Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Volume 11
Issue 3 Spring 2011: Trade, Investment, and Article 6
Sustainable Development

Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas

Sector: A Survey of Environmentally Relevant
Clauses
Kyla Tienhaara

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Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tienhaara, Kyla. "Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector: A Survey of Environmentally Relevant Clauses." Sustainable
Development Law & Policy 11, no. 3 (2011): 15-20, 39-40.

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Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil
& Gas Sector:
A Survey of Environmentally Relevant Clauses*
by Kyla Tienhaara**

Introduction regulation: the foreign investment contracts signed between

T
he Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in IOCs (or consortiums of IOCs) and host states, which allocate
2010, which resulted in the largest ever accidental marine rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons within an area of
oil spill,1 was a stark reminder of the environmental land (or an offshore block) over a fixed period of time.
risks posed by the oil and gas industry. Although disasters on In a 1994 monograph, Zhiguo Gao noted that environmen-
this scale are fortunately rare, the average oil and gas operation tal issues had “not received enough attention” in the oil and gas
has many other commonplace, yet significant, environmental contracts he had reviewed.12 His conclusion raises the question
impacts throughout its lifespan. Environmental issues begin with of whether environmental issues have received greater atten-
exploration activities—seismic tests, used to locate petroleum, tion in more recent oil and gas contracts (i.e. those negotiated
often disturb local wildlife—and carry on to the end of the pro- and signed in the last fifteen years). This question is difficult to
duction phase when facilities must be dismantled and disposed answer, not least because foreign investment contracts gener-
of.2 The everyday operation of many offshore petroleum instal- ally are not disclosed to the public.13 Many governments’ model
lations involves the discharge of oil-contaminated “produced agreements are publicly available,14 but it should be noted that
water,” drill cuttings and mud, and production chemicals.3 these models may be substantially altered or ignored altogether
Onshore, land clearing for base camps, helipads, roads, pipe- in the negotiation of actual contracts.15
lines, waste disposal sites, and other facilities has a considerable In this article, sample clauses from forty-one upstream oil
ecological impact.4 Furthermore, the industry is a significant and gas contracts (both onshore and offshore) covering thirty-
contributor to air pollution and a major emitter of greenhouse five countries and the period 1994-2008 were reviewed. Four-
gases. In 2008, thirty-two companies in the International Asso- teen of the contracts were models.16 An effort was made to
ciation of Oil and Gas Producers (“OGP”) reported emissions of find the most up-to-date model contracts, as governments peri-
296 million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide, 2.1 million odically revise them. However, it should be noted that some of
tonnes of methane, 1.1 million tonnes of non-methane volatile the models were undated. The twenty-seven signed contracts
organic compounds, 366 thousand tonnes of sulfur dioxide, and reviewed were from twenty-six different countries17 and had an
827 thousand tonnes of nitrous oxides.5 average signature date of 1999. Some of contracts in the sample
The industry faces increasingly strict environmental stan- are available on the Internet, either because governments have
dards in developed countries such as the United States and the chosen to release them or because they have been leaked to non-
United Kingdom.6 However, the majority of the world’s proven governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have subsequently
oil reserves are in developing countries and economies in transi- published them. Others are available in company filings to the
tion, which often lack sophisticated regimes for environmental U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
protection.7 Even when legislative frameworks are well devel- Given the small number of contracts that were reviewed, and
oped, there are often deficiencies in capacity and an unwilling- the great variety of clauses that were encountered, nothing can be
ness to monitor and enforce environmental regulation.8 There is, extrapolated from this preliminary survey about the frequency
furthermore, no comprehensive global convention on the envi- with which any particular type of clause is likely to appear in oil
ronmental impacts of petroleum exploration and production.9 and gas contracts. Furthermore, in any given situation, a contract
Although a number of multilateral and regional agreements should be considered within the broader context of a country’s
cover certain aspects of the industry, they require adoption into petroleum law, environmental law, and other domestic legisla-
domestic legislation to have a direct effect on international oil tion. The purpose of the article is not to provide a full picture of
companies (“IOCs”).10 environmental regulation of petroleum operations in individual
Apart from domestic and international law, one could also
look at conditions attached to loans and investment insurance, * A lengthier version of this article was published in the online journal Oil, Gas
as well as voluntary corporate social responsibility codes as and Energy Law Intelligence in September 2010.
sources of environmental standards for the petroleum industry.11 ** Co-Director of the Climate and Environmental Governance Network and
However, the intent of this article is to shine a light on a much Research Fellow at the Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National
less studied and poorly understood domain of environmental University.

15 Sustainable Development Law & Policy

countries, but instead to draw attention to how contracts can still in its infancy and it may be inadequate in some situations.27
either bolster or undermine environmental protection efforts. As such, reference in contracts to domestic legislation alone may
be undesirable. In any event, it would appear that parties rarely
Types of Foreign Investment Contracts adopt this form. A contract from Peru28 and one from Algeria29
There are three main types of foreign investment contracts were the only contracts in the sample that referred solely to
in the upstream oil and gas sector: (1) concessions or licenses; domestic environmental legislation.
(2) production sharing contracts (or agreements) (“PSCs” or In several of the contracts in the sample, the parties instead
“PSAs”); and (3) risk-service contracts. In addition, all three included a reference to international industry standards and
may be subject to association or joint-venture agreements.18 failed to mention the application of domestic environmen-
Under concession contracts and licenses, IOCs are often given tal law.30 The advantage from an environmental perspective
exclusive rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and in of referring to international industry standards is that in some
return are required to pay royalties, taxes, and fees to the govern- cases, they may be higher than, or cover specific issues not
ment.19 In a PSC, the IOC has similar rights, but obtains only addressed in, domestic legislation. Furthermore, reference to
“cost oil” and a share of any “profit oil” produced, with the state international standards allows some scope for change and evolu-
recouping the remainder in lieu of, or sometimes in addition to, tion of the environmental management regime of an investment
collecting royalties.20 The IOC also pays taxes and fees.21 Under over time, thus providing a way around a contractual require-
a risk-service contract the IOC explores for and produces petro- ment for stability, as will be discussed below. However, there are
leum on behalf the government and is paid a fee for its services, serious problems with referring only to industry standards, given
with a possible right to buy a portion of the production.22 Asso- their inherent ambiguity. The terminology “good oilfield prac-
ciation or joint venture agreements involve IOCs partnering with tices”31 or “good production practices”32 is frequently employed
host governments or state-owned enterprises and, as in a PSC, in environmental standards clauses, as well as in other types of
sharing petroleum production.23 provisions discussed further below, but these phrases are seldom
In practice, these forms and labels tend to be much less defined.33 A 2002 Cambodian contract provides a rare example
important than the specific content of a contract. 24 However, of a definition:
one relevant difference is that unlike a typical concession, an Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards
IOC’s costs are generally recoverable under a PSC in the form and practices, and exercise of that degree of skill, pru-
of “cost oil.” 25 If costs associated with remediating and com- dence and foresight that would reasonably be expected
pensating for environmental harm are “cost recoverable,” then of persons carrying out international petroleum opera-
the host government, not the IOC, would assume the risk of such tions, and adherence to generally accepted standards of
costs.26 A similar issue may arise with risk-service contracts and the international petroleum industry, including sound
even with concessions that have royalty rates that are somehow environmental provisions.34
indexed to costs. It is not at all clear where exactly one should look for “gen-
erally accepted standards” as there are a multitude of potential
Environmental Standards Clauses
sources. For example, members of the American Petroleum Insti-
Most, though not all, of the oil and gas contracts reviewed tute (“API”) “pledge” to manage their businesses according to a
contained a section on the environmental standards to be applied set of eleven environmental principles.35 However, the majority
to the project. In this regard, there are five general forms that of these principles are imprecise, such as the commitment “to
contracts appear to follow: reduce overall emission and waste generation.”36 The API also
(i) reference to domestic environmental law only; has guidelines for environmental protection in both onshore
(ii) reference to international industry standards only; and offshore oil and gas operations, although they are not freely
(iii) reference to both domestic law and international available to the public.37 Other potential sources include guide-
industry standards; lines produced by the previously mentioned OGP,38 the Austra-
(iv) reference to domestic law and/or industry lian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association,39 as well
standards and international environmental as bodies such as the International Organization for Standard-
agreements; or ization (“ISO”).40 As Wawryk notes, the existence of so many
(v) development of project-specific environmental guidelines in the petroleum industry makes it impossible to point
standards. to one that can definitively be considered “good” practice and
Some reference to domestic environmental legislation is furthermore the “actual practices of international oil companies .
clearly desirable from a public policy perspective. Domestic . . vary from company to company and, for one company, across
standards have been developed (in most cases) under a demo- jurisdictions . . . making it difficult to identify the best practices
cratic system of rule, have often been designed with local envi- actually in use.”41
ronmental conditions in mind, are familiar to the agencies that The majority of contracts reviewed for this article contained
are tasked with monitoring and enforcement, and are in the pub- reference to both domestic environmental law and international
lic domain. However, as noted previously, in many developing industry standards. In most cases, there was no mention of how
countries environmental regulation of the oil and gas sector is these two sources of standards would be reconciled in the event

Spring 2011 16
of a conflict. However, in some contracts a form of hierarchy was on Ecology and Control over the Use of Natural Resources will
established. For example, Article 21.1 of Brazil’s 2001 Model jointly agree on a set of safety and environmental standards
Concession Contract indicates that industry standards are only based on “(i) international petroleum industry standards and
intended to act as a supplement to domestic legislation: experience with their implementation in exploration and pro-
The Concessionaire shall adopt, at its own cost and duction operations in other parts of the world and (ii) existing
risk, all the necessary measures for the conservation of Azerbaijan safety and environmental legislation.”48 Once devel-
reservoirs and other natural resources and for the pro- oped, this set of standards can only be altered through a written
tection of the air, soil and water in the surface or in the agreement and if any standards that have not been agreed upon
subsurface, subject to Brazilian legislation and rules are applied to the project, the investor can invoke the contract’s
about environment and, in their absence or lack, adopt- stabilization clause.
ing Oil Industry Best Practice in this regard.42
In contrast, the clause below, from a 1994 Azerbaijani con- Stabilization Clauses
tract, has evidently been adopted to ensure that domestic envi- According to a 2008 study, the use of “stabilization clauses”
ronmental regulation is not more stringent than international in host-government contracts “is widespread across industries
industry standards: and regions of the world.”49 Stabilization clauses come in vari-
Contractor shall comply with present and future Azer- ous forms.50 In their most basic form, they “freeze” the law that
baijani laws or regulations of general applicability with applies to the investment at the time the contract is signed.51 A
respect to public health, safety and protection and res- more nuanced version is often referred to as an “economic equi-
toration of the environment, to the extent that such laws librium” clause, which requires the government to restore the
and regulations are no more stringent than the then balance of risks and rewards established in a contract when it is
current international Petroleum industry standards and upset by a new regulation or tax.52 A stabilization clause can be
practices being at the date of execution of this Contract strictly circumscribed to only cover very specific issues, or the
those shown in Appendix IX, with which Contractor parties to the contract can explicitly “carve out” areas such as
shall comply.43 environmental protection from its application. For example, in a
In addition to domestic law and industry standards, some 1997 contract from Kazakhstan, the stabilization clause contains
oil and gas contracts refer to international environmental agree- the caveat:
ments, although this does not seem to be a common practice. One provided, however, that no amendment to this Agree-
example is Article 6.5 of Liberia’s Model PSC, which states that: ment shall be required hereunder as the result of (i)
“The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum changes to Laws concerning health, safety or environ-
operations in accordance with the Environmental Protection mental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent
and Management Laws of Liberia and all international environ- with international standards for health, safety or envi-
mental practice.”44 It is questionable whether such a sweeping ronmental legislation and are applied on a non-discrim-
reference to international environmental law will have anything inatory basis . . . .53
more than symbolic value. Provisions in multilateral environ- As Lorenzo Cotula notes, this provision is weakened by its
mental agreements are not only typically “soft” in nature; they ambiguous reference to “international standards,”54 but it is still
also generally require adoption in domestic legislation before far preferable to the stabilization clauses found in many con-
they can have any impact on private actors.45 Furthermore, few tracts and even in model agreements that are worded in such a
environmental agreements tackle specific issues concerning the broad manner that they can stifle any future regulation that might
management of petroleum exploration and production. However, be perceived to undermine the profitability of an investment,
there are some treaties covering marine pollution that are rel- including efforts to address corruption, to safeguard human
evant to offshore operations.46 In this respect, Mauritania’s 1994 rights (including labor rights), and to protect the environment.55
Model PSC is less ambiguous in its reference to international
Environmental Impact Assessment Clauses
environmental law, noting in Article 6.6 that:
The Contractor shall take ail [sic] necessary precautions Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) and corre-
to prevent pollution of the marine area of the Explora- sponding management plans have become a staple requirement
tion Perimeter and observe, inter alias, the provisions for investment projects in many sectors.56 Unfortunately, a recent
of the International Convention on the prevention of survey of environmental governance in petroleum producing
petroleum pollution of sea waters signed in London on countries commissioned by the World Bank found that “much
May 12, 1954 and the amendments and texts enacted of the emphasis of the EIA process appears directed towards
for the implementation thereof.47 the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle
The final form of standards clause observed in the sample, approach for minimizing environmental and social impact.”57
although only in one contract, is the development of a proj- An EIA is typically mandated to be completed after a con-
ect-specific environmental regime. A 1996 contract between tract with the state has been signed58 and most of the contracts
Azerbaijan and a consortium of investors stipulates that the con- reviewed for this article contained some reference to the need
tractor, the state-owned oil company, and the State Committee for an EIA. However, the form of the EIA clauses varied widely

17 Sustainable Development Law & Policy

across the sample from a simple note of the existence of a Some of the contracts in the sample were completely silent
requirement,59 to detailed specifications of what the EIA should on the issue of access to natural resources, and a small num-
cover, who should prepare it, when it should be submitted, and ber had more nuanced provisions than those quoted above. For
so forth.60 example, a 1994 contract from Ethiopia states that the contrac-
tor shall “have the right, subject to the approval of the Minister,
Clauses On Access To Protected Areas to use water in the Contract Area for operational purposes, but
Petroleum operations are particularly contentious when the Contractor shall not deprive any land, domestic settlement
they are located, even partially, within wildlife reserves, parks, or livestock watering place of the water supply to which they
or areas of cultural or biological significance.61 NGOs have are accustomed.”67 A 2008 Model PSC from Bangladesh goes a
long argued that such areas should be off limits to the extrac- step further by requiring that the contractor pay for the natural
tive industries,62 but most governments are not ready to forgo resources, such as water, that it utilizes.68
the potential economic opportunities that the exploitation of
these areas offer. This is evident in several of the contracts in the Clauses on Gas Flaring
sample. For example, Article 37.6 of Madagascar’s 2006 Model The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the volume of asso-
Offshore PSC states: ciated gas being flared and vented globally every year was about
In the event that a portion of the Contract Area is 110 billion cubic meters—enough fuel to provide the combined
located within a natural reserve area, the Operator shall annual natural gas consumption of Germany and France.69
deploy the necessary efforts in order to minimize the Although some short-term flaring during testing or in cases of
negative impacts on these natural reserves, in accor- emergencies is accepted as standard practice in the industry, the
dance with generally accepted environmental practices flaring of more substantial amounts of gas is only practiced in
in the international petroleum industry.63 poor countries with limited infrastructure and weak regulatory
This is an incredibly weak provision. A 2004 PSC from institutions.70 Aside from being incredibly wasteful, flaring has a
Uganda is similarly permissive, but it also contains a bizarre significant impact on local air quality and also makes an appre-
caveat: ciable contribution to climate change.71 At the World Summit on
In the event of protest from responsible concerned third Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the World
parties within or outside Uganda regarding the conduct Bank launched a Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative to
of Petroleum Operations in any National Park or Game tackle the problem.72 Despite this development, and widespread
Reserve and the consequent effects upon the environ- condemnation of the practice, flaring continues in many states.
ment or wildlife, the Government and Licensee shall In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP admitted to flaring
meet to determine what if any action should be taken.64 18.6 tonnes of gas for every thousand tonnes of hydrocarbon that
Given that this clause provides nothing more than an obliga- they produced.73
tion for the investor and the government to meet, it is question- Many oil and gas contracts, even recent models, appear to
able why the parties bothered to include it at all. be lenient on the issue of flaring. For example, the Bangladesh
2008 Model PSC notes in Article 15.3 that:
Clauses on Access to Water & Any Associated Natural Gas as is not used under Article
Other Natural Resources 15.1 or Article 15.2 and which Contractor does not con-
Petroleum operations require natural materials in their con- sider possible to recover economically shall be offered
struction phase, and significant amounts of water and electricity to Petrobangla without any payment to Contractor but
throughout their operation. While many operations are self-suffi- at Petrobangla’s cost at the well-head or field facilities
cient in terms of energy supply, other natural resources may need in the Production Area. To the extent that Petrobangla
to be obtained from within or outside the contract area. does not so take any of such Associated Natural Gas,
From an environmental and community rights perspective, Contractor may flare such Associated Natural Gas pro-
as well as from an economic-development perspective, it is dis- vided that such flaring is included in the Development
turbing that many governments appear to focus solely on the Plan submitted under Article 8.10.74
potential revenue that they can obtain from petroleum produc- Although this clause gives priority to utilization of the
tion and are willing to simply give away other valuable natural resource, there is no requirement for the gas to be reinjected
resources under the terms of oil and gas contracts. For example, into the ground if it is not taken by the state-owned enterprise,
Article 27.8 of Mozambique’s 2007 Model concession contract and economic concerns clearly trump environmental ones.75 A
provides for the right of the investor “to drill for and have the free 1997 contract from Indonesia also reflects this position in the
use of water and impound surface waters.”65 A contract from the statement that gas “may be flared if processing and utilization
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is even broader, giving thereof is not economical.”76 Other contracts, such as a 2000
the contractor the right to “freely use sand, water, electricity, and contract from Belize77 and a 1998 contract from Angola,78 allow
any other natural resources located inside or outside the Contract for flaring only if it is authorized by the government. A Ugan-
Area for the Petroleum Operations.”66 dan contract from 2004 also follows this model, but includes the
caveat that the government’s consent “shall not be unreasonably

