Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate Author(s): Lela G.

Noble Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 11 (Nov., 1981), pp. 1097-1114 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643996 . Accessed: 30/01/2013 10:43
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1972-1981: THE MAKINGOF A STALEMATE Lela G. Noble*

THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES on the Moro National Liberation Front, which has provided the leadership for the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines during three periods: when fighting escalated markedly in 1972-1973, after the proclamation of martial law; when negotiations seemed to have produced an agreement that would end the fighting, in 1976-1977; and when fighting continued as martial law was officially lifted in 1980-1981. The article asks and attempts to answer why the MNLF did so well initially, why the negotiations did not succeed in settling the conflict, and what the prospects are for ending the current stalemate.

Emergence of the MNLF: 1972-1973

Much has been written about the origins of the Muslim separatist movement.' Joel De los Santos, for example, provides a list of its adherents: disgruntled politicians, pushed by their lust for power; ambitious people who saw the movement as a vehicle for the launching of successful careers; displaced farmers who wanted to get their lands back from the Christian settlers; victims of army and police abuses who regarded the movement as an instrument of revenge; religious leaders who welcomed the movement as a chance to construct an Islamic theocratic state; idealistic intellectuals and students who were moved by a social duty; impatient and adventurous young men who wanted to test their fighting prowess; and others who joined because their friends and relatives were members of the movement. The leadership of the movement was initially provided by two groups-the students and intellectuals, and the disgruntled politicians.2
* This is a revisionof a paperpreparedfor the annualmeeting of the Associationfor Asian Studies, Toronto, March 13-15, 1981.

1097

? 1981 by The Regents of the Universityof California

0004-4687/81/111097+18$00.50

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1098

ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1981

The list suggests the motivations, the scope, and some of the problems of the movement. Muslim separatism had centuries-old historical roots, but it was also a direct result of specific grievances accumulated during the 1960s. Increased Christian migration affected all sectors of Muslim society because it disrupted both traditional socioconomic patterns and the political system that reflected and perpetuated them. Fighting between Christians and Muslims began in Cotabato in 1970 over land-related issues. It continued and spread as Christians received support from the Philippine Constabulary and both Christian and Muslim politicians mobilized armed bands to increase their chances of winning elections. Muslims lost the controversial elections in areas where population shifts had occurred, but maintained representation in the few areas where Muslims still predominated. Economic conditions continued to deteriorate. Meanwhile Muslim students in Manila were caught up in the radical protest activities centered there, and the worldwide Islamic resurgence both raised the consciousness and expanded the contacts of Philippine Muslims. But the movement remained fragmented and its organization rudimentary until the imposition of martial law and the efforts of the new regime to collect weapons left many Muslims feeling they would be left with no recourse against a regime they perceived as being increasingly intrusive, abusive, and alien. The alternative was armed rebellion, which began spontaneously and spread rapidly. Under these circumstances the MNLF moved into prominence. It had critical assets. Its Manila-educated leaders had developed an ideology that emphasized both "Moro" nationalism and social reform, yet they represented the various Muslim ethno-linguistic groups and maintained strong connections with traditional leaders and hence their followers. The original small group had been expanded by careful recruiting.3 Study of the tactics of revolutionary movements elsewhere was supplemented by military training in Malaysia. Contacts with Kadafi of Libya provided funds, and support from Tun Mustapha, chief minister of the neighboring state of Sabah, provided both a supply route for weapons and a sanctuary. De los Santos summarizes: (Initially)the most that the MNLFcould do wasto starttheir own fighting units in each area, independent of the partisan native units that were alreadyin operation.The discipline,the organization,and the dedication of MNLFunits began to influence the activitiesof other partisangroups. Thus when a call to unity in some sort of united front was sounded off, manyof these groupsdecided tojoin the MNLFbut on the conditionthat they would retain their own independent identity.By the end of 1973, a loose structureof unity was ready and a representativeof the MNLFwas already accepted in almost all fighting partisangroups. This united front had, by the first quarterof 1974, intensified both its militaryand diplomaticactivities.Domestically,attackswere launched against army outposts, communication lines, supply depots and even provincialcapitals.In the diplomaticfield, the MNLFsucceeded in getting the attention of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers.As a

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

1099

consequence thereof, the MNLFsent a delegation to the KualaLumpur summit in June of 1974.4 The MNLF's delegation carried two documents, an "appeal letter" and a description of "the rise and fall of Moro statehood." Their message was clear: they wanted recognition and support in their battle for an independent Muslim state. They gained less than they wanted, since the foreign ministers' communique called for "a political and peaceful solution ... within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines."5 Yet they did achieve an explicit description of the socioeconomic measures proposed by the Philippine government as inadequate and specific recognition of the MNLF as representative of Philippine Muslims. Pressured by the costs of expanded military operations and the possibility of sanctions by states that controlled its oil supply, the Philippine government experimented with a variety of tactics. It made and shuffled appointments of Muslims; brought "rebel leaders" together for peace talks; created new offices and agencies; announced additional programs and appropriations; and spread rumors about factionalism, corruption, and foreign influence among the MNLF leadership. By mid-1975, before a meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference in Jidda, Marcos was proposing to restructure the southern Philippines into regions with "virtual autonomy." The government efforts had some success, particularly since they coincided with a marked decrease in the arms flow after Tun Mustapha's defeat in the Sabah elections in mid-1975. Defections certainly increased. The MNLF leadership's credibility was apparently affected among both Muslims and Christians. Indiscipline among MNLF ranks was manifested in kidnappings, plane hijackings, and other acts of extortion. But it can be argued that the government's successes were counterproductive in terms of its own presumed objective of achieving peace. By weakening the Front's cohesion it weakened the Front's capacity to negotiate a settlement that might "hold"; rather than reducing the level of violence, it simply made the violence more random
and vicious.

