A Sufi Response To Political Islamism Al-Ahbash of Lebanon

A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon
Author(s): A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian

Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (May, 1996), pp. 217-229
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 28 (1996), 217-229. Printed in the United States of America
A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian
A SUFI RESPONSE TO POLITICAL ISLAMISM:

AL-AHBASH OF LEBANON
The rise and spread of Islamist political movements have been topics of focal con-
cern for scholars and analysts in recent decades. Since Richard Mitchell's seminal
work on the Muslim Brotherhood, a plethora of writers have analyzed the at-
tributes of both Sunni and Shica revivalist movements and the policies of Arab re-
gimes and the West toward the Islamist phenomenon.' Yet scant attention has been
paid to the reactions generated within the larger Islamic community toward the
Islamist groups and their militant offshoots. One such unnoticed source of reaction
to political Islamism is the nebulous confraternity of Sufi orders (turuq) whose
mysticism and esoteric beliefs and practices have set them apart from the exoteric
revivalism and political activism of the Islamist societies, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood and its many affiliates.
The rivalry and controversies between Sufism and its legalist and conservative
detractors go back to the early epochs of Muslim history. The Sufi orders that
emerged in the crisis milieu of the 12th century represented a quest for gnosis, the
mystical search for truth, in contrast to the disciplined legalism and conservatism
of the ulama.2 As the guardians of the Islamic tradition and ethic, the ulama were
the legitimizers of power and authoritative interpreters of the law. In terms of
Weberian theory, the "traditional"and "legal-rational"authority of the ulama was
undermined by the free-flowing "charismatic"authority of the Sufi shaykhs.3
Yet under certain historical conditions, there was considerable coincidence and
coexistence between the Sufi shaykhs and the ulama.4 Furthermore,not all Sufi
shaykhs and movements were quietest in the religious and political spheres. For
example, the Sanusiyyah began as a Sufi movement, but in its third generation
became militant in response to French and Italian imperialism.5 Nor should it be
forgotten that some prominent leaders of political Islamist movements-Sudan's
Mahdi, Hasan al-Banna, and Ruhollah Khomeini-began their careers as Sufis. Un-
der the impact of the crisis conditions of their respective social milieux, these men
were propelled into lives of political activism.6 In the case of Banna, his Muslim
A. Nizar Hamzeh is Associate Professor in the Departmentof Political Science and Public Administra-
tion at the American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon. R. Hrair Dekmejian is Professor in the
Department of Political Science at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif. 90089-
0044, U.S.A.
? 1996 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/96 $7.50 + .10

218 A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian
Brotherhood emerged as a mass movement in response to the social changes

that brought about the decline of the Sufi orders in Egypt in the 19th and 20th
centuries.7
The resurgence of Islamism after the 1967 war and its subsequent use by Presi-
dent Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt as an antidote to Nasserism brought the Muslim
Brotherhoodinto prominence as a prelude to its emergence as a part of mainstream
Islam.8 With the rise of the Brotherhood'smilitant offshoots, and its growing criti-
cism of Sadat's policies of rapprochementwith the West and Israel, the govern-
ment sought to strengthen the Sufi movement, which by this time was presenting
itself as an Islamically legitimate but politically quietist, tolerant, and spiritually
vibrant alternative to political Islamism.9 This pattern of mutual accord between
the state and Sufism has persisted under President Husni Mubarak.10Similar poli-
cies of governmental support for Sufism have been discerned in Syria and Saudi
Arabia.
A dominant theme in the ideology and activities of contemporarySunni Islamist
movements is a deep-seated opposition to Sufism. Despite past instances of con-
vergence and overlapping between Sufi and revivalist movements, their mutual
antagonism has become pronounced particularly in the contemporary milieu of
heightened political Islamism. The doctrinal roots of opposition to Sufism among
today's Sunni Islamists are found in the writings of the eminent 13th-centuryHan-
bali C'lim Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya.12In his quest to purify the Muslim
faith, Ibn Taymiyya vigorously opposed Sufi pantheism and such practices as the
worship of saints and pilgrimages to their shrines, although he accepted a Sufism
based on Islamic legalism and tradition.13In the hands of Muhammad ibn CAbd
al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya's strictures on Sufism were transformed into a compre-
hensive condemnation and prohibition of the Sufi orders.14This critical stance to-
ward Sufism and its practices can be found among the major exponents of modern
Islamist thought, such as Abu al-AClaMawdudi,15Sayyid Qutb,16CAbdal-Salam
Faraj,17 and Fathi Yakan.18By anchoring themselves on the legalist tradition of Ibn
Taymiyya, these modern-day Islamists rejected Sufi esoteric (batini) beliefs and
ceremonial practices as being heretical innovations (bid'a) and superstitions (khu-
rafa).19 Instead of the Sufi's inner-directed mysticism, quietism, and withdrawal
from the mundane, the Islamists advocate religious-political activism, where a
person's piety can be outwardly demonstrated and socially validated in terms of
the shari'a. Indeed, the ultimate quest of the Islamists is to capture the Islamic
popular mainstream by imposing a single homogenizing ideology as a means to
mobilize the masses as a prelude to achieving political control. Thus, the phenom-
enal growth of the Islamist movement in recent decades has threatened the popu-
list social base of the Sufi orders. Despite their political quietism in the recent
past, some Sufi groups have begun to assert themselves to defend their interests in
the political arena. This paper will profile one of the most politically active of
these Sufi-based societies, the Ahbash of Lebanon-a rapidly growing association
with branches in many Muslim and Western countries. The analysis will focus on
the controversial historical and theological origins of this movement; its social
roots, leadership, and political activities in Lebanon; and the causal factors re-
sponsible for its dynamic growth in recent times.

