G.R. No.

213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during
trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his
criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the
public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August
8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-
CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several
others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his
Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16,
2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental
Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enriles
motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City,
and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General
Hospital following his medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which
were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a)
the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him
would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was
not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution
denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and
the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not
strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right.
Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his
bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact,
accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail
hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused
Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because
while he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be
possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He
anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the
allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not
taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in
the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail
because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be
seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk
are among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of
bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the
amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against
accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion
to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed
resolution to deny Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July
14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari ,
namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a
matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only
upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile,
if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;
hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to
bail as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has
failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking
into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition,
and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail,
it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there
is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the
guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to
be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his
provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the
Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under
the law existing at the time of its commission and the application for
admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of
any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the
officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty
under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26
Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of
right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua ,
or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction
by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances
enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter
of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing
with notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the hearing with
notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already
ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before
bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in
this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case
without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the
prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its
strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued
the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably
committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each
individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused
is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the
trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion
of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes
of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of
the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted.
The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross
examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines
outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence
of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor,
namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might
be imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of
two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or
absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the
Constitution deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged
with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle
him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily
factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is
guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines
responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well
as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of
bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director
of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric
patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the
UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple
drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral
artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by
Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it
could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under
stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack
under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they
could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity,
dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients
with asthma or COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age
and ill health required special medical attention. His confinement at the
PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that
medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that
hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if

the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things,
Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The
Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the
following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case,
the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of
the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise
its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the
effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable
type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that
in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into
advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any
avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioners previous petition for bail
was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner was
suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon
Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his
lungs, was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active
tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for bail; and
considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied
the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in
several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324)
and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were
released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or
endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the Peoples
Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the
petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then
enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before
a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to
defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue
of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is
properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider
in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the
People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the
same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial;
and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion,
as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ;
ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the
Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of 1,000,000.00 in the
Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan
Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO