ACTIVATING AMERICAN

INVESTMENT OVERSEAS
FOR A FREER, MORE
OPEN WORLD
How the Development Finance Corporation
Can Better Mobilize Private Capital

Hon. Mark R. Kennedy Director, Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition

Dr. Jeffrey R. Kucik Global Fellow, Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition 2024
Contents
Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Opportunities for Strengthening the
US International Development Finance Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Investing Abroad is Investing in America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
What is a Strategic Infrastructure Project?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Faster and Easier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Recommendation 1: Modify the board structure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Recommendation 2: Make compensation for professionals more competitive. . . . . . . . . . 9
Recommendation 3: Require a single environmental review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

China Acts Fast Even with Greater Embrace of ESG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Activating More Private Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Recommendation 4: Treat equity investments more favorably. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Recommendation 5: Encourage subordinated debt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Recommendation 6: Allow private participation in DFC loans.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Sharper Strategic Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Recommendation 7: Expand the list of nations eligible for investment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Moving Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Reports from Working Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Unleashing Opportunity by Unlocking
Private Investment in International Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Empowering Development Finance Corporation for Greater Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Investing in Infrastructure Bolsters a More Stable, Free and Open World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
About the Authors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
About the Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
About the Wilson Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Forward
The Wilson Center’s Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition convened
several working groups during 2023 to provide policy recommendations
for mobilizing private investment in international infrastructure. The groups
comprised experts from government, law, finance, and the private sector.
Their recommendations, which focus on strengthening the US International
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), are detailed below. The findings
were first presented at an event Mobilizing Private Investment in Interna-
tional Infrastructure in November 2023 at the Wilson Center.

This report highlights seven core recommendations and includes insights

from participants. Taken together, these ideas will help the DFC activate
more private investment that incorporates America’s high standards of
transparency and sustainability.

Summaries of work by the three working groups follow this report. They
include additional recommendations that would strengthen the beneficial
impact of a range of agencies. Taken together, the recommendations pro-
vide policy makers a roadmap for how the US can activate more private
investment in international infrastructure, elevating market opportunities
and quality of life for people around the world while also benefiting the
US economically and diplomatically. We at the Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition are grateful to each of the working group participants, who
devoted significant time in sharing their highly informed insights.

We hope the recommendations provided here will help strengthen the US’s
economic diplomacy.

Sadek Wahba
Chairman, Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 1

Executive Summary
Financing foreign infrastructure is a win-win situation for America and host nations. Robust, modern in-
frastructure boosts development abroad while also creating opportunities for American businesses and
advancing US foreign policy goals. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has led
recent US efforts to promote private investment in international infrastructure to advance development,
climate and strategic national goals.

DFC has made progress since its founding in 2018, yet the global infrastructure funding gap remains mas-
sive, and the US still trails the scale of comparable agencies in partner and competitor nations relative
to economic size. Policy changes can help the DFC activate more private investment in countries where
America has clear economic and diplomatic interests. We offer policymakers the following seven recom-
mendations to help embolden the DFC and help ensure a peaceful, prosperous global economy.

These recommendations will help create a stronger DFC—one that better meets the needs of today’s
competitive environment and helps ensure future opportunities for US firms and the American people.

Left to right: Ambassador Mark Green, President & CEO, Wilson Center; Development Finance Corporation Deputy
CEO Nisha Biswal; Sadek Wahba, Chair of WISC Steering Committee, Wilson Center Global Advisory Council Member;
Mark Kennedy, Director, Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition

2 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

u Recommendation 1: Modify the board structure
To better assess the risks and returns of potential investments in a timely manner, the
DFC board should be modified to include five members each with extensive experience in
emerging and developing country finance. Political appointees could serve in ex officio roles.

u R
ecommendation 2: Make compensation for professionals
more competitive
To better recruit and retain qualified staff, the DFC should be given greater flexibility to com-
pensate professionals in accordance with standards in legal and financial industries, in a
manner similar to the authority already granted to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

u Recommendation 3: Require a single environmental review

To expedite project approval while still maintaining high standards, only one environmental
review to be shared across agencies should be required.

u Recommendation 4: Treat equity investments more favorably

To better reflect the returns on infrastructure equity investments, accounting standards
must be changed, and those returns should be directed to a revolving account at the DFC
for reinvestment elsewhere.

u Recommendation 5: Encourage more subordinated debt

To activate more private investment in international infrastructure, the DFC should be
encouraged to offer more subordinated debt deals.

u Recommendation 6: Allow private participation in DFC loans

The DFC should be encouraged to sell participation in performing loans to attract private
capital and free up DFC resources for other projects.

u Recommendation 7: Expand the list of nations eligible for investment

To ensure that the DFC can pursue America’s strategic interests, the list of countries eligible
to receive money should include middle-income nations as classified by the World Bank.

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 3

Opportunities for Strengthening
the US International Development Finance Corporation
The United States prospers when global markets are free, open,
and stable. Financing strategic investments in foreign infrastruc-
ture can help achieve this goal. Infrastructure creates opportuni-
ties for US firms to reach new customers, it helps build more
resilient supply chains, and it even bolsters our nation’s security
by deepening America’s engagement in key regions of the world.
All of this is done while upholding good standards. As the DFC’s
Deputy CEO Nisha Biswal reminded us that at an event at the Wil-
son Center in 2023 “this is no longer a race to the bottom” but,
“This is no longer a rather, “[America] is driving up the quality, the transparency, and
the sustainability of infrastructure projects.”
race to the bottom”
but, rather, [America] Recognizing these benefits, Congress created the US Internation-
is driving up the quality, al Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 2018 to facilitate
infrastructure investment in emerging markets and developing
the transparency, and
countries. To date, the DFC has committed more than $40 billion
the sustainability of in 112 countries, providing services ranging from debt financing
infrastructure projects.” and risk insurance to feasibility assessments and equity invest-
NISHA BISWAL Deputy CEO of the US ment.1 This financing generates significant benefits for the host
Inter­national Development Finance Corporation nations and for the US. Beyond its economic, diplomatic, and se-
curity benefits, the DFC’s support for foreign infrastructure regu-
larly returns a net profit to US taxpayers.

Despite progress, the US government alone cannot meet the

substantial unmet need for infrastructure investment. Infrastruc-
ture projects are large, expensive, and require private-sector par-
ticipation to complete. Unfortunately, many investment opportu-
nities are missed because of significant regulatory barriers and
because unaddressed political risks deter private capital. Reform
is needed to take fuller advantage of the opportunities to promote
US economic and strategic interests abroad. As Ambassador
“American global Mark Green, President and CEO of the Wilson Center, observes,
leadership means “American global leadership means harnessing the might of pri-
harnessing the might vate enterprise to help countries go from being aid recipients to
development partners.”
of private enterprise to
help countries go from Emboldening the DFC with greater authority and streamlined pro-
being aid recipients to cesses can help it activate more private capital. And in doing so, it
can advance US economic and strategic interests.
development partners.”
AMBASSADOR MARK GREEN
President & CEO, Wilson Center

4 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

Investing Abroad is Investing in America
Global economic instability continues to do financial harm to governments, firms, and workers in the US
and abroad. Shocks caused by COVID-19 and the invasion of Ukraine drove up prices—and drove down
incomes—across international markets. In response, we need proactive efforts to stabilize markets and
reduce the uncertainty deterring business between America and its partners. The DFC can help.

DFC projects provide three considerable benefits “Partnership is the

that justify strengthening the organization.
key word. One of
The first benefit is economic. Infrastructure provides the advantages
a conduit through which future commerce flows, that the US has
creating opportunities for US firms to engage with
is a huge network
more industries in more countries. Infrastructure
not only facilitates the original sale of a good, but of partners.”
also the maintenance, replacement, and upgrading PRASHANTH
of parts and services that make up the bulk of Amer- PARAMESWARAN
Global Fellow, Wahba Institute
ica’s trade. Whether companies from the US and its
for Strategic Competition
allies or companies from competitor nations build
global communications, energy, healthcare, tech- “There has never
nology, and transportation infrastructure can make
been a question
the difference between whether US firms win or
lose in the global marketplace.
about the need
for infrastructure
The second benefit is diplomatic. Durable, produc-
invest­ment,
tive investments help strengthen America’s politi-
cal relationships with other countries. As noted by
especially in
Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition Global higher-risk, lower-
Fellow Prashanth Parameswaran, “partnership is income countries.”
the key word. One of the advantages that the US
SHIHOKO GOTO Director,
has is a huge network of partners.” Strengthening Asia Program, Wilson Center
these diplomatic ties must be among America’s
top priorities. Since these projects benefit local communities as well as the US, there are few better ways
than building infrastructure to foster sustainable economic growth and social progress. It will also advance
America’s core principle of free, open societies.

The third benefit is a safer, more secure US. America’s ability to maintain the international rules based system
depends crucially on safe and efficient supply chains through access to ports, airports, and global communi-
cations networks such as undersea cables. The US needs entities such as the DFC to support commercial
investments that have security implications. The result is a safer, more stable US and international system.

These three benefits highlight the key role the DFC plays and drives our recommendation for strengthening
the organization to encourage deeper investment in strategic projects. As Shihoko Goto, Director of the Wil-
son Center’s Asia Program, points out “there has never been a question about the need for infrastructure
investment, especially in higher-risk, lower-income countries.” Rather, the question is only is how to do it.

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 5

What is a Strategic Infrastructure Project?
Foreign infrastructure investments are an essential part of the US’s economic development efforts. Smaller
economies suffer vital shortages of communications, sanitation, public health, and transportation infra-
structure. Sustainable energy and climate adaptation also require significant infrastructure investment. The
DFC can—and does—help address economic development by investing in projects that improve the quality
of life in lower-income countries. Needs can also be addressed with reforms to strengthen the multi-lateral
development banks (MDBs) where the US is a key member.

Yet there are also strategic infrastructure projects that positively advance development and/or climate goals
where the US has a core national interest. The US cannot leave the important work of building foreign infra-
structure solely to MDBs and to other countries when US national interests are at stake.

The DFC is essential in promoting strategic investments that advance core national interests, bolstering
America’s economic and security. Core strategic priorities include:

■ Keeping commerce open. Foreign ownership of airports and seaports by competitor countries
raises important security concerns. Chinese companies reportedly operate in at least 100 sea-
ports in 63 countries—a number that has doubled in just a decade—including key sites in Eu-
rope and Israel.2 Ensuring that the US has a strategy, as well as the capability to ensure that key
corridors of commerce throughout the world remain accessible to all must be a priority. America’s
goods and military resources must be able to move freely around the world.
■ Securing digital communications. Access to affordable communications technologies cannot
come at the expense of digital security. US values dictate that telecommunication services,
data centers, and other technologies must empower citizens rather than enable governments to
coerce or repress. It is important that the US and its allies make every effort to offer other nations
competitive digital infrastructure alternatives that are trusted and secure.
■ Ensuring reliable energy supplies. Reliable access to supplies of critical minerals and rare earth
metals are crucial to the sustainability and security of the US. So too is access to the fuel sources
that make the US economy run. Infrastructure investments provide an effective way to shore up
essential supply chains and guarantee that the US is not over-reliant on any one country for these
core building blocks of prosperity and security.

These are just a few examples of the strategic priorities in America’s interests. Having access to ports,
providing avenues for open communication, and shoring up energy supplies all help guarantee a free, open
international system of transparent, healthy commerce, and diplomacy. The work of the DFC can help en-
sure these goals are met, but the agency needs core reforms to strengthen its position.

6 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

(David Jancik / Shutterstock)
 Faster and Easier
The DFC has a unique mandate among US government agen-
cies. It is best understood as a financial institution providing a
unique, critical service that requires timely responsiveness to
private sector partners for the critical element of economic di-
plomacy to succeed. When services are too costly, too slow, or
inordinately risk-adverse, private investors will forego valuable
opportunities, often forfeiting them to other competitors that
have access to substantially greater access to financial and eco-
nomic support. As a result, the DFC’s effectiveness directly im-
pacts whether US and partners are successful relative to com-
petitors. As Wilson Center Chief of Staff Eddy Acevedo notes,
“[we] cannot emphasize enough the importance of streamlining
the process… a lot of governments do not have the luxury to
wait and see if deals go through.” Delays mean the US loses out
“[We] cannot emphasize to competitors.

enough the importance Encouraging deeper investment requires changes to the DFC’s in-
of streamlining the ternational structure and its early phases of project approval. Here
process…a lot of are three ways to promote more efficient investment:

governments do not
u Recommendation 1: Modify the board structure.
have the luxury to
wait and see if deals The DFC faces two core challenges when making decisions.
go through.” The first is the need to assess risks in complex capital struc-
tures. The second is the need to price that risk appropriately.
EDDY ACEVEDO Chief of Staff,
Both tasks are difficult and require financial and legal expertise
Wilson Center
to make good decisions. Therefore, we suggest restructuring
the DFC’s board.