A Sufi Response to Political Islamism 219
LEBANON'S ISLAMIC SPECTRUM
The Islamic segment of Lebanon's political spectrum is exceedingly complex,

reflecting the country's pluralist makeup and the factionalism brought on by its en-
vironment of crisis. The factors contributing to Lebanon's instability in the 1970s
and 1980s included intersectarian and interclass conflicts, Palestinian-Israeli fight-
ing, and the proxy war fought by the neighboring countries on Lebanese soil.
Within this crisis milieu, Lebanon saw the emergence of both Sunni and Shi'i
Islamist groups, many engaged in political activism.20 Among the Sunni, the activ-
ist segment of the Muslim Brotherhood is represented by Fathi Yakan's al-JamaCa
al-Islamiyya, which has fought the Maronite militias and Israel. Another militant
Sunni group is Shaykh Sacid Sha'ban's Harakat al-Tawhid, which split from the
Jamaca al-Islamiyya in 1982.21 On the Shici side of the spectrum, Harakat Amal
was founded in 1975 by Imam Musa al-Sadr.22 After Sadr's disappearance in 1978,
Amal lost its revivalist character and under Nabih Barri became a Shici political
movement. The cause of Shici militancy was taken up by Hizballah-an umbrella
organization of more than a half-dozen radical groups nurtured by Iran's revolu-
tionary Islamic regime.23
The Sufi segment of the Lebanese Islamic spectrum consists of seven orders:
Qadiriyya, Rifaciyya, Naqshabandiyya, Shaziliyya, Badawiyya, Khalwatiyya, and
Mawlawiyya.24 Within this context, the Ahbash function as a pan-Sufi organiza-
tion-the activist expression of Lebanese Sufism, supported mainly by the Qadi-
riyya, Rifaciyya, and Naqshabandiyya orders.25
ORIGINS OF AL-AHBASH
The Ahbash, officially known as the Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects, or

Jamciyyat al-Masharic al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya, is unique and one of the most
controversial Muslim associations in the contemporary spectrum of Islamic groups.
The controversy surrounding this movement involves its peculiar origins and eclec-
tic theological roots, which define the society's separate identity and determine its
program of religious and political action. Indeed, the Jamciyya has invited con-
troversy precisely because its teachings do not fit the conventional "Islamist" or
"fundamentalist" mold.
The Ahbash are the devout followers of Shaykh CAbdallah ibn Muhammad ibn
Yusuf al-Hirari al-Shibi al-Abdari, also known as al-Habashi, signifying his Ethi-
opian origins-hence the appellations given to his movement: al-Ahbash and al-
Habashiyyin. While his detractors call him "a mysterious person"26 of Jewish
origins,27 the shaykh's official biography states that he was born in al-Hirara, near
Somalia, in 1920, where he studied Shafici jurisprudence and became a mufti in
the Oromo tribal region. In 1947, Shaykh Habashi came to the Hijaz after he was
expelled from Ethiopia, because his teachings were seen as a threat by Emperor
Haile Selassie. In 1948, the shaykh journeyed to Jerusalem and then to Damascus
to study with the Rifaciyya and Qadiriyya orders. He settled in Beirut in 1950, and
was licensed as a shaykh by al-Azhar University's branch in Lebanon.28
Originally founded by Shaykh Ahmad al-CAjuz in 1930, the Society of Philan-
thropic Projects was taken over by Shaykh Habashi's followers in 1983; by the late

1980s, the society had become one of Lebanon's largest Islamic movements. Dur-
ing the Lebanese civil war, the Ahbash grew from a few hundred members into
a large organization by infiltrating the Sunni militias and schools. When 'Abd
al-Hafiz Qasim's militia disbanded in 1984, the Ahbash recruited its members into
its ranks. However, the Ahbash abstained from creating a militia of its own and
from involvement in intersectarianviolence and fighting Israel; its main aims were
proselytization and recruitment, while it displayed a commitment to moderation
and political passivity.29It was not until the early 1990s that the Ahbash entered
the Lebanese political arena as a participantin the parliamentaryelections of 1992.
DOCTRINAL ROOTS
The complex structureof Shaykh Habashi'sbelief system blends elements of Sunni