Ultimately, the government was forced to negotiate. It could not ignore or defeat the MNLF in the southern Philippines, and it could not isolate it from its Islamic supporters internationally. The "Committee of Four," appointed by the Foreign Ministers' Conference to oversee negotiations, was as insistent as the MNLF that Philippine proposals did not constitute an acceptable form of autonomy and that genuine autonomy was essential for the achievement of justice for Muslim Filipinos.

The TripoliAgreement, 1976-1977

A series of meetings between Philippine officials and representatives of the Islamic Conference finally resulted in a visit by Imelda Marcos to Tripoli in November 1976 and negotiations involving

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1100

ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1981

Philippine, Islamic Conterence, and MNLF officials in Tripoli in December. The talks produced an agreement on a cease-fire and tentative terms for a peace settlement. The cease-fire was to be supervised by a committee representing the Philippine government, the MNLF, and the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission (the "Committee of Four"). The terms, which were not released in the Philippines at the time, provided for "autonomy for the Muslims" in thirteen provinces. The "autonomy" was to include Muslim courts, a legislative assembly and executive council, an administrative system, special regional security forces and representation in the central government; control over education, finance, and the economic system; and a right to a "reasonable percentage" from the revenues of mines and minerals. The central government was to maintain responsibility for foreign policy and national defense affairs. The role of the MNLF forces in the Philippine Armed Forces and relationships between structures and policies of the "autonomy" and those of the central government were to be discussed later.6 The -MNLF had reason to be satisfied with the preliminary agreement and with the cease-fire. While the MNLF had originally demanded that 21 provinces (all of Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan, and the Sulu Archipelago) be included in the "Bangsa Moro State" but were forced to settle for thirteen, eight of the thirteen had Christian majorities. The principles agreed to follow closely the MNLF's demands (which in turn were scarcely distinguishable from the "agenda" of the Islamic Conference's Committee of Four). The ceasefire benefited the MNLF by allowing the "Bangsa Moro Army" forces to recoup and regroup, whatever the outcome of the negotiations to work out final details. The gains for the MNLF, however, did not necessarily represent losses for Marcos. Philippine armed forces also badly needed a ceasefire; Marcos needed to establish a reputation as a statesman with leaders of Islamic states; and the Philippine government had provided itself a safeguard by insisting on the inclusion of a clause in the preliminary agreement that it would take "all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement."7 According to Philippine documents, it was understood by all parties that "constitutional processes" included a referendum ("to determine various questions including the administrative nature of the government") and elections for public officials.8 Marcos announced immediately after the preliminary agreement was signed that a plebiscite was "under study," then announced on February 11, 1977, that a referendum would be held on February 21 to get the consent of the people in the thirteen provinces to the territorial scope of the "autonomy"; on February 16 the referendum was postponed until March 17; on March 16 it was postponed until April 17. Meanwhile, the Tripoli talks had reconvened and deadlocked. The Muslim version of the deadlock was that after the MNLF and the Philippine government had presented their positions, the conference

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

1101

chairman suggested an adjournment for each side to work out a compromise; the MNLF was prepared to do so, the Philippine panel was not.9 The Philippine government charged that the MNLF was reverting to earlier demands for a separate state and insisted on a referendum, which the MNLF considered unnecessary.10 Finally Imelda Marcos flew to Tripoli again to work out another compromise. Her efforts produced an exchange of cables between Kadafi and Marcos on March 18-19: Marcos would declare an automonous region of thirteen provinces and appoint a provisional government, which would then hold a referendum on administrative details." On March 26 Marcos proclaimed the creation of the autonomous region; then he announced that he had invited Nur Misuari, chairman of the MNLF's "central committee," to head a provisional government composed of fifteen MNLF members, thirteen provincial governors, and regional commissioner Simeon Datumanong. The MNLF members did not appear, so in response to public clamor aroused by the "leak" of the MNLF's position paper prepared for the February talks in Tripoli (the MNLF had identified the points as negotiable), the "official" members of the new provisional government endorsed a new set of questions for the referendum. The "territorial" questions earlier proposed were kept. Voters in the three provinces not currently in either of the regions with heavy Muslim populations were given the opportunity of opting out of any association with the "Autonomy for the Muslims," and voters in Regions IX and XII were allowed to express their preference for maintaining two "autonomous" regions rather than the one Marcos had just proclaimed. To these questions were added others allowing voters to express their opinions on provisions in the MNLF's position paper, which had been prepared as a draft of a presidential decree.12 Not surprisingly, Kadafi, the Islamic Conference's secretary general, and Misuari protested that both the questions and the procedures were incompatible with the earlier agreements. Kadafi suggested an alternative set of questions, which reflected his understanding of the provision regarding a referendum in the March 18-19 cable exchange: the referendum was to be "concerning the administrative agreements within the areas of the autonomy. . . and this means that the people be asked how to organize themselves. Administratively within the areas of the autonomy [sic]."13 Kadafi's four questions dealt only with the nature of internal, subordinate structures within the "autonomy" that had been defined territorially at Tripoli and subsequently proclaimed by Marcos. Amadou Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the Islamic Conference, and Nur Misuari endorsed Kadafi's proposal.14 Marcos replied that the territorial questions already printed on the ballots reflected the "substance and intent" of Kadafi's questions. He claimed that the other questions regarding MNLF "proposals" or "demands" (Marcos used the words in consecutive sentences, as if they were synonymous) had been added in response to petitions from "the people of the area of the autonomy." All the questions had been circu-

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1102

ASIANSURVEY,Vol. XXI,No. 11, November1981

lated and discussed, and diplomatic observers and foreign correspondents were already prepared to witness the referendum. Hence it would be "embarrassing," Marcos argued, either to change the questions or to postpone the referendum.'5 The referendum was accordingly held, as scheduled. An overwhelming majority of those voting rejected the merger of the thirteen provinces into one region and the other proposals from the MNLF draft, and approved a proposal that the administration of the "autonomy" be under the general supervision and control of the Philippine government. Representatives from the Islamic Conference, the MNLF, and the Philippine government met in Manila in an attempt at saving the negotiations; talks ended at the end of April, with mutual
recriminations.

