Statcon Digests #4
Statcon Digests #4
Statcon Digests #4
Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979)Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14
FACTS:
Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was chargedwith violation
of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, particularly, for overtaking a truck.Petitioner
initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for theissuance of
preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the saidordinance.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta,Pangasinan is
valid.
HELD:
No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 ofAct No.
3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136(The Land
and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that alater law
prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinanceis that it
must not contravene the statute for it is fundamental principle thatmunicipal
ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446
(December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as
well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of
the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The
clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
February 4, 2014
annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real
estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in
marketing or selling any real estate development project in the regular course of
business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real estate
brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be
manned by a duly licensed real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the
case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service
practitioner, the same shall be reported by the employer to the Board within a
period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of the
resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may
hire the services of registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants on commission basis to perform real estate services and the latter
shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such
corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it
violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business
to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to
sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate
developers most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property,
which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A.
No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist
between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both
are property owners dealing with their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and
developing a "corps of technically competent, reasonable and respected
professional real estate service practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right
of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the
contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate
industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and
affordability of real estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed
that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate industry
generates for the government will be a thing of the past.
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision2 denying the petition. The
trial court held that the assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as
they are intended to regulate the practice of real estate service in the country by
ensuring that those who engage in it shall either be a licensed real estate broker,
or under the latters supervision. It likewise found no real discord between E.O.
No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the license to
sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license would still
subsist. The only difference is that by virtue of the new law, real estate
developers will now be compelled to hire the services of one licensed real estate
broker for every twenty salespersons to guide and supervise the coterie of
salespersons under the employ of the real estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions
do not preclude property owners from using, enjoying, or disposing of their own
property because they can still develop and sell their properties except that they
have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall oversee
the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under their employ. Since
the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of
the practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of
the States police power. The trial court further ruled that Section 28(a) does not
violate the equal protection clause because the exemption of real estate
developers was anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the
buying public from the rampant misrepresentations often committed by
unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical
real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of consumers
in the regular course of business compared to isolated sale transactions made
by private individuals selling their own property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to
adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one
subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648,
with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate
developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect
the rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive
due process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from
other natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service
with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause.3
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial
power the existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case
or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible to judicial resolution.5 The controversy must be justiciable
definite and concrete touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application
of a law.6 In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that
is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.7 An actual case is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it.8
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are
entities directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting
practice of real estate service without first complying with the registration and
licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The
possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is
likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property
owners to dispose of their properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional
grounds the implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the respondents defended
as a valid legislation pursuant to the States police power. The Court thus finds a
justiciable controversy that calls for immediate resolution.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law extended its
coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties.
Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or
transactions constituting real estate service practice without first complying with
registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents,
appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in
marketing or selling any real estate development project in the regular course of
business are now required to be headed by full-time, registered and licensed
real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the property
rights and business prerogatives of real estate developers which are not all
reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are
already regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition
of real estate service practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate
service practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress
of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity
and enhancing government income from real property-based transactions.
Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper and effective regulation and
supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and
service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real
estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the laws
primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and
respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of
practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of
the real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate development
projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions defined as real
estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically
covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No.
648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because
they conflict with P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have
"exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." Such
body for housing and land development under the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues to
carry out its mandate to register real estate brokers and salesmen dealing in
condominium, memorial parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11
of P.D. No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. No real estate
dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdivision
lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied
with the applicable rules of the Authority, including the payment of the
prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman
upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed
by the Authority conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the provisions of
this Decree: Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of
December of each year. Renewal of registration for the succeeding year shall be
granted upon written application therefore made not less than thirty nor more
than sixty days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the
prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further statements or information,
unless specifically required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said
period shall be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or
salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept
in the Authority which shall be open to public inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition
precedent for all persons who will engage in acts constituting real estate
service, including advertising in any manner ones qualifications as a real estate
service practitioner, compliance with licensure examination and other
registration requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate brokers
and private appraisers. While Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration
requirements for dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in the selling of
subdivision lots and condominium units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates
all real estate service practitioners whether private or government. While P.D.
No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and dealers who are engaged in the sale of
subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646 aims to regulate the real
estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the
level of ethical standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those
real estate service practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and
condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No.
957, and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the
regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURBs supervision of brokers and dealers
to effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose
regulation of the real estate service as a profession. Real estate developers
already regulated by the HLURB are now further required to comply with the
professional licensure requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in
Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly, there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted conflicting laws.19 Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to
have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D.
No. 957.
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly
oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property
without due process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now
burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and
dispose of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and
resources in their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still
have less control in managing their business and will be burdened with
additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no
restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the
implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel
burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real
estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct affects
the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, public health and welfare and public morals.20 In any case, where the
liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or professions.21
from those exempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them.
They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary property
owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of
entering into real estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed
real estate brokers.1wphi1 They assail the RTC decision in citing the reported
fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the
exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial courts ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal
protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as
follows:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It
is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within such
class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825).25
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law,
concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for
the development of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and
disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally
accepted standards and practice of the profession."28 Real estate developers
at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest number of
brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of
products (lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell
nationwide. As early as in the 70s, there has been a proliferation of errant
developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and
obligations to comply with government regulations such as the provision and
maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and other
basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from
fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to
strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in
approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of
imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners,
including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working
for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated
transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is
highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot
buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary
property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like
petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is
valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.29
Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who
attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports
the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in
favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted."30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice
Final Corporate ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should start
from Apr 15, 1998 and end on Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is
1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 . 24th month - Mar 15,
2000 to Apr 14, 2000. National Marketing v. Tecson, 139 Phil 584
(1969) is no longer controlling. The 2-year period should start to run
from filing of the final adjusted return.
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000)
was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day
respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period
CIR v. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.G.R. No. 184823 October 6,
2010Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine: The CIR has 120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents within which to grant or deny the claim for refund/credit of
input vat. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to
file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the
CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application
for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the
CIR to CTA within 30 days.
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly
granting such right, privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle
of solutio indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or illegally collected.
In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also
his compliance with the procedural due process.
As between the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987, it is the latter
that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex
posteriori derogat priori.
The phrase within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund under Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC refers to
applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the
CTA.
Facts:Petitioner filed a claim of refund/credit of input vat in relation to its zerorated sales from July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. The CTA 2nd Division
partially granted respondents claim for refund/credit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to
claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the
NIRC. He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the
claim for tax refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year
period, which expired on September 29, 2004. He cited as basis Article 13 of
the Civil Code, which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing
of the administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229
of the NIRC. According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim
is a condition precedent before a judicial claim can be filed.
The CTA denied the MPR thus the case was elevated to the CTA En Banc for
review. The decision was affirmed. Thus the case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.
Respondent contends that the non-observance of the 120-day period given to
the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal
because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period. In support thereof, respondent citedCommissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. [130 Phil 12 (1968)] where it was
ruled that if the CIR takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two
years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the CTA before
the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the CIR.
Issues:1. Whether or not the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed
period2. Whether or not the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior
filing of an administrative claim, and violates the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
Held:1. Yes. As ruled in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation (G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008), the two-year
period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc (G.R. No.
162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436), we said that as between the Civil
Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12
calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law,
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Thus, applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax
refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on
September 30, 2004. Hence, respondents administrative claim was timely filed.
2. Yes. We find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the
date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application
[for tax refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or
partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the
CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the
120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the
remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30
days.
Subsection (A) of Section 112 of the NIRC states that any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two
years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply
for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales. The phrase within two (2) years x x x
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund refers to applications
for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc. is
inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306, now
Section 229 of the NIRC. Section 229 does not apply to refunds/credits of input
VAT.
The premature filing of respondents claim for refund/credit of input VAT before
the CTA warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA