Technology-Facilitated Violence

Elizabeth Simpson
Technology-Facilitated Violence

Elizabeth Simpson
The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) or contributor(s) and do not necessarily represent the
official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific individuals, agencies, compa-
nies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s), the contributor(s), or the
U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and
websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s), the contributor(s), nor the COPS Office can vouch for their
current validity.

This resource may be subject to copyright. The U.S. Department of Justice reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive,
and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use and to authorize others to use this resource for
Federal Government purposes. This resource may be freely distributed and used for noncommercial and educa-
tional purposes only.

Recommended citation:
Simpson, Elizabeth. 2024. Technology-Facilitated Violence. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Polic-
ing Services.

Published 2024
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Vulnerable populations and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Technology-facilitated violence federal and state laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Prevalence and crime data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Understanding Your Local Problem—Asking the Right Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Places. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Targets/Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Offenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Guardians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Community members (handlers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Digital environment and internet (managers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Responses to Technology-Facilitated Violence—A Comprehensive Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

General response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Specific responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Measuring effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendix A. Stalking Incident and Behavior Log Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix B. Summary of Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

About the COPS Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

| iii
Introduction
This publication fulfills a Cyber Crime Review recommendation from the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General: “The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) should
produce a written resource and guide that summarizes critical investigative measures that SLTT
[state, local, tribal, and territorial] authorities should take in these investigations.” This guide is
an introduction to technology-facilitated violence (TFV), beginning with an overview of the
crimes and including definitions and examples of offenses. The guide also presents tools to
identify and measure the problem at a local level, as well as strategies for crime prevention and
crime investigation. The guide includes data and resources to illustrate the complexity of
cybercrimes and violence against vulnerable populations.

Because of the ever-changing landscape of electronic communications and the internet, the
guide will not identify specific software applications, online platforms, social media, “nontra-
ditional” technology such as multiplayer gaming, and hardware such as global positioning
system (GPS) tracking commonly used by offenders. In addition, references to statutes will be
limited because of ongoing changes in state, tribal, and federal legislation enacted to address
TFV and other cybercrimes.

|v
The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence
TECHNOLO GY- FACI L I TAT E D VI OL E N C E (TFV ) is a cybercrime in which the actions of one or
more people harm others via use of the internet and mobile technology. TFV is a crime about power
and control over others as a primary motive; most often it is not a crime primarily of financial gain.1
TFV can be a crime of both public and private relationships between friends, family members,
coworkers, or intimate partners but may also be perpetrated by a stranger who is unknown to the
victim. TFV has impacted individuals across the spectrum of age, sex, race, gender, ethnicity,
intellectual ability, and socioeconomic status. In addition, TFV crimes can compromise the victim’s
and their family’s privacy and safety. Harm to victims of TFV can include emotional trauma, finan-
cial costs and stable housing, employment, and physical harm, up to including loss of life.

Examples of technology-facilitated violence include

the following: Trolls post online to generate nega-
tive reactions: conflict, arguments,
z Cyber harassment. Online harassment of a victim
hostility. Trolls are motivated by
ranging from mild to severe. The harassment can
attention, rather than to harm an
include abusive language and comments, posting
individual. The average troll posts
false information, and troll attacks.
anonymously and doesn’t know the
z Cyberthreats. Using digital devices to threaten an victim(s) of the online content.*

individual with public humiliation, damage to

* “Cyber Tip: Social Media and the
their reputation, or bodily harm.2 Cyberthreats Use of Personal Information,” Federal
can include sending, posting, or sharing content Bureau of Investigation, October 27, 2015,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/cyber-
about an individual that causes embarrassment
tip-social-media-and-the-use-of-personal-
or humiliation.3 information-national-cyber-security-
awareness-month.

1. “Stalking,” Office for Victims of Crime, last modified June 1, 2020, https://ovc.ojp.gov/topics/stalking.
2. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Threat and Intimidation Response Guide (Washington, DC: Federal
Communications Commission, n.d.), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/threat_guide_english_final.pdf.
3. “What is Cyberbullying,” StopBullying.gov, last modified November 5, 2021,
https://www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it.

|1
 In 2019, Tyler Barriss was sentenced to 20 years in federal prison for his role in the “swatting”
death of Andrew Finch of Wichita, Kansas. After losing at Call of Duty, two online gamers paid
Barriss to “swat” Finch, who had won the game. Barriss subsequently made a hoax 911 call
pretending that he was in Wichita, holding a family hostage after murdering the father. Because
the police believed there was a violent and active hostage situation, officers and a SWAT team
responded to the reported address and fatally shot Andrew Finch when he stepped out on the
porch of his residence. Barriss plead guilty to one count of making a false report resulting in a
death, one count of cyberstalking, and one count of conspiracy.*

* “Three Men Charged in ‘Swatting’ Schemes in which Admitted Hoax-Maker Targeted Individuals,
Schools and a Convention Center,” press release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of
California, January 23, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/three-men-charged-swatting-
schemes-which-admitted-hoax-maker-targeted-individuals.

z Doxing or doxxing. Posting the personal information of an individual online with malicious intent.

z Swatting. Using technology to make a false 911 call and to draw an emergency law enforcement
response, usually a special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, as a prank or act of revenge.

Vulnerable populations and gender-based violence

Vulnerable populations are targeted for TFV based on age (children, older adults), ethnicity, physical
or cognitive disabilities, mental health, sexual orientation, or gender or gender identity. Unlike the
examples of TFV that can impact any person online, gender-based violence (GBV) occurs when one or
more perpetrators harms others based on their perceived sexual or gender identity.4 Although much
online harassment is intersectional—often incorporating sexism, racism, homophobia, and other forms
of oppression—GBV is rooted in gender inequality via the abuse of power and harmful norms. GBV is
perpetrated against individuals based on their gender identity or presentation. It affects women, girls,
and others with female gender identity, as well as transgender men and boys and nonbinary indivi-
duals, irrespective of their sexual orientation. GBV results or is likely to result in physical, sexual,

4. Laura Hinson et al., Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence: What Is It, and How Do We Measure It?
(International Center for Research on Women, 2018), https://www.icrw.org/publications/technology-facilitated-
gender-based-violence-what-is-it-and-how-do-we-measure-it/.

2 | Technology Facilitated Violence

psychological, or economic harm or suffering to the victim. GBV crimes can include threats of harm;
threats for the purpose of coercion; or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, either in a public setting or via
private communication.

TFV based on gender or other vulnerability can be a pattern of conduct over time or a single incident.
The crime(s) can be perpetrated by strangers online who target an individual or may be one aspect of
domestic violence situations such as intimate partner violence (IPV) or family violence. Abusive
partners and ex-partners can use electronic devices and other technology to control and psychologi-
cally abuse their victims. This can take place during a relationship, but it is unfortunately also the case
that it most often continues after the relationship has ended.5 The following is a list of crimes that are
commonly committed against vulnerable populations with perpetrators that exploit power inequity
and negative gender norms.

z Cyberbullying (both perpetrator and victim are younger than 18 years old)

z Cyberstalking

z Sextortion and nonconsensual pornography (sometimes called “revenge porn”)

z Defamation and targeted hate speech, including cross-platform posting

Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying occurs when both the perpetrator and victim are younger than 18 years old. Cyberbul-
lying is defined as “willful and [or] repeated harm inflicted through the use of computers, cell phones,
and other electronic devices.”6 Examples of behaviors that can constitute cyberbullying include
hurtful comments, threats, rumors, pictures, or videos posted or circulated online to peer or other
teens or younger children. In most cases, the harmful behavior is repetitive and conducted via online
technology platforms such as social media apps, but the perpetrator may also be bullying the victim
during in-person interactions on the school campus or in the community.