Decision-making authority should be concentrated in the hands

of a smaller board of five members consisting of the CEO and
the members currently set forth in the BUILD Act.3 Each member
must have significant experience in finance in emerging and de-
veloping countries. To ensure a degree of connectivity with policy-
makers, political leaders should remain involved, but the number
should be limited to two and they should serve only in ex officio
roles, without voting power.4 It is worth noting that these individu-
als have an important role in helping ensure that US foreign policy
objectives and priorities are being considered.The Export-Import
Bank of the US provides a useful model. There, a smaller board of
experts makes decisions and a couple of cabinet members serve
in ex officio roles.

8 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

Additionally, we suggest adjusting the threshold required for
board approval for loans, loan guaranties, and political risk insur-
ance upward to $150 million. All projects not going to the board
would still need to be approved both by credit professionals and
the senior leadership team comprised of political appointees.

A leaner, experienced board can focus more sharply on projects

of high economic and strategic value. Investments offer an oppor-
tunity to export America’s values and standards in ways that may
strengthen the rule of law in host countries.

Recommendation 2: Make compensation

u 
for professionals more competitive.

Making good investment decisions requires qualified, commit- “Getting the best talent
ted staff. The DFC has done a good job expanding its human requires appropriate
resources by recruiting skilled professionals from finance, law, compensation.”
and development. However, staff turnover remains a problem
TARA HIGGINS Partner, Sidley Austin LLP
as government agencies struggle to match the compensation
offered by private firms. Tara Higgins, a partner at Sidley Aus-
tin LLP, cautions that the DFC struggles to lure personnel away
from the comparatively large salaries offered by the private firms
the DFC competes with and that “getting the best talent re-
quires appropriate compensation.”

Investing in the DFC’s talent promises positive returns. We

want to ensure that the organization makes good initial invest-
ments—and that the DFC has the internal stability to see those
project through long into the future. Congress should pass leg-
islation to provide the DFC with additional flexibility in setting
pay scales. This flexibility would not be unprecedented. Section
4802 of the Pay Parity Act of 2002 gave the Securities and Ex-
change Commission leeway to compensate employees in key
positions in ways that help close the gap with comparable po-
sitions in the private sector. That legislation aimed to increase “Investing in finance
the SEC’s ability to attract—and to retain—top talent. A similar expertise will reduce
effort with the DFC will lead to more efficient processes. Hills
cycle time.”
Stern & Morley LLP partner Laura Hills observes that “invest-
ing in finance expertise will reduce cycle time,” lowering the LAURA HILLS Partner,
Hills Stern & Morley LLP
likelihood that US investors miss out on opportunities due to
costly delays.

Offering more competitive salaries will have a substantial return

on investment in the high returns profitable investments return to
the US economy.

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 9

 u Recommendation 3: Require a single environmental review.

Not all infrastructure projects are created equal. Money spent on infrastructure generates larger rewards
when projects are durable and sustainable, so that today’s investments will reap rewards well into the
future. Marie Lam-Frendo, participating as CEO of the Global Infrastructure Hub, observes that “govern-
ments need to do better infrastructure, not just more of it.” This is what separates US projects from some
competitors. America’s world-leading standards, including its careful reviews of environmental impact, help
ensure long-term benefits.

“Governments However, impact assessments can be expensive and

need to do better time consuming. It is particularly burdensome to con-
duct multiple environmental reviews for different agen-
infrastructure, not
cies on the same investment, which can lead to un-
just more of it.” derinvestment. There are two problems. First, private
MARIE LAM-FRENDO Former capital can sometimes forego a promising investment
CEO, Global Infrastructure Hub opportunity if the startup costs are perceived to be too
high. Second, even if investors wish to go through a
“The faster we can prolonged review, delays in approval can result in for-
get the rail built, feiting opportunities to competitors. Even if reviews
the sooner agri­ are eventually successful, they can delay generating
business can get its benefits. As Danae Pauli, Senior Advisor at the Depart-
ment of State points out, “the faster we can get the
goods to market.”
rail built, the sooner agribusiness can get its goods
DANAE PAULI Senior Advisor, to market.” If the US is not building those rails, then
Department of State
someone else will—and those other nations may have
“[Investors] much lower standards than the US.

should be able Congress can help promote America’s world-leading

to share best standards and ensure that US investors do not lose
prac­tices to out to faster-moving competitors. A key is streamlining
the upfront review processes. The Fiscal Responsibili-
cut costs and
ty Act of 2023 states that “if a proposed agency action
streamline will require action by more than one Federal agency
the process.” and the lead agency has determined that it requires
MICHAEL KUMAR Former Global Head of Project, preparation of an environmental document, the lead
Commodity, and Infrastructure Finance to Morgan Stanley and cooperating agencies shall evaluate the proposal
in a single environmental document.”6 Such alignment
should occur with international infrastructure investment efforts. These documents can be overseen by a
single US government agency and shared freely with other agencies and allied development finance institu-
tions. As Michael Kumar, participating as Global Head of Project, Commodity, and Infrastructure Finance for
Morgan Stanley points out, investors “should be able to share best practices to cut costs and streamline the
process,” which will result in the “next level” of efficient lending.

Clearer, more transparent communication is consistent with US principles, and it cuts down on costly,
unnecessary, and potentially harmful delays in doing business abroad.

