61. United States v. Toribio 15 Phil.

85

FACTS:
Appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao
described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality wherein
it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating
the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was
slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large
cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied
him on the ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for
appellant contends that the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos
for human consumption as food, without first obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the
event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft purposes," is unconstitutional and
in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902), which
provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."

ISSUE:
WON ACT No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.

RULING (SUMMARY):
No. It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

1. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

(The interests of the public, in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the intervention of the State.)
 Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work
animal almost exclusively in use in the fields.
 The agricultural crisis was exacerbated by a shortage of work animals, hindering long-
term progress. Efforts were made to import animals and conserve existing ones, with
experts engaged to find preventive and curative measures. Despite these initiatives, the
scarcity of work animals led to a significant increase in carabao prices
 Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of
cattle, the crime of cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands

2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive on individuals.
 prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals
are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals
by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or
by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive
power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
RULING:
NO. The doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury, where it distinguished the exercise of the right of
eminent domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State:

POLICE POWER:
That every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment
of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community

EMINENT DOMAIN
The right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property
interests to a "public use," and is not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the
right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature
deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare.

Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal almost
exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with which they
were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of productive
land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off
to such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its
importation, notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice
lands of the country could easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs.

In response to widespread crop failures in the Philippines, the government allocated substantial funds,
including three million dollars from the United States Congress, to address immediate needs and initiate
public works projects for employment. The agricultural crisis was exacerbated by a shortage of work
animals, hindering long-term progress. Efforts were made to import animals and conserve existing ones,
with experts engaged to find preventive and curative measures. Despite these initiatives, the scarcity of
work animals led to a significant increase in carabao prices.

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of
cattle stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a
special law penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by
roving bands; and it must be assumed from the legislative authority found that the general welfare of the
Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the branding and
registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter for food.
63. People v. Fajardo 104 SCRA 443
FACTS:
Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the
Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building without permit
from the mayor.

During the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along
the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. It was denied for the reason among
others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.

Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the request was turned down by the
mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and
hitherto they had been living on leased property.

Appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur,
for violation of the ordinance in question. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is a valid

RULING:
(INVALID POLICE POWER AGAIN, PWEDENG EMINENT DOMAIN SANA KASO WALANG JUST
COMPENSASTION)
NO. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or
refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The
ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of
building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow
or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid

The State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial
use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on
appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in
effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it
is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
65. White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
FACTS:

NOTE: REASON FOR THE ORDINANCE (The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.)

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7774 which prohibits short time admission, or checking in for
less than twelve hours, in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the city, and provided that violators shall punished by imprisonment and fine. The Petitioners questioned
the ordinance before the Regional Trial Court arguing that it is unconstitutional for violating right to
privacy, and infringing their property right thus affecting their business interests as operators of drive-in
hotels and motels in the city.

The RTC ruled in their favor and strike down the ordinance as unconstitutional for infringing personal
liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution such as the right to operate economic enterprises. Further, the
illicit relationships the ordinance sought to dissuade could be performed still by paying the 12-hour stay.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC stating that:

(1) it did not violate right to privacy and freedom of movement as it only penalizes owners or
operators of establishments that admit individual for short time says, and
(2) it is a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is valid

RULING:
NO. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use.

These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by
charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
67. Balacuit v. CFI 163 SCRA 182
FACTS:
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 640, which penalizes persons and entities
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets for movies or other public events who require
children between the ages of 7 and 12 to pay full price. Petitioners are managers of theaters of the said
city.

They contended that the ordinance was unconstitutional and should not be enforced. The Municipal
Board, on the other hand, insisted that it as a valid exercise of police power because as provided in RA
523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, the Board has the power to regulate and fix the amount of the
license fees for theaters, cinematographs, etc.

(REASON FOR THE ENACTMENT)

A certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents
that for them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome.

The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in
all probability the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the
joys of their elders, but that considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and
twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought to be reduced.

ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 640 is a valid police power

RULING:
NO. 2 requisites ng substantive due process sa POLICE POWER bagsak (Lawful purpose hindi at lawful
means hindi rin kasi kinawawa yung mga theater house)

The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents
who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they
would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings
for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings.

The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes
them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to
avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this
undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however,
not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive
upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
68. Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD GR No. 166494, June 29 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines.

Public respondents, on the other hand, include the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), the Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Finance (DOF), the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) which have been specifically tasked
to monitor the drugstores’ compliance with the law; promulgate the implementing rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of the law; and prosecute and revoke the licenses of erring drugstore
establishments.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded
Senior Citizens Act of 2003.”

Sec. 4(a) of the Act states that The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: (a) the grant of twenty
percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and burial services
for the death of senior citizens;

Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of
private property. Compelling drugstore owners and establishments to grant the discount will result in a
loss of profit and capital because according to them drugstores impose a mark-up of only 5% to 10% on
branded medicines, and the law failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores will be justly
compensated for the discount.

ISSUE:
WON RA 9257 is constitutional

RULING:
YES. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent
domain, has general welfare for its object.

Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of
their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision
on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition cost,
as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right,
petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to raise their
prices for fear of losing their customers to competition.

The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a
business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
70. AgustIn v. Edu 88 SCRA 195
FACTS:
The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show
that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of
disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early
warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by
such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety

President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: (IN SHORT LAHAT DAPAT MAY EWD)

1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor
vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the
sides.
2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more
on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or
driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four
meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked.
3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning
Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor
vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the
acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order.
4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or
appropriate to carry into effect then instruction.
The Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from
any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device,
as d bed of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle.

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could
very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions
No. 229.

Petitioner states that the Letter of Instruction "clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police
power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay
unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society."

He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable
to the motoring public;” are "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
[they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners
who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to
P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate
New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well
provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of
EWD's."

ISSUE:
WON the Letter of Instruction is constitutional
RULING:
YES. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and
implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge that there
was unlawful delegation of legislative power.
As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was
clearly intended to promote public safety.

Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with

1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’

2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’
3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or
4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .

because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty
in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
71. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties 234 SCRA 255
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did
the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The
media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to
expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the
same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2)
ordinances prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit
to establishment for the operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting
the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor
and supplemental petitioner.

Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
WON the ordinances are a valid police power

RULING:
NO. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid,
an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the
public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical
to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others
for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are
not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to
which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way
these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will
ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
65. City of Manila v. Laguio 455 SCRA 308 (2005)
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel.

City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels,
inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up
business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other
kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and
inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

(AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES

PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.)

Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

Petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court
in its ruling

ISSUE:
WON oridnance is unconstitutional

RULING:
Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutional.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values
of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the
scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under
the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.

Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral
sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of
Manila ordering the closure of the church or court concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street
or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are
no "pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the Tradition of
Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history.
78. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City L-23794; Feb 17 1968
FACTS:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series
of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte against the
Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation.
It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax which Ormoc City
under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, otherwise
known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a
customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264
because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.

The defendants contended that the tax ordinance was within the defendant city’s power
to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
constitutional limitations.

The CFI rendered a decision, upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared
the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to
include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
W/N the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection
clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?

HELD:
NO. the tax imposed is violative against the equal protection clause.
In Felwa v. Salas 5 We ruled that theequal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where:
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As
it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
.

73. People v. Cayat 68 Phil. 12

FACTS:
Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty of
violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is
not a native wine.

Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-Christian tribe
to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines. Consequently,
Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies
the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police
power.

ISSUE:
WON the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:
NO. Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.
Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications. The
classification to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.

(1) On the first requisite, the classification rests on real and substantial distinctions. The non-
Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly
to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization.
(2) Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure peace and order among the non-Christian tribes.
The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which
hamper the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
(3) Third, the said act is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature
understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go
measures of protection and security.
(4) Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.
80. Binay v. Domingo 201 SCRA 508
FACTS:
The Municipality of Makati approved Resolution No. 60 which confirms and ratifies the ongoing Burial
Assistance Program initiated by the Mayor. Under the program, bereaved families of Makati whose gross
family income does not exceed Php 2,000.00 a month shall be its qualified beneficiaries and shall receive
an amount of Php 500.00 as relief.

Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in
audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof.

Two letters for reconsideration filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent

Two contentions of respondent about the denial of resolution no. 60:

(1) We see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be

attained under Resolution No. 60, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc.
of the inhabitants of Makati.
(2) let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure
covered thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of
P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of
P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of the whole, if
not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a
few individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or property shall
be spent or used solely for public purposes.
ISSUE:
WON Resolution No. 60 as re-enacted by the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause.

RULING:
YES.

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. First, although the COA suggested that there is no connection
between the objective of the resolution and the alleged public safety or general welfare of the inhabitants
of Makati, the Court ruled that police power is not capable of exact definition but has been veiled to
underscore its all-comprehensiveness. The police power of municipal corporation is broad and said to
be commensurate with, but shall not exceed, the duty to provide the real needs of the people in their
health, safety, comfort and convenience.

Second, public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As pointed by the Solicitor-General, the social welfare legislations geared towards
the promotion of general welfare, social justice and human dignity and respect for human rights. It has
been held by the Court that the support for the poor has been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of common good. Resolution No. 60 is a program towards social justice which
relieves the poor from the painful experience of bereavement. Hence, it vivifies that those who have less
in life should have more in law.
74 .Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

FACTS:
A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with an effect of
nationalizing the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:

(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on
May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited
in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons,
and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws
on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry;
(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business,
(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with
the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue
such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to
obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law ;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it
to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of
Article XIV of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process and equal
protection as guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING:
NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power of the State.
It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and danger to the
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business and free citizens and country
from the said dominance and control.

Official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the
alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assets and gross
sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have
the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assets and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many
Filipino retailers.

EQUAL PROTECTION
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated.

The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for
personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit,
is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this
country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and
consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness
and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country
and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown
such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found
necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in
the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or
ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
76. Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

Doctrine:
A LAW THAT DOES NOT SPECIFY THE MANNER OF EXERCISE OF
DISCRIMINATION IS VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. The
contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal
purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires
that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of
discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for
employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic
or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is
obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider
valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full
time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he
can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it
at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in
a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under
the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Facts:
City ordinance No 6537, prohibits aliens from being employed or engaged or participate in any
position or association or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual,
without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila is being questioned by
the private respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal protection guarantee. The trial
court ruled in favor of the nullity of the ordinance.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the ordinance cannot be invalidated on the ground that it
violated the rule on uniformity of taxation, because it apples to pure tax or revenues measures
and said ordinance is not such but is an exercise of the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinance is constitutional.

Held:
The ordinance is unconstitutional. The contention that it was not purely a tax or revenue
measure because its principle purpose was for regulation has no merit. It is obvious that THE
ORDINANCE WAS PURPOSELY FOR THE RAISING OF MONEY UNDER THE GUISE
OF A REGULATION.
Further, the assailed ordinance violates the equal protection clause. To require a person to
get a work permit before he can be employed from the Mayor who may withhold or refuse it
at will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to engage in a means of
livelihood . Aliens once admitted cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.

The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its
principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the first part which
requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise
of discretion and judgment in the processing and
approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in
character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure.

There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been “CLEARED”
for employment . It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the
guise of regulation. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive BUT
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO CONSIDER VALID SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES IN
SITUATION AMONG INDIVIDUAL ALIENS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO PAY IT .
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation . The same amount of P50.00 is
being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or
full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion . It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to
state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no
purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or
refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity
per se lawful .

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, where a law granted a
government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the
Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the
administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard
from which it can be measured or controlled. It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso that the
authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of
Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be
exercised within the limits of the law. Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or
suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been
granted to him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution. (Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is
admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause
is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.)
62.Churchill v. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580
FACTS:
Plaintiffs erected a billboard on private land in Rizal Province that was "quite distance
from the road and strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained
no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the
community." However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of Internal Revenue, decided to
remove the billboards after conducting a thorough investigation into the complaints of the
British and German Consuls.

Act No. 2339 empowered the then-Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any billboard
exposed to public view after conducting a thorough inquiry if it determines that it is
objectionable to the sight or otherwise a nuisance. In the agreed-upon statement of facts
filed by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are
offensive to the sight."

The Court of First Instance permanently restrains and prohibits the defendant and his
deputies from collecting and enforcing the annual tax mentioned and described in
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, as well as from
destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard owned by the plaintiffs, and
orders the cancellation of the plaintiffs' bond.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?

HELD:
YES. Things irritating to the senses, such as sight, smell, or hearing, may be repressed
by the state, particularly in densely crowded areas. The state's police authority can control
aesthetics if it is justified by public interest and safety.

Furthermore, if the police authority may be used to promote a healthy social and economic
situation in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included,
then everything that encroaches on such territory is subject to the State's police power.
Consequently, the CFI's decision is overturned.
64.Ermita-Manila Hotel 7 Motel Operator v. City of Manila 20 SCRA 849
FACTS:
Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate
motels. The following are the contentions of Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Manila hotel and Motel Operators
Association:
1. That Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable
and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class
motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels.
2. Owners and managers are to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open to public view at all times.
3. The ordinance is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination;
that the ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive.
Respondents countered that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of
the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self- incrimination.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional as it violates due process.

HELD:
No, it is not unconstitutional. An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors who must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be valid
and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal property rights under the guise of
police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut
its validity is unavoidable. In the case at bar, there being no factual foundation laid for overthrowing
Ordinance No. 4760 of Manila as void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail.
DANS V. PEOPLE
FACTS
Sometime in 1984, then Minister of Human Settlements Imelda R. Marcos and then Transportation and
Communications Minister Jose P. Dans, Jr., petitioners herein, entered into several contracts involving
the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI).
Concurrently and respectively, Marcos and Dans served as ex-oficio Chairman and ex-oficio Vice-
Chairman of the LRTA, and as Chairman and Director of the Board of Trustees of the PGHFI.
By virtue of these agreements, which were authorized and in fact ratified by the LRTA Board of Directors,
two vacant LRTA lots located in Pasay City, and lot in Sta. Cruz, Manila, were leased out to the PGHFI.
Specifically, the LRTA and the PGHFI, represented by Dans and Marcos, respectively, approved three
deeds, namely, an Agreement for the Development of the Areas Adjacent to the Light Rail Transit System
Stations and the Management and Operation of the Concession Areas Therein,[1] and two lease
agreements[2] dated June 8 and June 18, 1984, covering the Pasay and the Sta. Cruz lots.
The terms of the lease agreements were identical except as to the price: the lease would be good for 25
years subject to an annual escalation of 7.5%.
PGHFI had the right to sublease the lots; and the monthly lease was P102,760.00 for the Pasay lot and
P92,437.20 for the Sta. Cruz lot.
Within the same month, the Pasay lot was subleased by PGHFI, through Marcos, to Transnational
Construction Corporation (TNCC) for P734,000.00 a month, while the Sta. Cruz lot was
allegedly subleased to Joy Mart Consolidated Corporation (Joy Mart) for P199,710.00 per month.
Because of these deeds, petitioners were charged of crimes in violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
A total of Five (5) separate cases were filed against petitioners. Marcos and Dans were separately
charged under Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452 for accepting employment in and/or acting as
Chairman and Director, respectively, of the PGHFI while the latter had pending business (the lease
agreements) with the LRTA, which they both also headed. With regard to the other cases, Criminal Case
Nos. 17449, 17450 and 17453, the accusations against both of them stemmed from the contracts they
signed in representation of the LRTA and of the PGHFI which were allegedly entered into under terms
and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.
Before trial could commence, Dans moved for the advance examination of defense witness Ramon F.
Cuervo, Jr., a real estate broker, appraiser and friend of Dans who, as an expert witness, was in a
position to inform the court that the agreed lease prices stated in the subject agreements were fair based
on standard industry valuation standards.
The court a quo granted said motion, and Cuervo was allowed to testify on August 12, 13, and 19, 1992.
During this time, Marcos never questioned Cuervo and later expressed that she had no desire to further
examine him.
The court issued an order admitting all the exhibits except Exhibits D and E as to Dans, who challenged
the two sublease agreements, and Exhibit E-1 as to Marcos, who, while accepting the validity of said
sublease agreement, nevertheless questioned the authenticity of her signature thereon.
Dans filed a Motion to Dismiss but the court denied the same, as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereof.
By the time the case was submitted for decision, Marcos had neither submitted a formal offer of evidence,
despite notice of the courts orders to do so, nor the required memorandum. She did file a motion for
inhibition of the justices of the Sandiganbayans First Division on the ground of pre-judgment of her case
based on the courts denial of Dans demurrer to evidence, but this was denied in the courts
On September 24, 1993, The court a quo rendered judgment, acquitting petitioners in Criminal Case Nos.
17449, 17451, and 17452, but convicting them in Criminal Case Nos. 17450 and 17453.
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration which respondent court promulgated two
resolutions, one denying the motion of Dans, and another denying that of Marcos and modifying the
assailed September 24, 1993, decision with the addition of a sixth paragraph in the dispositive portion
which dealt with the civil liability of petitioners.
Aggrieved, petitioners separately elevated their case to SC for a review.
The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raise similar issues and seek the
same reliefs.
One of the few issues raised by Imelda Marcos is the constitutionality of Sec 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. According to her, the section is vague and superfluous. She claims that the phrase
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government is vague for it does not set a definite standard
by which the court will be guided, thus, leaving it open to human subjectivity.Petitioners were charged
with and found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. It states thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.
ISSUE:
WON Sec 3 (g) of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is unconstitutional on the ground of vagueness
RULING:
NO. There is, however, nothing vague about the statute. The assailed provision answers the basic query
What is the violation? Anything beyond this, the hows and the whys, are evidentiary matters which the law
itself cannot possibly disclose in view of the uniqueness of every case. The disadvantage in this instance
is something that still has to be addressed by the States evidence as the trial progresses. It may be said
that the law is intended to be flexible in order to allow the judge a certain latitude in determining if the
disadvantage to the government occasioned by the act of a public officer in entering into a particular
contract is, indeed, gross and manifest.

The personal circumstances of an accused are, in this regard, also immaterial, because of the nature
of the statute. As the Court declared in Luciano,
. . . In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of a malum prohibitum; it is the
commission of that act as defined by the law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether
or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced
purpose for which Republic Act (No.) 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public
officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Note that the
law does not merely contemplate repression of acts that are unlawful or corrupt per se, but even of those
that may lead to or result in graft and corruption. Thus, to require for conviction under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act that the validity of the contract or transaction be first proved would be to enervate, if
not defeat, the intention of the Act.