5. Vibeke Home, “How Can We Fight Tech-Facilitated Violence?” Synergy, last modified July 1, 2022,
https://www.eeagender.org/the-synergy-network/news/how-can-we-fight-tech-facilitated-violence/.
6. “What Is Cyberbullying?” Cyberbullying Research Center, accessed October 24, 2023,
https://cyberbullying.org/what-is-cyberbullying.

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 3

 The 2019 National Crime Victimization Survey found that approximately 24 percent of teens are the
victims of cyberbullying,7 with persistent, permanent harassment that can be difficult for school staff
to recognize8 because of the number of stressors impacting students in schools since the beginning of
the COVID-19 pandemic and the fact that online instruction and the diminishing workforce of teachers
have led to less interpersonal engagement between school staff and students. Some victims report
feeling depressed and hopeless as a result of cyberbullying. Further, victims report lower grades and
less interest in school activities than they felt before they were bullied, as well as isolation from friends
and family.9 In addition, students report increases in all of the following: abuse of drugs and alcohol,
skipping class and truancy, self-harm, and suicidal thoughts.10

Cyberstalking
Cyberstalking is “with the intent to harass and intimidate another person . . . use [of] the mail, interac-
tive computer services and electronic communication services and an electronic communication system
of interstate commerce, and other facilities of interstate and foreign commerce, to engage in a course of
conduct that caused, attempted to cause, and would be reasonably expected to cause substantial
emotional distress to a person.”11 It is the use of electronic communications and the internet to make
repeated unwanted contacts or engage in behaviors that caused the victim to experience fear or sub-
stantial emotional distress. The majority of stalkers use technology to monitor, watch, contact, control,
threaten, sabotage, isolate, and frighten victims, as well as to damage victims’ credibility or reputation
in their professional capacity or in the community, for example by sending communication (real or
computer generated, generally sexually explicit) to victims’ colleagues, family members, churches, and

7. Charisse L. Nixon, “Current Perspectives: The Impact of Cyberbullying on Adolescent Health,” Adolescent
Health, Medicine, and Therapeutics 5 (2014), 143–158, https://doi.org/10.2147%2FAHMT.S36456.
8. Sherry Everett Jones et al., “Mental Health, Suicidality, and Connectedness Among High School Students
During the COVID-19 Pandemic — Adolescent Behaviors and Experiences Survey, United States, January–June
2021,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report Supplements 71, Suppl. 3 (2022), 16–21, http://dx.doi.org/10.
15585/mmwr.su7103a3.
9. “Get Help Now,” StopBullying.gov, last modified December 13, 2022, https://www.stopbullying.gov/
resources/get-help-now.
10. “Effects of Bullying on Mental Health,” StopBullying.gov, last modified October 25, 2019,
https://www.stopbullying.gov/blog/2019/10/25/effects-bullying-mental-health.
11. United States v. Diaz, 8:21-CR-00084 (C.D. Cal.), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/
1394186/download; 18 U.S.C. §2261A. Stalking (1996, as amended), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/USCODE-2021-title18/html/USCODE-2021-title18-partI-chap110A-sec2261A.htm.

4 | Technology Facilitated Violence

so forth.12 Offenders can also engage in online threat of bodily harm or death to a victim or the victim’s
family. One element of stalking is pattern or course of conduct, meaning two or more acts that suggest
the offender has consistently engaged in the behavior and will continue to do so. Cyberstalking is a
crime of power and control, with a perpetrator using technology to cause fear and anxiety via

z repeated and unwanted communication through the internet, such as spamming an individual’s
email inbox or social media platform;

z unauthorized use of an individual’s technology devices or spyware to track their activity

via GPS.13

Cyberstalking victims report that perpetrators use multiple forms of digital communications to engage
in an ongoing pattern: 55 percent receive unwanted emails or messages, 32 percent are monitored
through social media, 29 percent had inappropriate or personal information posted about them or
received threats that the stalker would do so, and 14 percent were tracked with an app or device.14

Perpetrators of cyberstalking are identified as either intimate or nonintimate. If a former or current

relationship exists between the stalker and the victim, the offender has an intimate relationship, likely
with a history of abuse. (In most cases the intimate relationship is romantic, but stalkers may also
victimize colleagues, friends, and neighbors.) Nonintimate perpetrators have no interpersonal relation-
ship with the victim and may be totally unknown or known only through brief social contact. How-
ever, most stalking victims (67 percent in 2019) are pursued by people they know, such as a romantic
partner, coworker, or neighborhood friend.15

12. SPARC (Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center), Technology-Facilitated Stalking: Fact Sheet
(Washington, DC: Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center, 2022), https://www.stalkingawareness.org/
fact-sheets-and-infographics/.
13. SPARC, Technology-Facilitated Stalking: Fact Sheet (see note 12).
14. Rachel E. Morgan and Jennifer L. Truman, Stalking Victimization, 2019, Bulletin (Washington, DC: Bureau
of Justice Statistics, 2022), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/sv19.pdf.
15. Morgan and Truman, Stalking Victimization, 2019 (see note 14).

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 5

 Image-based sexual abuse:
Sextortion and nonconsensual intimate image abuse
TFV has evolved with the internet and digital communication devices. Offenders engage in image-
based sexual abuse (IBSA) such as sextortion (extortion of sexual material) and non-consensual inti-
mate image abuse to manipulate, threaten, cause emotional distress, and economic hardship to victims.
The offender is engaging in a crime for power over the victim. Financial gain may be a secondary
motivation or not a consideration for the perpetrator.

Sextortion is the use of deception, manipulation, or threats to convince a victim to produce an explicit
video or image and subsequent threats that harm or exposure will be used for additional videos or
images.16 Sextortion victims can be any age, but overall, offenders may particularly target teen
(younger than 18 years of age) and young adult (18–25 years old) victims. In 2022, the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) CyberTipline received more than 32 million reports
about 88.3 million files;17 in 2017, approximately 78 percent of victims of such exploitation were girls
with a mean age of 15 years old.18 Data collection and reporting on adult victims (18 years or older) of
sextortion and nonconsensual intimate image abuse is rare. The National Incident-Based Reporting
System (NIBRS)—the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) national standard for law enforcement
crime data reporting in the United States as of 2017—does not have a separate category for reporting
cybercrimes such as sextortion. Instead, if those crimes are reported, the likely category used by SLTT
law enforcement agencies is “Group B All Other Offenses 90Z.”19 Most data collection and research is
conducted by organizations outside the United States, such as the United Nations.20

16. “FBI Launches Sextortion Awareness Campaign in Schools,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, last modified
September 3, 2019, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/stop-sextortion-youth-face-risk-online-090319.
17. NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children), “CyberTipline 2022 Report,” accessed November
21, 2023, https://www.missingkids.org/cybertiplinedata.
18. NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children), The Online Enticement of Children: An In-Depth
Analysis of CyberTipline Reports (Alexandria, VA: National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, 2017),
https://www.missingkids.org/ourwork/ncmecdata.
19. UCR (Uniform Crime Reporting) Program, NIBRS Offense Codes (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2011/resources/nibrs-offense-codes.
20. Alex Berryhill and Lorena Fuentes, Technology-Facilitated Violence Against Women: Taking Stock of
Evidence and Data Collection (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Women and World Health Organization, 2023), 4,
https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2023-04/Technology-facilitated-violence-against-women-
Taking-stock-of-evidence-and-data-collection-en.pdf.