and Shici theology with Sufi spiritualism. The outcome of his doctrinal eclecticism
is an ideology of Islamic moderation and toleration that emphasizes Islam's in-
nate pluralism, along with opposition to political activism and the use of violence
against the ruling order. These attributes of the Ahbash creed set the group on a
collision course with the political thought of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab,
Sayyid Qutb, and the activist segments of the Muslim Brotherhood and its militant
affiliates in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Lebanon.
In an attempt to neutralize his critics and reinforce the legitimacy of his imama
among the Sunni Muslims, Habashi traces his genealogy to the Prophet Muham-
mad.30Similarly,his ideological discourse goes back to the pious ancestors(al-salaf)
and the writings of Shafici, Ashcari, and Maturidi. He follows Shafici and Ashcari
by relying on the hadith and the sunna, while placing secondary emphasis on qiyas
and ijmac. Like Ashcari and Maturidi, he insists on the unquestionable acceptance
of the revealed text without asking "how"-bila kayf31 Also, Habashi follows
Ashcari and Maturidi in believing that Islam and faith are tied closely together
despite their different meanings. He defines faith as tasdiq bil-qalb (inner assent),
expressed by verbal affirmation(iqrar bi'l-lisdn). Islam, however, is the language
of faith in the Prophet's teachings, and neither faith nor Islam is acceptable with-
out the other.32In regard to predestination and free will, however, Habashi takes
an intermediate position between Ashcari and Maturidi. He affirms that acts of
men are created by God subject to His will and decree.33While they are acts of
God in one respect, they are also man's acts and his free choice (ikhtiydr).34God
created both good and evil and will lead astray (.dalal) only those who, He knows,
will choose the wrong way and will guide only those who, He knows, will choose
the right way.35Thus, Habashi follows Ashcari in ascribing all acts to God, al-
though like Maturidihe accords man's free will the logic of its consequences-that
is, the just are saved on that basis.36
THE SHICA DIMENSION
One of the most revealing aspects of Shaykh Habashi'sthought is his acceptance of

the Shica doctrine of legitimacy. He begins by quoting Shafici, that everyone who
fought CAliwas a bdghi (transgressor).37Habashi further cites Ibn Hanbal to jus-

tify CAli'scaliphate against Mucawiya and his "faction of transgressors"(al-firqa

al-baghiya).38As a furtherstep, Habashi underlines the legitimacy of all four mem-
bers of the Prophet'sfamily-CAli, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn-by citing the ca-
nonical writings of Muslim and al-Nisa'i.39 Equally significant is Shaykh Habashi's
rejection of the use of ijtihdd by some Sunni jurists to legitimize Mucawiya's op-
position to CAli.As a case in point, Habashi takes issue with Ibn Taymiyya's view
that fighting with CAli against Mucawiya was neither a duty nor a Sunna. This
product of Ibn Taymiyya's ijtihdd is found invalid by Habashi because of the pres-
ence of a clear Qur'anic text and hadith. In support of his position, Habashi cites
the verse "fight the group that is a transgressor" along with the Prophet's hadith
warning CAmmarbin Yasir, a companion of Muhammad and CAli, about the fac-
tion of transgressors who would kill him. Habashi concludes that "the faction of
transgressors"was that of Mucawiya, and fighting on CAli'sside was a duty and
Sunna.40Furthermore,Habashi explicitly disagrees with most contemporary Sunni
jurists by citing several ahhdith in order to uphold the legitimacy of the imdma of
CAliand of his sons Hasan and Husayn.4' Also, Habashi upholds the teachings of
Imam Husayn's son, Zayn al-CAbidin,who is held in high esteem by the Ahbash.42
Yet, beyond his acceptance of the foregoing doctrinal positions, Habashi's close-
ness to Shicism comes from another source-his deep immersion in Sufism.
THE SUFI DIMENSION
Sufism represents the essential key to understanding Habashi's thought and the
ideological roots of the Ahbash movement. Habashi'sveneration of 'Ali is in keep-
ing with the special position assigned by all Sufis to the fourth caliph, who is
considered the originator of Islamic mysticism as "the Knower of God" (al-'arif
bi'llah).43 Moreover, Shi'ism was an important influence on the two 12th-century
Sufi orders-the Qadiriyya and RifaCiyya-with which Habashi became associated
during his formative years. The founding "saint" of Rifaciyya, Ahmad al-RifaCi
(d. 1183), who claimed descent from 'Ali and Fatima, is venerated by the Ahbash
as "al-RifaCial-Husayni" and "sifi salaf"-a pious mystic ancestor.44
As a dedicated mystic, Habashi defends many centuries-old Sufi beliefs and
practices that are attacked as innovations (bidca) by the Wahhabis and other Is-
lamist groups. To Habashi there are two types of innovation: "bad" innovations
(bid'at dalala) are those against the Qur'an and Sunna and should be rejected;
"good" innovations (bid'at hudd) are those consistent with the Qur'an and Sunna
and should be preserved, because God told his Prophet that his umma can innovate
(yuhdithu) in keeping with the Qur'an and hadith, as did the "Godly religious
orders" (turuq ahl Allah)-that is, the Qadiriyya and RifaCiyya.45These "good"
innovations include giving bayca (allegiance) to the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-
sdlih); upholding the name of Allah by prayer and singing (tahlil); celebrating the
Prophet'sbirthday;visiting the shrines of saintly ancestors for their blessing; pray-
ing loudly after mosque services; and keeping meditation boxes (mihrab) in the
mosques.46All these constitute a forthrightrestatement of Sufism as a distinct and
Islamically legitimate way of life, which the Ahbash are preparedto defend against
their Islamist foes.

HABASHI VERSUS IBN TAYMIYYA
Despite their deep Sufi roots, the Ahbash differ from traditional Sufi orders in their
aggressive proselytization and political activism directed at Islamist opponents.
Their religious, social, and political activism is rooted in the belief that the Islam-
ist movement and its militant offshoots have become the self-styled defenders of
Islam by representing themselves as the Islamic mainstream to the exclusion of
other exponents of the faith. Thus, the Ahbash have taken the offensive in the
name of Islamic pluralism to challenge the Islamist groups in doctrine, preaching,
and social action; in street battles; and at the ballot box.
The Ahbash ideological offensive against the Islamist thinkers is both virulent
and comprehensive, beginning with Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab and
their contemporary disciples, Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, and Fathi Yakan of Leba-
non's al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya.47In attacking Ibn Taymiyya, Habashi positions him-
self in the AshCaritradition, to which, he states, the majority of the Ahl al-Sunna
belong.48 Habashi considers Ibn Taymiyya an exponent of "extremism" who was
sent to prison by four judges representing the four schools of law; thus, he is no
"shaykh al-Islam," as his followers have called him.49In doctrinal terms, Habashi
attacks IbnrTaymiyya on four central issues. The first concerns Ibn Taymiyya's
prohibition as shirk of Sufi beliefs and popular practices such as al-shafdca-
appeals for intercession (al-tawassul) from the faithful to the prophets and pious
ancestors by using such expressions as ya rasul Allah and yd CAll.50Habashi up-
holds the use of these terms, along with the veneration of saintly persons and
visitation of their shrines-all of which Ibn Taymiyya prohibited. Habashi also
attacks Ibn Taymiyya's rejection of consensus (ijmd'); opposition to Shicism and
Sufism; and support of anthropomorphism(al-tashbih), ascribing human attributes
to God.51
In essence, Habashi criticizes Ibn Taymiyya for the intolerance that he has in-
spired among contemporaryIslamists toward different forms of Islamic expression.
To Habashi this intolerance is the hallmark of Ibn Taymiyya's progeny-from the
Wahhabis to the Muslim Brotherhood and its militant affiliates in Egypt, Afghan-
istan, Syria, Algeria, Jordan, and Lebanon, which support violence "under the
guise of Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism."52In fact, Habashi opposes all
political Islamists; he does not differentiate between the political gradualism of the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the tactics of its revolutionary offshoots such
as al-Takfirwal-Hijra, Tanzlm al-Jihad, and al-JamaCaal-Islamiyya.
Three interrelated factors fuel Habashi's unremitting opposition to the contem-
porary Sunni Islamists, much of it imbedded in his Sufism. The first is his total
opposition to violence, including revolutionary action against constituted authority.
The second is Habashi's eschewal of the goal of all political Islamists: that is, the
establishment of an Islamic order, "because the Muslims are not preparedfor it"53
and "there is no way to appoint a caliph at the present time."54The third factor is
Habashi's opposition to takfir, the charge of unbelief leveled by the Islamists
against other Muslims.
In his blanket opposition to takfir, Habashi attacks the absolutist standards of
the Islamists who follow Ibn Taymiyyahin determininga Muslim's "Muslimness."55

Instead, he posits a relativistic standardbased on moderation (al-iCtidal). Thus, if

a person fulfills all the Islamic obligations, he or she is a muslim kdmil-a com-
plete Muslim. However, should a Muslim violate some prohibitions but believe in
God, he is still a believer and not a kafir; and should such individuals ask forgive-
ness, God will forgive them. While "faithful sinners" will be punished by God for
their transgressions, they will not be excluded from paradise.56
Similarly, Habashi opposes the Islamist practice of takfir in denouncing rulers,
as inspired by Qutb's concept of al-jdhiliyya, which Habashi finds responsible for
"the most horrible acts of violence" by al-JamaCaal-Islamiyya in Egypt, and the
groups led by 'Ali Bil-Haj in Algeria and Rashid al-Ghannushi in Tunisia.57Ha-
bashi rejects as "dangerous" the application of strict Islamist standards to judge
leaders and governments. For example, he takes issue with Shaykh Ibn Baz of
Saudi Arabia for denouncing the late Gamal Abdel Nasser as a kafir.58He vehe-
mently attacks Fathi Yakan, the leader of Lebanon's al-JamaCaal-Islamiyya, for
asserting that rulers who do not govern by the sharica are kuffar, as are their
followers.59 In a bid to discredit Islamists such as Yakan, Habashi charges them
with following the Kharijitepractice of fighting rulers by using the sharica and the
extremist methods employed by the Bahshamiyya.60
By leveling the charge of Kharijite extremism at their Islamist opponents, the
Ahbash depict the whole spectrum of political Islamist groups as "deviators"
(firaq al-dalal), as distinct from the proponents of moderation-"those who are
saved" (firqa al-najiya) by following the correct path.61
IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL ROOTS
The "correct path" as defined by Shaykh Habashi involves knowledge of "the nec-
essary science of religion," which recognizes the primacy of revelation (naql),
complemented by reason (Caql).62This science of religion is binding upon all "au-
thorized" preachers (mukallaf), who must know the thirteen attributes of divinity:
al-Wujud (existence), al-Qiyam (resurrection), al-Wahdaniyya (unicity), al-Baqda
(eternity), al-Qiyam bi'l-nafs (resurrectionof the soul), al-Mukhalafa li'l-hawadith
(God's will over events), al-Qudra (capability), al-Irada (will), al-'llm (knowl-
edge), al-Haydt (life), al-Samc (hearing), al-Basar (vision), and al-Kalam (Allah's
Word).63Knowledge of the science of religion, particularlyCilmal-tawhid, is con-
sidered more importantthan the different schools of jurisprudence. Its components
are: (1) faith in God and his Prophet; (2) faith in the hadith and Sunna; (3) knowl-
edge of God's attributes,without anthropomorphism(al-tajsim); (4) knowledge of
deviations from Islam, such as kufr; and (5) knowledge of the rules and regu-
lations of prayer and purity.64A deep knowledge of the faith comes not simply
from reading the holy scriptures but also through the teachings of "a trustworthy
calim."65 Superficial understandingof the texts can lead to ignorance of Islam and
to extremism.66By stressing the pivotal role of an "authorized" 'alim, Habashi
comes close to emulating the guidance function of the Shici mujtahid, as distinct
from the Sunni Islamist view of the ulama.
Guided by their Sufi origins, the Ahbash present themselves as apostles of mod-
eration-a desirable alternative to the Islamists' doctrinal strictness and political