Soon thereafter the Islamic foreign ministers met in Tripoli. Kadafi's role made it obvious that his interests had shifted, and the conference's final statement contained little more than a complaint about Philippine actions and a call to good behavior.'6 Thereafter Marcos rejected not only the terms but apparently also the mediatory role of the Islamic Conference. The problem was internal, the Philippine government insisted, and should be settled among Filipinos negotiating within the Philippines. Despite the breakdown of negotiations, ceasefire arrangements remained in effect until October 1977 when the Philippine military resumed full-scale activities in the aftermath of the killing of a brigadier general and 34 of his men by an MNLF unit in Sulu (soldiers had recently killed members of the MNLF commander's family). Meanwhile other 'Muslims began to challenge both Misuari's leadership of the MNLF and the MNLF's representativeness of Philippine Muslims, and in the process gave the Marcos government additional reasons to stall on negotiations.'7 It is important to try to identify what went wrong. The easiest explanation is that neither side was sufficiently interested in a settlement to make the compromises necessary to secure one; neither side was convinced that it would lose more by the resumption of fighting than it would lose in a settlement. That explanation seems essentially correct, but more can be said. Interviews and the public record suggest that Marcos probably assumed in December 1976 and January 1977 that he would have a referendum that would allow three provinces to opt out of the new "Autonomy for the Muslims" agreed to at Tripoli. The three had not been included in the two southern regions established in 1975, at a time when Marcos was demonstrating he would respond to MNLF demands for autonomy. The Philippine government had opposed their inclusion in the Tripoli list, presumably not only because of their Christian majorities but also because of their economic resources. The Philippine government had also opposed the creation of a single "autonomy" and had argued for the continuation of the two existing regions. This issue, too, could be submitted to the voters. Then,

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

1103

the government apparently assumed, it could define (or reaffirm) a form of autonomy that would be a pattern for administrative decentralization it was already considering for the entire country, but with special provisions to conciliate Muslims. The resumption of talks in Tripoli made it obvious, however, that the MNLF was unlikely to settle for the form of autonomy or the role for their leadership that the Marcos regime had in mind. Hence one of the Philippine delegates to the talks, with or without Marcos' permission (there is a rumor that Marcos was furious at the action), "leaked" the MNLF paper in the Philippines, where it was promptly distributed by officials.and the press.'8 The regime then decided to change the nature of the questions, taking advantage of "outraged" public opinion to get a basis for refusing to make any concesions and hence for deadlocking the talks. Filipinos, the line went, would not bow to foreign pressure to accede to demands amounting to the "dismemberment" of their country.19 While the regime's record in regard to expressions of public outrage gives grounds for skepticism, there was undoubtedly opposition both to the original December agreement and to the draft decree circulated in March and April. The leadership of the Philippine Armed Forces reportedly was solidly opposed to any compromise. There is no reason to doubt that the Christians who dominated the area numerically, economically, and politically were also opposed to a shift of power to Muslims, and specifically to the MNLF and voted accordingly in the April 14 referendum. Muslim opinion was divided: the established Muslim leadership had no reason to oppose it; MNLF adherents supported the agreements; most others had no way to express opinions, if they felt any desire to do so. Moreover, the refusal of the Islamic foreign ministers to recommend oil sanctions against the Philippines or military support for the MNLF made it clear that the Philippines could expect the Islamic Conference to take a stronger stand on behalf of the MNLF during negotiations than at any other time. Thus, after the foreign ministers' meeting in May, the Philippines had little incentive to negotiate. The MNLF, meanwhile, was also hardening its position. As Marcos resorted to a referendum to divide and weaken (geographically and politically) the "autonomy" agreed to in December, the MNLF sought to institutionalize its role in a post-settlement South and to define further, and more rigorously, its notion of autonomy. If in the original Tripoli negotiations it had demanded (and received) more territorially than current Muslim/Christian population ratios would have justified, in the subsequent negotiations it demanded a greater role for itself and more powers for the "autonomy" than its mass base or support among Muslims, let alone Christians, would have justified. Its positions on both geographical and political issues were backed by logic. Christian migration had forced Muslims out of, or into minority status in, lands that were historically theirs; Muslims hence had a claim to the territory. The MNLF needed to institutionalize its role

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1104

Vol. XXI,No. 11, November1981 ASIANSURVEY,

precisely because it could not assume majority support for its Muslim/ reformist goals. "Autonomy" needed to be defined rigorously because the Philippines had an historical tradition of strong centralization, which had reached an extreme form under the Marcos regime. But the very factors that made its positions logical also made them unrealistic. Without majority support in the "autonomy," as defined in Tripoli, the MNLF was forced to rely on Marcos to agree to and help implement an arrangement that was contradictory to the essence of his regime. Simply, its leaders had to trust him to give them governing powers because they did not trust him to govern them. They were equally dependent on the Islamic Conference, which, it became increasingly clear, was not willing to punish Marcos with oil (or other) sanctions for reneging on any agreements he had made, and hence was not able to force him to make a final settlement.20 The Tripoli Agreement, which in December 1976 appeared to demonstrate the strength of the MNLF, in the end revealed some of its weaknesses. The cease-fire, however, suggested that the Front maintained considerable authority in the field. Violations occurred frequently between January and October and were carefully chronicled in MNLF documents and in a government "white paper."'2'Yet their occurrence and the ultimate breakdown of the cease-fire months after negotiations had ceased seem much less remarkable than the fact that the cease-fire was as effective as it was for as long as it was, given the looseness and incompleteness of the Front's structure.

ContinuingStalemate, 1980-1981
Since tne breaKdown of negotiations and of the cease-fire in 1977, 'government" in the southern Philippines has been provided by the three parallel structures. The first is an "official" government structure, dominated by civilians; divided into regional, provincial, and local levels; and integrated into national structures by elections, representation in parties and planning bodies, and implementation of programs. The second structure is the Philippines Armed Forces, divided into two commands containing in total about three-quarters of the country's military manpower. The third structure, rudimentary but dominant in certain areas and/or for certain functions, consists of a number of armed bands, some affiliated with the MNLF or with factional groups linked loosely with the MNLF and some assuming whatever identity or allegiance best legitimizes their schemes for extortion.

"Official" GovernmentStructure:Each of the two regional governments, located in Cotabato City and Zamboanga City, has a legislative assembly, an executive council, and a bureaucracy. The Philippine position paper presented at the Tripoli negotiations argued as a reason for their existence: Two regional legislativeassembliesand two executive councils (one per region) will enable more Muslimsto participatein the administrationof

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIM SEPARATISM INTHEPHILIPPINES 1105

government affairs and train them in leadership. Leadership and administrativeskills are what most of the MuslimYouth need now.22 To the extent that participation and employment are ends in themselves, the regional governments have functioned well. Perhaps it can be argued that they have provided training appropriate for participation in the kinds of legislative and administrative bodies that exist at the national level. But there is little indication that they produce or administer effectively the kinds of programs one might expect from autonomous governments sensitive and responsive to local conditions. In Region IX, the major opposition to the government's party, the KBL, has been led by Cesar Climaco, of Zamboanga City. The opposition announced that it would not field candidates in the May 7, 1979 polls to elect representatives to the regional assembly and asked Marcos to use the five million pesos that the election would cost for development projects. In Region XII, the KBL, another opposition party, and self-identified MNLF candidates (who were disavowed by MNLF spokesmen) decided to merge into one party and allow Marcos to choose the candidates for its regional assembly.23 The election was significant, according to the government, because it implemented the Tripoli Agreement. Coverage in the Mindanao Cross, Cotabato's newspaper, suggests post-election operating procedures in Region XII's Assembly. Abul Khayr Alonto, who had formally "returned to the fold of the law" in March 1978, was elected Speaker of the Assembly, though he was absent. The reason for his absence was allegedly that Ali Dimaporo (governor of Lanao del Sur and an implacable foe of the Alonto family), Admiral Romulo Espaldon, and others had blocked the appointment he expected, to be Chairman of the Executive Council. Since his absence was prolonged, Mario Badelles was chosen Speaker Pro-tem. Badelles, however, left for abroad. Alonto then flew in to attend one day of the Assembly session, during which he designated John Hofer as presiding officer, and returned to Manila to "attend to the people's needs" by providing escort service for two deputy ministers from
Yemen.24

On April 19, 1980, the Mindanao Crossreported that when "Commander Ronnie," an MNLF leader, rejoined the government, President Marcos had ordered the organization of regional security forces in Regions IX and XII. He intended, according to the story, to have army units confined to their barracks unless the regional forces needed help. On May 3, the Crossreported that Amelil Malaquiok (alias "Commander Ronnie"), after discussions with area military commanders, had introduced a proposal for a Regional Security Force of Philippine Constabulary units, Civilian Home Defense Forces, returnees, and MNLF members with the government, a total of about 15,000 men. On May 17, a final article said that two Assembly men felt that the proposal had not been properly debated before being submitted to Marcos. Since the sequence of news articles suggests that Marcos had already made his decision before the proposal was introduced, their concern over the adequacy of subsequent debate seems misplaced.
This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1106

