2 Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
2 Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
2 Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
SYLLABUS
DECISION
RELOVA, J :p
On October 21, 1980, petitioner was charged with the crime of grave
coercion in an information filed before the respondent court, which reads:
"That on or about July 2, 1979, in the municipality of Sta. Cruz,
Province of Marinduque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
then the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking advantage of his
public position and which offense was committed in relation to his
office, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro
Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said
gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose,
and padlock dispensing pump thereof without authority of law,
depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade
or occupation, by means of threat, force and/or violence, thereby
preventing said Pedro Par from doing something not prohibited by
law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it be
right or wrong.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
(p. 10, Rollo)
On November 27, 1980, the information was amended with the
insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the
words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline."
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the
ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and
that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where
the alleged crime was committed.
Respondent court denied the motion. Hence, petitioner instituted this
proceeding for certiorari seeking the same relief, alleging that —
1. Â The offense for which he was charged is not related
to his office as mayor;
2. Â The offense of grave coercion is not among those
mentioned or determined by Section 4(c), Presidential Decree No.
1486, as amended; and
3. Â Assuming that respondent has jurisdiction to try this
case, it committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
transfer of the hearing of the case to the Court of First Instance of
Marinduque because all witnesses of both the prosecution and
defense will have to come from Marinduque, a far away island.
Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, provides for the creation of a
special court known as the Sandiganbayan and defines the jurisdiction
thereof. It states:
"SEC. 5. Â The National Assembly shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction
over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and
such other offenses committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office as may be determined by law."
It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision that
respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers
and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to
their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be
determined by law. The intention of the framers of the New Constitution is
patent from the explicit language thereof as well as from Section 1 of the
same Article XIII titled "Accountability of Public Officers," which provides:.
"SECTION 1. Â Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the
people."
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 4(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of
Section 5 of Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges
what the latter limited. Said constitutional provision delegates to the
lawmaking body the determination of "such other offenses" committed by
public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking
authority and prerogative vested in him by the Constitution, issued
Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in Section 4(c) thereof that
the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over "other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporation, in relation to their office."
(Emphasis supplied) When the lawmaking authority chose to include all
public office-related offenses over which respondent court shall have
jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is
enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body
or authority and, if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply.
The original and amended information clearly alleged that petitioner
took advantage of his position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline
station's owner in taking over the operation and control of the
establishment, ordering his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and
padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority. Stated
differently, if petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly
directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and
instructions to sell Pedro Par's gasoline and padlocked the station. The fact
that he is the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the
operations and control of complainant's gasoline station and padlock the
same without observing due process.
The crime for which petitioner is charged, grave coercion, is penalized
by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding P500.00 under the first paragraph
of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Respondent court,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as
amended, has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Well
established is the rule that once a court acquires jurisdiction in a case where
said jurisdiction is concurrent with another court, it must continue exercising
the same to the exclusion of all other courts. In Laquian vs. Baltazar, 31
SCRA 551, We ruled that "in case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is axiomatic
that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts." Thus,
respondent's denial of petitioner's request for the transfer of the case to the
Court of First Instance of Marinduque was well-grounded and certainly not a
grave abuse of discretion. LibLex