Spring 2011 18
withheld or delayed.”79 The most stringent clauses, found in only The issue of “what” concerns the types of harms (e.g., only
a few contracts in the sample, restricted flaring to cases of an death or injury or also “damage to the environment”), the period
emergency or for safety reasons.80 in which the harms were caused (i.e. no liability for prior envi-
ronmental damage established in a baseline assessment), and the
Clauses on Responding to Emergencies legal form of the liability (fault, strict, or absolute).89 Finally, on
and Accidents
the issue of to “whom” the contractor is liable, there are typi-
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP reported 2,978 cally two separate issues covered in contracts: liability to the
spills greater than one barrel in size, resulting in the release of state and liability to third parties. 90 In the latter case, the issue is
18,266 tonnes of oil into terrestrial and marine environments.81 not directly one of liability—contracts cannot affect the rights of
In many of the oil and gas contracts in the sample, the parties third parties under national law—but rather one of indemnity.91
have recognized that spills and other accidents and emergencies Through indemnity clauses, IOCs commit to compensate states
have the potential to occur and should be planned for. As such, for any costs incurred resulting from a third-party liability suit.92
as a part or separate from an EIA, an emergency response plan is Most contracts in the sample made specific mention of
often required from the contractor.82 “pollution” or “environmental damage” in liability/indemnity
Some oil and gas contracts also cover three additional ele- clauses and adopted a strict liability approach.93 However, a
ments in respect of emergencies: notification, response, and 2002 Cambodian94 contract provided only for fault liability. The
consequences for failure to respond. In the oil and gas contracts most developed liability/indemnity clause in the sample was
reviewed, notification was limited to the contractor apprising the from a contract signed by Belize in 2000, which required that the
government of the situation, but not the local community or the contractor contribute one tenth of one percent of the value of the
broader public.83 In terms of response, the requirements were gross annual production to a fund managed by the government
often vague (e.g., “take prudent steps”) or simply provided refer- “for the sole purpose of indemnification against any or all envi-
ence to good oilfield practices.84 However, some of the contracts ronmental damages cause during the petroleum operations.”95
in the sample did additionally stipulate that in the event that the An additional issue closely related to liability and indemnity
contractor did not act promptly to respond to an emergency or is the requirement for contractors to have insurance coverage.
accident, the government had the right to mount its own response These clauses often specify that insurance should cover “pollu-
and charge the contractor for expenses that it incurred in doing tion” or “environmental damage.”96 One potential problem with
so. An example is found in a PSC from Ghana: both liability/indemnity and insurance clauses is that the term
If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control, “pollution” is quite narrow and does not cover all of the vari-
clean up or repair any pollution or damage, GNPC ous environmental impacts from oil and gas operations.97 Even
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after references to “environmental damage” could be subject to inter-
giving Contractor reasonable notice in the circum- pretation if not defined in the contract.
stances, take any actions which are necessary, in accor-
dance with accepted Petroleum industry practice and Clauses on Decommissioning & Remediation
the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall When an oil operation reaches the end of production, a
be borne by Contractor and shall, subject to Article number of costly activities must be undertaken. Onshore wells
17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs.85 need to be plugged and structures dismantled, with materials
removed and ultimately recycled or disposed of. Remediation of
Clauses on Liability, Indemnity, & Insurance the local environment (e.g., decontamination and revegetation)
Liability for environmental damage is an increasingly may also be required. Offshore installations present particularly
important issue for the oil industry. The dispute between Chev- complex issues in terms of decommissioning, although it is also
ron and the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon concerning the in this area that international law has its most direct and signifi-
company’s liability for oil pollution is a prime example of why cant impact on the oil and gas industry.98
most modern contracts have express provisions on liability that The extent to which decommissioning is dealt with in con-
cover environmental damage.86 tracts depends somewhat on the contractual relationship between
Issues of liability for environmental damage can be com- the parties and the expected life of the project. Under some
plex, especially when multiple parties, including state-owned arrangements, states retain ownership over production facilities
enterprises, are involved in petroleum production. Contracts, and may continue operations after the termination of the con-
therefore, should have provisions that are explicit about who is tract. However, even in such instances, there may be contractual
to be liable for what and to whom. The issue of “who” depends provisions covering decommissioning of installations that are
somewhat on the form of contract, but generally it is the con- not destined to be taken over by the state.
tractor or concessionaire (the IOC) who will be liable, except in Clauses on decommissioning and remediation found in con-
cases where fault can be directly attributed to the state or state- tracts in the sample were generally lacking in detail. For exam-
owned enterprise.87 If there is more than one contractor involved ple, a 1997 PSC from Benin states:
in the project, then there will likely be a clause that stipulates At the end of the Contract, in any other situation than
that they are jointly and severally liable.88 the abandonment case, the Contractor must take the

19 Sustainable Development Law & Policy

 measures according to the Good Practices of the Oil contracts vis-à-vis environmental protection. The small sample
Industry to restore the environment and the sites where of contracts reviewed in this article indicates that a significant
the Petroleum Operations have been performed to number of clauses covering a variety of issues—from baseline
their original state on the Effective Date of the Con- environmental assessments all the way through to environmental
tract, taking into account the rules of the abandonment remediation—can be found in modern contracts. Given the mon-
procedure.99 umental increase in environmental awareness and the intense
Although this provision appears quite strict, as it sug- scrutiny that the industry has come under in the two decades,
gests that sites should be restored to their “original state,” it is this is unsurprising. What is remarkable is that a handful of con-
weakened by the generic reference to good oilfield practices.100 tracts still resemble those that Gao criticized for having only a
According to a recent World Bank report, the absence of guide- token mention of environmental protection, and that references
lines for what should be included in a decommissioning plan is a to ambiguous terms such as “good oilfield practices” remain so
pervasive problem in petroleum producing countries.101 pervasive.
In addition to an absence of guidelines, there are obviously Further research will be required to build an understand-
strong incentives for some companies to “cut and run” or to con- ing of why there are such wide disparities in contracting prac-
duct only superficial remediation to minimize costs. One method tice between countries. For example, it would be interesting to
for ensuring that decommissioning and remediation are carried explore whether the environmental provisions in oil and gas con-
out to plan is to use a financial mechanism such as a perfor- tracts reflect domestic attention to these issues or if the capac-
mance bond or reserve fund. Tanzania is an example of a country ity of the government to negotiate with IOCs is a more relevant
that has set up such a regime in its 2008 Model PSC.102 factor. Additionally, empirical work is required to determine the
extent to which contract clauses on environmental issues are
Conclusion actually implemented by IOCs and monitored and enforced by
Since Gao’s study was published in 1994,103 there have governments.
been significant changes in the content of upstream oil and gas

Endnotes: Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector

1 Ronen Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil 14 Id. at 38.
Liability, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2011). 15 Id. at 12.
2 Zhiguo Gao, Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas in the Twentieth 16 From the following countries: Angola, Bangladesh, Brazil, Egypt, Equa-

Century and Beyond: An Introduction and Overview, in Environmental Regu- torial Guinea, India, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Pakistan, Tanzania,
lation of Oil and Gas 3, 4-7 (Zhiguo Gao ed., 1998). Timor-Leste, Trinidad & Tobago, and Vietnam.
3 Sergei V. Vingradov & Jay Paul Wagner, International Legal Regime for the 17 Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Cambodia, Cam-

Protection of the Marine Environment Against Operational Pollution from Off- eroon, China, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, India,
shore Petroleum, in Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas 93, 96 (Zhiguo Indonesia, Kazakhstan, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Mongolia, Peru, Russia,
Gao ed., 1998). Senegal, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Uganda, and Venezuela.
4 Amy B. Rosenfeld, Debra L. Gordon & Marianne Guerin-McManus, 18 King & Spalding LLP, An Introduction to Upstream Government Petroleum

Approaches to Minimizing the Environmental and Social Impacts of Oil Devel- Contracts: Their Evolution and Current Use, Oil Gas & Energy Law, Mar.
opment, in Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas 279, 294 (Zhiguo Gao 2005, at 3, http://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=1730.
ed., 1998). 19 See generally Michel Kerf, Concessions for Infrastructure 7 (World Bank,
5 Int’l Ass’n Oil & Gas Producers, Environmental Performance in the Working Paper No. 399, 1998), http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/
E&P Industry 2008 Data 6 (Nov. 2009), http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/429.pdf. concessions_fulltoolkit.pdf.
6 See Gao, supra note 2, at 32-35. 20 See Bernard Taverne, An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petro-
7 Id. at 35-37. leum Industry: Laws, Contracts and Conventions 24, 28 (1994); Thomas W.
8 Kit Armstrong, Managing Environmental Legal Risks in Oil & Gas Explo- Waelde, International Energy Investment, 17 Energy L.J. 191, 200, 202 n.53
ration & Production Activities, in Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (1996).
359, 374-75 (Zhiguo Gao ed., 1998). 21 Taverne, supra note 20, at 27.
9 See Ayesha Dias, The Oil and Gas Industry in the Tangled Web of Environ- 22 Id. at 20-21.

mental Regulation: Spider or Fly?, in Environmental Regulation of Oil and 23 Id. at 133-35.

Gas 59, 63-72 (Zhiguo Gao ed., 1998). 24 Waelde, supra note 20, at 200.
10 See Lawrence L.C. Lee, Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening Interna- 25 Id. at 202, n 53.

tional Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 3-4 (1998) (noting that interna- 26 Taverne, supra note 20, at 24-25.

tional soft law must be adopted into domestic law to be legally binding). 27 Gao, supra note 2, at 35-37.
11 See Jędrzej George Frynas, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and 28 Contract for Hydrocarbon Exploration & Exploitation in the Ucayali

Gas Sector, 2 J. World Energy L. & Bus. 178 (2009); Peter Utting & Kate Basin Between PeruPetro S.A. & Chevron Overseas Petroleum (Peru) Ltd.
Ives, The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and the Oil Industry, 2 St. Anto- (Block 52) (Nov. 8, 1995) (Peru) (on file with the author).
ny’s Int’l Rev. 11 (2006). 29 Contract for the Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons
12 Zhiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and Between BHP Petroleum (Exploration) Inc. and Sonatrach (Boukhechba
New Directions 213 (1994). Area) (May 31, 1997) (Alg.) (on file with the author).
13 See Peter Rosenblum & Susan Maples, Revenue Watch Inst., Contracts
Confidential: Ending Secret Deals in the Extractive Industries 11-14 (2009), Endnotes: Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector
http://www.revenuewatch.org/files/RWI-Contracts-Confidential.pdf. continued on page 39

