Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No.

L-10405, Dec 29 1960]

FACTS:

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works
particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of
the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the
petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed
within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig,
Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is
public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the
construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land
supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE:

WON incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of
justifying an expenditure of the government?

RULING:

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or
business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of Manila [G.R. No. L4817, May 26 1954]

FACTS

This suit was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by two lawyers, a medical
practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a pharmacist, purportedly "in their
own behalf and in behalf of other professionals practicing in the City of Manila who may
desire to join it." Object of the suit is the annulment of Ordinance No. 3398 of the City of
Manila together with the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of
taxes collected under the ordinance but paid under protest.

The ordinance in question, which was approved by the municipal board of the City of
Manila on July 25, 1950, imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the tax ". Among the professions
taxed were those to which plaintiffs belong.

Having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, plaintiffs, upon being required to pay the additional tax prescribed in the
ordinance, paid the same under protest and then brought the present suit for the purpose
already stated.

Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust and oppressive because they say that it creates
discrimination within a class in that while professionals with offices in Manila have to pay
the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein are
not subject to the tax.

ISSUE

WON the ordinance and the law authorizing it constitute class legislation, are unjust and
oppressive, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.

RULING

No. Plaintiffs make a distinction that is not found in the ordinance. The ordinance imposes
the tax upon every person "exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of Manila naturally — any
one of the occupations named, but does not say that such person must have his office in
Manila. What constitutes exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a matter of judicial
determination. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is
imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p.
492), it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation,
calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof.

Lladoc vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR No. L-19201, June 16 1965]

Facts:

M.B. Estate, Inc. donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz of Victorias, Negros
then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, for the construction of a new Catholic
Church in the locality. The total amount was actually spent for the purpose intended.

A year later, M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. CIR issued an assessment for
donee's gift tax against the parish, of which petitioner was the priest.

Petitioner filed a protest which was denied by the CIR. He then filed an appeal with the CTA
citing that he was not the parish priest at the time of donation, that there is no legal entity
or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he
should not be liable for the donee's gift tax and that assessment of the gift tax is
unconstitutional.

Issue:

WON the church is exempt from the tax mentioned

Ruling:

No. It is a cardinal rule in taxation that exemptions from payment thereof are highly
disfavored by law, and the party claiming exemption must justify his claim by a clear,
positive, or express grant of such privilege by law.

Statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed
fairly though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the
lawmakers.

The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated
under sec 22(3) of the Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, as property taxes, as
contra distinguished from excise taxes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed
was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15 1988]

FACTS:
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and
declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located
at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial
Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor
of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground
floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment,
and thus the property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes.
A. that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College
Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all;
B. that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about
120 meters from the Court of First Instance building;
C. that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street;
D. that the high school and college students are housed in the main building;
E. that the Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and
F. that the annual gross income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos

ISSUE:
WON the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

RULING:
No. It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI,
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been
made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence.

Thus, while the use of the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential
purposes of the Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental
use, which is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, the lease of the first
floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661

FACTS:
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. It amended Section
21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents
on

(a) taxable compensation income,

(b) taxable net income,
(c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings,
(d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and
from trust fund and similar arrangements,
(e) dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership,
(f) adjusted gross income.

Petitioner as taxpayer alleged that "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher
rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." He characterizes the above section as arbitrary
amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character.

For petitioner, therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.

ISSUE:
WON the assailed provision violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution while also violating the rule that taxes must be uniform and equitable.

RULING:

No. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is without merit, considering the

(1) lack of factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision;
(2) the force of controlling doctrines on due process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation
(3) the reasonableness of the distinction between compensation and taxable net income of
professionals and businessman certainly not a suspect classification,

It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it
finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power.

For equal protection, the applicable standard to determine whether this was denied in the exercise of
police power or eminent domain was the presence of the purpose of hostility or unreasonable
discrimination. If law be looks upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest.
Tolentino v. Sec of Finance GR No. 115455, Aug 25 1994

FACTS:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties
as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price
or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross
receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code.

PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining
those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. CREBA asserts that R.A.
No. 7716 impairs the obligations of contracts, and violates the rule that taxes should be
uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.

CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to
cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject
cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:

WON RA 7716 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax
burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The VAT is not a license tax.
It is imposed purely for revenue purposes.

Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that the statute or ordinance applies
equally to all persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation.

Tolentino v. Sec of Finance GR No. 115455, Aug 25 1994

FACTS:

Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines, Roco, and Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Association) seek reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling
dismissing the petitions filed for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, the
Expanded ValueAdded Tax Law. Petitioners contend that the R.A. did not “originate
exclusively” in the HoR as required by Article 6, Section 24 of the Constitution. The Senate
allegedly did not pass it on second and third readings, instead passing its own version.
Petitioners contend that it should have amended the House bill by striking out the text of
the bill and substituting it with the text of its own bill, so as to conform with the
Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 7716 constitutional?

RULING:

(Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.)

Yes. While the aforementioned Constitutional provision states that bills must “originate
exclusively in the HoR,” it also adds, “but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.” The Senate may then propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
Petitioners erred in assuming the Senate version to be an independent and distinct bill.
Without the House bill, Senate could not have enacted the Senate bill, as the latter was a
mere amendment of the former. As such, it did not have to pass the Senate on second and
third readings.

Petitioners claim that the R.A. violates their press freedom and religious liberty, having
removed them from the exemption to pay VAT. Suffice it to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. By granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.

petitioners contend that the R.A. violates due process, equal protection and contract
clauses and the rule on taxation. Petitioners fail to take into consideration the fact that the
VAT was already provided for in E.O. No. 273 long before the R.A. was enacted. The latter
merely EXPANDS the base of the tax. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate, the taxing
power having authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. It is enough that the statute applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations
placed in s similar situation
PPI v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 1660066, March 14 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under
Philippine laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides
and agricultural chemicals.

On 3 June 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI
No. 1465 which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component
(CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its

fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of not less
than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until
adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital
contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers
in the Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to
the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far
East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from
July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986

After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the
return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No.
1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand.

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in
Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable,
oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law.
Fertiphil alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the
proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465
was a valid exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer
industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI
because the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.

RTC: the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the State’s inherent power of taxation;
invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public
purpose.

CA: affirmed with modification; even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the
police power of the state, it is still unconstitutional because it did not promote public welfare; the
levy was NOT for the benefit, as alleged, of Planters Foundation, Inc. (on the strength of the Letter of
Understanding (LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on 18 April 1985 and affirmed by the
Secretary of Justice in an Opinion dated 12 October 1987.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power.
(2) Whether LOI 1465 constitutes a valid legislation pursuant to the exercise of taxation.

RULING:

1. Yes. The imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While
it is true that the power of taxation can be used as an implement of police power,the
primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily
revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then
the exaction is properly called a tax.

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose.
The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the seller or the ultimate consumer. It increased
the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. A plain reading of the LOI also
supports the conclusion that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided
that the levy was imposed "until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable."

2. No. The P10 levy is unconstitutional because it was not for a public purpose. The levy
was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI

An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are

exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private
purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The reason for this is
 simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence, implicit in its
power is the limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

FACTS:

Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government which was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Marcos, the AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its
findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, finding ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 against Ramas. The Amended
Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On
the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power,
authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of
respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only,
Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles
taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was an illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of
merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner argues that the
exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUE:
WON the illegal search and seizure is valid

RULING:
No. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and
the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a
person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them
by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned
the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge
upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid
with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner’s witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we
do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure
warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus
hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

(SUMMARY)

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.

Phil. Blooming Mills Employees v. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc 51 SCRA 189

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang in protest to express their
grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO.
During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out
that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers’ inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech, and freedom
for the petition for redress of grievances.

The Management informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. This was followed with a warning of possible
dismissal of workers should they push with the rally as it would constitute to illegal strike and is a
violation under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration
despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized
for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, the Respondent filed a charge against
petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a “violation for
unfair labor practices under Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15,
all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ “. Petitioners
thereafter were held guilty by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer,
as a violation of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances.

Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement is an inhibition of the rights of free
expression, free assembly and petition of the employers.

RULING:

1. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill
of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and
powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress
of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their
civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of,
and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits.

2. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
 demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is “a potent means of inhibiting speech” and therefore inflicts a moral as
well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees,
according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the
“duty … to observe regular working hours.” The strain construction of the Court of Industrial
Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass
demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over
the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the
freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground. The respondent company is
the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm
to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly
and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to
the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.

The Supreme Court set aside as null and void the orders of Court of Industrial Relations. The
Supreme Court also directed the re-instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full
back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re-instated, minus one day’s
pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
separation from the service.
Banco Espanol v. Palanca 37 Phil. 921

FACTS:
The mortgage in question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant
herein, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the
bank. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears
to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1910, without again
returning to the Philippine Islands.

An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due
form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit
in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the
defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order
was made pursuant section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Defendant not having appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon
July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that
publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice
having been given mail.

It was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment within such period,
the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. The payment
contemplated in said order was never made. The court ordered the sale of the property which was
bought by the bank.

After seven (7) years, Defendant-Appellant Vicente Palanca, the administrator of the estate of
Engracio, filed a motion to set aside the order of the CFI on the ground that it never acquired jurisdiction
over Engracio or over the subject of the action. The CFI denied the motion

ISSUE:
WON court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the
mortgage.
WON due process of law was observed

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation
may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, where it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or may result from the institution of legal proceedings which gives the court has
power over the property under special provisions of the law.

The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of such
action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations, namely:

(1) that the property is located within the district;

 (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation
fixed upon it by the mortgage; and
(3) that the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if
necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.

YES, the observations of the Court led to the conclusions:

(1) that the failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy
the jurisdiction of the court and
(2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. Notice was
given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law
unconditionally requires.
Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685

FACTS:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and
two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and
seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. On December 15, 1993,
before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw
Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on
December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the
same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder,
two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession
of firearms. Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of
petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash. In the
meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was
issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners, ordering the reinstatementof the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the
accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and,
in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos
which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier stated,
respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this
petition.

Issue:

WON the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that
there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet
been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could
be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real
grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three informations but the filing of
four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense.
Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant
petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion
to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as
a candid presentation of their real position.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the
new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They
would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the
capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was
shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended
informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a
capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion
under either an amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court
of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court
granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is
merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the
aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured
by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”
State Prosecutors v. Muro 236 SCRA 505

FACTS:
The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against
respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the
provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges
against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central
Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the report
published from the two newspapers, which the judge believes to be reputable and of national
circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.

The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court
of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further
contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such
fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary
on his part.

ISSUE:
WON respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial notice on the
statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the
newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?

RULING:
YES. It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a
newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s statement
was published in the newspaper, the respondent judge admitted of not having seen the
official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this
matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on the public
knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.

For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be presented:
1. The matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
2. It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
3. It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The
judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of
the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court
ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take
judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.

Procedural Due Process

Judicial Proceedings

Perez v. Estrada AM. No. OI-4-O3-SC June 29, 2001 and Sept. 13, 2001

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner asserts that the right of the people to public information and right of the press should be
upheld because the people are the repository of sovereignty. Petitioner also argued that live
television coverage is a safeguard against any attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments to achieve their selfish interests

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that,
based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for
so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and
prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage

ISSUE:
WON should the live media coverage be allowed in former President Estrada’s impeachment
proceeding

RULING:
No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved
to order the audio-visual recording of the trial. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast
but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the
Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains.

Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes.
The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print
cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for
the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the
Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635

FACTS:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged
that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one.

National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.

Petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:
WON new trial be granted since the documents attached to the petition was inaccessible to the
respondent National labor union
RULING:
Yes. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved.

The Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due process, as follows:

(a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(c) The decision must have something to support itself;
(d) The evidence must be substantial;
(e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
(f) The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision; and
(g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision.

OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604

FACTS:
Sometime in February 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo
Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities
and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Angat, Bulacan.

The letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation into
the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. They proceeded
to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. However, they have
found out that Ceferino Tigas was a fictitious name.

Because of this, an Entrapment Operation was made by the NBI in order to convict the
respondent judge of Bribery. After the entrapment operation was conducted, petitioner asked
for the removal of respondent judge from his office.
ISSUE:
WON due process was observed during the hearing of the bribery case of the respondent judge
at the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:
NO. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted consist only
The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of the respondent judge at the
Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein
respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand
that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense,
the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.

Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125

Facts:

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of The Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Jeannette Ober Zamudio charged Lumiqued with Malversation through falsification of

public documents. He allegedly falsified gasoline receipts amounting to Php 44,172.46 and
made unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 116,000.00. Zamudio also charged
him with oppression and harassment after being relieved without just cause after filing the
2 cases against Lumiqued.

On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department
Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The
investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his
counter-affidavit
In his counter affidavit, Lumiqued alleged, that the cases were filed against him to extort
money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in
connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III.

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of
the five service vehicles issued under his name. Because these receipts were merely
turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of
auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature
on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued by the establishments
concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.

In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended
that private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her
duties due to her prolonged absences.

Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA
examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989,
were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount
on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued
asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs that would not
require handling of cash and money matters.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but
Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its
resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself
had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that
he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent
was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing,
which date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose
that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and inability to
attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report
dated July 31, 1992 finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the
Committee" with the DOJ. He was informed that investigating committee could no longer
act on his motion for reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed
because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilon's
recommendation.

On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52
(A.O. No. 52), finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of
fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his
retirement and other benefits

Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations."
This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain
Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored
the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest
man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were
"altered." IT WAS DENIED

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other
things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. However,
before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died.

ISSUE:

WON lumiqued was denied on his contitutional right to counsel during the administrative
hearing

RULING:

NO. Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree of
Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and
grants, and underwent training seminars both here and abroad. Hence, he could have
defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if the truth were on his side. This,
apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend.
As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is
the very essence of due process.Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied
if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration
cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

Fabella V. CA 282 SCRA 256

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all
public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates
during the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass action had been
staged to demand payment of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage
of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things.

On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases against herein petitioner-
appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken
part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations,
At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to be placed under
preventive suspension.

Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-appellees' counsel

objected to the procedure adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished a
copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and imposition of
penalties. As he received no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.

On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case No. 60675) with the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño
with fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and
from rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial court denied
them a restraining order

They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. They
alleged that the investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of discretion because
its guidelines for investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove
their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to adduce evidence to
prove the charges against the teachers.

Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision on August 6, 1991,

finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.

On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus for
lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was
denied on September 11, 1991.

Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds:

1. first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and denied access to evidence;
2. second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their
innocence;
3. third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition
and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
ISSUES:

WON the teachers were dismissed without due process of law

RULING:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent's legal rights;

(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a

person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and

(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of
the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national
teachers' organization and a supervisor of the division.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could
not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents
Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153

FACTS:
Major Lazaro Torcita was offduty , coming from a party was driving and was overtaken
by Mazda pick-up (TORICITA DRANK ALCOHOL BUT IS NOT DRUNK) w/ owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers
afterwards.

After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford (TORCITA’S CAR), a
vehicular collision almost took place, Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the
Mazda pick-up to stop but it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a
sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman.

That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered the compound and was
approached by two persons in civilian clothes (Alex Edwin del Rosario and Jesus Puey)
which prevented him from further proceeding; Torcita identified himself but the same had
no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous
for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up.

Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place
where Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were.

12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of
Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were
consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer.

The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish
that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place
between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of
violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that
Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the
influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and
salary suspended for the same period of time.

Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law).
The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.

ISSUE:

WON Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline,
when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer,
Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority
and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

RULING:

NO. Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually
found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal
process.
The 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses
mentioned specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no
indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties.

Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to
have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty
at the time that he had a taste of liquor because he was on a private trip fetching his wife.