6 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Nonconsensual intimate image abuse—also known as nonconsensual pornography or revenge porn—is
the distribution of nude or sexually explicit images or videos without the subject’s consent. These
images or videos could have been consensually produced or obtained in the context of a romantic
relationship—or they could have been produced or obtained without the victim’s consent by a part-
ner; by a friend, neighbor, or co-worker; by someone the victim knows casually, such as a friend’s
sibling; or by a near or total stranger. The images and videos are used by the offender to manipulate,
threaten, or harm the victim. Nonconsensual video and images can be one aspect of intimate partner
violence (domestic violence, family violence, and dating violence) or may be revenge against a prior
intimate partner as a crime of power.21

Removal of nonconsensual intimate images from the internet can be difficult or impossible, and these
crimes can have long-lasting impacts on victims.22 Social media platforms and internet service provid-
ers have not created industry standard policies for victims to request removal of nonconsensual images,
and victims must report to each multimedia platform separately because there is not a central reporting
location. Further, at time of publication, “revenge porn” is not a crime in all states, so depending on
their location victims may have no recourse. However, the Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource
Center (SPARC) provides resources to victims of sextortion and nonconsensual pornography as well as
“help for the helpers”—resources and training for victim service providers in the community.23 Victims
are also encouraged to contact the police and report the crime so there is an official record.

Defamation and targeted hate speech including cross-platform posting

Hate speech and defamation in online communication is a hate crime, i.e., a criminal offense that is
motivated by personal prejudice and directed at an individual because of their race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, gender identification, religion, or disability. Hate speech may involve more than one
victim and be perpetrated by more than one offender. Hate speech and defamation can also involve
symbols and images used in digital communication to harass, threaten, or cause harm to a victim.

21. “Intimate Partner Violence,” Office for Victims of Crime, last modified May 28, 2020, https://ovc.ojp.gov/topics/
intimate-partner-violence.
22. “Revenge Porn,” National Domestic Violence Hotline, accessed November 21, 2023, https://www.thehotline.org/
resources/revenge-porn/.
23. “External Resources,” SPARC (Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center), accessed November 21, 2023,
https://www.stalkingawareness.org/external-resources/.

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 7

 Technology-facilitated violence federal and state laws
Because of the nature of TFV and digital communication, federal and state legislators have typically
passed laws in response to crimes rather than proactively engaging or passing comprehensive legisla-
tion to anticipate criminal conduct. For example, in 2013, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI)
drafted model state legislation to criminalize nonconsensual distribution of intimate images (NDII)
that has subsequently served as a template for many state laws.24 The legislation was enacted in many
states before NDII was known to the community. Conversely, although every state has at least one law
that addresses stalking, the laws themselves vary; for example, the state of West Virginia has no
explicit “stalking” statute, but stalkers are prosecuted under the state’s harassment statute, a misde-
meanor that does not address the crime’s severity.25 The Federal Government has strengthened the
enforcement and prosecution of TFV through updates and expanded use of previously established
laws. Both legislators and the courts must respond to an ever-changing technical landscape that sup-
ports new methods of criminal behavior with proactive legislation and court decisions that anticipate
technology-based offenses.

Federal law (18 U.S.C. 875(c)) states it is a federal crime to transmit any communication in interstate or
foreign commerce containing a threat to injure the person of another. Federal statute 18 U.S.C § 2261A
defines stalking as interstate travel or communication “with the intent . . . to kill, injure, harass,
intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to cause” harm.26 As a result of conduct, the victim
(and their family) reasonably fear death or bodily harm and suffer emotional distress.

The Federal Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX generally prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in schools that receive federal funding.27 Because sexual harassment, cyberbullying, and cyber-
stalking are forms of sex discrimination, they are prohibited by Title IX, and schools must respond to
victim reports. In addition, some states have separately outlawed sexual harassment in schools (as a

24. “Legislative Reform: Model Laws,” Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, accessed November 21, 2023,
https://cybercivilrights.org/legislative-reform/.
25. SPARC (Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center), Stalking Statutes in Review (Washington, DC:
SPARC, 2022), 4–5, https://sparc.broncotime.info/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Stalking-Statutes-in-Review.pdf.
26. 18 U.S.C. §2261A. Stalking (1996, as amended), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title18/
html/USCODE-2021-title18-partI-chap110A-sec2261A.htm.
27. 20 U.S.C. §1681–1688. Discrimination Based on Sex or Blindness (1972, as amended), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title20/html/USCODE-2021-title20-chap38.htm.

8 | Technology Facilitated Violence

form of bullying),28 and the 2020–21 Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC) survey published by the U.S.
Department of Education reports that school districts disciplined 20,800 students for engaging in
harassment or bullying on the basis of sex.29

In addition to state and local statutes, there are Federal charges related to TFV perpetrated in multiple
jurisdictions. For example, the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)30 addresses access,
use, disclosure, interception, and privacy protections of electronic communications.

Title I of the ECPA prohibits interception and disclosure of wired, oral, or electronic communication
while in transit.31 This law may apply when a perpetrator wiretaps a phone line, does physical bug-
ging, or puts a keylogger on someone’s computer.

Title II of ECPA, the Stored Communications Act, makes it unlawful to intentionally access stored
communications without authorization or by exceeding authorized access.32 This law may apply when
a perpetrator accesses someone else’s email, voicemail, online social networking account, or informa-
tion stored on a computer or with a cloud provider.

Most states have laws addressing gender-based online violence crimes such as nonconsensual distribu-
tion of intimate images33 and sextortion laws.34 Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia include
federal hate crime laws related to gender and sex in their state law codes,35 and approximately half the

28. “Laws, Policies & Regulations: State Anti-Bullying Laws & Policies,” StopBullying.gov, last modified May 17,
2023, https://www.stopbullying.gov/resources/laws.
29. Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Violence and Sex-based Harassment or Bullying in U.S. Public Schools During the
2020–21 School Year, Data Snapshot (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 2023), https://civilrightsdata.
ed.gov/publications.
30. 100 Stat. 1848 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/
STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg1848/context.
31. 18 U.S.C. §2511. Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited (1986,
as amended), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title18/html/USCODE-2021-title18-partI-
chap119-sec2511.htm.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§2701–2712. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access (1988, as
amended), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title18/html/USCODE-2021-title18-partI-chap121.htm.
33. CCRI (Cyber Civil Rights Initiative), “Nonconsensual Distribution of Intimate Images,” accessed December 6,
2023, https://cybercivilrights.org/nonconsensual-distribution-of-intimate-images/.
34. CCRI (Cyber Civil Rights Initiative), “Sextortion Laws,” last modified September 22, 2021,
https://cybercivilrights.org/sextortion-laws/.
35. “Federal Bias Categories Included by State Laws,” U.S. Department of Justice, last modified July 21, 2023,
https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/laws-and-policies#table.

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 9

 states have laws that reflect federal hate crime laws on
The federal interstate stalking statute
sexual orientation and gender identity.36 The National
comprises three elements:
Association of Attorneys General has links to all state,
1. Malicious intent by the perpetrator
territory, and Office of the Attorney General for the Dis-
toward the victim in another jurisdiction
trict of Columbia and to cybercrimes resources, such as
2. A course of conduct making use of examples of state attorney general cybercrime activities.37
a facility of interstate commerce
Every state and the District of Columbia has enacted
3. Substantial harm to the victim* criminal laws regarding stalking, but not all have
legislation that directly speaks to cyberstalking. The
* United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849
(8th Cir. 2012) at 860, https://casetext.com/ U.S. Department of Justice’s Office on Violence Against
case/united-states-v-petrovic; 18 U.S.C. Women (OVW) maintains a list of all local resources in
§2261A(2)(A), https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/USCODE-2021-title18/html/
each state and territory and the District of Columbia
USCODE-2021-title18-partI-chap110A- that respond to stalking, domestic violence, and sexual
sec2261A.htm.
assault.38 In addition, OVW provides funding for the
State and Territorial Sexual Assault and Domestic
Violence Coalitions Program to coordinate victim services activities and collaboration with federal,
state, and local entities engaged in addressing crimes such as cyberstalking.39 Nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGO) such as the National Resource Center on Domestic Violence (funded by a U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services grant) provide support and resources for state and local
jurisdictions working to create and update legislation around cyberstalking and technology-facilitated
GBV.40 The Cyber Civil Rights Initiative has collected model language as templates for states to enact
laws against sextortion and revenge porn; it tracks GBV crimes committed online.41

36. “State Laws, Codes, and Statutes,” U.S. Department of Justice, last modified July 21, 2023,
https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/laws-and-policies#statelaws.
37. “Find My AG,” National Association of Attorneys General, accessed October 24, 2023,
https://www.naag.org/find-my-ag/; “CyberCrimes,” National Association of Attorneys General,
accessed December 6, 2023, https://www.naag.org/issues/cyber-and-technology/cybercrimes/.
38. “Local Resources,” Office on Violence Against Women, accessed October 24, 2023,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/local-resources.
39. “State and Territorial Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Coalitions Program,” Office on
Violence Against Women, accessed January 2, 2024, https://www.justice.gov/ovw/state-and-
territorial-sexual-assault-and-domestic-violence-coalitions-program.
40. “What We Do,” National Resource Center on Domestic Violence, accessed October 24, 2023, https://nrcdv.org/.
41. “Legislative Reform,” Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, accessed October 24, 2023, https://cybercivilrights.org/
legislative-reform/.

10 | Technology Facilitated Violence

The application of state and federal laws is impacted by the nature of TFV crimes: In most cases, these
crimes involve offender behavior that over time crosses multiple SLTT agencies and jurisdictions. In
addition, these crimes may have statutes of limitations for reporting, and prosecuting can be challeng-
ing because they occur in multiple jurisdictions with different laws. Also, state and federal statutes
may require that a “course of conduct” be “repeated” acts or be a “series” or “pattern of behavior;”
but the ease of anonymity in digital communications can protect the offender who commits cyber-
stalking, cyber-harassment, doxing, and other cybercrimes.

Prevalence and crime data

TFV are complex crimes that target people of all demographic and cultural backgrounds; however, the
victims of TFV are overwhelmingly women, vulnerable individuals, and other marginalized popula-
tions. Surveys conducted by the World Health Organization found that “despite the relatively new and
growing phenomenon of internet connectivity [. . .] more than one in 10 women have already experi-
enced a form of cyberviolence” (and this figure includes girls as young as 15).42 Reporting accurate
crime rates for TFV is extremely difficult, because many victims do not file reports with SLTT agen-
cies. For example, in 2019, more than 2.7 million people 16 and older were victims of “stalking with
technology” in the United States, but only 29 percent of all stalking victims filed a report with the
police.43 Victims choose not to report the crimes for several reasons: because of the nature of the crime,
victims determined the police could not help; victims decided the stalking offenses caused less disrup-
tion to their lives than filing police reports and going to court; and victims feared the offender. In
addition, victims of interpersonal violence may not realize that online behavior such as posting non-
consensual pornography is a crime.

Researchers have found a correlation between domestic violence offenders and perpetrators of stalk-
ing: 81 percent of women stalked by a current or former partner were also physically abused by the
same person, and the average length of partner stalking is more than two years. Among women who
were murdered by their domestic partner, 76 percent were the victim of stalking in the year prior
to their death.44

42. “Cyber Violence against Women,” European Institute for Gender Equity, accessed October 24, 2023,
https://eige.europa.eu/gender-based-violence/cyber-violence-against-women.
43. Morgan and Truman, Stalking Victimization, 2019 (see note 14).
44. Judith M. McFarlane et al., “Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide,” Homicide Studies 3, no. 4 (1999),
300–316, https://doi.org/10.1177/1088767999003004003.

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 11

 Data collection and analysis of cybercrime is also limited by time; the world wide web was only
founded in 1989, and the first website was launched in 1990. Personal communication via text
message only began in 1992, and smartphones were released for sale in 1994. Communication
methods have changed drastically in the last 35 years and researchers are working to effectively
analyze the information.

Further, state and federal cybercrime reporting is primarily focused on financial crimes, identity
theft, and—since 2019—a rise in domestic extremism.45 For example, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) operates the nation’s central hub for reporting cybercrime, the Internet Crime Complaint
Center (IC3). Although individuals can file a complaint about any cybercrime, the highlighted topics
are consumer alerts, scams, and elder fraud, with no reference to TBV. And the National Incident-Based
Reporting System (NIBRS) does not collect SLTT data on any specific cybercrimes.46

Most of the available federal- and state-level data on GBV are focused on crimes against children and
adolescents. Crimes such as cyberbullying, sexual exploitation, and trafficking of child sexual abuse
material (CSAM) are underreported, but rates of reporting are improving as more people learn about
victim support resources.

Crime analysis completed by Pitt County (North Carolina) Sheriff’s Office found that within the
jurisdiction, more than 50 percent of homicides were directly related to domestic violence (DV),
which was also the second most common crime. Of those, all were victims of stalking prior
to the homicide. The sheriff’s office created a Domestic Violence Prevention Unit that collects
evidence on domestic violence and related stalking crimes during investigations, while also pro-
viding resources for victims.*

* John Guard, Chief Deputy, Pitt County (North Carolina) Sheriff’s Office, Showcasing Success:
National Stalking Awareness Month, webinar (Washington, DC: Office on Violence Against Women,
2023), https://ovc.ojp.gov/events/showcasing-success-national-stalking-awareness-month.

45. “The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It,” U.S. Government
Accountability Office, last modified March 2, 2023, https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-threat-domestic-
terrorism-u.s.-and-federal-efforts-combat-it.
46. UCR (Uniform Crime Reporting) Program, National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) Offense Codes
(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2011/resources/nibrs-offense-codes.

12 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Unfortunately, rates of CSAM have also increased as children and teens attend online school and
virtual activities; NCMEC found an 82 percent increase in online enticement crime reports between
2021 and 2022.47 For another example, based on arrests and evidence gathering, the FBI reports a
significant post-COVID increase in reports of sextortion, with offenders targeting teens to obtain
money or additional CSAM.48 The FBI issues warnings and provides awareness materials to help pre-
vent crimes and encourage victims to come forward and report the crime to a trusted adult.49 In
2022, as noted, NCMEC’s CyberTipline reports included 88.3 million images, videos, and other files
related to CSAM.50 NCMEC works with law enforcement to identify and save the victims with
limited resources.

47. NCMEC, “2022 CyberTipline Report” (see note 17).

48. NCMEC, “2022 CyberTipline Report” (see note 17).
49. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), “FBI Columbia Warns of Sextortion Schemes Targeting Young Boys,”
press release, April 13, 2022, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/columbia/news/press-releases/
fbi-columbia-warns-of-sextortion-schemes-targeting-young-boys.
50. NCMEC (National Center for Missing & Exploited Children), “Our 2022 Impact: Files and Hashing,”
accessed October 24, 2023, https://www.missingkids.org/content/ncmec/en/ourwork/impact.html.

The Problem of Technology-Facilitated Violence | 13

Understanding Your Local Problem—
Asking the Right Questions
SLTT AGENCI E S RE SP OND TO A BR OAD S PEC TR U M O F C R IME V IC TIMS , and much of
the standard enforcement strategy can be applied to TFV response. This section of the guide pro-
vides an overview of problem scope and investigation questions that are part of a victim-centered,
trauma-informed approach. An analysis of the local problem should involve engagement with
stakeholders and outreach to marginalized populations who can provide input on an effective
response strategy.

Published reports on the scope and impact of TFV are limited, so data
gathering and the expertise of local law enforcement agencies (LEA),
stakeholders, and victims is essential to understanding the problem.
Local victim reports may be limited or even nonexistent, but both

er

Ma
ndl
perpetrators and victims are present in any community with

nag
er
Ha

Pla
end

er
internet access and technology.

ce
Off Problem
The questions in the following sections are organized by
Target/Victim
the problem analysis triangle (shown in figure 1) and
focus on the factors that LEAs can impact in the con- Guardian
text of places, victims, and offenders and those that
are able to influence them, namely managers, guardians, Figure 1. Problem analysis triangle

and handlers.51 Community engagement is encouraged Source: John Eck, “Police Problems:The
Complexity of ProblemTheory, Research and
so the LEA can determine the scope of nonreporting
Evaluation,” in Problem-Oriented Policing:
and conduct outreach online via social media requests From Innovation to Mainstream, ed. Johannes
for information, online surveys victims can complete Knutsson, vol. 15 of Crime Prevention Studies
(Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2003),
and submit, online cyber safety training with K–12 https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/crime-
and higher education students, collecting surveys at prevention-studies-volume-15-volume-15.

local community events, and anecdotal information.

51. COPS Office (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC:
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014), https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter?item=cops-p157.

| 15
 Places
z What types of electronic platforms are individuals using to facilitate TFV incidents?

z Are TFV incidents recorded and tracked?

z How are TFV crimes recorded—as one incident or as a pattern of conduct based on the victim and
initial report? Are the technology platform(s) and methods of communication included in the
record? Does the records management system (RMS) enable search by screen name, website, or
victim social media details?

z How are TFV crimes handled in the agency RMS?

z How many crimes involve other offenses, such as domestic violence, sexual assault, harassment?

z What evidence is collected, such as technology artifacts and warrants for internet service
provider (ISP) records?

z Are incident logs provided to victims for reporting?52

Targets/Victims
z How many victims have reported TFV in the jurisdiction? Is this information tracked by the
agency? What are other data sources available for comparison? (DV shelters, victim services,
K–12 and higher education, FBI Uniform Crime Reporting [UCR], National Incident-Based
Response System [NIBRS])

z Does the victim know the offender? What is the relationship (friend, coworker, significant other)?
How does the agency collect this information in the report?

Offenders
z What percentage are repeat offenders? What is the criminal history of the offender?

z What is the relationship between the perpetrators and victims? Is that recorded for statistics?

z What level of computer expertise does the offender have? Are there screen names recorded?

z Are offenders monitored online during investigations?

52. SPARC (Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center), Stalking Incident and Behavior Log (Washington, DC:
Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center, 2018), https://www.stalkingawareness.org/what-to-do-if-you-are-
being-stalked/.

16 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Guardians
Law enforcement and the court system impact offender behavior through arrest, charge, and
conviction. Punitive sanctions can include restraining orders, custody, and community supervision.

z What is the current policy or protocol for TFV incidents? Are the policies in writing?

z How is a cybercrime reporter or victim addressed by investigators?

z What training do officers receive on TFV?

z How do other agencies (prosecutor’s offices, courts, victims’ assistance organizations)

handle cases?

z Are cross-jurisdiction cooperative agreements established? Does the state provide resources
for investigations?

z Who in the agency has computer expertise that may be useful in investigations?

Community members (handlers)

Collaboration with community members can impact offender behavior through intervention
and supervision. Community members who are mandated reporters can limit criminal conduct
in some cases.

Potential community partners include the following:

z Victim services and the courts, pretrial services

z Hospitals and sexual assault response teams (SART), urgent care, drug treatment
(counseling, inpatient)

z Rape crisis centers, domestic violence advocacy centers, counselors and mental health providers

z K–12 schools, higher education (both on campus and via online student portals, summer camps)

z Exercise facilities and local gyms, community centers, game fields, and parks

z Local neighborhood groups, homeowners associations (HOA), social media (NextDoor,

FrontPorchForum, Facebook groups)

Understanding Your Local Problem: Asking the Right Questions | 17

 Digital environment and internet (managers)
Technology companies, internet service providers, and software developers can limit criminal conduct
in online and digital applications as well as tracking and removing TBV offenders.

z Do internet providers have cybersecurity settings documented and enforce rules of conduct?

z Are social media applications and platforms monitoring for safety? What are the report-
ing protocols?

z Are local businesses and schools monitoring digital communication?

z Do providers offer cybersecurity training or cybercrime awareness program? Are LEAs involved?

18 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Responses to Technology-Facilitated
Violence—A Comprehensive Strategy
A COMPREHE NSI VE ST RAT EGY TO DEAL WITH TFV will involve victim safety and the suc-
cessful investigation and prosecution of offenders. TFV is a complex problem, and responses should
be customized based on the data analysis and available resources. In most TFV, the offender behav-
ior involves a “course of conduct” through time that is perpetrated to threaten the victim. Docu-
mentation of online evidence and digital communication is essential to establish a pattern of
conduct and the offender’s intent. Victims should be asked to keep a detailed diary of interactions
and print or archive images and messages when possible. Appendix A is a sample stalking incident
and behavior log that can be provided to victims. Not only will the information be useful to the
investigation and prosecution, but also the victim can be empowered in their own response.

Many federal and state resources provide information on how to conduct search warrants for elec-
tric materials. The U.S. Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
Criminal Division (CCIPS) has published a guide, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining
Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations,53 and many fusion centers also have guides and tool-
kits for SLTT investigators.

General response
Many small and rural agencies do not have a specialized internet crime unit, but front-line officers
and civilian personnel can obtain assistance or training through various resources. Virtual training
can be completed at minimal or no cost, and online resources are available from federal agencies and
NGOs. In addition, appendix B is a Summary List of Responses that provides suggested actions for
LEAs and collaborative partners in the field.

53. Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Service, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic
Evidence in Criminal Investigations, OLE Litigation series (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-ccips/ccips-documents-and-reports.

| 19
 Connect with other agencies and jurisdictions. It is important that local police departments share
information and coordinate their activities with other local jurisdictions to maximize resources. All
LEAs have access to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fusion center—an analytic hub to
share information and get intelligence updates. The FBI has specially trained cyber squads in all 56
field offices who will provide technical assistance and investigation support with other National Cyber
Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) partners.

Maintain a presence in local social platforms. Create and maintain LEA accounts on local social media
platforms, with contact information for individuals to report concerns and potential digital crimes.
The contact information should be a dispatch or general on-call number, and the 24/7 response can be
supplemented by other staff as appropriate.

Prevention resources and outreach should target at-risk populations identified through collaborative
partners and the problem analysis conducted by the LEA. Community champions can also be enlisted
to collaborate on prevention outreach and community trust events. LEAs can discuss cyber safety for
students and families during back-to-school and holiday events, as a trusted community partner.
Online safety is an important topic for every person and general prevention materials can be used to
open dialogue and promote cyber safety.

Specific responses

Victim report
The effective investigation and arrest of TFV offenders requires a victim-centered approach that uses
trauma-informed interviewing techniques. In 2022, the U.S. Department of Justice released an updated
publication, Improving Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence by Identify-
ing and Preventing Gender Bias,54 that includes eight principles for SLTT to improve conviction rates:

1. Recognize and address biases, assumptions, and stereotypes about victims.

2. Treat all victims with respect.

3. Ensure that policies, training, supervision, and resource allocation support thorough
and effective investigations.

54. Office on Violence Against Women, “Improving Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic
Violence by Identifying and Preventing Gender Bias,” last modified December 19, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/
ovw/policing-guidance.

20 | Technology Facilitated Violence

 4. Appropriately classify reports of sexual assault or domestic violence.

5. Refer victims to appropriate services (health care, advocacy, legal services, etc.).

6. Properly identify the predominant aggressor in domestic violence incidents.

7. Implement policies to prevent officer perpetrated sexual assault and domestic violence and hold
officers who commit these offenses accountable.

8. Maintain, review, and act on data regarding sexual assault and domestic violence.

Victim interview considerations

Trauma-informed victim interviews require preparation, patience, and respect. The ultimate goal is to
document criminal behavior and provide resources to help support the victim. One avenue of support
is arrest and conviction based on a strong investigation report.

z If possible, provide the option of a victim advocate during the interview.

z Listen closely to victims—even if what they say sounds unbelievable—and document everything.

z It is important to ask open-ended questions and give the victim plenty of time to respond.

z Screen for related crimes, such as other methods of threat or intimidation, domestic violence,
and sexual abuse.

z Look at the duration, intensity, and frequency of the behaviors.

z When asking questions about electronic evidence, explain why the evidence would be helpful.

z Connect the individual with victim services.

z Provide the victim with information on protection orders.55

Does the agency have written policy for online investigations? Be sure that any online investigation
has approval of supervisor and follows the written policies and procedures.

55. SPARC (Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center), Stalking Cases: Law Enforcement Investiga-
tions and Report Writing (Washington, DC: Stalking Prevention, Awareness, & Resource Center, 2022),
https://www.stalkingawareness.org/law-enforcement-resources/.

Responses to Technology-Facilitated Violence—A Comprehensive Strategy | 21

 Are staff members trained on search and seizure of digital equipment and peripherals, such as cell
phones, laptops, external hard drives, memory cards, and servers? Make sure to institute department
policy on securing the scene, evidence collection, and storage of digital equipment that will ensure
safe analysis.56

Work with others to identify specific possible charges. During the investigation and in partnership
with the District Attorney, identify all the possible charges related to technology, communications,
privacy, and confidentiality that can apply to TFV:

z Unauthorized access

z Unauthorized recording/taping, illegal monitoring of communications, surveillance

z Identity theft, impersonation

z Privacy violations: Reasonable expectation of privacy, voyeurism

z Confidentiality violations: Including regulations and use of digital equipment that

apply to the offender’s place of employment

z Defamatory libel, slander, economic, or reputational harms

z Burglary, reckless endangerment, obstruction of justice, possession of a device for

unlawful purposes

z Violation of no contact orders, protection orders, and restraining orders

Victim impact statements and testimony should also be used to determine charges and sentencing
recommendations. TFV crimes are based on power and control of the victim, with the intent to
cause the victim fear for their safety. The victim of TFV can suffer significant personal and emo-
tional trauma, as well as negative impacts on employment and housing depending on the crime.
Any stressors and sustained losses should be clearly documented in the victim impact statement.

Coordination with victim services and community resources

It is critical that SLTT LEAs collaborate with victim services and community resources to pro-
vide support for TFV victims. The impact of TFV can last for years, and victims may require a
variety of services that can be provided by collaborative partners. In addition, coordination
with advocates provides opportunities to learn more about the topic of TFV and local resources.

56. National Institute of Justice, Electronic Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders, second edition
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/electronic-crime-scene-
investigation-guide-first-responders-second-edition.

22 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Also, bringing in advocates to work with victims during the initial reporting can help create a safe,
supportive environment.

Most courts and LEAs provide the contact information for local victim services, but a nationwide
directory is also available at https://ovc.ojp.gov/directory-crime-victim-services/search#search.
The directory can also be used by SLTT to find services, because the filters include location, type
of crime, and services provided.

The Cyber Civil Rights Initiative has an image abuse crisis hotline for victims of intimate image abuse
(nonconsensual intimate image sharing), as well as other forms of online abuse. The hotline also pro-
vides support and referral services: 844-878-2274.

NCMEC provides a cyber tipline for cyberbullying and CSAM that also has references and resources
for victims and their families, 1-800-THE-LOST (1-800-843-5678), https://www.missingkids.org/
gethelpnow/cybertipline. NCMEC also supports Take It Down (https://takeitdown.ncmec.org/), a
service to help remove and stop the online sharing of CSAM. Take It Down will also help any adult
remove CSAM created before they were 18 years old.

The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (https://www.ic3.gov/) is the U.S. centralized location to
report TFV and other cybercrimes such as elder abuse. IC3 also provides resources and technical
assistance for SLTT, as well as alerts about changes in online crime patterns.