Spring 2011 20
Transboundary Air Pollution as of 01 March 2011, UN Econ. Comm’n for “break China’s chokehold on the strategic metals crucial to products as diverse
Europe, http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/status/lrtap_st.htm (last visited Apr. 15, as Apple’s iPhone, Toyota’s Prius and Boeing’s smart bombs.”).
2011). 14 Phil Taylor, Nev. Mining Firm Seeks Place in Emerging Lith-
11 Id.; see also INC2, supra note 5. ium Market, N.Y. Times (June 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
12 David Kirby, Made in China: Our Toxic Imported Air Pollution, Discover gwire/2010/06/17/17greenwire-nev-mining-firm-seeks-place-in-emerging-
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://discovermagazine.com/2011/apr/18-made-in-china-our- lithiu-11460.html?pagewanted=1&sq=lithium&st=cse&scp=10.
toxic-imported-air-pollution (“Even as America tightens emission standards, the 15 See Russell, supra note 4.

fast-growing economies of Asia are filling the air with hazardous components 16 Kirby, supra note 12.

that circumnavigate the globe.”). 17 An example of an international legal framework addressing waste manage-
13 Keith Bradsher, Taking a Risk for Rare Earths, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2011, ment includes the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
at B1 (detailing the Malaysian construction of a rare earth element refinery, to of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1653 U.N.T.S. 57.

Endnotes: Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector continued from page 20

30 E.g., the 1994 Cairn Energy Production Sharing Contract Between the 44 Nat’l Oil Co. Of Liberia, Model Production Sharing Contract, art. 6.5
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh & Bangladesh Oil, (2009), http://www.molme.gov.lr/doc/MODEL%20PRODUCTION%20SHAR-
Gas & Mineral Corporation, Cairn Energy PLC and Holland Sea Search ING%20CONTRACT.pdf.
Bangladesh B.V. (Block 16) (1994) (Bangl.) (on file with the author) men- 45 Lee, supra note 10.

tions the applicability of Bangladeshi law to the implementation of the contract 46 See, e.g., Vingradov supra note 3, at 98-115.

generally (art. 28.1), but the article specifically referring to the protection of the 47 Model Production Sharing Contract (1994) (Mauritania), http://

environment only mentions “generally accepted standards of the International resources.revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/MauritaniaContracttypeAngl.pdf.

Petroleum Industry” (art. 10.6). Similarly, the 2000 RSM Production Shar- 48 Shah Deniz PSA Excerpt, Gas Export Project Stage 1 Development,

ing Agreement for Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production Environmental & Socio-economic Impact Assessment, Appendix I art. 26.1
Between Belize and RSM Production Corporation (Area A) (Apr. 3, 2000) (Aug. 2002) (Azer.), http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/
(Belize) (on file with the author) is governed by the laws of Belize (art. 29.1) bp_caspian_en/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/o/SD_English_ESIA_
but the section on environment (art. 23.1) refers only to “standards acceptable Main_ESIA_Content_SD_Appendix_01_-xtract__En_.pdf.
to practices of the International Petroleum Industry.” 49 Andrea Shemberg, Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights, at vii (2008),
31 Ibibia Lucky Worika, Environmental Concepts and Terms in Petroleum http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_StabilizationClauses
Legislation & Contracts: A Preliminary Study, in Environmental Regulation of andHumanRights/$FILE/Stabilization+Paper.pdf.
Oil and Gas 393, 398-401 (Zhiguo Gao ed., 1998). 50 See generally Peter D. Cameron, Ass’n of Int’l Petroleum Negotia-
32 Id. at 401-02. tors, Stabilisation in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host
33 Id. at 402. Countries: Tools for Oil & Gas Investors (2006), http://lba.legis.state.ak.us/
34 Agreement Between The Royal Government of Cambodia, Cambodian sga/doc_log/2006-07-05_aipn_stabilization-cameron_final.pdf; Abdullah Al
National Petroleum Agency, Chevron Overseas Petroleum (Cambodia) Lim- Faruque, The Rationale and Instrumentalities for Stability in Long-Term State
ited, MOECO Cambodia Co. Ltd and Woodside South East Asia Pty. Ltd., Contracts: The Context for Petroleum Contracts (2006) 7 J. World Inv. &
art. 1.2 Definitions (Aug. 15, 2002) (Cambodia) (on file with the author). Trade 85; A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Pursuit of Stability in International
35 Environmental Principles, Am. Petroleum Inst., http://www.api.org/ Energy Investment Contracts: A Critical Appraisal of the Emerging Trends 1 J.
aboutapi/principles/index.cfm (last updated Mar. 7, 2011). World Energy L. & Bus. (2008) 121.
36 Id. 51 Shemberg, supra note 49.
37 E.g., Am. Petroleum Inst., Recommended Practice 51R, Environmental 52 See id. at 17.

Protection for Onshore Oil and Gas Production Operations and Leases (2009), 53 Production Sharing Agreement in Respect of the North Caspian Sea

http://publications.api.org/Exploration-Production.aspx. (Kashagan) among Agip Caspian Sea B.V.; BG Exploration Limited; BP

38 Int’l Ass’n of Oil & Gas Producers, Principles and Guidelines for the Kazakstan Limited; Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap a.s.; Mobil Oil Kazakstan
Oil & Gas Industry, Report No. 6.88/307 (2000), http://www.ogp.org.uk/ Inc.; Shell Kazakstan Development B.V.; Total Exploration Production
pubs/307.pdf. Kazakstan; JSC Kazakstancaspianshelf; The Republic of Kazakstan and JSC
39 Austrl. Petroleum Prod. & Exploration Ass’n, APPEA Code of Envi- National Oil and Gas Company Kazakoil, art 40.2 (Nov. 18, 1997) (Kaz.) (on
ronmental Practice (2008), http://www.appea.com.au/images/stories/Policy_-_ file with the author).
Environment/Code_of_Environmental_Practice.pdf. 54 Lorenzo Cotula, Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Envi-
40 See TC 67–Materials, Equipment and Offshore Structures for Petroleum, ronmental Standards in Investment Contracts: Toward a Rethink of Stabilization
Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries, Int’l Org. for Standardization, Clauses, 1 J. World Energy L. & Bus. 158, 174 (2008).
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/technical_committees/list_of_ 55 See generally id; Kyla Tienhaara, Unilateral Commitments to Investment

iso_technical_committees/iso_technical_committee.htm?commid=49506 (last Protection: Does the Promise of Stability Restrict Environmental Development?
visited Apr. 2, 2011). The Association of International Petroleum Negotiators 17 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 139 (2008).
also considered adopting model environmental clauses and standards for use in 56 See, e.g., World Bank, Environmental Governance in Oil-Producing

negotiating host-government instruments but ultimately discarded the proposal Developing Countries 1 (Eleodoro Alba ed., 2010), http://siteresources.world-
because it was viewed as too controversial by the Association’s members. bank.org/EXTOGMC/Resources/336929-1266963339030/eifd17_environmen-
41 Alexandra S. Wawryk, Adoption of International Environmental Standards tal_governance.pdf.
by Transnational Oil Companies: Reducing the Impact of Oil Operations in 57 Id.

Emerging Economies, 20 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 402, 431 (2002). 58 See generally Malta Env’t & Planning Authority, Environmental Impact
42 Concession Agreement for the Exploration Development and Production Assessments (1994), http://www.mepa.org.mt/lpgdocuments/policies/eia.pdf.
of Oil And Natural Gas cl. 21-1 (2001) (Braz.), http://www.anp.gov.br/brnd/ 59 Kashagan PSA supra note 53, at art. 5.2b.

round9/geral/contratos/ContratoR3_eng.pdf. 60 Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Model Production Sharing

43 Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Contract (Seventh Offer of Blocks), art. 14.5 (2007) (India), http://petro-
Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep Water Portion of the Gunashli Field leum.nic.in/nelp3.pdf
in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, The State Oil Company of the 61 See, e.g., Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 1002 Area, Petroleum Assess-

Azerbaijan Republic- AMOCO Caspian Sea Petroleum Limited et al., art. 26.3 ment, 1998, Including Economic Analysis, U.S. Geological Survey, http://pubs.
(Sept. 20, 1994) (Azer.), http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/ usgs.gov/fs/fs-0028-01/ (last modified Dec. 14, 2005).
bp_caspian_en/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/pq/ACG_PSA.pdf. 62 See generally Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Defenders of Wild-

life, http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/habitat_conservation/

39 Sustainable Development Law & Policy

federal_lands/national_wildlife_refuges/threats/arctic/index.php (last visited art. 19.3 (Jan. 27, 2007) (Uganda), http://www.platformlondon.org/carbonweb/
Apr. 2, 2011). documents/uganda/leaked_Uganda_PSA_Block3A_Heritage_part1.pdf.
63 Office of National Mines and Strategic Industries, Model Offshore 80 See, e.g., Kashagan PSA supra note 53, at art. 21.1d.

Production Sharing Contract, art. 37.6 (2006) (Madag.), http://www.omnis- 81 Int’l Ass’n Oil & Gas Producers, supra note 5, at 2, 23.

madagascar.mg/contrat/offshore%20contract.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 82 See, e.g., Kashagan PSA supra note 53, at art. 5.2c; Production Sharing
64 Draft Production Sharing Agreement for Petroleum Exploration, Dev. Contract Between the Government and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
and Production in the Republic of Uganda, Uganda-Heritage Oil and Gas Limited (ONGC), Reliance Industries Ltd., & Enron Oil & Gas India Ltd.
Limited, art. 5.3 (Uganda), http://www.platformlondon.org/carbonweb/docu- (Tapt Block), art. 12.6 (Dec. 22, 1994) (India) (on file with the author).
ments/uganda/leaked_Uganda_PSA_Block3A_Heritage_part2.pdf (last visited 83 See, e.g., Azeri and Chirag Fields PSA supra note 43, at art. 26.2.

Apr. 2, 2011). 84 Timor-Leste Inst. for Dev. Monitoring & Analysis, Model Production
65 Gov’t of the Republic of Mozambique, Exploration and Production Con- Sharing Contract Under the Petroleum Act (Timor-Leste), http://www.lao-
cession Contract, art. 27.8 (2007) (Mozam.), http://www.inp.gov.mz/content/ hamutuk.org/Oil/PetRegime/PSC%20model%20270805.pdf (last visited Apr. 2,
download/192/790/file/Mozambique%20Model%20EPC-Public-April%202007. 2011).
pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2011). 85 Petroleum Agreement, Republic of Ghana-Tullow Ghana Limited-Sabre
66 Production Sharing Cont. for Taq Taq and Kewa Chirmila Areas in the Oil and Gas Limited-Kosmos Energy Ghana HC, art. 17.7 (Mar. 10, 2006)
Kurdistan Region, Kurdistan Regional Gov’t of Iraq-Genel Entergy Inter- (Ghana), http://sec.edgar-online.com/kosmos-energy-ltd/s-1a-securities-regis-
national Limited-Addax Petroleum International Limited, art. 2.8 (Feb. 26, tration-statement/2011/03/03/section58.aspx.
2008) (Iraq), http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/02_Genel_Contract.pdf. 86 See generally Tim Padgett & Stephan Kuffner, Chevron v. Ecuador: Will
67 Ministry of Energy, Production Sharing Contract (2008) (Kenya), http:// the Plaintiffs Get Paid?, Time, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/
www.nockenya.co.ke/images/File/RECENT DRAFT PSC (3).DOC. article/0,8599,2053075,00.html.
68 Bangladesh Oil, Gas, & Mineral Corp., Model Production Sharing Con- 87 See generally Timor-Leste Inst., supra note 84.

tract, art. 9.2 (2008) (Bangl.), http://www.petrobangla.org.bd/MODEL%20 88 Id. at art. 1.5.

PRODUCTION%20SHARING%20CONTRACT%202008-FEBRUARY.pdf. 89 UNEP Secretariat, Liability & Compensation Regimes Related to Environ-

69 World Bank, Regulation of Associated Gas Flaring and Venting: A mental Damage (2002); see also A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liabil-
Global Overview and Lessons 1 (2004), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/exter- ity: The Interplay of National and International Law, 14 J. Envtl. L. 3,
nal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2004/07/16/000012009_2004071613 14 (2005).
3951/Rendered/PDF/295540Regulati1aring0no10301public1.pdf. 90 See generally Gov’t of the Republic of Mozambique, supra note 65.
70 See generally Middle E. & N. Africa Forum on Flaring Reduction & Gas 91 See id. at art. 19.1.

Utilization: Addressing the Imbalance Between Gas Demand and Supply, 92 Id.

http://www.menaflaringforum.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). 93 Even in the absence of explicitly listed exceptions within the liability
71 A.S. Abdulkareem, Evaluation of Ground Level Concentration of Pollutant clause, the extremely common “force majeure” clause provides a defense for
Due to Gas Flaring by Computer Simulation: A Case Study of Niger Delta– non-compliance.
Area of Nigeria, Leonardo Elec. J. of Practices & Techs., Jan–June 2005 at 29, 94 Government of Cambodia supra note 34, at art. 20.7d.

30, http://lejpt.academicdirect.org/A06/29_42.htm. 95 RSM PSA supra note 30, at art. 27.3.

72 See generally Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, World Bank, 96 See Timor-Leste Inst., supra note 84, at art. 19.2.

http://www.worldbank.org/ggfr (last updated Mar. 21, 2011). 97 Id.

73 Int’l Ass’n Oil & Gas Producers, supra note 5, at 3, 28. 98 See generally Zhiguo Gao, International Law on Offshore Abandonment:
74 Bangladesh Oil, Gas, & Mineral Corp., Model Production Sharing Con- Recent Developments, Current Issues and Future Directions, in Environmental
tract, art. 15.3 (2008) (Bangl.), http://www.petrobangla.org.bd/MODEL%20 Regulation of Oil & Gas (Zhinguo Gao ed., 1998); Agnieszka Rawa et al., Sus-
PRODUCTION%20SHARING%20CONTRACT%202008-FEBRUARY.pdf. tainable Decommissioning of Oil Fields and Mines (World Bank Issues Paper,
75 Id. 2009), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/wb_ogm_
76 Production Sharing Contract, Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak issues_paper.pdf.
Dan Gas Bumi Negara-APEX, Ltd., art. 6.2.1 (Dec. 4, 1997) (Indon.), 99 Oil Exploration and Exploitation Contract (Offshore No. 1 and Seme

http://agreements.realdealdocs.com/Production-Sharing-Agreement/ Block) Between The Government and Addax Petroleum – Abacan Benin
PRODUCTION-SHARING-CONTRACT-1005914/. Consortium, art.18.12 (Feb. 1, 1997) (Benin), http://www.secinfo.com/
77 RSM PSA supra note 30, at art. 14.1. duvJ5.68m.j.htm.
78 Production Sharing Agreement Between Sonangol, U.E.E., Texaco 100 Id.

Exploration Angola Sumbe Inc., ESSO Exploration & Production Angola 101 See Rawa, supra note 98, at 36-46.

(Block 22) Limited & BHP Petroleum (Angola 22) Inc. (Block 22), art. 29.5 102 Model Production Sharing Agreement (2008) (Tanz.), http://resources.

(Dec. 16, 1998) (Angl.) (on file with the author). revenuewatch.org/sites/default/files/Model%20Production%20Sharing%20
79 Draft Production Sharing Agreement for Petroleum Exploration, Agreement%202008.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
Development and Production in the Republic of Uganda by and Between The 103 Gao supra note 12.
Government of the Republic of Uganda and Heritage Oil and Gas Limited,

Endnotes: Global Trade: The Impact of Massachusetts’ Energy Policy on Columbia’s Mining Industry
continued from page 21
1 See, e.g., Coal Explained: How Much Coal is Left, U.S. Energy Info. Colombia); Emissions Standards for Power Plants, 310 Mass. Code Regs. 7.29
Admin., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_reserves (2010) (providing the regulation governing Massachusetts power plant emissions
(last updated Feb. 19, 2010). for pollutants including, among other things, mercury, particulate matter, and
2 See Obama Announces Steps to Boost Biofuels, Clean Coal, Dep’t of sulfur dioxide).
Energy (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.energy.gov/news/8596.htm. 6 Coal Explained: Where Our Coal Comes From, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
3 Jeff Deyette & Barbara Freese, Union of Concerned Scientists, Burning http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_where (last
Coal, Burning Cash 13 (2010), http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/technol- updated Oct. 6, 2010).
ogy_and_impacts/impacts/burning-coal-burning-cash.html. 7 Robert C. Milici & Kristen O. Dennen, Production and Depletion of Appala-
4 Mark Clayton, Why Coal-Rich U.S. is Seeing Record Imports, Christian Sci. chian and Illinois Basin Coal Reserves, in National Coal Resource Assessment
Monitor (July 10, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0710/p02s01-usec. Overview, Ch. H, 1 (Brenda S. Pierce & Kristen O. Dennen eds., U.S.G.S. Prof.
html. Paper 1625-F, 2009), http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1625f/downloads/ChapterH.pdf.
5 See The Price of Colombian Coal, The World, Pub. Radio Int’l (Jan. 10, 8 How Coal Works, Union of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/
2009, 10:33 AM), http://www.pri.org/business/global-development/price-colum- clean_energy/coalvswind/brief_coal.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
bian-coal.html (detailing some of the environmental degradation experienced in 9 Id.

Spring 2011 40