10 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

China Acts Fast Even with Greater Embrace of ESG
China’s infrastructure lending continues to outpace that of the US. Since 2000, China has committed more
than $1.3 trillion to 165 emerging and developing markets—more than twice the US total. And despite
the DFC helping close the gap, China’s current spending, at about $80 billion annually, exceeds the US’s
$60 billion.5

Part of China’s success comes from mastering the art of public-private partnerships. Beijing took significant
strides in activating private capital through its use of syndicated loan deals. Over the past decade, syndicat-
ed loans increased from less than 10% of China’s deals to more than 40%.

China has done all of this while raising standards. Ammar A. Malik of AidData notes that “China already had
an advantage in speed and scale. Now it’s showing that higher standards do not compromise project com-
pletion.” Data show there is no difference in time to completion for Chinese projects with higher environ-
mental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. In fact, China’s projects finish on average of 3 years—half
the time it takes World Bank projects.

China’s Increasing Reliance on Syndicated Loans and Strong ESG Standards

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
% with syndicated lending % with ESG standards

Notes. Strong standards defined by the AidData project as whether loans meet at high stan-
dards across at least two out of three dimensions of ESG. Data from Parks, B. C., et al. 2023.
“Belt and Road Reboot: Beijing’s Bid to De-Risk Its Global Infrastructure Initiative.” Williams-
burg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 11

Activating More Private Capital
Returns on infrastructure investments can be attractive. Yet concerns about risk deter private capital. Un-
stable governments, cloudy regulatory regimes, and outright corruption are all common worries when
investing abroad. These risks are especially important for infrastructure projects, given the potentially long-
time horizons to completion. It may be years before investors see any return.

Reforms to the DFC can help it attract more private investment while, at the same time, opening more
channels through which investors can access opportunities abroad. When implemented correctly, we can
significantly increase private sector participation in projects that are win-win for the US and its economic
partners. Here are three ways to motivate more investment:

u Recommendation 4: Treat equity investments more favorably.

The DFC recognizes that its participation in equity investments “catalyzes” private sector capital by making
the US government a partner in the venture and by making lending less risky. Unfortunately, federal bud-
geting processes limit these opportunities. Office of Management and Budget standards essentially treat
equity investments like grants—a practice inconsistent with how infrastructure investments work. These
investments are not like concessionary loans or foreign aid packages provided to a developing country.
Rather, they are investments in building something tangible that promises positive returns. Yet there is no
accounting for those returns under current rules. Money flows back to the Treasury, rather than to the DFC,
giving the false appearance that these expenditures are net losers to the investor and to US taxpayers.

We recommend the DFC be permitted to fund a cash revolving account so returns on equity investments
flow back to the DFC. Those returns may subsequently be used to fund future project equity investments
and credit subsidy costs.7 Congress should work with the private sector and examine the ability to create
such fund.

The methods for calculating credit subsidy costs also need revision. The Government Accountability Office
defines these costs as “the net present value of estimated cash flows from the government (e.g., loan
disbursements and claim payments to lenders) minus estimated cash flows to the government (e.g., loan
repayments, interest payments, fees, and recoveries on defaulted loans) over the life of the loan.”8 Howev-
er, there is a problem with calculating net present value in equity investments. Unlike grants, these invest-
ments do not have a fixed date on which a fund is dissolved and capital is returned to investors.

Better reflecting the realities of these investments requires assumptions to determine net present value.
For equity investments to investment funds, the discount rate should be the average interest rate on mar-
ketable Treasury securities of a maturity, similar to the maximum life of the investment fund. For direct
equity investments, the discount rate should be the average interest rate on marketable Treasury securities
of a maturity similar to the equity investment, based on an estimated date of the sale or other disposal of
the equity.

These relatively small changes to accounting procedures/risk provisioning will produce large, practical re-
wards, freeing up more money to reinvest in future projects.

12 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

 u Recommendation 5: Encourage subordinated debt.

Given the risks sometimes associated with infrastructure projects

in developing countries, it can prove challenging to raise enough
money. Kimberly Heimert, Founder and CEO of the Energy Transi-
tion Advisory Group, points out how pervasive these risks are, not-
ing that “the private sector doesn’t go into these countries because
there are risks that they cannot tolerate or are unable to mitigate.”
Development institutions such as the DFC have an important role to
play here in reducing risks to levels tolerable to investors, especially
in “greenfield” projects.9 DFC involvement in a project can send an
important political signal about the US government’s commitment.
More practically, the way the DFC structures lending can lower risks
to attract investors and lenders.
“The private sector
The DFC is limited in how much private capital it activates if it only doesn’t go into these
provides senior debt that is first in line for repayment in the event
countries because there
of a default. But, as John Greenwood, head of Latin America In-
are risks that they
vestment Banking for Goldman Sachs, notes “the point of blended
finance is to bring in more capital at a reduced cost.” The DFC is cannot tolerate or are
much more likely to attract private capital to fund infrastructure if its unable to mitigate.”
loans are subordinated to the private loans, rather than if it insists
KIMBERLY HEIMERT Founder and
on being senior. CEO, Energy Transition Advisory Group

While subordinated debt is, by definition, riskier than senior debt,

that economic risk can be offset by proper pricing. Properly priced
subordinated lending can allow the DFC to activate more private
investment while continuing its track record of regularly returning
money to taxpayers.

Congress should provide the DFC with greater leeway to offer

subordinated debt. The BUILD Act now permits the DFC to issue
subordinated debt with “a substantive policy rationale.”10 It should
be amended so the DFC’s board is permitted to determine circum-
stances in which it may issue subordinated debt. The board, then,
should adopt a resolution that authorizes and encourages the is- “The point of blended
suance of subordinated debt, particularly in instances in which the finance is to bring in
DFC also holds senior debt that grants legal rights that permit it to
more capital at a
take action if a project is not being completed or operated in a man-
ner that will achieve the intended development.
reduced cost.”
JOHN GREENWOOD
Offering subordinated debt will help raise the capital needed to Head of Latin America Investment Banking,
invest more widely around the world. Goldman Sachs

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 13

 Recommendation 6: Allow private participation
u 
in DFC loans.

Having a US government agency involved in a project helps build

investor confidence. Peter Corsell, partner at I Squared Capital,
notes that “a great amplification effect can occur when [govern-
ments] originate loans.” When the DFC takes the lead, it sends an
important signal to the private market.

A more direct way to involve private sector investors at a lower

risk to them is for the DFC to “sell down” performing loans. Proj-
ects that have reached completion and comply with the negoti-
ated terms are attractive to private capital. The DFC should have
“A great amplification greater freedom to sell a stake in these projects to interested in-
effect can occur vestors. This would free up commitments that could be deployed
when [governments] to originate additional lending.
originate loans.” While the DFC has the authority to sell its loans, it is disincentiv-
PETER CORSELL Partner at ized because of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA),11
I Squared Capital which requires any loan to be rescored when it is sold. Because
of the relatively low cost of capital for the DFC, FCRA will almost

(thelamephotographer / Shutterstock)

14 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

always see the sale of a project loan as a loss as the sale price for the loan participation is adjusted to reflect
the private sector’s higher cost of capital. Yet this loss is illusionary to the extent that DFC’s lending capac-
ity is not unlimited. Given FCRA treatment, the sale would require an allocation of the DFC’s appropriated
credit subsidy to cover the difference. We recommend that the DFC’s board request an additional credit
subsidy for this purpose and that Congress should consider it.

Having greater leeway to sell down performing loans would encourage more private sector involvement
while freeing up DFC capacity to support additional projects.

Sharper Strategic Focus

Investing overseas is an important instrument in the US’s broader foreign policy toolkit—one that can be
used to advance US interests and bolster peace, stability, and security around the world. As noted above,
strategic investments include a diversity of projects, including ensuring that foreign ports are accessible
during periods of geopolitical stress, that telecommunications empowers instead of controls, and that crit-
ical mineral supply chains are resilient. US engagement also helps build local institutions that strengthen
the rule of law and promote the US’s ideals of free and open societies.

To achieve US strategic objectives, the DFC needs greater leeway in where it spends money around the
world. We recommend the following reform:

u Recommendation 7: Expand the list of nations eligible for investment.

The DFC faces constraints on where it can lend not just because of perceived risks but because some
countries are deemed ineligible because of DFC’s development criteria. The bulk of the DFC’s work is ap-
proved for low- and lower-middle income countries as defined by World Bank lending categories. According
to the latest figures, 80 countries fit one of those two classifications.12 The DFC may lend to upper mid-
dle-income countries under certain circumstances, but there are approximately 100 countries around the
world ineligible for DFC project funds without special exception.13

Some of America’s main competitors, including China, face no such restrictions. To the contrary, one-third
of participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative are upper-middle income countries. This ability to invest in
relatively wealthier nations gives competing development agencies a competitive advantage over the DFC.

The DFC’s selection criteria should be amended to better align with World Bank Group standards. Specifi-
cally, any country should be eligible for DFC project lending if it is also eligible for the World Bank’s Interna-
tional Development Association lending to the world’s poorest developing nations or its International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development that lends to middle-income countries. This would somewhat widen
the DFC’s reach and reflect the reality that there are strong strategic reasons to support infrastructure
investments in these middle-income nations. DFC involvement would still need to augment private sector
resources by mobilizing private capital that would otherwise not deploy without such support.

Expanding the list would help reach countries at both ends of the development spectrum. The US should
not ignore opportunities where competing countries are taking advantage.

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 15

Moving Forward
The DFC’s upcoming reauthorization in October 2025 is already generating conversations about the agency’s
size and scope. Amid the world’s ongoing political and economic turmoil, now is the time to expand US support
for foreign investment. The DFC should be emboldened to make deeper commitments to foreign infrastructure
projects, which have already shown themselves to be win-win. Investing strategically abroad generates bene-
fits to host markets, it opens new opportunities for US businesses, and it helps strengthen the diplomatic ties
that bring America’s allies closer together in common cause. Best of all, these benefits come at no cost to US
taxpayers because the projects have consistently shown a collective return on DFC’s financings.

Given the benefits, the only question is: Why aren’t we doing more? The US Government has a chance to
increase the DFC’s role in catalyzing private infrastructure investment abroad. To do so, the initial phases of
investment must be faster and easier to use. Lending must be structured in ways that incentivize private
participation. And we need to focus sharply on investments with strategic benefits by giving the DFC great-
er leeway in the countries where it operates.

The above recommendations advance these goals—and help ensure long-term peace and prosperity.

(Travel mania / Shutterstock)

16 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

Endnotes
1 “DFC’s Global Portfolio Surpasses $40 Billion Across More Than 100 Countries.” Development Finance
Corporation Media Release, December 13, 2023.

2 Xie, John. “China’s Global Network of Shipping Ports Reveal Beijing’s Strategy.” Voice Of America¸
September 13, 2021. See also: Sly, Liv and Julia Ledur. “China has acquired a global network of strategically
vital ports.” Washington Post, November 6, 2023.

3 See Section 1413(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the BUILD Act of 2018.

4 Unlike a typical corporate board, the DFC’s membership consists mainly of political leaders with other appointed
roles. The members include the Secretaries of States, Treasury, and Commerce, and the Administrator of USAID,
with the Secretary of State serving as chair.

5 Parks, B. C., Malik, A. A., Escobar, B., Zhang, S., Fedorochko, R., Solomon, K., Wang, F., Vlasto, L.,
Walsh, K. & Goodman, S. 2023. Belt and Road Reboot: Beijing’s Bid to De-Risk Its Global Infrastructure Initiative.
Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.

6 See Section 107(b) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023.

7 This is consistent with the DFC’s latest request in its Congressional Budget Justification for FY2024 (see page 5).

8 US Government Accountability Office. “Credit Reform: Current Method to Estimate Credit Subsidy Costs Is
More Appropriate for Budget Estimates Than a Fair Value Approach.” Report to Subcommittee on Financial
Services and General Government, January 2016.

9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Infrastructure Financing Instruments and Incentives.”
Report on Public and Private Pensions, 2015.

10 See Section 1442(b)(12) of the BUILD Act of 2018.

11 See Section 504 of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.

12 Exactly 80 countries had per capita incomes under $4,465 a year, which is the current World Bank cap on
lower-middle income. Full lists are available via the World Bank Country and Lending Groups charts.

13 A complete list of ineligible countries, including the relevant exceptions, can be found on the DFC’s
“Where We Work” list (https://www.dfc.gov/what-we-offer/work-with-us/where-we-work).

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 17

REPORTS FROM WORKING GROUPS

Unleashing Opportunity by
Unlocking Private Investment
in International Infrastructure

The Wilson Center’s Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition (WISC) launched a
study group comprising leaders in the financial sector who explored how to close the
multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure funding gap in emerging markets and developing
economies (EMDE).

There are a variety of ways Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks
(MDBs) can activate private capital support for EMDE infrastructure investments. The traditional focus has
been on transaction-level mobilization from commercial banks and equity investors, along with balance
sheet mobilization by issuing bonds. There is even greater opportunity to mobilize capital at scale from in-
stitutional investors. The study group offers the following recommendations to bolster global opportunities,
strengthen the rule of law, and expand American exports to advance US national security and foreign policy
objectives. Most recommendations can be enacted by MDB/DFIs without further authority. Admini­strative
or legislative action may help enable and encourage those recommendations marked with an *.

Transactional-Level Mobilization from

Commercial Banks and Equity Investors
■ Capital Treatment. Instituting higher required capital levels following the 2007-08 financial crisis
led to a scaling back in commercial EMDE lending. Uncertainty regarding pending increases in
capital standards inhibits expanded lending. In addition to clarity and stability in regulations, clear
guidance on preferable capital treatment for infrastructure lending when in tandem with DFIs and
MDBs would unlock additional leading.*
■ Longer Tenors. Higher capital and liquidity requirements mean commercial banks have less appe-
tite for longer-tenure lending. MDB/DFIs providing tenors that are much longer than commercial
tranches, with a principal grace period during the commercial tranche period, would activate
greater bank lending.
■ Streamline Reviews. Streamlining environmental reviews to avoid the need for multiple reviews
of a single project would make EMDE investments more attractive, as would expediting the
approval process.
■ Offset Costs of Higher Standards. US contractors typically have much higher standards, making
their overall bids higher cost and therefore less competitive. Grant funding to offset such higher
costs would enhance competitiveness of US offerings and interest in participation by US entities.*

18 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

 ■ Government agencies should redouble efforts to encourage procurement processes that incorpo-
rate the benefits of high standards.
■ Enhance Tools for Addressing Currency Risk. Enhancing the ability to mitigate currency risks is a
primary avenue to greater activation of private investment. Helping countries develop programs
that offer a currency swap from the government is one option. Another is MDB/DFIs issuing
greater local currency bonds to enable them to de-risk projects through increased local currency
lending while also developing local capital markets. Funding and risk participation agreements
from local institutions could be another route to channel local liquidity into infrastructure invest-
ments in the local currency.
■ Expand and Broaden Risk Coverage. Increasing insured coverage of debt to 100% (assuming
equity participates in project risk) would attract broader private participation.* Coverage could re-
duce over time if certain conditions are met and lenders gain comfort in the external risk factors.
First-loss tranches and credit enhancements or liquidity lines to limit risks related to the level of
toll-paying traffic on a transportation project or the solvency of the entity contracting to consume
energy from an energy project can activate greater private participation.* Including products and
services from allied countries in Export-Import Bank country-of-origin requirements would better
position allied action.

Mobilization from Institutional Investors

■ Lender of Record Structure. Greater use of a model the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
Inter American Development Bank (IDB) and other MDB/DFIs call B Loans or Bonds could better
tap the institutional market. Once an MDB/DFI originates a loan, it remains the lender of record,
retaining a portion (the A Loan) and selling participations in the remainder to investors. This gives
comfort to investors because the borrower cannot default on them without also defaulting on an
MDB/DFI. Investors also find value in having the MDB/DFI monitor and report on environmental
and social impacts.
■ Portfolios of Loans. MDB/DFIs bundling loans into portfolios and then selling participation in the
portfolio to investors allows investors to diversify risk. Even if some assets don’t perform, the
larger portfolio of assets can still deliver an attractive return. It is more efficient to de-risk assets
(including through concessional blended finance) at the portfolio level rather than in individual
transactions. Portfolios could be tailored to target areas of investor appetite. Maintaining a pipe-
line of opportunities would enhance investor interest.
■ Assuming Construction Period Risk. MDB/DFIs helping investors manage the construction and
early operational, regulatory, environmental, and social risks of greenfield infrastructure projects
would attract more investors.
■ Enhance Infrastructure Asset Class. Standardizing MDB/DFI assets and adopting a common,
market-based credit risk rating for MDB/DFI loans would facilitate securing them and selling them
to investors.

To learn more, contact Mark Kennedy at Mark.Kennedy@wilsoncenter.org or visit the Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition at www.wilsoncenter.org/WISC

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 19

REPORTS FROM WORKING GROUPS

Investing in Infrastructure Bolsters

a More Stable, Free and Open World

The Wilson Center’s Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition, or WISC, launched a
working group to explore how America can be a catalyst for greater private investment
that supports international development and climate action to ensure global stability,
but also leads to a free and open environment for individuals and countries alike. This
led to a focus on ensuring trusted and secure communications, free and open maritime
transportation systems, and open access to critical minerals.

Even with the creation of the US International Development Finance Corporation, or DFC, the US needs to
prioritize international infrastructure investment. The US provides significantly less financing for international
infrastructure (adjusted for economic scale) than development finance institutions from Europe and Japan.
It greatly trails the level of support provided by China. The working group offers the following recommenda-
tions to bolster global opportunities and the rule of law, while expanding American exports and influence.

Shape a Free and Open Environment

for Private Investment in Infrastructure
Emerging nations need more US support to better balance the perceived “faster or cheaper” alternative
compared to US offerings with greater attention to environmental impacts, skills transfer to local workforces,
transparency, financial sustainability, and product quality.

Recommendations:
■ Strengthen existing tools. Build on the success of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
and empower the agency with new tools such as modifying the candidate country pool, provid-
ing gift authority for MCC so that it can leverage existing funds to get other donors to co-fund
infrastructure investments, and creating a new authority for compacts with countries who are
considered a foreign policy and national security priority.
■ Target added investment and tax treaties. The US should explore opportunities to define where
additional bilateral investment and tax treaties would be most helpful to advance national strate-
gic priorities.