State and metropolitan fusion centers are operated across the United States and its territories, sup-
ported by DHS funding. Fusion centers provide resources, training, and other coordinated services
in support of community safety through a strong national network of collaboration. Fusion centers
can provide support to local law enforcement through investigation and arrest of TFV offenders.
https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.

Measuring effectiveness
SLTT LEAs should include evaluation measures to determine response effectiveness to TFV as part of
overall operations review. Leadership can identify best practices and model policies that produce
strong results. Officers can attend training and collaborate with other local jurisdictions to share
resources and investigation materials. Law enforcement can also work with victim services, the prose-
cutor’s office, and the courts to ensure victims are safe and offenders are prosecuted. Data analysis and
assessment can help identify policy changes that are having a positive impact on crime prevention.
Repeated domestic violence calls for service to one address indicate a need for intervention, including
not just arrest of the offender but also referrals to victim counseling and community resources. Data

Responses to Technology-Facilitated Violence—A Comprehensive Strategy | 23

 can also be collected from the court, victim services, and community services to optimize limited
LEA resources. Determine what common factors help to ensure successful prosecution of offenders.
Identify the most useful resources to support stalking victims and provide that information during
the initial report. Collaborating with community partners will provide opportunities for information
exchange and may result in life-saving information for the LEA, potentially allowing the proactive
investigation and arrest of a stalking offender rather than response to a volatile domestic violence
incident in progress.

Community prevention and awareness programs can provide opportunities for positive outreach and
feedback about issues of concern. Agencies can use social media outreach to engage a wide range of
community members about TFV topics such as doxing, cyberstalking, and harassment. For example,
school resource officers (SRO) and law enforcement are teaching about online safety in K–12 and
post-secondary schools. In addition to the crucial information provided to students and teachers,
officers are available for children and young adults who may be victims of online crimes like sextor-
tion. Law enforcement can also partner with social services to provide resources and training for crime
victims, such as helping stalking victims create a historic record of harassment—not only will the
record help victims, but also it can later aid prosecutors in establishing a pattern of offender conduct
during trial.

The measures of effectiveness and data collection can be used by law enforcement to explain crime
trends and budget needs to city or county officials. The data can also be used to demonstrate suc-
cessful agency work and crime prevention efforts that have a positive impact on the community.
Agencies can also promote the success of multiagency collaborations and comprehensive victim
support. TFV will continue to increase over time as technology evolves and creates new opportu-
nities for online crime.

24 | Technology Facilitated Violence

Appendix A.
Stalking Incident and Behavior Log Template
REPORT/
INCIDENT
WITNESS EVIDENCE? NUMBER
NAME(S) WITH (PHOTOS, VIDEO, (OFFICER NAME
DATE/ DESCRIPTION LOCATION OF CONTACT SCREENSHOTS, & BADGE
TIME OF INCIDENT INCIDENT INFORMATION* ITEMS, ETC.) NUMBER)

* Do not include any confidential information that you don’t want your stalker to see.

| 25
 Appendix B. Summary of Responses
RESPONSE HOW IT WORKS WORKS BEST IF . . . CONSIDERATIONS

Conducting Increases awareness of crime . . . programs are designed Finding adequate time for programs
TFV prevention to increase online safety, with other LEA tasks; combining the
programs for not just awareness, and education with other online prevention
community support best practices programming topics such as financial
members crimes

Locating Increases chance offender will be . . . coordinated with other Requires specialized expertise to
CSAM sites apprehended; law enforcement agencies and jurisdictions access hidden areas of the Internet
agencies conduct their own
searches of the Internet for CSAM

Conducting Deters offenders through . . . coordinated with other Requires specialized expertise to
undercover sting increased risk of apprehension; agencies and jurisdictions access hidden areas of the Internet
operations undercover law enforcement
agents enter pedophile
newsgroups, etc., to collect
evidence against offenders

Setting up honey Increases chance offender will . . . the existence of the sites Requires specialized expertise to
trap sites be apprehended; phony child is widely publicized to access hidden areas of the Internet
pornography sites are established increase the deterrent effect
that capture the details of
offenders who attempt to access
the supposed CSAM

Publicizing Increases the perception . . . publicity is widespread Requires specialized expertise to

crackdowns among offenders that the and sustained access hidden areas of the Internet
Internet is an unsafe environ-
ment to access CSAM

Conducting Increases chance offender will . . . police have strong links Key role for local police
traditional criminal be apprehended; police uncover with key community groups
investigations information about CSAM in the
course of their daily work

Implementing a Addresses both victimization . . . the collaborative does an Group should be educated about
comprehensive and offending; identifies gaps appraisal of the community’s what works in reducing domestic
and collaborative in strategies, resources, and response to domestic violence victimization and revictim-
response strategy response protocols violence to identify what is ization and the limitations of some
and isn’t working and gaps approaches; group should commit
to evaluating implemented response
strategies; collaboration with a
university researcher may be use-
ful; will probably require a cham-
pion who pursues a collaborative
response strategy

Educating Increases likelihood of adoption of . . . collaborative partners Requires high level of coordination
collaborative proven effective responses commit to relying on
partners facts and research, rather
than anecdotes

26 |
 RESPONSE HOW IT WORKS WORKS BEST IF . . . CONSIDERATIONS

Tailoring the police Applies the most appropriate . . . offender is told about Accurate victimization and offending
response on the type and level of response to the the measures police put in information is needed to select the
basis of offender particular victim and offender place; graded responses most appropriate level of response
and victim risk are applied quickly because
the highest risk period for
further assault is within the
first four weeks of the last
assault

Educating potential Encourages victim reporting, . . . efforts are highly If evaluation mechanisms are not put
victims and demotivates potential offenders, targeted and focused on a in place, the campaign, which can be
offenders or raises the consciousness of geographic area or certain costly, will remain of unknown value
potential witnesses to abuse high-risk groups

Encouraging Deters potential and . . . at-risk populations and Hard core batterers are not likely to be
victims and actual offenders their peers and neighbors deterred just by calling, so more must
witnesses to call believe that calling the be done
the police police will be effective

Encouraging Increases likelihood of effec- . . . medical professionals Requires active participation of

medical profes- tive intervention in abusive have adequate training community’s medical profession
sionals to screen relationships
for domestic
violence victim-
ization and make
appropriate
referrals

Providing victims Provides safe place for victims; . . . there is a belief that each May require extensive discus-
with emergency improves information sharing service provider, including sions by parties to define roles,
protection and between police and victim service the police, has a common responsibilities, and limits of
services after an providers; informs police about interest in ensuring victim partnership; collaboration requires
assault high-risk victims and offenders; safety and demotivating the agreement about confidentiality
links victims with other essential offender issues
services

Assessing the Determines need for immediate . . . officers/collaborators Requires training and timely and
threat of repeat protection of victim and are trained to assess accurate intelligence information
victimization apprehension of offender revictimization threats

Arresting offenders Incapacitates offender during high- . . . a graded response Under some conditions arrest may
risk periods and deters potential to battering is adopted increase risk of revictimization; some
and actual offenders depending on the likelihood offenders undeterred by arrest
of re-battering; used with
situational crime prevention
opportunity blocking
framework

Creating multi- Provides a range of expertise in . . . formed as a collabor- As a stand-alone strategy, not likely
agency task forces critical areas ative partnership between to directly impact the scope or level
public, private, and non- of the problem
profit agencies

Working across Creates the ability to build cases . . . created through formal Relationships require maintenance;
jurisdictions against highly mobile offenders; interagency agreements need clear indications of the lead
incorporates expertise in areas of with clear and specific agency in specific cases; potential
co-occurring crimes protocols for line-level for “turf” issues to reduce efficacy
officers

Appendix B. Summary of Responses | 27

 RESPONSE HOW IT WORKS WORKS BEST IF . . . CONSIDERATIONS

Improving reporting Improves the quality of the data . . . clear directions for Rate of reported crimes will increase;
mechanisms available to assess the scope of reporting are widely potential for one agency to interfere
the local problem; creates the publicized; specific with the activities of another working
ability to provide services to avoid protocols for agency cross- the same case
repeat victimization reporting are developed

Training police to Increases the quality of . . . ongoing training is Requires long-term commitment to
interview sexual investigations; increases sensitivity available; barriers to training; requires obtaining access
assault victims to victims’ needs accessing information to information that is traditionally not
held by other agencies are quickly available to police
removed up front

Decreasing victims’ Improves the ability to support . . . contact is ongoing Requires long-term commitment
isolation victims of GBV; improves the and in person; contacts
chances of early detection are knowledgeable about
warning signs

Training police Increases possibilities for early . . . there are ongoing May still require a mental health
and professionals detection working relationships professional to determine the
involved in TFV with between police and the capacity for consent; assessments
joint sessions professionals; a specific are expensive
officer is identified for future
inquiries

Improving police Improves response by better . . . training covers a range Limited evaluation of its overall impact
understanding of preparing professionals for of specific topics on the problem; may be ineffective if
TFV and connection these cases not backed up by adequate resources
with other crimes to respond to elder abuse cases

Developing policies Improves quality of investigations . . . policies and protocol are Policies must be reinforced through
and protocol that by providing specific directions clear and specify nature of monitoring and enforcement
communicate the and emphasizing seriousness of interagency relationships
importance of TFV the problem

Promoting Ensures that victims will receive . . . professionals are Requires attention to factors that
collaborative TFV appropriate interventions from committed to working commonly undermine interagency
efforts to respond multiple professionals together and focused on the collaborations
across jurisdictions goal of protecting vulnerable
individuals; backed by laws
that require collaboration

Customizing police Ensures that interventions are . . . tailored to local conditions Requires extra time and effort
responses to the responsive to all victim populations to develop special responses to
special needs of GBV victims
GBV victims

Reducing general Reduces general risk factors that . . . special attention is given Difficult for police to affect general
community and contribute to TFV and GBV to risk factors affecting community-level factors such as
cultural risk factors highest-risk victims (e.g., poverty, housing, health care
marginalized populations)

Adopting Allows the system to address . . . victim’s individual Victims may lose their independence
mandatory arrest stalking before cases escalate needs and preferences are and experience more harm than good
and prosecution considered when deciding if offender is arrested; if arrest is to be
policies whether to arrest and made, police should initiate the action,
prosecute offender rather than putting burden on victim
to do so

28 | Technology Facilitated Violence

 RESPONSE HOW IT WORKS WORKS BEST IF . . . CONSIDERATIONS

Identifying stalking Allows the system to address . . . the police department Requires the department to identify
cases early stalking before cases escalate implements a clear stalking and track repeat crimes
protocol and trains all
officers in the screening of
stalking cases

Getting effective Provides police with the . . . victims trust police Police should also solicit input
victim input information necessary to from the victim’s family members,
apprehend, build prosecutable neighbors, employer, coworkers,
cases against, and deter stalkers and others

Ensuring that Victims create safety plans and . . . the department Requires the availability of advocates
victims receive receive support from advocates, encourages the use of trained and experienced in safety
consistent, thereby ensuring victim safety and advocates and officers planning
professional support while saving the police are trained to use them in
support services department’s manpower resources stalking cases
throughout the
criminal justice
process

Using a Gathers service providers . . . all applicable service Requires that all involved develop
collaborative, and community resources to providers and stakeholders working relationships and coordi-
multidisciplinary coordinate a wide-ranging are included in the problem- nate together
approach response; ensures that the victim’s solving effort
personal information and privacy
are protected

Enforcing all Provides a record to establish . . . police recognize the Requires cooperation
relevant laws stalking behavior via arrest records stalking pattern early on from prosecutors

Assessing the Identifies the stalking motives . . . police gather sufficient Requires the commitment of
threat the stalker and threat levels, and enables reliable information on investigative resources to properly
poses the development of an effective which to assess the threat assess threats in individual cases
response for the particular victim

Warning and Deters and/or . . . stalkers are genuinely Requires cooperation

arresting stalkers incapacitates stalkers unaware that their conduct from prosecutors
is illegal and/or threatening,
and police recognize the
threat stalkers pose

Adopting a Tailors the official response to the . . . there are adequate Protocol should be sufficiently
graduated- threat each stalking incident poses, resources available to flexible to adapt to the circum-
response stalking thereby increasing the likelihood respond to stalking, and stances of each case
protocol of effectiveness while conserving sufficient information in
scarce resources each case to tailor the
appropriate response

Monitoring stalkers Improves the development of . . . the police department Surveillance of suspects can
and gathering criminal cases against stalkers prioritizes stalking cases be labor-intensive
evidence to make officers and other
resources available

Providing victims Enhances the quantity and . . . the contact is provided All police officers should receive
with a single point quality of the information victims with all relevant information basic training in stalking
of contact provide to police; enhances to assist victims
victims’ confidence in police
and willingness to assist with
prosecutions

Appendix B. Summary of Responses | 29

 About the COPS Office
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state,
local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police
and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address
our nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address
underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strate-
gic problem-solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire commu-
nity policing officers and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS
Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local gov-
ernment leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has been appropriated more than $20 billion to add community policing
officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives,
and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. Other achievements
include the following:
z To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 136,000 additional officers by more
than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
z More than 800,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have
been trained through COPS Office–funded training organizations and the COPS Training Portal.
z More than 1,000 agencies have received customized advice and peer-led technical assistance
through the COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance Center.
z To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than nine million topic-specific publications,
training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs and flash drives.

The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums focused on issues critical to
law enforcement. COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing
topics such as school and campus safety, violent crime, and officer safety and wellness, can be down-
loaded via the COPS Office’s home page, https://cops.usdoj.gov.

30 |
Technology-facilitated violence (TFV) such as doxing, swatting, or cyberstalking is a cybercrime
that harms victims via use of the internet and mobile technology. This publication is a resource
that will assist state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies in addressing these issues. It
begins with an overview of TFV crimes, including definitions and examples of offenses. It also
presents tools to identify and measure the problem at a local level, as well as strategies for crime
prevention and crime investigation. Finally, it includes data and resources to illustrate the
complexity of cybercrimes and violence against vulnerable populations, with a focus on victim-
centered response.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
145 N Street NE
Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details about COPS Office programs,

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800-421-6770.

Visit the COPS Office online at cops.usdoj.gov.

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Published 2024