militancy. The Ahbash vision is a society of normalcy and stability, where social
and religious pluralism is the mode for Muslims among themselves and in their
relations with non-Muslims. In discourse, the Ahbash emphasize the need for
civility and moderation at the individual, societal, and state levels.67
The political stance of the Ahbash organization as presented by its president,
Shaykh Husam Karakira,accepts Lebanon'sconfessional system and the primacy of
serving Lebanon's national interests.68It rejects violence and the politicization of
Islam in favor of participation in politics "as public service" within the Lebanese
political system. The Ahbash pledge loyalty to Lebanon as an Arab country and
support its armed forces as the defenders of its citizens, their families, and the
country itself.69 In opposing the establishment of an Islamic order, the Ahbash are
committed to coexistence with the Christian communities. Consistent with his Sufi
beliefs, Habashi extolls al-rahbdniyya-the fraternity of mystics-as "a virtuous
way" that is also practiced by the monastic "followers of Christ."70
Equally mild is the foreign-policy orientation and world outlook of the Ahbash.
While supporting the liberation of the "security zone" in the South through United
Nations Resolution 425 and affirming "Palestinian rights," the Ahbash literature
makes no reference to jihad or the use of force against Israel "unless it is neces-
sary."71Nor are the Ahbash angry at the West; on the contrary, they recommend
that their members study Western learning and science in order to achieve a "civ-
ilized" Islamic society.72
A close correspondence exists between the content of the Ahbash message
(da'wa) and the social roots of its expanding constituency within and outside
Lebanon. Beginning as a small philanthropic and spiritualist movement among the
Sunni lower stratum, the Ahbash have come into the mainstream of Lebanon's
Sunni community in direct rivalry with the Islamist organizations.73Indeed, by po-
sitioning themselves as a non-militant alternative to the Islamists, the Ahbash have
emerged as a Sunni middle-class movement that attracts intellectuals, profession-
als, and businessmen, particularlythe traditional Sunni commercial families of the
urban centers.74Among these social groups, the Ahbash call for religious modera-
tion, political civility, and peace has had a powerful resonance after fifteen years
of civil war and bloodshed. Indeed, there has been a convergence between the val-
ues, aspirations, and socioeconomic interests of the Sunni middle classes and the
contents of Shaykh Habashi's message-that is, intersectarianaccord and political
stability; an enlightened Islamic spiritualism within a modern secularist frame-
work; a Lebanese identity wedded to Arab nationalism; and an accommodating
attitude toward the Arab regimes, particularly the Syrian government.
Clearly, the Ahbash see themselves as fighting for the soul of the Sunni com-
munity. Their immediate goal is to build an organization of 100,000 members,75to
be recruited mainly from the young generation of Sunnis.76 While the Ahbash
lack the social-services network of Hizballah, they have concentrated on building
mosques and schools, which provide venues to spread their daCwaand philanthro-
pic activities. In addition to religious education, Ahbash schools offer vocational
programs, computer training, sports activities, and instruction in English as a
second language.77The organization has its headquartersat Markaz al-Shaykh al-
Iskandarani,based in Beirut's Burj Abi Haydar Mosque, at the heart of the Sunni

community. This is a strategically advantageous location, surroundedby quarters

inhabited by Ahbash members and with easy access to the different segments of
the Sunni community. Beyond Beirut, Ahbash followers are concentrated in the
Sunni communities of Tripoli, Sidon, Biqac, and 'Iqlim al-Kharrub in the Shuf.
In recent years, the Ahbash have gained ascendance over nine mosques, including
Burj Abi Haydar and CAlibin Abi Talib in Beirut, al-Siddiq in Tripoli, and Sa-
lah al-Din al-Ayyubi in Sidon. Also, the Ahbash have established thirty overseas
branches in a dozen countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Jordan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and the United States.78
The Ahbash are led by a group of shaykhs and some laymen. At the apex is
its saintly founder, CAllamaShaykh CAbdallahal-Habashi; the administrative func-
tions are carried out by Shaykh Husam Karakira,who serves as president of the or-
ganization. As vice presidents,Shaykhs Samir al-Qadi, Usama al-Sayyid, and Khalid
Hunayna head the branches in North Lebanon, Biqac, and South Lebanon, respec-
tively. Shaykh CAbdal-Qadir al-Fakhanileads the Ahbash in 'Iqlim al-Kharruband
is chief editor of the journal Mandr al-Hudi. The public relations of the Ahbash
are conducted by Dr. CAdnanTrabulsi, a layman educated at Kiev University.
In their religious practices, the Ahbash unabashedly follow Sufi mystical tradi-
tions, which are denounced by Yakan's Islamists as bidca. In their ceremonies, the
Ahbash use two musical bands bearing the names of ancient Sufi orders: "al-
Rifaciyya" and "al-Jilaniyya." Shaykh Habashi and his followers go on retreats
(khalwa) for meditation and fasting, in keeping with esoteric Sufi practices. The
Prophet's birthday-al-mawlid-is celebrated, and mystical dancing sessions are
held to unite the faithful with their creator.
AHBASH VERSUS ISLAMISTS
The fundamental factor that has propelled the Ahbash into dynamic religious pros-
elytization and electoral politics is their fear of the aggressive political activism of
the Islamist societies. In an unprecedented step in 1992, the Ahbash ran two can-
didates in Lebanon's parliamentaryelections, one of whom, Dr. Trabulsi, won a
seat in Beirut. Despite their commitment to pacifism and moderation, the Ahbash
are engaged in a life-and-death struggle with what they call "Hizb al-Ikhwan"-
"the BrotherhoodParty"-particularly Fathi Yakan's al-JamaCaal-Islamiyya and its
transnationalallies. Beyond their doctrinal and ideological conflicts, al-Ahbash and
al-JamaCahave engaged in bloody clashes around the 'Umar al-Kabir Mosque in
Sidon and the 'Isa bin Maryam Mosque in Tripoli.79Spokesmen for al-Jamacaand
its Egyptian Islamist allies have denounced Shaykh Habashi as "an individual who
plans to divide the Sunnis of Lebanon."80Yakan has accused the Ahbash of serv-
ing Zionism and protecting its interests in the Middle East.81He has also attacked
Habashi for deviating from the Prophet'steachings by following the Mu'tazila and
for his categorical rejection of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab, and Sayyid
Qutb.82Yakan further criticizes the Ahbash for their wholesale use of takfir-an
accusation of unbelief (kufr) against their enemies; he calls them "the denouncer's
faction" (al-firqa al-mukaffira).83The fact is that both al-Ahbash and al-Jamacaare
engaged in mutual takfir, refusing to recognize each other's Islamic legitimacy.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS
In contrast to their profound enmity toward Yakan's Jamacaal-Islamiyya, the Ah-

bash have "normal"and "friendly" relations with Hizballah, while expressing mis-
givings about the latter's violent activities.84Despite their doctrinal sympathy with
CAli and Shicism, the Ahbash are careful not to appear too close to the Shi'a,
which risks alienating their Sunni constituency, as happened to Shaykh Shacbanof
Harakat al-Tawhid of Tripoli.85Yet in the 1992 parliamentaryelections, the Ah-
bash and Hizballah concluded an undeclared alliance in Beirut that assured the
election of their respective candidates, CAdnanTrabulsi and MuhammadBurjawi.86
While maintaining amicable ties, the Ahbash have been singularly reluctant to
support Hizballah's call for an Iranian-style Islamic order in Lebanon as a substi-
tute for its present consociational system. In view of their strong endorsement of
consociationalism and their opposition to an Islamic state, the Ahbash have found
a natural ally in the Amal movement, which also shares with the Ahbash a pro-
Syrian orientation. These shared interests prompted the Ahbash to support the
election of Amal leader Nabih Barri as speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.87
With respect to Lebanon's Sunni religious establishment-the Sunni Juridical
Office-the Ahbash maintain an uncooperative attitude. This stance is prompted
by the Ahbash's desire to have one of their shaykhs appointed by the government
as the chief Sunni mufti of Lebanon-a position now held by an acting mufti,
MuhammadRashid Qabbani.88
Within the Sufi movement, the Ahbash enjoy the support of three traditional
Sufi orders that Shaykh Habashi considers TuruqAhl Allah-Qadiriyya, Rifaciyya,
and Naqshabandiyya.89The growing ties of cooperation between the Ahbash and
the Naqshabandi order were manifested in a meeting in December 1993 between
Shaykh Habashi and MuhammadcUthman Siraj al-Din. The two leaders announced
a coalition between "two Islamic powers" dedicated to fighting the "Islamic
Jamaca"and the "Hizb al-Ikhwan,"particularly "the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and
others who have deviated from the consensus of the umma."90The conclusion of
such a Sufi alliance against the political Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood and
its allies is politically significant, given the large following of the Naqshabandi
order throughout the Islamic world.
However, not all Sufi orders are acceptable to the Ahbash. Such recently founded
Sufi orders as al-Badawiyya, al-Khalwatiyya, and al-Mawlawiyya, with few fol-
lowers in Lebanon, remain outside the pale of Shaykh Habashi's TuruqAhl Allah.
And the Shaziliyya order's practices are denounced by Habashi as "bad innova-
tions" that go against the Qur'an and the Sunna, particularly the Shaziliyya use of
superstitions and magic in their tahlil and dhikr.91
The Ahbash enjoy excellent relations with most Arab governments, particularly
with the Syrian authorities. They see Syria as the protector of Lebanon from Israel
and the defender of Lebanese unity.92Their pro-Syrian stance and nonmilitant atti-
tude toward Arab regimes and Israel have made the Ahbash suspect in the Islam-
ists' eyes and brought accusations of taking financial supportfrom Israel, the West,
and some Arab governments.93These accusations have been vehemently rejected
by Ahbash leaders.94

The Ahbash suffered a major setback when their president, Shaykh Nizar al-
Halabi, was assassinated on 31 August 1995, by unknown assailants. The society's
vice president, Shaykh Husam Karakira,immediately became president amid grow-
ing polarization between the Ahbash and its Islamist opponents.95
Whatever their sources of support, there is no doubt that the Ahbash have
emerged as important political actors in Lebanon and within the Islamic orbit.
They present a clear alternative to the powerful Islamist trend and, as such, are
likely to attract a considerable following among those Sunni Muslims who are
searching for a middle way out of the bloody conflict between the Arab regimes
and the Islamist societies. Moreover, within their pluralist framework, the Ahbash
can accommodate individuals who desire a retreat into spiritualism, as well as
conventional Muslims and secularists who have adopted the lifestyles of modern
society. As an alternative to conservative Islamism, the Ahbash and similar groups
could well emerge as the voice of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, which favor
the establishment of liberal regimes in the Arab world.96Despite the general ex-
pectation that the Sufi orders would decline as a result of modernization and in-
dustrialization, the Ahbash have demonstrated that Sufi traditions possess special
strengths in societies such as Lebanon's, where a high degree of religious plural-
ism prevails.97
NOTES
1RichardP. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
2Michael Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 10-11.
3Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, trans. A. M. Henderson and
Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 328-33, 358-73. For an overview of Sufi
orders, see Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1981), 222-35.
4Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, 12.
5R. Stephen Humphreys,"The ContemporaryResurgence in the Context of Modern Islam,"in Islamic
Resurgence in the Arab World,ed. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1982), 74-75.
6R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse,
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 64, 210.
7Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi, 203-5.
8John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), 132-33.
9Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1986),
65-68,79-81.
l?Ibid., 81-88.
1lDekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 150. For a penetrating analysis of Sufism and other branches of
Islam, see Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri, Takwin al-'Aql al-'Arabi (Formation of the Arab Mind), 4th
ed., 2 vols. (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1989); and idem, Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabi
(Structure of the Arab Mind), 2nd ed. (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdaal-'Arabiyya, 1987).
l2MajmiCaFatdwd Shaykh al-Isldm Ahmad ibn Taymiyya,37 vols. (Compilation of Legal Opinions
of Shaykh al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya), ed. and comp. 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Qasim, (n.p., n.d.),
11:5-24, 401-33, 27:106-11, 114-288, 314-444.
13Recent research has shown that Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali jurists were not as opposed to
Sufism as once believed, and that some Hanbali ulama were well-known Sufis. See George Makdisi,
"Hanbalite Islam," in Studies on Islam, ed. and trans. Merlin L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981), 247-51.

14ShaykhMuhammad Ibn CAbdal-Wahhab, Kitab al-Tawhid, trans. Ismacil Raji al Faruqi (Beirut:
The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1979), 25, 64, 68.
15S. Abul ACla Maududi, A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam, trans. Al-AshCari
(Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1981), 135-36.
16Beyond Sayyid Qutb's advocacy of militancy, his understanding of a worshiper's relationship
toward God sets him apart from Sufi beliefs and practices. See Sayyid Qutb, Fi Zilal al-Quradn (In the
Shade of the Qur'an), 6 vols., 9th ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980), vol. 4, parts 12-18:2139, vol. 5,
parts 19-25:2577-78, 2603-2812.
17Jansen,Neglected Duty, 9-10.
18FathiYakan, Al-Mawsiua al-Harakiyya (Encyclopedia of Movements) (Amman: Dar al-Bashir,
1983), 259-67.
19Fora comprehensive Islamist critique of Sufism, see 'Uthman 'Ali Hasan, MawdqifAhl al-Sunna
min al-Mandhij al-Mukhalifa Lahum (Positions of the Sunni Toward Dissenting Views) (Riyadh: Dar
al-Watan lil-Nashar, 1413/1983), 54-102.
20Foran overview, see A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Islamic Spectrum of Leba-
nese Politics," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Affairs, XVI, 3 (Spring 1993): 25-42.
21MariusDeeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis and Ideology (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for ContemporaryArab Studies, 1986), 5-9.
22AugustusRichard Norton, Amal and the Shia (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 13-83.
23Onaspects of ShiCaradicalism, see Martin Kramer,ed., Shicism, Resistance and Revolution (Boul-
der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).
24MuhammadDarnikha, Al-Turuq al-Siufiyya(The Sufi Orders) (Tripoli: Dar al-Insha3 li'l-Sahafa
wal-Nashr, 1984), 87-286.
25Manaral-Hudd, June-July 1993, 34; ibid., December 1992-February 1993, 31-33; ibid., November
1992, 41.
26Al-Muslimin, 20 November 1992, 3.
27Manaral-Hudd, December 1992-January 1993, 41.
28See interview with 'Abd al-Rahmanal-Habashi, son of Shaykh Habashi and president of the Ahbash
in Australia, in ibid., 32-34. See also al-ShiraC, 27 July 1992, 30-31.
29Al-Nahar, 8 December 1992, 11.
30ShaykhCAbdallahal-Habashi, Sarlh al-Baydn (Explicit Declaration) (Beirut: Jamciyyatal-Mashari',
1990), 195.
31Ibid., 24.
32Ibid., 28, 30.
33Shaykh CAbdallahal-Habashi, Al-Sirdt al-Mustaqim (The Correct Path) (Beirut: Burj Abi Haydar
Mosque, 1984), 34.
34Ibid., 31.
35Ibid., 32.
36Ibid., 30.
37Ibid., 88; see also Shaykh CAbdallahal-Habashi, Al-Kafil bi-'Ilm al-Din al-Dartirl (The Guarantor
of the Necessary Science of Faith) (Beirut: Burj Abi Haydar Mosque, 1984), 46.
38Habashi,Sarlh al-Bayan, 90.
39Ibid., 111. Habashi does not give much importance to the Hanafi and Maliki Schools of Law.
40Ibid., 107; see also Manar al-Huda, April-May 1993, 45.
41Habashi, Sarih al-Bayan, 86, 88, 105. These ahadith are: "For whosoever I am master, this Ali is
his master; O God support whosoever is loyal to him and fight whosoever is fighting him," and "Hasan
from me and Husayn from CAli."
42Mandral-Hudd, November 1992, 32; ibid., April 1993, 37.
43Ibid., November 1992, 18.
44Ibid., December 1992-January 1993, 24-25.
45Ibid., April-May 1993, 36-37; Habashi, Sarlh al-Bayan, 74.
46Manaral-Hudd, April-May 1993, 36-37.
47Hasan al-Banna' is the sole Islamist who is spared criticism.
48Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Habashi, Al-Durar al-Sunniyya fi al-radd CalaAhmad ibn Taymiyya (The
Sunna Jewels in Response to Ahmad ibn Taymiyya) (Beirut: Jam'iyya al-Masharic, 1990), 5.
49Ibid., 10.