Achieve Environmental Reviews

without Advantaging Low-Standard Competitors
The added cost and time delay of completing environmental reviews puts US proposals at a disadvantage
over low-standard competitors. Conducting separate environmental reviews for multiple US government
agencies is particularly onerous. Recommendations to mitigate this disincentive while achieving high stan-
dards more efficiently are:

20 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

 ■ Cover environmental review costs with grant or equity. Making the host country pay the cost of
environmental reviews puts high standard offerings at a competitive disadvantage vs. nations
not requiring them. Designating grant funds or equity to cover these expenses would make DFC
more competitive.
■ Single environmental review. Just as the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 “designates a single
lead federal agency to coordinate with participating federal agencies and supervise the prepara-
tion of a single environmental document,” such alignment should occur with international infra-
structure investment efforts.

Organize to Ensure Free and Open Global Commerce

To bolster the effectiveness of the DFC and allied development finance institutions to ensure trusted and
secure communications, free and open maritime transportation systems, and open access to critical min-
erals, the working group offers these recommendations:
■ Create DFC priority interests directorate. Add a new directorate, including appropriate authorities,
to address national priorities. This directorate would be staffed with those aligned primarily to
address security and supply chain resilience objectives.
■ Serve a wider range of nations. To better address strategic competition, the US should broaden
the number of nations in which the DFC can operate, modeling expanded authority off the Millen-
nium Challenge Corporation Candidate Country Reform Act.
■ Encourage greater collaboration with allied financial institutions. The DFC should better coordi-
nate with like-minded development finance institutions and multilateral development banks.

Calibrate Micro and Macro Risk

so DFC can Activate More Private Investment
To enhance the DFC’s ability to activate private investment, the working group recommends:
■ Define preapproved categories/countries. To facilitate quicker action on priority areas, streamline
approvals for a predefined set of project/country combinations with certain exemptions.
■ Treat equity more favorably. Create a revolving fund at the DFC for equity investments, with invest-
ment returns flowing directly back to that DFC fund. Alternatively, use a “net present value” basis
■ for valuing equity.
■ Authorize use of subordinated debt and first loss grants. The DFC must be able to prudently
use subordinated debt and first loss grants to be able to activate the level of private investment
required to meet global and national goals.
Embracing needed reforms can activate greater investment, not only bolstering opportunities for countries
around the world and the rule of law, but also expanding American exports and increasing economic prosperity.

To learn more, contact Mark Kennedy at Mark.Kennedy@wilsoncenter.org or visit the Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition at www.wilsoncenter.org/WISC

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 21

REPORTS FROM WORKING GROUPS

Empowering Development Finance

Corporation for Greater Impact

The Wilson Center’s Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition (WISC) launched a
study group comprising legal professionals with extensive development finance expe-
rience, which explored how to close the multi-trillion-dollar infrastructure funding gap
in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDE). It focused on providing more
authori­ties to the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the US gov-
ernment’s development finance institution (DFI). The study group offers the follow­ing
recommendations that would empower DFC to make a greater impact.

Ensure Continued, Effective Operations and Relationships

As a unique and essential provider of international financial services, DFC must be highly responsive to the
private sector and, on a continual basis, must originate a steady pipeline of projects to effectively fulfill its
mission of mobilizing private sector capital and skills to achieve economic development goals and foreign
policy objectives. Unlike other DFIs, DFC must be responsive to US government policy considerations. For
optimal working relationships with borrowers and investors, the DFC must continue to invest in their board
and skilled staff, in particular focusing on retaining and cultivating specialized backgrounds, expertise, and
skills necessary to effectively assess risks of complex and consequential transactions. It also needs the
ability to avoid gaps in leadership–both career and political.

Modify board structure. Modify DFC’s board membership to closely resemble the board of The Export-Im-
port Bank of the US (ExIm Bank). The board should have five permanent members, consisting of the CEO
and the members currently set forth in Section 1413(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the BUILD Act, and should require all
voting members to have significant EMDE finance expertise. To ensure a degree of connectivity with poli-
cymakers, political leaders should serve in ex officio roles, as they do with the EXIM Bank.

Improve the ability to recruit and retain skilled professionals. The private sector highly compensates
those with the financial and legal skills necessary to effectively process and complete transactions that
mobilize private capital with an appropriate balance of risk and reward. To recruit and retain financial pro-
fessionals and lawyers with the necessary skills, DFC should have authorizations similar to Section 4802
of the Pay Parity Act of 2002 with respect to the SEC, so that it may attract and retain employees with the
necessary background and expertise to carry out its mission.

22 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

Prioritize Mobilizing Private Sector Capital
Mobilizing more private sector capital in high-risk EMDE countries requires that DFC is authorized to use
a full set of financing tools that will help to reduce risk to a level that is still significant, but acceptable to
private lenders and equity investors. The risk-averse nature of DFC’s current authorization limits the private
capital it can mobilize.

Comply with Congressional intent on guarantees. Congress should clarify that, notwithstanding OMB
Circular A-129, loan guaranties can be issued for up to 100% of the amount of loans, provided that other
parties bear a risk of loss in the project equal to at least 20% of the amount of the loan guaranty.

Encourage subordinated debt. DFC is limited in how much private capital it activates if it only provides
senior debt that is first in line for repayment in the event of a default. It also needs to offer subordinated
debt, which allows senior creditors to be paid first. Provision of such debt would require high pricing, but
should not require policy justification.

Allow private sector investors to participate in DFC loans. Allocate credit subsidy to encourage the sell-
down of DFC’s performing loans, which would enhance its ability to mobilize private capital.

Treat equity more favorably. Create a revolving fund at the DFC for equity investments, with investment
returns flowing directly back to that DFC fund. Additionally, use a “net present value” basis for scoring such
investments, with a discount-rate term equal to the term of the fund or the reasonable estimate of the date
that such investment will be sold.

Reduce Time from Project Submission to Project Approval

Align board approval threshold to current scale. Adjusting the threshold required for board approval for
loans, loan guaranties, and political risk insurance to $150 million to reflect the greater liability limits of the
DFC would streamline approval for many projects. All projects not going to the board would still need to
be approved both by credit professionals and the senior leadership team comprised of political appointees.

Accept IFC environmental reviews. The DFC should interpret the BUILD Act to require it, when re-
quested by the borrower, to accept the International Finance Corporation’s environmental reports and
contractual language.

Simplify collateral for smaller loans. Encourage that loans and loan guaranties under $20 million be
secured only with a pledge of shares. Obtaining additional collateral on such loans is costly, even though
action against such collateral is rarely exercised because the costs of obtaining and enforcing such security
generally exceed any reasonable recovery.

READ THE FULL PAPER ONLINE:

To learn more, contact Mark Kennedy at Mark.Kennedy@wilsoncenter.org or visit the Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition at www.wilsoncenter.org/WISC

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 23

Acknowledgements
This report represents the work of a dedicated team. Ammar A. Malik of William & Mary’s AidData project
provided additional data. Ken McConnellogue offered thoughtful, detailed feedback.

Most of all, we wish to thank the members of each Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition working
group. Involvement in the working group does not constitute each participant endorsing each recom-
mendation listed in the individual working groups, nor the contents of this publication. Their input was
invaluable in providing insights from those with intimate knowledge of international infrastructure. The
Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition of the Wilson Center is grateful for their contribution.

Members of the working group for: Investing in Infrastructure Bolster a More Stable, Free and Open World

Flaronica Allen Executive Assistant, Office of the CEO, Wilson Center

Alex Botting Senior Director of International Cybersecurity Services, Venable LLP;
Global Fellow, Wilson Center
US Navy Vice Admiral (retired) Mike Franken Center for Naval Analyses
Benjamin Gedan –Director of the Latin America Program, Wilson Center
Bella Grabowski Government Affairs Manager, Intelsat
Suhail Khan Director of External Affairs, Microsoft
Marie Lam-Frendo CEO, Global Infrastructure Hub
Seth Levey Head of US Government Relations, Glencore
Rory Linehan Director of Engagement, Global Infrastructure Hub
Lucas Myers Senior Associate for the Southeast Asia, Asia Program, Wilson Center
Leila Ndiaye Senior Vice President, Business Strategy and Government Affairs, Cybastion
Tom Plofchan Chief Investment Officer, Pangiam; former Intelligence Counselor to the
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security
Bruna Santos Director of the Brazil Institute, Wilson Center
Pierce Scranton –Steering Committee Member of the Wahba Institute for Strategic
Competition, Wilson Center
Ambassador (retired) John Simon Former US ambassador to the African Union and
Executive Vice President of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); Founding
Partner of Total Impact Capital

Members of the working group for: Empowering Development Finance Corporation for Greater Impact

Amy Bailey Attorney Specializing in International Finance and Private Equity;

former Associate General Counsel, Development Finance Corporation
Julien Blanchard Columbia Law School
Peter F. Fitzgerald Of Counsel, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP; former Associate General
Counsel for Finance and former Associate General Counsel for Insurance, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation
Kimberly Heimert Founder and CEO, Energy Transition Advisory Group; former General
Counsel and Vice President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Laura Hills Partner, Hills Stern & Morley LLP; former Associate General Counsel for Finance,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation

24 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

Members of the working group for: Unleashing Opportunity by Unlocking Private Investment
in International Infrastructure

Amer Bisat – Managing Director, Head of Emerging Markets Fixed Income, BlackRock
William Campbell – General Counsel, I Squared Capital
Peter Corsell – Global InfraTech Fund Partner, I Squared Capital
John Greenwood – Co-Head of Structured Finance, Goldman Sachs
Michael Kumar – Global Head of Project, Commodity and Infrastructure Finance, Mor-
gan Stanley
Zahid Riaz Qureshi
Gabriel Sod Hoffs

Submarine communications cables covered with feather hydroids, Yucatan, Mexico, 2012
(Mayumi.K.Photography / Shutterstock)

WAHBA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC COMPETITION | 25

About the Authors
Hon. Mark Kennedy Dr. Jeffrey Kucik (Ph.D. Emory
(US Congress, 2001-07 MN), ’10) is an Associate Professor
Director of the Wilson Center’s of Politics and Law at the
Wahba Institute for Strategic University of Arizona specializing
Competition, also serves as in political risk, trade law, and
an appointed Civic Leader foreign investment. He is a
supporting the Secretary of Global Fellow at the Wahba
the Air Force and as President Emeritus of the Institute for Strategic Competition. Kucik
University of Colorado. Mark applies experiences previously directed programs at the City College
as a first-generation college graduate, corporate of New York and University College London.
executive, presidentially appointed member of He was also Fellow at the Niehaus Center for
the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Globalization and Governance at Princeton
Negotiations, founder of the Economic Club of University. He has advised government agencies
Minnesota and author of an Ivy League published and industry associations in the United States,
book. He has engaged wide cross-sections of Canada, Europe, and Asia.
society in over 45 countries, including refugee
camps, war zones, 50 military bases and three
aircraft carriers at sea.

About the Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition

The Wilson Center established the Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition to shape conversations
and inspire meaningful action to strengthen the technological, economic and infrastructure underpin-
nings required for America and its allies to deter aggression and secure the rules-based order. Key prior-
ities include promoting infrastructure finance, trade, and a shock-free energy transition. By focusing on
how to strengthen and capitalize on America’s many advantages alongside allies and partners, the Wah-
ba Institute for Strategic Competition seeks to help chart the path to peace and prosperity. The Wahba
Institute for Strategic Competition’s core constituencies include Members of Congress and senior
staffers, the current administration, government agencies, the private sector, and academia.

26 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

About the Wilson Center
Chartered by Congress, the Wilson Center provides nonpartisan counsel and insights on global affairs to
policymakers through deep research, impartial analysis, and independent scholarship. The Wilson Center
brings fresh thinking and deep expertise to the most pressing policy challenges we face today. We convene
scholars to create a global dialogue of ideas that Congress, the administration, and the international policy
community can act on. In 2019, the Wilson Center was named the #1 regional studies think tank in the world.

Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals
or organizations that provide financial support to the Center.

Please visit us online at www.wilsoncenter.org.

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Lecturer of Laws, New York University
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and Development Agency

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28 | ACTIVATING AMERICAN INVESTMENT OVERSEAS FOR A FREER, MORE OPEN WORLD

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