The document discusses a case involving the granting of bail to an accused named Vicente Go. Go was charged with murder in 1991. The presiding judge, Judge Gako Jr., granted Go's petition for bail without first conducting a required hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that the bail order was legally invalid because in cases where bail is discretionary, like murder charges, the judge must hold a hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on the strength of the case before deciding on bail. Failing to hold such a hearing denied the prosecution's right to due process.
The document discusses a case involving the granting of bail to an accused named Vicente Go. Go was charged with murder in 1991. The presiding judge, Judge Gako Jr., granted Go's petition for bail without first conducting a required hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that the bail order was legally invalid because in cases where bail is discretionary, like murder charges, the judge must hold a hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on the strength of the case before deciding on bail. Failing to hold such a hearing denied the prosecution's right to due process.
The document discusses a case involving the granting of bail to an accused named Vicente Go. Go was charged with murder in 1991. The presiding judge, Judge Gako Jr., granted Go's petition for bail without first conducting a required hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that the bail order was legally invalid because in cases where bail is discretionary, like murder charges, the judge must hold a hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on the strength of the case before deciding on bail. Failing to hold such a hearing denied the prosecution's right to due process.
The document discusses a case involving the granting of bail to an accused named Vicente Go. Go was charged with murder in 1991. The presiding judge, Judge Gako Jr., granted Go's petition for bail without first conducting a required hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that the bail order was legally invalid because in cases where bail is discretionary, like murder charges, the judge must hold a hearing to allow both parties to present evidence on the strength of the case before deciding on bail. Failing to hold such a hearing denied the prosecution's right to due process.
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BAIL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR.
(Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO FACTS: Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead on 25 June 1991. On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating therein Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan. On 9 July 1991, an Information was filed against the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. (Criminal Case CBU-22474). Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused. On 22 July 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital was filed. On 2 August 1991, the hearing on said motion was conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On 6 August 1991 an Order was issued to confine Go in a hospital without the prosecution having crossexamined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report. On 15 July 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied. On 20 November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 32954). In its Decision dated 18 April 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated 26 June 1995, the criminal case was set anew for trial. The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias. On 2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13 February 1997, Go filed a Petition for Bail. On 7 March 1997 and 10 March 1997, the prosecution presented de la Pea who was acquitted in 1993. De la Pea testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify on. On 21 March 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The motion of the prosecution
IPIL, CAREYSSA MAE I.
to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea. The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing resumed. On 26 September 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On 10 November 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go. On 11 November 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the arrest of Go. On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the order which granted bail to Go. On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment. On 15 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated 10 November 1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read. On 1 December 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on Go were not exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On 11 December 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the prosecutions Manifestation dated 21 March 1997 on the confinement of Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated 26 September 1997 against Go. On 20 January 1998, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 10 November 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency. The OSG received copy of the resolution on 29 June 1998. On 3 August 1998, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA-GR SP 47142). On 12 August 1998, said petition of the OSG was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the petition was practically a reproduction of the petition earlier filed by Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on 26 March 1998. Hence, the appeal by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the voluminous records of the case, without necessarily hearing the prosecution.
RULING:
IPIL, CAREYSSA MAE I.
The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary. When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.