50Ibid., 25; idem, Sirat al-Mustaqim, 55.

51Habashi,Durar al-Sunniyya, 51; idem, Sirat al-Mustaqim, 50. Manar al-Huda, May-June 1993, 47.
Ibn Taymiyya's followers do not regard him as an anthropomorphist.
52Manaral-Huda, April-May 1993, 45.
53Al-Nahdr, 12 September 1992, 11.
54Habashi,Sarih al-Baydn, 118.
55While requiring strict standards to differentiate the Muslims from the Tatars, Ibn Taymiyya was
reluctant to use takfir, as is done frequently by some contemporary militant Islamists. For a discussion
of takfir, see R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, 1st ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1985), 40, 92-95.
56H.abashi,Sarih al-Baydn, 32.
57Mandral-Huda, April-May 1993, 45-46.
58Ibid., 47.
59Ibid., 48.
60Ibid.
61Ibid., 49.
62Ibid., May-June 1993, 46; see also Habashi, al-Kdfil, 5-11.
63Habashi, Sarih al-Bayin, 28.
64Ibid., 24.
65Ibid., 25.
66Mandral-Hudd, April-May 1993, 49.
67Ibid.
68AI-Safir,19 November 1992, 3.
69Ibid.
7Habashi, Sarih al-Baydn, 76.
71Ibid., 169; see also Mandr al-Huda, December 1992-January 1993, 42.
72Mandral-Hudd, November 1992, 6; ibid., April-May 1993, 6.
73Al-Nahdr, 12 September 1992, 11.
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
76A1-Nahdr,9 December 1992, 113.
77Mandral-Huda, August-September 1992, 12-13.
78Al-Shirdc,27 July 1992, 30-31; Mandr al-Huda, November 1992, 59.
79Manir al-Hudd, December 1992-January 1993, 41.
80Al-Muslimun,20 November 1993, 3; Mandr al-Hudd, December 1992-January 1993, 41.
81Al-Muslimun,20 November 1992, 3.
82Yakan,Al-Mawsiia al-Harakiyya, 259.
83Ibid., 267.
84Al-Masira,27 December 1992, 15.
85Ibid.
86Al-Shiric, 7 September 1992, 20.
87Al-Safir, 1 October 1992, 4.
88Al-ShiraC,5 October 1992, 16-17; see also, al-Muslimin, 30 November 1992, 3.
89Mandral-Hudd, November 1992, 41; ibid., June-July 1993, 37.
90Ibid., December 1992-February 1993, 31-33.
91Ibid., 35.
92Al-Safir, 10 September 1992, 3; Mandr al-Huda, August-September 1993, 30-32.
93Al-Muslimun,30 November 1992, 3.
94Mandral-Huda, August-September 1992, 12.
95Al-Nahdr,9 October 1995, 6.
96Onthe preconditions of liberal Islamic regimes, see Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 357-59.
970n the adaptability of the Sufi orders to modern societies, see John Obert Voll, "Sufi Orders,"The
Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols., ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 4:116.


A Sufi Response To Political Islamism Al-Ahbash of Lebanon

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A Sufi Response to Political Islamism: Al-Ahbash of Lebanon

Author(s): A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian

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A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian