herselfacknowledges:"Civilsocietyandits associations citizens' initiatives,to social movements,to voluntary
are not publicin the sense of alwaysallowinguniversal associations,to consciousnessraising groups and the

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Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

like" (p. 73). This does not appear to be selective, civil society, does not respect difference and in fact
inasmuch as "voluntary associations" would include all endangers plurality.
associations in civil society (with the exception of the The problem is not with a principle of universaliza-
family). tion per se, for the limitations of public reason are also
In raising the question of the propriety of applying a a form of such a principle, but with where it should be
postconventional ideal of discourse ethics to associa- applied. The value of a more limited conception of the
tions in civil society, we confront a paradox. The public domain is that it can acknowledge the validity-
principles of discourse ethics, as analogously is Rawls's and perhaps even the value- of nonpublic associations
device of an original position, are principles of univer- based upon nonuniversalizable interests and modes of
salization. And according to Benhabib (1992, 42), the discourse. This very feature of nonuniversalizability, I
problem with the adherent of conventional morality is have argued, is the impetus for the formation of
that "the kinds of grounds such a person will bring into discrete and varied associations to begin with. The
the moral conversation will not be sufficiently univer- ideal of public reason applies in those circumstances in
salizable from the standpoint of all involved." While which citizens are publicly addressed as citizens con-
not excluded from the moral conversation, such per- cerning political issues, not as church members or
sons face a "rationality deficit"; there is a point in the members of a particular association. Put another way,
conversation beyond which they cannot proceed: "Be- the "association" addressed by public reason is the
cause the adherents of such moralities are willing to association of political society as a whole, what Rawls
stop the conversation and because they have to with- (1971, 527) has termed "the social union of social
draw from the process of reflexive justification in order unions." The process of adhering to the limitations of
not to let their world view crumble, their position is not public reason in such circumstances is, I have argued,
comprehensive and reflexive enough" (Benhabib 1992, not a particularly unnatural or demanding process; it is
43). To attain sufficient reflexivity, then, means a the process cited by Benhabib whereby persons try to
transformation from conventional to postconventional convince "others," such as those of a different faith, by
morality. And this in turn means argumentation from appealing to reasons that can be convincing reasons for
universalizable grounds, which presumably means be- them, that is, for "all."
lieving in reasons based upon universalizable grounds It may be objected that the argument thus far has
and generalizable interests (assuming general princi- displayed a good deal of sociological naivete. If non-
ples are not presented hypocritically or for prudential public life is not characterized in some ways by princi-
ples of egalitarian reciprocity, then how can we expect
reasons). The implications of this are, arguably, either
public life to be so characterized? Certainly, this is a
the end of associations in civil society or their melding
matter of degree. We would expect a society in which
into one association 'ala Rousseau's ([1762] 1978, 109)
all associational life, including personal relationships,
General Assembly, in which "the more harmony there
is characterized by racial division to be race conscious
is in the assemblies, that is, the closer opinions come to
and racially divided in public life as well. As I have
obtaining unanimous support, the more dominant as noted above, the nonpublic realm changes in regard to
well is the general will." changing societal norms and vice versa. From a socio-
The reason for this, simply put, is that what is logical perspective, they are not at all completely
nonuniversalizable is the basis of difference, and dis- distinct entities or domains. For the most part, associ-
crete associations are founded upon a principle of ations of all kinds are "semipermeable" bodies within
difference. Neither the interest that unites bowlers nor the larger democratic culture. At the same time, how-
the beliefs that unite Catholics are universalizable in a ever, a good deal of associational self-selectivity, non-
pluralist society. Churches are now viewed as associa- reflexivity, hierarchy, and deference to authority (of a
tions within civil society rather than as part of the religion, a text, a wise person, a teacher, a guru, God)
public domain, precisely because the beliefs and prac- is also compatible with democratic self-rule and adher-
tices of particular religions are held to be nonuniver- ence to principles of egalitarian reciprocity in public
salizable in a pluralist society. If reciprocity is to life.9 Put another way, public postconventional moral-
"become the norm among humans as concrete selves ity is compatible with considerable conventional mo-
and not just as juridical agents," in the strong "post- rality in nonpublic associational life. In asserting this, I
conventional" sense in which Benhabib (1992, 60) do not intend to extol the virtues of "conventional"
appears to intend the principle of reciprocity to apply, morality, but it is my hope to avoid unnecessary
then all forms of conventional morality will become criticism of such moralities as presently embodied in
postconventional, and all reasons will ultimately be numerous and varied forms of associational life.
universalizable ones. In regard to pluralism and the
public realm as a "discursive space," Villa (1992, 714)
9 Recent work by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 19) demon-
has remarked: "The public realm understood as a strates how involvement in religious associations can promote the
discursive space characterized by symmetry, nonhierar- development of various "civic skills" associated with democratic
chy and- reciprocity, both presupposes, and makes citizenship: "organizational and communications skills that are rele-
possible, plurality and so provides the opportunity for a vant for politics and thus can facilitate political activity."The authors
argue that these civic skills are "more or less fungible" and can be
politics based on mutual recognition and respect for effectively transferred from the various "nonpublic"venues in which
difference."What I have argued is that the public they are developed (in this case, religious associations) to public life,
realm,thus understood,if locatedin the associationsof enhancing political participation (p. 520).

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RAWLS'S ROUSSEAUISM AND THE tries emphasize faith over reason to such an extent
COLLAPSE OF THE PUBLIC-NONPUBLIC that they codify, as an article of faith, a certain hostility
DIVIDE toward rationality, such as Tertullian's credo quia ab-
surdum (I believe because it is absurd) and Kierkeg-
Although for Rawls public reason entails that citizens
aard's "blind leap of faith." Furthermore, why are
forgo arguing or reasoning on the basis of their com-
tradition and gradual evolution cited as features of the
prehensive views in the limited circumstances defined
reasonable? The history of religion is punctuated by
as the public domain, this by no means entails that
the relatively sudden appearance of new faiths: Luth-
these very same views do not have a fundamental
eranism, for example, did not evolve gradually from
political role to play. As noted, the very views which are
Catholicism. Even in the case of science, which in some
to give way in public life ideally guarantee the stability
ways embodies the reasonable as an exercise of theo-
of the regime by forming the basis of an overlapping
retical, as opposed to practical, reason, development
consensus. The political conception of justice is "a
has been punctuated by dramatic shifts in thought and
module, an essential constituent part that fits into and
doctrine, often not entirely explainable in terms of
can be supported by the various reasonable compre-
what has preceded (Kuhn 1962).
hensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated
Second, and more significant, is the issue of whether
by it" (Rawls 1993, 12). Thus, the political conception
a doctrine that seeks as far as possible to limit itself to
is in some way related to the broader moral and ethical
the domain of the political and political values should
values of citizens' comprehensive views and is thereby
pass judgment on what general structural features a
given a deeper or "ultimate" justification as part of
comprehensive doctrine must have in order to count as
what citizens view as the "whole truth." But given that
reasonable and, hence, be part of an overlapping
citizens affirm a plurality of comprehensive views, the
consensus. "Reasonable" here is not being used as a
bases of deeper justification will themselves be plural:
political or even moral concept, for its opposite is
"It is left to citizens individually-as part of the liberty
something like inconsistent or "irrational." Consider,
of conscience-to settle how they think the values of
for example, Rawls's (1993, 60) assertion that "in a
the political domain are related to other values in their
particular case someone may, of course, affirm a rea-
comprehensive doctrine" (Rawls 1993, 140).
sonable doctrine in an unreasonable way, for example
For Rawls, however, not just any comprehensive
blindly or capriciously."Thus, Kierkegaard's blind leap
view can be a part of an overlapping consensus, only
of faith could be seen as an instance. Therefore,
"reasonable" views: "We look for a consensus of
judgment is being passed from a nonpolitical perspec-
reasonable (as opposed to unreasonable or irrational)
tive-a blind leap of faith endangers no one's
comprehensive doctrines. The crucial fact is not the
rights-on the proper way to come to hold a religious
fact of pluralism as such, but of reasonable pluralism"
belief, in direct violation of Rawls's insistence upon
(Rawls 1993, 144). It is the appropriateness of this
positing a domain of nonpublic reason that lies outside
division of comprehensive views into the reasonable
the purview of a strictly political conception. Such a
and the unreasonable that I now want to question.
breach in the public-nonpublic divide entails a corre-
Such a classification, I argue, is a problematical step in
sponding violation of Rawls's (1993, 150) avowed hope
Rawls's theory and has the effect of ultimately collaps-
"neither to assert nor deny, any particular religious,
ing the public-nonpublic distinction upon which his
comprehensive, philosophical, or moral view, or its
theory critically depends. To see why this is so, consider
associated theory of truth and the status of values."
what exactly, according to Rawls, makes a comprehen-
Certainly, a belief as to how one comes to hold a true
sive doctrine reasonable. He appears to offer two very
religious belief is an important component of any
different sets of criteria. The first concerns what might
religion's theory of truth.
be called general features of coherence or rationality.
In addition to these general features, Rawls's (1993,
Thus, a reasonable doctrine
243) definition of a reasonable doctrine does have
covers the major religious,moral, and philosophicalas- moral aspects: A doctrine is reasonable which can
pects of human life in a more or less consistent and support a reasonable balance of political values. Before
coherent manner. It organizes and characterizesrecog- attempting to explicate this description, it must be
nized valuesso that they are compatiblewith one another noted that Rawls consistently talks about reasonable or
and expressan intelligibleview of the world....it normally unreasonable comprehensive doctrines as opposed to
belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and the reasonable or unreasonable use of a doctrine. He
doctrine.Although stable over time, and not subject to does characterize as unreasonable (p. 138) those who
suddenand unexplainedchanges,it tends to evolve slowly
in the light of what from its point of view, it sees as good seek to enforce the doctrine extraecclesiam nulla salus
and sufficientreasons(Rawls 1993, 59). (beyond the church there is no salvation) as a political
doctrine, in the sense of making conformity to the
The first question that may be raised is: How many church in question required by law. He also asserts as
religions (or for that matter philosophical) views actu- vital to the idea of political liberalism that, while it may
ally fit this characterization of the reasonable? I would be unreasonable to use the power of the state to
hazard that there never has been a religious or philo- enforce a religious doctrine, this does not necessarily
sophical system without major inconsistencies, incoher- mean the doctrine is incorrect. This is all well and
ences, and incompatibilities as well as a general clash of good, and consistentwith the aims of politicalliberal-
values on one level or another. Some religious doc- ism, but Rawlsdoes not alwaysadhereto thisprinciple.

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Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

Rawls (1993, 152-3) considers the case of "ration- legitimate governmental interests, not in terms of the
alist believers" who seek to establish their particular court's passing judgment on the falsity of the religion in
religion on the grounds that it is a truth readily question. (See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts [1905],
accessible to all through reason. To them, he says, "we in which the compulsory vaccination of school-aged
need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, children of Christian Scientists was sustained against a
since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and free exercise challenge on the basis of the state's
fully established by reason is not to say that they are compelling interest in protecting the health and safety
not true." Yet, in the next sentence he asserts: "Of of the community. As the Court noted in Prince v.
course, we do not believe the doctrine believers here Massachusetts [1943, 158], "the right to practice reli-
assert, and this is shown in what we do. Even if we do gion freely does not include liberty to expose the
not, say, hold some form of equal liberty of conscience, community ... to communicable disease.") Conversely,
our actions nevertheless imply that we believe the if religion is "advanced," in the sense of removing a
concern for salvation does not require anything incom- governmental burden seen as inhibiting its free exer-
patible with that liberty"(p. 153, emphasis added). But cise, the justification is presented in terms of the value
does our unwillingness to consider enforcing the doc- of the free exercise of religion in general, not in terms
trine as law (or "establishing" it) really imply that we of the truth of the particular religion in question. Thus,
think the doctrine is false and, what is more, false as in People v. Woody (1964, 72), the court held unconsti-
theological doctrine, that is, not required for salvation? tutional the application of state criminal statutes to
Rawls's (1993, 152) claim that the falsity of a practice Navahos using peyote in religious ceremonies, on the
is implied by "whatwe do," in the specific sense of how grounds that "peyote ... is the sine qua non of the
we adjudicate, has unfortunate consequences for polit- defendants' faith." It did not say: "We have determined
ical liberalism's hope "to try to bypass religion and that the practice is pleasing to God." In outlawing the
philosophy's profoundest controversies." It is impor- use of peyote for all citizens in a general nondiscrimi-
tant to note that there are two ways in which such natory manner, the state was not passing judgment on
controversies can be "bypassed" as a political matter. the propriety of its use as part of a religiousceremony;in
One is simply to remove from the political agenda making an exception to this law, the state was not
altogether any issues which may give rise (or have given endorsing the practice from a theological perspective.
rise) to such controversies. This is rarely a viable Michael Sandel (1994) appears to question the pos-
alternative. How would one remove from the political sibility of the kind of bypassing (or "bracketing") here
agenda debates concerning abortion, capital punish- argued for, and he implies that adjudication affecting
ment, doctor-assisted suicide, same-sex marriages, and religious belief has in fact decided, albeit often surrep-
a host of other issues with profoundly controversial titiously, its truth or falsity. He writes in relation to
philosophical and religious implications? The other abortion,
way to bypass issues is a constraint upon reasons that But whether it is reasonable to bracket for political
can be invoked to justify public policies, or laws, or purposes the moral and religious doctrinesat stake de-
principles of justice, that is, by adhering to something pendson whichof those doctrinesis true.If the doctrineof
like the principles of public reason. the CatholicChurchis true, if humanlife in the relevant
For example, the establishment clause of the First moralsense does begin at conception,then bracketingthe
Amendment is held to require that legislation be moral-theologicalquestion is far less reasonablethan it
justified on the basis of legitimate secular (i.e., politi- would be on rival moral and religiousassumptions.The
cal) governmental interests (Lemon v. Kurzman, 1971). more confidentwe are that fetuses are, in the relevant
Simultaneously, the free exercise clause has long been moralsense, differentfrombabies,the more confidentwe
held to bar from legal consideration the truth or falsity canbe in affirminga politicalconceptionof justicethatsets
of religious doctrines or beliefs. This principle was aside the controversyabout the moral status of fetuses
(Sandel 1994, 1,778).
given explicit statement in United States v. Ballard
(1944), in which Justice Douglas's majority opinion This formulation is based upon a misunderstanding. In
stated that the First Amendment barred submission to regard to resolving the abortion issue, Rawls does not
the jury of "the truth or verity of respondent's religious assert that the relevant moral status of fetuses should
doctrines or beliefs"; all that the jury could consider or can be bypassed or "set aside." Rather, as far as
was whether the respondents believed the claims they possible, one should try to resolve the matter by public
made. Douglas commented in Ballard (pp. 86-7): reason or in political terms (Rawls 1993, 243-4),
Men maybelievewhattheycannotprove.Theymaynot be which, as Rawls argues throughout, are also moral
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. terms. The political is a domain of the moral, and a
[The] miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of political conception of justice is also a moral concep-
Christ,life afterdeath,the powerof prayerare deep in the tion (Rawls 1993, 13, 174-5). But how can one resolve
religiousconvictionsof many.If one could be sent to jail such a question in political terms? Note that public
because a jury in a hostile environmentfound these reason includes common sense and the conclusions of
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious science when not controversial. What does "common
freedom. sense," or a kind of basic empiricism that excludes
In free exercise cases, if a religion is adversely affected revelation, tell us in this regard? It tells us that a
by legislation and a free exercise claim is denied, then fertilized egg cell up to a certain point appears and acts
the burden is justified in terms of the importance of nothing like a distinct human being (in fact, before a

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American Political Science Review Vol. 92, No. 1

certain point it cannot be said to act at all). From this doctrine would be an unreasonable application of that
we may infer that it is not human in the relevant and doctrine to public political matters; rather, any com-
limited political-moral sense, at any rate as far as prehensive doctrine that would not support such a
preserving basic human rights go. This is undoubtedly balance of values is "to that extent" an unreasonable
crude. It is certainly not meant to be any kind of doctrine. This means that even when an individual does
decisive argument (although it may be all that we can not vote on the basis of her comprehensive views, when
or should go on for political purposes). she believes that it would be unreasonable to try to
Consider what it means to say that the resolution of institute such views as a political matter, by the tenets
the controversy depends upon showing that the Cath- of political liberalism her views can still be classed as
olic doctrine is false (or true): "If the Catholic doctrine unreasonable. Thus, a Catholic who believes as an
is right.. .it is not clear why the political values of article of faith that status as a person begins at
toleration and women's equality.. .should prevail.... conception, but who does not believe that such a view
It [the case for abortion] must engage rather than avoid can reasonably be defended by public reason and
the comprehensive moral and religious doctrines at therefore does not, for example, seek to overturn Roe
stake" (Sandel 1994, 1,778). Catholic belief that status v. Wade (1973) (assuming this to constitute the correct
as a person begins at conception is an article of faith balance of the political values at issue), will still be held
based upon a particular interpretation of the Bible by the tenets of political liberalism to hold a compre-
(seen as a divine document), revelation, and theologi- hensive view which is to that extent unreasonable.
cal doctrine. How are we to prove it wrong? Whether a Paradoxically, so characterized, she would be a reason-
fertilized egg cell or a fetus is a person is a normative able person but the holder of an unreasonable doc-
question not amenable to anything like scientific refu- trine. But is the doctrine itself unreasonable, and
tation or verification (as opposed, e.g., to the heliocen- should it be classified as such by an avowedly political
tric doctrine of the solar system, which the Catholic conception? Or is its proposed use an unreasonable
church initially opposed). To say that we must strive to one, that is, its use as a political doctrine?
"engage," that is, prove right or wrong, theological Consider what it means to say that a doctrine such as
doctrine whenever adjudication touches upon theolog- extra ecclesiam nulla salus (beyond the church there is
ical matters would mean, for example, that we should no salvation) is an unreasonable doctrine. In one form
determine from a theological perspective the propriety or another, this is precisely the doctrine held by the
of the use of peyote as part of a religious ceremony. Catholic church and numerous other denominations at
Yet, when Rawls asserts that our not believing the the present time. For example, according to the New
doctrine which rationalist believers assert "is shown in Catholic Encyclopedia:
what we do," he seems to put in doubt the possibility of
just this kind of "bypassing" and to threaten the The necessityof the churchfor salvationis illustratedin
constitutional divide between the public and private the Fathersby meansof Biblicalfiguressuchas that of the
ark in the deluge... . Origenis the firstto formulatethe
domains.
dogmatic axiom *ExtraEcclesiamnulla salus (EnchPatr
Rawls is not entirely consistent concerning whether 557)... . If the Catholicchurchis necessaryfor salvation,
our actions imply that we do believe such doctrines are it followsthat no one can be savedunless one belongsto
false. But what seems textually unequivocal (or at any the Churchin some way or other (Eminyan1967,995-7).
rate, less equivocal) is that such doctrines are classed as
unreasonable. This can be seen by returning to Rawls's Perhaps such a doctrine, which may appear to some as
description of a reasonable doctrine. Rawls (1993, 243) morally objectionable per se, conceals what is at issue
asserts: "The only comprehensive doctrines that do not here. One must keep in mind that there are plenty of
accord with public reason on a given question are those religious prescriptions about which one justifiably may
that cannot support a reasonable balance of political say it would be unreasonable to make them into law;
values on the issues that it raises." To illustrate, Rawls but one would not be justified in saying, at least as a
considers abortion and identifies three primary politi- political matter, that they are unreasonable per se, that
cal values as being at issue: respect for human life, the is, as religious doctrines applied within their own
reproduction of political society over time, and the appropriate (i.e., nonpublic) domain. For example, in a
equality of women citizens. According to Rawls, "Any religiously pluralistic society, it certainly would be
reasonable balance of these three values will give a unreasonable to propose that Talmudic dietary restric-
woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not tions become national law, but are they therefore
to end her pregnancy during the first trimester.. .any "unreasonable," or should they be classified as such?
comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of Religions contain numerous articles of faith affecting
political values excluding that duly qualified right to social relations among coreligionists: Extra ecclesiam
abortion in the first trimester is to that extent unreason- nulla salus is just such a tenet. Those who hold this
able" (p. 243, emphasis added). Furthermore, he notes belief may accept the illegitimacy of having it-or
that "a comprehensive doctrine is not as such unrea- political principles derived from it-imposed upon or
sonable because it leads to an unreasonable conclusion applied to society at large; they may accept that, in
in one or even in several cases. It may still be reason- Locke's words, ([1689] 1983, 31) "excommunication
able most of the time." (p. 243). neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated
Rawls is not sayingthat a view proposedas a public Person of any of those Civil Goods that he formerly
matter which is derived from such a comprehensive possessed." But as an associational belief in the non-

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Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere March 1998

public domain and a manifestation of nonpublic rea- doctrine, can act reasonably for political purposes, why
son, its truth or falsity, as well as its "reasonableness," classify doctrines-or persons-in this manner at all?
should be outside the purview of an avowedly limited By such a classification, judgment is being passed
political conception. upon religious doctrine per se in violation of Rawls's
I have observed how, according to this classification, own division between the realms of public and nonpub-
a Catholic who adheres to public reason would be a lic. If a theory, as well as a political regime, is commit-
reasonable holder of an unreasonable doctrine. But she ted to respecting the plurality of comprehensive views
may not be a reasonable person according to political existing within society, then it appears that very little is
liberalism, because of the very particular way in which to be gained by such a socially divisive classification as
Rawls defines a reasonable person. That definition that between reasonable and unreasonable compre-
raises all the same difficulties associated with the hensive views. Furthermore, as the abortion example
definition of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine as shows, Rawls does not consider any balancing of
well as the further and even more perplexing question political values as reasonable and appropriately so. But
of whether an unreasonable person can still act reason- what appears questionable in this example is the spec-
ably. According to Rawls (1993, 48-54), one basic ificity with which Rawls identifies what constitutes the
feature of reasonable persons is their readiness to correct balance on a given political question. In dis-
propose and willingly abide by principles and standards cussing the idea of public reason, Rawls maintains
that are fair terms of cooperation, given assurance that (1993, 226): "Accepting the idea of public reason and
others will do likewise. So in this regard, the individual its principle of legitimacy emphatically does not mean,
mentioned above who holds an "unreasonable" doc- then, accepting a particular liberal conception of jus-
trine but believes it would be illegitimate to impose tice down to the last details of the principles defining its
that doctrine upon others would be a reasonable content... . Public reason does not ask us to accept
person. Rawls adds, however, that reasonable persons the very same principles of justice." Here, however, for
also must recognize what he calls the "burdens of a comprehensive doctrine to be reasonable (in regard
judgment" (pp. 54- 8). These are meant to explain why, to the issue in question) and not "run afoul of public
under conditions of freedom and the good faith exer- reason," it appears that it must in some way support the
cise of our powers of reason and judgment, we gener- "last details" of the political principles.10
ally end up with a plurality of comprehensive views Why, then, does Rawls insist upon classifying com-
rather than convergence upon one accepted view. As prehensive doctrines as reasonable and unreasonable?
defined by Rawls (pp. 55-7), the burdens of judgment The answer, as I have noted, concerns his conception
include such factors as the difficulty of weighing the of an overlapping consensus-which ensures the stabil-
relevant considerations in matters of "ultimate truth," ity of the regime-as a consensus only of reasonable
the conflicting and complex nature of relevant evi- doctrines. The implications of this are enormous. The
dence, and the influence of the particularities of our point is no longer that all will accept the political
life situation on our view of the world and of the proper conception as a "common ground," whatever their
balance of values. various comprehensive views, or will accept the reason-
The problem with this formulation is that most ableness and necessity of a separation of church and
religions, including those which accept the general state; rather, all citizens will (ideally) hold only compre-
principles of liberty of conscience and free faith, do not hensive views that supportthe political conception. Thus,
accept anything like the burdens of judgment. In fact, it for all its commitment to taking seriously the fact of
is arguably necessary for any religion, if it is to present pluralism and the irreconcilable differences of diverse
itself as a sure and infallible guide to the truth, comprehensive views, and to separating public reason
precisely to deny them. As Leif Wenar (1995, 44) has from nonpublic reason, Rawls's conception of an over-
noted: "A religious doctrine-as a purportedly author- lapping consensus points to a rather surprising unity,
itative guide to moral requirements and/or salvation- even homogeneity, of comprehensive views. Whatever
characteristically presents itself as universally accessi- their differences, all the comprehensive views held by
ble to clear minds and open hearts." Catholic doctrine, citizens in society will (ideally) support a rather precise
for example, explicitly denies the reality of anything balance of political values. More specifically, the bal-
like the burdens of judgment. Rather, it holds that, ance of moral and ethical values as articulated inter-
through revelation, "those religious truths which are by nally to each "reasonable" comprehensive view will
their nature accessible to human reason can be known support the appropriate balance of political values. It is
with solid certitude, and with no trace of error, even in this aspect of political liberalism that I call Rawls's
the present state of the human race" (Dogmatic Con- "Rousseauism."
stitution on Divine Revelation, article 6, in Abbott 1966,
cited in Wenar 1995, 44). So the hypothetical Catholic 10 Rawls (1996, lv-lvi) has clarified what he intended by this example
who abides by public reason and a principle of reci- in the Introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism.
procity would not be a reasonable person, because, let He says that his point was not to argue for a right to abortion in the
us assume, that as a believing Catholic she does not first trimester but simply to show what a reasonable balance of the
relevant political values might look like. Yet, this in no way affects
accept the burdens of judgment. In this case, we have
the present criticism. I am questioning the specificity with which
an unreasonableperson acting reasonably.But if an Rawls identifies what would constitute a reasonable balance on a
unreasonableperson,or the holderof an unreasonable given issue, not the content of the balance.

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In the Social Contract, Rousseau ([1762] 1978, pluralism as such, but of reasonable pluralism. The
131-2) writes: problem with both these formulations is that modern
Those who make a distinctionbetween civil and theolog- democratic society as we know it is composed of
ical intoleranceare mistaken.These'two intolerancesare numerous associations and individuals who embrace a
inseparable.It is impossibleto live in peace with people conventional morality, do not support a precise "rea-
whomone believesare damned... . Wherevertheological sonable" balance of political values, and reject the
intoleranceexists,it is impossiblefor it not to have some burdens of judgment. Yet, these same persons and
civil effect... . Now that there is no longerand can never groups can and do accept basic democratic principles,
againbe an exclusivenationalreligion,one shouldtolerate the separation of church and state, and liberty of
all those religions that tolerate others insofar as their conscience (though, of course, there will always be
dogmasare in no waycontraryto the dutiesof the citizen. some in every democratic society who do not accept
But whoeverdaresto saythereis no salvationoutsideof the these principles). How is this possible?
churchshouldbe chasedout of the State,unless the State Liberalism claims that this can be achieved through
is the church,and the princeis the pontiff.
bifurcation of a human being into a public and non-
Rousseau, then, denies the possibility of a stable public entity, into a homme and citoyen. This is and will
regime if persons hold religious beliefs seen as conflict- remain a difficult and delicate project involving a
ing with the virtues necessary for good citizens. Thus, constant reevaluation of boundaries, for these two
in important ways, he denies the possibility of separat- identities are never entirely distinct. We are all simul-
ing the public and nonpublic spheres: Only those taneously persons and citizens. There is a constant
religious doctrines are to be tolerated which are temptation, however, to erase this distinction with all
deemed to teach nothing contrary to the duties of its inevitable tensions, even among those liberal and
citizens. While Rawls seems to embrace the possibility democratic theorists who in other respects appear to
of the separation of these spheres, his idea of an accept such a bifurcation and embrace a division
overlapping consensus seems in surprising agreement between the public and nonpublic domains. To over-
with Rousseau. Only those comprehensive doctrines come bifurcation (die Aufhebung der Entzweiung, to
which support the proper balance of political values borrow a Hegelian phrase) would require our nonpub-
and the virtues of political liberalism will be part of an lic values, beliefs, and modes of discourse to cohere
overlapping consensus; such citizens will constitute, as with our public (general-universal) values, beliefs and
it were, the foundation and "true" citizens of political modes of discourse. The problem is that the "project"
society, that is, its General Will. of such cohesion fails to respect difference and ulti-
Furthermore, Rawls (1993, 60) asserts that "reason- mately endangers pluralism. It involves collapsing, in
able persons will not think it reasonable to use political one way or another, the boundary that separates the
power, should they possess it, to repress comprehen- public and private. As Shklar (1989, 25) warned, the
sive views that are not unreasonable, though different importance of maintaining this boundary, which while
from their own." The implication is that they may think "a shifting line" is "not an erasable one," must never be
it reasonable to suppress unreasonable views and, like forgotten.
Rousseau, "chase them out of the state." In fact, Rawls
believes "comprehensive doctrines that would suppress
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