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If Randolph could not be overcome in debate, he might at least
be overborne by numbers; if the best part of the old Republican party
went with him, the rank and file of Northern and Western democrats
would remain to support the Administration. Once more the
committee was called together. Bidwell moved to appropriate two
millions for foreign relations; the majority rejected his motion and
adopted a report echoing the warlike tone of the President’s public
message, and closing with a Resolution to raise troops for the
defence of the Southern frontier “from Spanish inroad and insult, and
to chastise the same.” This report was laid before the House by
Randolph Jan. 3, 1806, when two additional Resolutions were
immediately moved,—one appropriating money for extraordinary
expenses in foreign intercourse, the other continuing the
Mediterranean Fund for a new term of years; and the three
Resolutions were referred to the House in Committee of the Whole,
with closed doors.
Monday, Jan. 6, 1806, the debate began; and throughout the
following week the House sat in secret session, while Randolph
strained every nerve to break the phalanx of democrats which
threatened to overwhelm him. Perpetually on the floor, he declaimed
against the proposed negotiation at Paris; while Nicholson,
unwillingly consenting to vote for the two millions, said openly that he
hoped in God the negotiation would fail. When at length a vote could
be reached, the Administration carried its point,—seventy-two
members supporting the President, against a minority of fifty-eight;
but in this minority was included no small number of the most
respectable Republicans. Twelve of the twenty-two Virginia members
broke away from the President; and for the first time in a struggle
vital to Jefferson’s credit, more than half the majority consisted of
Northern men.
The House having recovered control of the matter, thrust
Randolph aside, rapidly passed a Bill appropriating two million
dollars for extraordinary expenses in foreign relations, and Jan. 16,
1806, sent it to the Senate by a vote of seventy-six to fifty-four. It was
accompanied by a secret message explaining that the money was
intended for the purchase of Spanish territory east of the Mississippi.
The Senate closed its doors, and with the least possible debate,
Feb. 7, 1806, passed the bill, which, February 13, received the
President’s approval. Not until March 13,[112] six months after
Armstrong’s despatch had been written, did Madison at length send
to Paris a public authority for Armstrong to offer France five million
dollars for Florida and Texas to the Colorado,—an authority which
should have been secret and prompt, to be worth sending at all.
Jefferson carried his point; he won a victory over Randolph, and
silenced open resistance within the party; but his success was
gained at a cost hitherto unknown in his experience. The men who
were most obedient in public to his will growled in private almost as
fiercely as Randolph himself. Senator Bradley made no secret of his
disgust. Senator Anderson of Tennessee frankly said that he wished
the Devil had the Bill; that the opposition did not half know how bad it
was; that it was the most pernicious measure Jefferson had ever
taken; “but so it was, so he would have it, and so it must be!”[113]
Three Republican Senators—Bradley, Logan, and Mitchill—absented
themselves at the final vote; four more—Adair, Gilman, Stone, and
Sumter—voted against the Bill, which on its third reading obtained
only seventeen voices in its favor against eleven in opposition.
Worse than this, the malcontents felt that for the first time in the
history of their party the whip of Executive power had been snapped
over their heads; and, worst of all, the New England Federalists took
for granted that Jefferson had become a creature of Napoleon. Of all
political ideas that could gain a lodgment in the public mind, this last
was the most fatal!
That either Jefferson or Madison was led by French sympathies
has been shown to be untrue. Both of them submitted to the violence
of all the belligerents alike, and their eagerness for Florida caused
them by turns to flatter and to threaten Spain, France, and England;
but not even for the sake of Florida would they have taken either a
direct or an indirect part with France. Their unwillingness to offend
Napoleon rose not from sympathy with him, but from the conviction
that he alone could give Florida to the United States without the
expense and losses inevitable in a war. Unhappily the public knew
little of what President Jefferson had done or was doing; and another
piece of legislation, carried through Congress at the same moment
with the “Two-million Act,” went far to fix the Federalists in their belief
that the Administration obeyed the beck and call of the French
Emperor.
The Annual Message made no allusion to St. Domingo; no public
announcement had been given that the Executive wished for further
legislation in regard to its trade, when, Dec. 18, 1805, Senator Logan
of Pennsylvania brought forward a Bill to prohibit the trade
altogether. That he acted without concert with Madison was not to be
conceived. Logan privately admitted as his only object the wish of
enabling Madison to tell the French government that the trade was
forbidden, and that the merchants who carried it on did so at their
own peril.[114] The Federalist senators opposed the Bill, and were
joined by several Republicans. General Smith and Dr. Mitchill spoke
against it. The opposition showed that the measure would sacrifice
several hundred thousand dollars of revenue; that it would close the
last opening which the new British policy left for American commerce
with the West Indies; that it would throw the commerce with St.
Domingo wholly into British hands; that it was an attempt to carry out
French objects by American legislation, which would endanger the
property and lives of American citizens in the island; and finally, that
it was done in obedience to Napoleon’s orders. December 27 the
Senate called for the diplomatic correspondence on the subject, and
the President communicated the extraordinary notes in which
Talleyrand and Turreau declared that the commerce “must” not
continue. The Senate received this mandate without protest or
remonstrance; and after a long debate passed the Bill, Feb. 20,
1806, by a party vote of twenty-one to eight. Of the twenty-seven
Republican senators, Stone of North Carolina alone voted against it.
Amid execrations against the Haytian negroes, the Bill was next
forced through the House almost without debate, and Feb. 28, 1806,
received the President’s signature.
This law,[115] limited to one year, declared that any American
vessel “which shall be voluntarily carried, or shall be destined to
proceed” to St. Domingo should be wholly forfeited, ship and cargo.
Passed in consequence of Napoleon’s positive order, communicated
by the President to Congress as though to overawe objection, the
Act violated the principles of international law, sacrificed the interests
of Northern commerce, strained the powers of the Constitution as
formerly construed by the party of States-rights, and, taken in all its
relations, might claim distinction among the most disgraceful statutes
ever enacted by the United States government. Nevertheless, this
measure, which bore on its face the birth-mark of Napoleonic
features, did in fact owe its existence chiefly to a different parentage.
In truth, the Southern States dreaded the rebel negroes of Hayti
more than they feared Napoleon. Fear often made them blind to their
own attitudes; in this instance it made them indifferent to the charge
of servility to France. The opportunity to declare the negroes of Hayti
enemies of the human race was too tempting to be rejected; and not
only did the Southern Republicans eagerly seize it, but they
persuaded their Northern allies to support them. John Randolph
himself, though then wearying the House day after day with cries
that Madison had sold the honor of the United States to France,
never alluded to this act of subservience, which would have made
any other Administration infamous, and quietly absented himself at
the vote, that he might seem neither to obey Bonaparte’s mandate
nor to oppose the Bill. Of the twenty-six voices against it, nearly all
were Federalists; yet in this curious list, side by side with Josiah
Quincy, Samuel Dana, and John Cotton Smith, stood the names of
Jacob Crowninshield and Matthew Lyon, democrats of the deepest
dye and objects of John Randolph’s bitterest sneers.
The “Two-million Act” and the Act forbidding commerce with St.
Domingo were measures equally necessary for the success of the
Florida purchase. Without conciliating Napoleon at St. Domingo,
Jefferson could not expect his help at Paris. These measures,
together with some appearance of military activity, completed the
Executive scheme of foreign policy in regard to France and Spain;
the more difficult task remained of dealing with England.
When the first news of Sir William Scott’s decision in the case of
the “Essex” arrived in America, the merchants were indignant; and
their anger steadily rose as the confiscation of American ships
became more general, until at length, in December, 1805, Stephen’s
pamphlet, “War in Disguise,” arrived, and was reprinted in the
newspapers. By the close of the year 1805 no one could longer
doubt that Great Britain had, so far as suited her purposes, declared
war against the United States.
The issue was simple. The United States might make war in
return, or submit. Any measure short of open hostilities had
unquestionably been taken into Pitt’s account, and would produce no
effect on his policy. War alone could move him from his purpose; but
war would destroy American commerce and ruin Federalist
resources, while any retaliation short of war would not only prove
ineffective, but would injure the American merchants alone. Their
dilemma was so unavoidable that they could not fail to be caught in
it. George Cabot saw their danger from the first. Much against his
will the merchants of Boston placed him upon a committee to draw a
remonstrance to Congress against the British doctrine of neutral
trade. “Our friend Cabot,” wrote Fisher Ames,[116] “is much, too
much, mortified that he is one of them. He hates hypocrisy, and
respects principles; and he dreads lest the popular feeling should
impel the committee to deny what he believes to be true, or to ask
for what he knows to be mischievous.” The Boston “Memorial,”[117]
drawn by James Lloyd, was as cautious as popular feeling would
tolerate, and asked no action from Government except the
appointment of a special mission to strengthen the hands of Monroe
at London; but Cabot signed it with extreme reluctance, and only
with the understanding that it did not represent his personal views.
The Philadelphia “Memorial” closed with stronger language,
suggesting that war must be the result if Great Britain refused
redress. The Baltimore “Memorial,” drawn by William Pinkney, spoke
in strong tones, but offered no advice. Toward the middle of January,
1806, these memorials, together with others, were sent to Congress
by the President, with a Message inviting the Legislature to take the
matter in hand, but offering no opinion as to the proper course to
pursue.[118]
The fears of George Cabot were quickly justified. He chiefly
dreaded the theories of the Republican party, which in his opinion
were more destructive to American commerce than the British
doctrines themselves or the demands of James Stephen. Jefferson
and Madison were bent on testing the theory of the first Inaugural
Address,—that commerce was the handmaid of agriculture; but in
the harshest application of the slave-code of South Carolina or
Georgia such treatment as agriculture proposed to her handmaid
would have been rejected as inhuman, for it was a slow torture.
The theory of peaceable coercion, on which Jefferson relied, had
often been explained as a duel in which either side counted upon
exhausting its opponent by injuring itself. As Madison once said of
the British manufacturers: “There are three hundred thousand souls
who live by our custom: let them be driven to poverty and despair,
and what will be the consequence?” The question was more easily
asked than answered, for in the actual condition of Europe
economical laws were so violently disturbed that no man could
venture to guess what fresh extravagance might result from new
delirium; but while the three hundred thousand Englishmen were
starving, three hundred thousand Americans would lose the profit on
their crops, and would idly look at empty warehouses and rotting
ships. English laborers had for many generations been obliged to
submit to occasional suffering; Americans were untrained to
submission. Granting that the Boston merchant, like the injured
Brahmin, should seat himself at the door of the British offender, and
slowly fast to death in order that his blood might stain the conscience
of Pitt, he could not be certain that Pitt’s conscience would be
stimulated by the sacrifice, for the conscience of British Tories as
regarded the United States had been ever languid. Cabot saw no
real alternative between submission to Great Britain and the entire
sacrifice of American commerce. He preferred submission.
The subject in all its bearings quickly came before Congress.
Jan. 15, 1806, the Senate referred to a special committee that part of
the President’s Message which related to the British seizures.
February 5, General Smith reported on behalf of the committee a
series of Resolutions denouncing these seizures as an
encroachment on national independence, and recommending the
prohibition of British woollens, linens, silks, glass-wares, and a long
list of other articles. On this Resolution the debate began, and soon
waxed hot.
CHAPTER VII.
Nothing in Jefferson’s life was stranger to modern ideas of
politics than the secrecy which as President he succeeded in
preserving. For two months the people of the United States saw their
representatives go day after day into secret session, but heard not a
whisper of what passed in conclave. Angry as Randolph was, and
eager as the Federalists were to make mischief, they revealed not
even to the senators or the foreign ministers what was passing in the
House; and the public at large, under their democratic government,
knew no more than Frenchmen of their destinies of war and peace.
Such a state of things was contrary to the best traditions of the
Republican party: it could not last, but it could end only in explosion.
When the debate on Smith’s non-importation Resolutions began
in the Senate February 12, the previous struggle which had taken
place over the Spanish policy and the “Two-million Act” was still a
secret; Randolph’s schism was unknown beyond the walls of the
Capitol; the President’s scheme of buying West Florida from France
after having, as he maintained, bought it once already, was kept, as
he wished, untold. The world knew only that some mysterious
business was afoot; and when Senator Samuel Smith’s attack on
trade began, the public naturally supposed it to be in some way
connected with the measures so long discussed in secret session.
The President’s attitude became more and more uneasy.
Jefferson disliked and dreaded the point in dispute with England.
The Spanish policy was his own creation, and he looked upon it with
such regard as men commonly bestow upon unappreciated
inventions,—he depended on its success to retrieve defeats
elsewhere; but for the very reason that he exhausted his personal
influence to carry the Spanish policy against opposition, he left
British questions to Congress and his party. Where England was to
be dealt with, Madison took the lead which Jefferson declined. For
many years past Madison had been regarded as the representative
of a policy of commercial restriction against Great Britain. To revive
his influence, his speeches and resolutions of 1794[119] were
reprinted in the “National Intelligencer” as a guide for Congress; his
pamphlet against the British doctrines of neutral trade was made a
political text-book; while his friends took the lead in denouncing
England and in calling for retaliation. He himself lost no chance of
pressing his views, even upon political opponents. “I had
considerable conversation with Mr. Madison,” wrote one of them
February 13, “on the subjects now most important to the public. His
system of proceeding toward Great Britain is to establish permanent
commercial distinctions between her and other nations,—a
retaliating navigation act, and aggravated duties on articles imported
from her.”[120] By his own choice, and in a manner almost defiant of
failure, Madison’s political fortunes were united with the policy of
coercing England through restrictions of trade.
At first much was said of an embargo. Senator Jackson of
Georgia, Dec. 20, 1805, declared with his usual vehemence in favor
of this measure. “Not a nation,” said he, “exists which has West
Indian colonies but is more or less dependent on us, and cannot do
without us; they must come to our terms, or starve. On with your
embargo, and in nine months they must lie at your feet!” John
Randolph, sure to oppose whatever Madison wished, also looked
with favor on this course. “I would (if anything) have laid an
embargo,” he said.[121] The embargo party at best was small, and
became smaller when toward the close of December, 1805, news
arrived that Admiral Nelson had fought a great naval battle, October
21, against the combined French and Spanish fleets, off Cape
Trafalgar, ending in a victory so complete as to leave England
supreme upon the ocean. The moral effect of Nelson’s triumph was
great. Embargo was the last step before war, and few Americans
cared to risk war with England under any circumstances; with
harbors undefended and without an ally on the ocean, war was
rashness which no one would face. Madison’s more gentle plan of
partial restrictions in trade became the Republican policy.
Even before Senator Samuel Smith reported his Resolutions,
February 5, to the Senate, the British minister Merry wrote to his
Government that the members most opposed to commercial
restrictions, despairing of effectual resistance, would endeavor only
to limit the number of articles to be prohibited, and to postpone the
date on which the law should take effect, in order to send a special
mission to England and negotiate an amicable arrangement. Merry
added that a special mission had been under discussion from the
first:—
“But I now learn that it has been, and continues to be, opposed by
the President, who wishes that Mr. Monroe ... should continue to carry
on the negotiation alone. Matters, however, being now brought to a
disagreeable crisis by the clamor of the nation and the instigation of
the Administration, some of the members of the Senate are, I find,
endeavoring to engage the rest of their body to join them in exercising
their constitutional privilege of advising the President on the occasion;
and that their advice to him will be to suspend any step that can have
a hostile tendency until the experiment has been tried of an
extraordinary mission.”[122]
Merry was exactly informed as to the fate of General Smith’s
Resolutions even before they had been reported to the Senate. They
were three in number; but only the third, which recommended non-
importation, was drawn by Smith. The first and second, the work of
Senator Adams of Massachusetts, were not wholly welcome either to
the Administration or to the minority. The first declared the British
seizures “an unprovoked aggression,” a “violation of neutral rights,”
and an “encroachment upon national independence.” The second
requested the President to “demand and insist upon” indemnity, and
to make some arrangement about impressments. The first
Resolution, although fatal to future Federalist consistency, was
unanimously adopted by the Senate, February 12, almost without
debate,—even Timothy Pickering recording his opinion that the
British government had encroached upon national independence.
The second Resolution was criticised as an attempt at dictation to
the Executive, which would give just cause of offence to the
President. By this argument the Senate was induced to strike out the
words “and insist;” but although the Resolution, thus altered, was
weak, seven Republican senators voted against it as too strong.
The reason of this halting movement had been explained by
Merry to Lord Mulgrave nearly two weeks before. The Senate
stumbled over the important personality of James Monroe. The next
Presidential election, some three years distant, warped the national
policy in regard to a foreign encroachment. Senator Samuel Smith,
ambitious to distinguish himself in diplomacy, having failed to obtain
the mission to Paris, wished the dignity of a special envoy to London,
and was supported by Wilson Cary Nicholas. The friends of Madison
were willing to depress Monroe, whom John Randolph was trying to
elevate. Even Mrs. Madison, in the excitement of electioneering,
allowed herself to talk in general society very slightingly of Monroe;
[123] and there were reasons which made interference from Mrs.