ASIANSURVEY,Vol. XXI,No. 11, November1981

Government at the provincial and local levels seems solidly grounded in the patron-client linkages characteristic of traditional Philippine politics. In Lanao del Sur, for example, Governor Ali Dimaporo, who has close ties with Marcos, has cemented relationships with his former enemy, Governor Arsenio Quibranza of Lanao del Norte, by arranging a marriage betweeen two of their children. When he needed more votes in the last election, he arranged a marriage between one of his sons (he has about 15 children) and a daughter of former Vice-Governor Abdul Marohombsar. As a part of the deal, Dimaporo agreed to pay a bride-price of 250,000 pesos, secure Marohombsar's appointment to the Regional Assembly, and arrange an amnesty for his nephew, Jalondoni, the leader of the group that kidnapped American missionary Lloyd Van Vactor in March 1979. Another participant in the kidnapping, who lacked such connections, was killed by his Philippine Constabulary escorts "while attempting to escape."25 Dimaporo also controls, directly or indirectly, all public hiring in tie province, including that done at Mindanao State University, whcre he continues to be Acting President. There are, of course, honest and competent public officials throughout the South. They do not appear to be part of a system that encourages or rewards those characteristics. The Military:Information about the military is more scarce. Much of the Southern Philippines looks like occupied territory. Military personnel are omnipresent, though efforts have been made to withdraw them to less populated areas and hence reduce their visibility. Sentries patrol all roads, and military authorities grant or refuse travel passes into particular areas. Rivalry among military units seems to have decreased, and efforts to reduce particularly blatant forms of indiscipline apparently have had some success (Saturday night shootouts between drunken military police and constabulary units seem less frequent). The behavior of Civilian Home Defense Force units has been more difficult to control, at least partially because entry into their ranks has frequently been one of the rehabilitation measures offered to selfidentified rebels. Thus the military constitutes, in some areas, a law unto itself. Its power is based on its control of weaponry. Its use of that power is limited by the decisions of its commanders (which are in turn limited-to a degree-by Marcos' wishes) and by a far from perfect system of discipline. Muslim Forces: The armed bands constituting the third "governing" structure in the Muslim areas vary in geographical and ethnic base, affiliation, ideology, strength, and tactics. Lindy Washburn has identified five major groups in the Lanao (Maranao) area.26 Most of those fighting with Abul Khayr Alonto's "Northern Mindanao Revolutionary Command" have apparently surrendered. They identified themselves

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

INTHEPHILIPPINES 1107 MUSLIM SEPARATISM

as part of the "Bangsa Moro Army" and the MNLF, though Alonto's status with the MNLF had been severely affected by his decision to run for Vice-Mayor of Marawi in 1971 and his brief "defection" in January 1977. A second group, led by Jamil (or Diamel) Lucman, has also surrendered. Jamil, the nephew of Rashid Lucman (whose wife is the aunt of Abul Khayr Alonto), had been identified as "Field Commander of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization," a conservative Jidda-based rival to the MNLF that emerged in mid-1977 under the leadership of Rashid, Salipada Pendatun, and Macapanton Abbas, Jr. There were reports in August 1980, about the time thatJamil surrendered, that the BMLO had been expelled from Saudi Arabia. These reports proved false, but soon thereafter Salipada Pendatun returned to the Philippines. In May 1981 Rashid Lucman agreed to accept Misuari's leadership in the MNLF.27 Thus the BMLO seems to have ceased to exist as an independent organization, though the personalistic linkages on which it was based undoubtedly remain. The third group, led by Jack Dimas, has been consistently identified with the reformist ideology of the MNLF. Dimas, according to some accounts, has been made Vice-Chairman of the Front's Central Committee and has remained outside the country since late 1978. In contrast, the "alim's group" has not been linked with the MNLF. Led by Middle-Eastern trained religious teachers, they have been identified with Hashim Salamat, a Maguindanaon who was part of the MNLF's Central Committee until he broke with Misuari in late 1977, allegedly over Misuari's "radicalism." Members of the "alim's group" were responsible for the September 1980 burning of the United Church of Christ chapel in Marawi, presumably to enhance Salamat's prominence at a time when negotiations were to be resumed. The action was counter-productive, since ulama in the area joined in denouncing the burning as contrary to the Qur'an, and hence un-Islamic. Finally, the "Partisan Elite Brigade" has been responsible for a series of kidnappings, including that of Lloyd Van Vactor, and for other extortion attempts. While they claim identification with the MNLF, they have been repudiated by both Jack Dimas and Jamil Lucman. In the Cotabato area, the structure seems somewhat simpler.28 There have been three main groups identified together as the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee and affiliated with the MNLF. Hashim Salamat's Maguindanaon ties and his more traditional religious orientation constituted a strong pull, however; there may also have been some resentment of the arms distribution policies attributed to Misuari's leadership of the MNLF. In any event, the pro-Salamat political commander of the KRC, "Ronnie," decided to join the government, denying that he was "surrendering" in doing so. The two other KRC commanders, Commander Ali Morad (Ahod Ibrahim) and Ibrahim Sema, remain in the field; the division between them is geographic, not ideological, though Sema is more strongly identified with Misuari. Another group, referred to as the "lost command," is made up

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1108

ASIANSURVEY, Vol. XXI,No. 11, November1981

of defected military personnel. The MNLF has generally disavowed any association with it. Besides these groups, a loosely knit organization of Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims affiliated with the radical National Democratic Front is based in Cotabato. Some of its members purportedly are responsible for the publishing of the newsletterMoro and of the pamphlet Two Hills of the Same Land, the latter under the pseudonym of Rad D. Silva. Both publications advocate a class- rather than a religion-based analysis of the Muslim problem; Moro opposed the Tripoli Agreement. Scanty information suggests that the MNLF's base is more solid in the Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi areas. Misuari's background is Tausug and Samal; most of the current MNLFIleadership is said to be Tausug. These factors undoubtedly bolster the MNLF's appeal in this area, though reputedly Misuari's "low birth" is a handicap. Most accounts of "mass-owned" plantations and schools originate from here. The MNLF's headquarters are located near Zamboanga City, and Misuari made a brief visit in March 1980. Access to Sabah, which apparently remains a source of weapons and other supplies as well as a refuge, is easy. The Bangsa Moro News is mailed from Sandakan. The coexistence of rival structures of "government" results in a situation most accurately described as anarchy. Violence is endemic, though its incidence and form vary. Tension rises and falls with particular circumstances. It was particularly high in the Iligan-Marawi area during summer 1980, following the grenade incidents in Ozasmis and Iligan in March. Muslims in Marawi believed reports that Christians in Iligan were murdering Muslims there. Hence some Muslims commandeered a public vehicle, killed all four Christian males aboard, badly wounded an eighteen-year-old Christian girl, and spared only her twelve-year-old sister. Kidnapping threats against both foreigners and Filipino Christians were constant. In Cotabato City, in contrast, tension seemed low after the surrender of "Commander Ronnie," though there was considerable resentment of the "bounty" given by the government to "Ronnie" and his followers. Zamboanga City resembled Cotabato, both in the comparatively low level of tension and in the resentment of government dispensations to Muslim defectors. Subsequently, however, there have been grenade incidents in both Cotabato and Zamboanga. In no case have the perpetrators been firmly identified. After the incident in Ozamis in March 1980, the government announced the capture of an MNLF "operative" who allegedly identified other MNLF personnel involved in the explosions. Efforts by Maranao researchers to corroborate the names in the barrios from which they were listed were unproductive. One last name was recognized; it belonged to someone who had been killed months earlier. Apparently, then, the story was fabricated-a conclusion also reached by U.S. government sources. Certainly MNLF spokesmen denied any responsibility for the bombings, or any strategy of urban guerilla actions except those directed specifically at military personnel. Specula-

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIM SEPARATISM INTHEPHILIPPINES 1109

tion about those responsible for the Cotabato and Zamboanga incidents ranges from the military (who are also suspected in the March bombings) to the "lost command(s)," the NPA, the MNLF, and the April 6 Liberation Movement. Under the prevailing circumstances, however,! all such incidents exacerbate Muslim-Christian relations. Restrictions on travel make it difficult to know what is happening outside the cities, particularly in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi. MNLF newsletters report constant skirmishes throughout the area, ranging from full-scale offensives (e.g., in Zamboanga del Sur and Norte in May-June 1980) to isolated encounters. Casualties are equally difficult to calculate. According to MNLF figures, approximately 750 soldiers or "renegades" (MNLF defectors) were killed, 73 "mujahideen" were "martyred," and 249 civilians were "slaughtered" in the last six months of 1980.29 One of the worst incidents of the war occurred in Pata Island, off Jolo, in early 1981. Accounts vary, but it seems established that MNLF guerillas killed over 100 (119, by "official" figures) government soldiers in retaliation for a military rampage that involved raping Muslim women, desecrating mosques, and strafing houses. Other military units then counterattacked. Estimates of civilian deaths range from 400 (the constabulary commander's minimum) to 750 (from a "wellinformed government source") to 2000 (based on refugees' statements) 30 Efforts at resuming negotiations have been unproductive, despite vigorous efforts by Islamic Conference officials. In March 1980 the Philippine government issued a "primer" in which it described the Tripoli Agreement as having "lapsed or expired" because of the "intransigence of the MNLF." It also denied that the MNLF was the legitimate representative of Muslims in the southern Philippines.3' Misuari responded by saying the MNLF would no longer agree to any negotiations based on autonomy and would return to its original goal of independence.32 Misuari's new position was not upheld by the foreign ministers' conference, which met in May in Islamabad, but the foreign ministers did condemn the Philippine government for shirking its responsibilities to implement the Tripoli Agreement, which they affirmed as the basis for solving the problem. They also urged the member states to exert "appropriate economic, social and political pressures" on the Philippines and to continue to grant material assistance to the MNLF.33 Given these stances, it is not surprising that scheduled negotiations were postponed three times in 1980. Differences in objectives were accompanied by differences over who should attend and where negotiations should be held. At one stage the Philippines said that there should be no preconditions and all sessions should be kept secret. Later the Philippines insisted that the sessions be held in Jakarta rather than Kuala Lumpur, that participants represent a variety of Filipino Muslim groups or positions, and that no outsiders (i.e., no one from the Islamic Conference) could attend. The MNLF was unenthusiastic about shifting toJakarta but agreed, and apparently also agreed to the inclusion of

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1110

ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1981

some Muslim "renegades" on the government panel, but was adamant that representatives from the Islamic Conference participate. According to MNLF sources, Secretary General Habib Chatti, who had been working on behalf of the Islamic Conference to arrange the talks, was infuriated by Marcos' shift and pledged his support for Misuari's goal of independence.34 Marcos' announcement of the end of martial law brought no change in the situation, particularly since the writ of habeas corpus remained suspended in the "troubled areas" of the South.

Conclusion
A break in the stalemate can conceivably come in one of four ways. If the MNLF is able to reconstruct itself in ways allowing it to overcome some of its more obvious problems-lack of consensus on goals; weakness in grassroots organizing capacity; continuing strains among Maranao, Maguindanaoan, Tausug, and Samal units; dependence on a foreign-based leadership and foreign sources of support-then it may be able to expand its military operations and force the Philippine government to agree to an acceptable compromise settlement. There are signs that some of these things are happening. Recent announcements of a rapprochement between Misuari and Lucman state that the MNLF is willing to resume negotiations on the basis of the Tripoli Agreements-which is to say that the MNLF has once again renounced secession as a goal. Changes in the Manila government might also open new possibilities, but these do not seem likely to be forthcoming under a regime dominated by Marcos. The regime has developed a pattern of devising new governmental structures and programs into which Muslims are co-opted but which also foment resentment and cynicism because they are neither planned carefully nor implemented consistently. Imelda Marcos' appointment as head of the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) may have been intended to indicate the priority to be given to economic changes in the South. That priority has not been apparent in action, nor is there reason to think that policies developed under her leadership would meet the needs of most Muslims, or Christians, in the areas. The SPDA once commissioned a two-million peso study of Philippine Muslims to serve as a basis for development planning, as well as a detailed study of implementation problems with earlier projects. Both studies have now been stopped; completed work is to be sold to anyone interested. The government has apparently decided it knows all it wants to know. Mrs. Marcos did, however, invite SPDA members, including Muslims, to Leyte'to celebrate her birthday. Souvenirs included a small statue of the Santa Nifio (clad in red velvet), a medallion, and a pin, all engraved with "Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II." Christians might have their own reasons for reacting negatively. To Muslims, such "gifts" could hardly demonstrate sensitivity to religious differences. The Marcoses have also made efforts to cultivate Muslim leaders

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

1111

internationally. By their own accounts, they have been successful. Certainly they have been less criticized than they might have been. Here, too, however, there have been problems. Malacanang invited a group of visiting Muslim officials to lunch during Ramadhan. Marcos' speech to an Islamic conference in Manila was elaborately reproduced in a pamphlet, which lauded "the plight of the prophet Mohammed from prosecution in Medina." Such mistakes do not go unnoticed, no matter how well-intended the gesture. According to former Senator Benigno Aquino, he was asked by Deputy Minister of Defense Carmelo Barbero to talk with Misuari and Lucman during a visit to Saudi Arabia, in order to assess the possibilities of resuming negotiations. After Aquino's efforts produced a statement on the terms for resuming negotiations, Marcos denounced him for forging relationships with Misuari and Lucman that would result in a "Cambodian-type holocaust."35 Then, just before the June 1981 presidential election, the Philippine government announced the discovery of an assassination plot against Marcos and other government officials and the arrests of many involved. According to the government account, "Operation June Bride" was planned jointly by Aquino and the MNLF, with the intention of disrupting the elections.36 Later information, from other sources, confirmed the involvement of Muslims in a plot, but identified the instigators as Maranao Muslims who were arrested in late 1979 for demonstrating outside the U.S. Embassy in support of Khomeini. While they had contacts within the MNLF, and at least one Maranao affiliated with the MNLF was belatedly included in the plans, the MNLF's role was peripheral at most, and Aquino was apparently totally uninvolved. Hence, the government's handling of the case seemed primarily indicative of its desire to discredit two visible sources of opposition before the election, but also reflective of its continuing lack of interest in negotiations.37 If the Marcos government is destabilized by either a coup or a revolution, Muslims might cooperate to assert their right to selfdetermination and ultimately to establish an autonomous government, in or out of the Philippines. Their capability for doing so depends not only on their success in unifying themselves and on their willingness and ability to build alliances with non-Muslims, but also on the receptivity of other opposition groups. The platform of the National Democratic Front includes support for Muslim self-determination, and there has been some local cooperation between MNLF and New People's Army groups. Before the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) decided to boycott the June presidential election, there was talk of including in the UNIDO candidate's platform a proposal that the two existing southern regions be reorganized to include only provinces with Muslim majorities and then to grant them genuine autonomy.38 After the election there was a report that opposition leader Jose Laurel had left the Philippines for a meeting with Aquino and Misuari.39 Aquino has obviously been working to consolidate relationships with Misuari and with Saudi Arabian officials, whom he hopes to involve in

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1112

ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1981

negotiating a settlement.40 Aquino's objectives remain unclear, so it is difficult to assess the validity of Marcos' reactions. A final factor is support from outside. As suggested earlier, aside from early support from Kadafi and Tun Mustapha, assistance from Islamic states has come primarily in the form of efforts to facilitate a negotiated settlement and criticisms of Philippine policies. Iran has imposed an oil boycott, and Iranians in the Philippines have tried to mobilize Filipino Muslims in support of their own revolutionary goals. Their success has been limited. Some Filipino Muslims who participated in at least one protest march against the U.S. Embassy were reportedly paid for their services; others were intent on advancing their own political prominence. A library stocking anti-American literature in Cotabato City quickly reverted to a feed storage area after the Iranian who established it was deported; his student visa had expired. Piles of anti-American propaganda rotted on the docks in Zamboanga. "We do not pray with them," was the Tausug explanation to an American researcher, who assumed she was being told that Sunni Muslims had no reason to heed the words of Shiites.4' Saudi Arabia also imposed a brief oil boycott in late 1980. The reasons were never clear, and the contract was soon renewed. Most foreign Muslims in the Philippines-aside from Iranian students, who are divided in their political allegiance-are teachers from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and appear to be reformist in their religious attitudes but politically conservative. In an effort to increase support from the radical Islamic states, the rhetoric of MNLF spokesman has, in particular forums, become more strident. Speeches to the foreign ministers' conferences have remained comparatively moderate, though at the May 1980 session Misuari clearly placed "Moro" nationalism-which he defined in terms of Islam, historical experiences, and territory-in the context of the right to national self-determination. Even this muted argument is unlikely to win support, though Philippine definitions of "autonomy" have already been rejected as inadequate. The Islamic Conference will protest the maltreatment of Philippine Muslims; it will facilitate their efforts to reach ajust settlement; it will not promote a victory for radical Islamic separatists. Thus the stalemate seems likely to continue.
LELA G. NOBLE is currently serving as Associate Academic Vice President, San Jose State Univesity, San Jose, California.

NOTES 1. For a good compilation of the literature, see Alfredo T. Tiamson and Rosalinda N. Cafieda (eds.), The SouthernPhilippines Issue, Readings in the Mindanao Problem, Vol. I (Marawi City: Southern Philippines Center for Peace Studies, Mindanao State University, 1979). 2. R. Joel Jalal-ud-din De los Santos, "Towards a Solution of the Moro Problem," SoutheastAsian Affairs 1978 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Singapore', p. 211.

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

MUSLIMSEPARATISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

1113

3. The original five, according to one account, were Nur Misuari, Abul Khayr Alonto, Indar Tampi, Amelil Malaquiok ("Commander Ronnie"), and someone from Zamboanga-two Tausug/Samal, two Maranao, and one Maguindanaoan. Interview, Marawi City, July 1980. Jamil Lucman identified ten founders and their current status (BulletinToday, September 4, 1980): Jamil Lucman (joined government); Nur Misuari (at large); Abul Khayr Alonto (joined government); Amalil Malaquiok (joined government); Al Bandaing (joined government); Sali Wali (joined government); Utu Salajuddin (killed); Ali Boon (killed); Abdul Manan (killed); and Akman Inampala (killed). T. S. J. George has still another version; see, for example, Revolt in Mindanao (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 117-230. 4. De los Santos, "Towards a Solution," p. 212. 5. The text is included in The Southwestern Philippines Question (SWPQ), 2nd ed. (issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, 1977), pp. 48-50. For a full account of activities of the Islamic Conference, see Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble (eds.), Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 185-189. 6. For the text see SWPQ, pp. 76-82. 7. SWPQ, p. 81. 8. SWPQ, pp. 17-18. 9. This account is based on interviews in the Philippines. MNLF and Islamic Conference participants in the talks have been much more circumspect about publishing accounts of presumably "secret" talks than the Philippine government. Mahardika, "the official organ of the Moro National Liberation Front" (published in Tripoli), provides some information about positions taken. There are also reports prepared by the Islamic Conference's secetary-general and the Quadripartite Commission for the annual meetings of foreign ministers, but these are very difficult to obtain. 10. SWPQ, pp. 19-20. 11. SWPQ, pp. 95-98. 12. One version of the question (some questions varied in different areas) and returns is included inSWPQ, pp. 145-147. The text of the MNLF draft is on pp. 148-165. The heading "MNhF draft demand" was added by the editors of the book. 13. SWPQ, p. 95. 14. SWPQ, pp. 140-142. 15. SWPQ, pp. 138-139. 16. FBIS Daily Report:Middle East and North Africa, May 17, 1977, from ARNA (the Libyan News Agency), and Far Eastern EconomicReview, June 3, 1977. 17. For a brief summary of the factionalism that developed, see Lela Noble, "The Philippines: Muslims Fight for an Independent State," SoutheastAsia Chronicle,October 1980, pp. 16-17. 18. Marcos claimed that the MNLF "demands" were transmitted and circulated by "persons not in the government"; c.f., his reply to Kadafi, April 14, 1977, SWPQ, p. 138. Manila sources deny this claim. 19. Manila papers in March-April 1977 reported both expressions of "public opinion" and the regime's responses. 20. We have no Islamic Conference or MNLF statements to compare with the Philippine interpretation of the provision in the Tripoli Accord which says that, "the Government of the Philippines shall take all constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Areement." It seems unlikely, however, that either the MNLF or the Islamic Conference's representatives would have accepted a provision which they understand as allowing an agreement to be "implemented" by being rejected or fundamentally modified. Certainly, both Kadafi's statements and normal usage of the English language suggest that Marcos' subsequent actions were inconsistent with the "agreement" reached in the March 18-19 exchange of cables. 21. The Philippine government (Southern Philippines Research and Information Group) published a "White Paper on Ceasefire Violations and Terrorist Atrocities in Southwestern Mindanao and Sulu, 29 October 1977." The MNLF's documents were less formal. 22. SWPQ, p. 85. 23. Bulletin Today, April 11, 1979.

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1114

ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1981

24. Mindanao Cross, May 10, 1980. 25. TimesJournal, July 19, 1980. 26. Lindy Washburn, "Muslim Resistance With or Without the Elite," SoutheastAsia Chronicle, October 1980, pp. 18-24. IQRA, the original MNLF newsletter in Northern Mindanao, has now been replaced by the Ranao Tribune, "the official monthly organ of the Ranao Revolutionary Committee, MNLF." 27. Philippine News (San Francisco), May 20-26, 1981. 28. This account is based on interviews in Cotabato City, July 1980, and on newspaper accounts. The KRC publishes a newsletter called Tantawan. 29. These numbers are calculated from reports in the Bangso Moro News. The Far EasternEconomicReview (January 30, 1981) uses a figure of 10,000 AFP personnel killed since 1972. The total number killed is estimated at 60,000. 30. Richard Vokey, in Far Eastern EconomicReview, May 8, 1981. 31. Regional Autonomous Governments,Southern Philippines, issued by Manuel Collantes as Chairman, Cooperation for Southern Philippines, p. 8. 32. Mahardika,April 1980. The speech to the "International Conference on Prophet Mohammed and His Message," London, April 12-15, 1980, was reprinted in subsequent issues of Mahardika. 33. Resolution No. 22/11-P on the Question of the Muslims in Southern Philippines, Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, May 17-21, 1980. 34. Bangsa Moro News, December 1-15, 1980, p. 2. There is no evidence that Chatti has fulfilled the alleged pledge. 35. Philippine News, May 20-36, 1981. 36. FBIS, June 9 and 15, 1981. 37. Personal correspondence, August 1981. 38. Vokey, FEER, May 8, 1981, p. 40. 39. FBIS, June 18, 1981. 40. Philippine News, July 15-21, 1981. 41. The information on Iranian involvement is based on interviews in Manila, Marawi, Cotabato, and Zamboanga, July 1980. The American researcher is Ruth Moore.

This content downloaded on Wed, 30 Jan 2013 10:43:18 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions