Understanding e Government Failure in The Developing Country Context A Process Oriented Study
Understanding e Government Failure in The Developing Country Context A Process Oriented Study
Understanding e Government Failure in The Developing Country Context A Process Oriented Study
To cite this article: Panom Gunawong & Ping Gao (2017) Understanding e-government failure in
the developing country context: a process-oriented study, Information Technology for Development,
23:1, 153-178, DOI: 10.1080/02681102.2016.1269713
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This research aims to investigate the underlying process-based Actor-network theory;
causes of e-government failure. Through the lens of actor-network accumulated process;
theory, this paper presents a process-oriented study of the failure developing countries;
of Thailand’s Smart ID Card project. Adding to the extant e-government failure;
process-oriented study;
knowledge on e-government failures that attributes this Thailand
phenomenon to internal and external factors, this paper argues
that the reason the project failed was a cumulative process of
failure to create and maintain the actor-network. Policy
implications for developing countries to efficiently manage their
e-government initiatives are given, such as adopting an open
principle in setting e-government project objectives and initiating
the actor-network; implementing the e-government target in
stages based on prepared environment; allowing an
e-government system to evolve according to the degree of
readiness in the information and communications technology
(ICT) system design, implementation and local adoption; and
including large, nationwide projects as part of a national
informatization strategy.
1. Introduction
This paper addresses one important topic covered by this journal: national initiatives that
facilitate the contribution of information and communications technology (ICT) to econ-
omic growth and structural change in the context of developing countries. Since the
mid-1990s, the widespread adoption of Internet-based ICT has encouraged many
countries, both developed and developing, to adopt e-governments, which were expected
to transform the public administrative system and to improve the efficiency of public
service (Holliday, 2002; Wescott, 2001). As early as 2003, 198 countries had implemented
e-government projects (Haldenwang, 2004). According to Navarra and Cornford (2005,
p. 9), “e-government involves the creation, development and interlinking of a variety of
social, institutional and technological ecologies to deliver services which are perceived
as legitimate, innovative, useful and welfare enhancing.” This statement implies that
e-government projects are complex and involve multiple tasks, including constructing a
CONTACT Ping Gao ping.gao@manchester.ac.uk Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester,
Arthur Lewis Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Sajda Qureshi is the accepting Associate Editor for this article.
© 2017 Commonwealth Secretariat
154 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
large-scale ICT infrastructure, restructuring public activities, and offering a broad range of
public services. Because of their complexity, e-government projects generally risk undesir-
able outcomes, for example, budget overspending, falling behind schedule, fewer func-
tions, and failure to achieve the original objectives of the project (Goldfinch, 2007). The
situation in the developing world, where 80% of e-government projects have failed to
achieve part or all of their main goals, is even more severe (UNDESA, 2003). Some projects
– for example, Thailand’s Smart ID Card project, which is analyzed in this paper – have even
been abandoned.
As a widely existing phenomenon, e-government failure has recently received
increased research attention from both information systems and public administration
scholars (Goldfinch, 2007; Gronlund & Horan, 2005). However, most studies have
focused on developed countries, but e-government failure in developing countries
appears poorly understood (Ciborra, 2005; Stanforth, 2007). Moreover, the majority of
the literature has focused on identifying the external economic and technological
elements and internal organizational factors that impact the implementation and adop-
tion of e-government projects. We lack knowledge of the dynamic processes that different
causes accumulate, leading to e-government failure. The process drivers that lead to
e-government failure are poorly understood.
Through a case study of Thailand’s Smart ID Card project, this paper aims to address
these research gaps and to enhance our understanding of the underlying process-
based causes of e-government failure in the context of a developing country. Our research
question is as follows: how do different causes emerge, accumulate and ultimately lead to
e-government project failure?
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on e-govern-
ment in developing countries, focusing on failure phenomena. In Section 3, we introduce
the actor-network theory (ANT), justifying it as an appropriate theoretical lens for our
research. In Section 4, we describe the case background and data collection and data
analysis methods. In Section 5, we draw upon ANT terminologies to dissect the case of
Thailand’s Smart ID Card project. The final two sections discuss the theoretical findings
on e-government failures. Useful lessons are drawn for countries to prevent failures in
their e-government initiatives. We also discuss the potential of ANT to uncover the
deep causes of the ICT project failures.
for review, all of which were ranked as “best quality” by the ISI Web of Knowledge. Inves-
tigations were then undertaken one issue at a time and one article at a time. Only a few
articles were found on e-government in developing countries, indicating that high-level
research on this topic has been rare in both fields. Next, we searched the electronic
journal database in our library and identified six journals that focus on e-government.
We then scanned every issue of these six journals. To identify relevant articles, we first
read the titles and then the abstracts of the articles. We read the full texts of the articles
that the screening indicated were relevant to our theme. Forty-three articles were found to
be useful. Last, to ensure the inclusion of articles from back issues, we investigated the ABI
and EBSCO databases using the keywords “e-government in developing countries” and
“electronic government in developing countries.” It was found that most of the relevant
articles located in this manner were the same as those identified using the first two
methods. We found only eight additional relevant articles. These 51 articles included
both empirical and documentary research. Because the objective of this review is to
explore real and implicit e-government phenomena in developing countries, we ultimately
selected the 36 empirical articles for review. The selected journals are listed in Appendix
1. The review results are documented in Appendices 2 and 3. Specifically, Appendix 2 sum-
marizes the research foci, findings, frameworks, analytical approaches, and methods of the
selected articles. Appendix 3 categorizes the factors that cause e-government failures in
developing countries.
The literature review result disclosed important research gaps. First, the majority of the
literature on e-government in developing countries has addressed the issue of e-govern-
ment service adoption by citizens, e-government usage in organizations, and e-govern-
ment website design. Taking e-government in Malaysia as example, Isa, Suhami, Safie,
and Semsudin (2011) have investigated the usability and accessibility of Malaysian e-gov-
ernment websites. Lean, Zailani, Ramayah, and Fernando (2009) have focused on the
factors influencing the intention to use e-government services among citizens in Malaysia,
identifying the elements of trust, perceived usefulness, perceived relative advantage, per-
ceived image, and perceived complexity. Hussein, Karim, Mohamed, and Ahlan (2007)
have analyzed the organizational factors that influence e-government success in selected
public-sector agencies in Malaysia, including top management support, decision-making
structure, management style, managerial ICT knowledge, goal alignment, and resource
allocation. Seng, Jackson, and Philip (2010) have examined cultural barriers and enablers
in organizations that have either impeded or facilitated the implementation of e-govern-
ment initiatives. They contrasted two cases in Malaysia: one displaying constraining
characteristics that impeded e-government service use and the other displaying enabling
characteristics that facilitated use. Second, some scholars have revealed that many e-gov-
ernment project implementation processes are flawed (Gronlund & Horan, 2005). Never-
theless, this research primarily uses model- and category-based frameworks to identify
several factors that have constrained the implementation of e-government projects,
including retarded economic growth, low productivity, lack of skilled personnel, bad ICT
infrastructure, poor Internet access, high computer illiteracy, and so on, in the developing
world (Chen, Chen, Huang, & Ching, 2006). Both the failure process and the dynamic mech-
anisms of this complex phenomenon have been largely ignored. Specifically, of the 36
empirical articles, only 3 articles were process-oriented studies; in contrast, the other 33
articles held static views of the e-government failure phenomenon (Appendix 2). Finally,
156 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
e-government projects are typically complex in nature, and their implementation requires
many actors with varied resources for and different interests in these projects. If actors are
to work together efficiently, they must be co-ordinated. However, papers normally focus
on the role of one specific type of actor in a particular e-government initiative, such as citi-
zens and public agencies (Chircu, 2008; Rowley, 2011). They often fail to provide a full
picture of the common efforts of various actors.
In concluding the literature review, we argue that more research efforts are required to
understand the process of e-government project implementation, during which various
challenges can appear at various stages. Furthermore, we should focus on the interactions
of different actors when collectively addressing the emerging challenges that determine
the success or failure of a project (Madon, Sahay, & Sahay, 2004). In this paper, we draw
upon ANT to investigate these phenomena in the case of Thailand’s Smart ID Card
project to shed light on the deep roots of the causes of the failure of e-government in
the developing world.
human artifact, through the lens of actor-network building and maintenance. More specifi-
cally, ANT attributes this failure to the failed creation and maintenance of an actor-
network, which is evident from the original works by the founding ANT theorists. Law
and Callon (1992) trace the actor-network of the failed project of a British military aircraft,
which consisted of the existing industry, labor, and government. These actors failed to
align themselves with each other to develop and produce a new aircraft. Consequently,
the shape and fate of this project were determined by the degree of privacy for project
builders to make mistakes without interference by other actors (Stalder, 2002). Latour
(1996) explains the demise of Aramis, the revolutionary public transportation system of
Paris. He argues that this technological system failed not because any particular actor
killed it but because the actors collectively failed to sustain it by negotiating and adapting
to a changing social situation (Tatnall & Gilding, 1999). Callon (1986) uses ANT as a theor-
etical lens to investigate the declining scallop population in St. Brieuc Bay. The main actors
in this network include three researchers, their associated scientific community, the gov-
ernment, and fishermen. Because the scallops were fished to species-threatening levels,
the fishermen were concerned about their livelihoods. The researchers wanted to exper-
iment with new Japanese intensive-farming techniques in an attempt to restock the bay.
In explaining various stages of scallop development, the author offers an account of not
only how power relationships were constructed, maintained, or destroyed within the
network but also how certain actors persuaded others to comply.
In recent years, scholars have drawn upon ANT to understand how and why ICT projects
fail to be implemented or used. For example, Gao (2007) analyzes the causes of failure to
implement a wireless local-area network standard in China, which was that different actors
established two contradictory networks, namely, counter-networks (Castells, 2000), that
could not cooperate in key project implementation decisions. Mähring, Holmström, Keil,
and Montealegre (2004) explores why a technological project could not deliver the
intended outcome. Sarker, Sarker, and Sidorova (2006) explain the implementation
failure of an ICT-supported business process change initiative. Agreeing with Gronlund
and Horan (2005), they find that the properties of the social structure constructed by differ-
ent actors in an ICT project determined the success or failure of the project. Our paper
extends the application of ANT to the analysis of e-government failure.
company in the United States, Sarker et al. (2006) provide a good summary of the relevant
terminologies of actor-network translation, a term originally coined by Callon (1986).
Based on these two works, the following table introduces the ANT vocabulary used in
our case study (Table 1).
Translation involves creating a temporary social order or the movement from one order
to another through changes in the interest alignments in a network (Sarker et al., 2006).
Problematization is the first moment of translation. At this moment, the focal actor, an
organization with the capacity of establishing and controlling an actor-network, creates
the project and identifies other participating actors from its point of view. One major chal-
lenge for the focal actor is to negotiate with others to establish an obligatory passage
point (OPP) that is acceptable to all. The OPP is a certain point that forces all actors to con-
verge on a shared topic, purpose, and action plan. The OPP relates to the process through
which the focal actor convinces all other actors to accept the proposal of a network. Each
actor must pass the OPP to achieve its interests (Callon, 1986). For example, in the British
military aircraft project, the project management of designing a new strategic jet fighter
became an OPP between representatives of government and aerospace engineers (Law
& Callon, 1992).
At the interessement moment, the focal actor convinces the other actors to align
their interests around the project target and motivates them to overcome obstacles
to passing through the OPP. In doing so, the focal actor often must manipulate
necessary devices, such as standards, budgeting, meetings, debates, and conversa-
tions, to lure others into fitting positions in the network (Callon, 1986; Sarker
et al., 2006).
If interessement is successful, enrollment will occur when the focal actor negotiates
with other actors to define their roles in creating or implementing the technological arti-
fact, and uses various strategies to convince them to align their interests with their desig-
nated roles (Callon, 1986). At this moment, swift translation, which is a process in which an
actor rapidly inherits relationships, roles, and agreements from its host actor-network, can
occur. A Trojan actor-network, which is a betrayal of the host actor-network established in
the initial problematization stage, might emerge (Mähring et al., 2004).
The final moment is mobilization, which aims both to keep the actors’ interests aligned
with that of the focal actor and to ensure that the actor-network works as a single unit to
achieve the goal as planned. Failure in mobilization indicates that the actor-network is
betrayed by some actors and will collapse (Callon, 1986).
4. Research methods
4.1. Case study design
A case study in general is suitable for answering “how” or “why” questions about a con-
temporary set of events (Yin, 2002), and in particular our research objective of under-
standing how do different causes emerge, accumulate, and ultimately lead to e-
government project failure. Thailand’s Smart ID Card project will serve as our study
sample. This project was initiated in 2003 by the Thai Cabinet as part of its desire to
use smart ID cards, a state-of-the-art technology, to revolutionize the national public
administration system and transform Thailand into a world leader in public service mod-
ernization. The use of new ICT in the public sector was expected to reduce corruption,
increase transparency, and improve governance. The project was to be implemented in
four stages and to conclude by 2007. However, as shown in Table 2, the stage goals
were not achieved according to that timeline. Only 12 million ID cards were ultimately
issued, far fewer than the original target of covering all 64 million Thai citizens (Depart-
ment of Provincial Administration, 2004). Moreover, these cards had no electronic func-
tionality and could not replace the identity cards, civil servant cards, and medical care
cards that people already used. During the process of the Smart ID Card project
implementation, various problems continued to emerge, cumulatively leading to
project failure.
The Cabinet was the focal actor of the Smart ID Card actor-network, making
decisions about key issues regarding the project. Other main actors included the Min-
istry of ICT, the Ministry of the Interior, and the citizens. The Ministry of ICT was the
national authority regulating the ICT industry therefore was (of course) ordered to
take over card production in the Smart ID Card project. The Ministry of the Interior
was responsible for citizen database management. It was in charge of card distribution.
The citizens were the card users. These actors had different interests in and varied
resources available to, this project and accepted different responsibilities (Table 3).
For the purpose of coordination, the Cabinet formed the Committee for the Integration
and Reform Registration System (CIRRS). Chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, the
CIRRS included relevant ministers, high-ranking officers from various government
departments, and ICT and management experts. The Smart ID Card project is a good
case for us to understand the technological and social factors that determine the
160 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
Phase 2, 2005 . The Cabinet forced the Ministry of the Interior to accept the
1st batch of 12 million smart ID cards.
. The cards began to be officially issued to citizens in
. To produce and issue the 2nd batch of 26 million
October 2005.
smart ID cards
. Production of the 2nd batch of 26 million smart ID cards
. To replace cash cards, debit cards, credit cards, and
telephone cards with the smart ID cards was not completed on a timely basis.
. The smart ID cards could not be used electronically or
. To use the smart ID card for residence registration,
replace any other cards.
referenda, and elections
Phase 3, 2006 . Bidding for the production of the 2nd batch smart ID cards
• To produce and issue the 3rd batch of 26 million smart did not go through.
ID cards . In August 2006, the Ministry of the Interior stopped issuing
• To replace passports, driving licences, debit cards, and smart ID cards because it had run out of stock.
credit cards with the smart ID cards . In September 2006, a military coup overthrew the
government in Thailand and interrupted the Smart ID Card
project.
Phase 4, 2007 . The Smart ID Card project was investigated by the new
• To give the smart ID card alternative uses, such as dual government for corruption and a lack of transparency.
contact, in other words, either contact or contact- . A magnetic card was issued to citizens and was used
less instead of the smart ID cards.
The above methods, including documentary research and interviews, yielded a report
of more than 1000 pages, which outlined the contour of a sequence of events and exhib-
ited both specific decision-making outcomes and the reasons for those outcomes. We
then coded the report with the ANT terminologies provided in Table 1. Finally, we
depicted the process of the Smart ID Card project as consisting of four moments of trans-
lation, during which a sustainable actor-network failed to be formed for reasons such as
actor betrayal and inadequate devices for use, and so on, leading to project failure.
To validate data from different sources, we performed data triangulation (Blaikie,
2000). For documentary research, this study used multiple sources of data to
compare the data for consistency. With regard to interview information, the interview
scripts obtained from multi-informants were compared to justify the logic and coher-
ence of the answers. Subsequently, the data from both the documentary research
and the interviews were compared again for consistency of information to create a logi-
cally coherent justification for the analysis. In interpreting the collected data, we
engaged in two types of dialogical reasoning to develop an empirically based under-
standing through dialogues (Monteiro, 2000; Reznitskaya et al., 2009). First, during dis-
cussion between the authors, we triangulated the data from one perspective that had a
deep background in the Thai government system and from another perspective that
analyzed the data from the viewpoint of an outsider generally entrenched in electronic
business research from the ANT perspective. As another dialogical perspective, the
authors engaged in discussion with the interviewees who acted as practitioners in
the Thai e-government context.
In creating this project, the Cabinet ignored the interests of citizens. They did not consider the
readiness of our society and the capability of the public sector to adopt the smart ID card. As a
result, the project objective was set to have Thailand become the world leader in e-govern-
ment by equipping every Thai citizen with a smart ID card. This was impossible to accomplish
within even 10 years. This project was very complicated, involving more than 60 million citi-
zens. In my opinion, it had already failed when it was initiated.
et al., 2006), such devices were unavailable for the Smart ID Card project. Consequently,
the actors involved could not be locked into proper positions in designing, producing,
and diffusing Smart ID cards. A researcher from a Thai university made the following
comments:
According to the relevant Thai laws, when contacted by a citizen, a public agency must require
him to provide a photocopy of his identity card. This means in practice that the smart ID card
cannot be used in a smart way. Regardless of how much personal information the card can
offer and how good the information systems are in processing the smart ID card services,
the public agencies would still offer the same services and do the same thing as they normally
did. We need new laws and regulations to ensure that different organizations work together to
make the smart ID card function smartly.
“The project should not be scrapped due to what were considered minor technical
glitches” (Bangkok Post, 2009). The House urged the Ministry of the Interior to quickly
issue the cards to citizens notwithstanding the fact that the cards were made to the
wrong specifications.
Consequently, the Ministry of ICT lost control of the non-human artifact, the blank smart
ID card, and its actor-network responsible for card design and production. The cards were
produced according to the wrong specifications. Such a smart ID card could be called a
Trojan actor, the emergence of which was fatal to the host actor-network (Mähring
et al., 2004). In the citizens’ hands, it functioned as a normal card, not as the expected
smart ID card.
6. Discussion
6.1. Causes of the failure of the smart ID card project: a contextual analysis
Interpreting the Thai Smart ID Card project case using ANT terminologies, especially the
translation concept, we find that errors existed from the beginning of the social translation
process, that is, the problematization moment. The initial actor-network did not include
independent, professional organizations with valuable technological knowledge and prac-
tical experience in ICT project design and implementation. Consequently, an infeasible
objective was set, causing the focal actor to fail to establish an OPP that could hold the
important actors together. This failure was the starting point of the failure of the Smart
ID Card project. The interessement moment was incomplete because of a lack of strong
devices. The budget was insufficient, restricting the progress of the project. Other impor-
tant devices such as standards, laws, and regulations were not in place. Consequently, the
Cabinet could not motivate the actors to commit to their designated roles in the actor-
network. The enrollment moment presented an uncontrollable, chaotic status. Consistent
with Lambright (1994) and Mähring et al. (2004), chaos at the enrollment moment arose
from the effects of the inefficient management of swift translation, which in our case
occurred between the technology vendor and the Ministry of ICT in card production. Con-
sequently, we saw the emergence of a Trojan actor, the malfunctioning blank smart ID
cards. Finally, betrayals of the different actors in the actor-network caused the Smart ID
Card project to collapse.
166 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
an open principle in initiating the actor-network. It must enroll relevant actors in the actor-
network and ensure that actors with strong interests and key resources have the oppor-
tunity to voice their concerns. The focal actor should implement measures both to
prevent the emergence of conflicts between actors and to resolve such conflicts if they
emerge. Necessary devices like budgets, laws, standards, and so on, should be available
so that the focal actor can maneuver to help each actor play its designated role in the
actor-network.
The outcome of an ICT project relies on the selection of a focal actor that can efficiently
manage the actor-network. The focal actor as the central unit plays a critical role in the
passage of e-government initiatives (Wescott, 2001). Ideally, the focal actor should be pro-
vided with a state of stability so that its interests in the maintenance and operation of the
actor-network can be sustained (Law & Callon, 1992). However, Thailand’s Smart ID Card
project was managed by an unqualified actor, the Cabinet, which experienced frequent
reshuffles. It would have been better to have an independent Parliamentary committee
to lead the project. Moreover, particularly in developing countries, the e-government
target should be implemented in stages and the e-government system should evolve
according to the degree of readiness, including domestic capabilities for ICT system
design and implementation, political status, local adoption level, and so on (Nour et al.,
2008). For example, Malaysia initiated an e-government plan as early as the mid-1990s,
but it was not until the mid-2000s that its e-government Internet portal began to offer
a broad range of services across the country, including a Generic Office Environment,
Electronic Procurement, a Human Resource Management Information System, a Project
Monitoring System, Electronic Services Delivery, an Electronic Labor Exchange, an
E-Sharia Court, and so on (Lean et al., 2009). The Smart ID Card project lacked the
support of a prepared environment. Finally, if possible, large nationwide projects such
as the Smart ID Card project should be included in the national informatization strategy.
Informatization is the production and use of ICT hardware, software, and services (Kraemer
& Dedrick, 1994; Seifert & Chung, 2009). One example of such a strategy is provided by the
State Council of China, which in 2005 published its National Informatization Development
Strategy 2006–2020. This publication established China’s 15-year goals for informatization
development, which included providing information infrastructure nationwide, building
an information-oriented national economy and society, enhancing the ability to apply
information technology among the public, and so on (People’s Daily, 2005). This type of
national strategy is a strong device for managing the actor-network in an e-government
initiative (Gao, 2007; Holliday, 2002).
7. Conclusions
Adding to the extant literature attributing e-government failure to several internal and
external factors, this paper demonstrates that this phenomenon should be investigated
as a cumulative process incurred by the failed creation and maintenance of an actor-
network around a feasible objective. Furthermore, from the ANT perspective, the founda-
tional causes of the failure of an ICT project can be traced and explained both by following
the four moments of the social translation process and by referring to other relevant ANT
terminologies as listed in Table 1. Specifically, the focal actor must ensure the smooth
translation of the actor-network by actively resolving various problems at different
168 P. GUNAWONG AND P. GAO
moments. At the initial problematization moment, the focal actor must invite relevant
actors to contribute their ideas to establish the objective of the actor-network, thus ensur-
ing that the objective is feasible in terms of technology, timing, and finance. The formation
of an improper project objective can be the starting point of the failure of the actor-
network. At the interessement moment, the key challenge of the focal actor is to
support the other actors in the network in their efforts both to play their roles properly
and to prevent betrayals from occurring by employing various financial, technological,
and administrative devices. At the enrollment moment, the key challenge for the focal
actor is the mobilization of other actors to work on the tasks assigned to them. One key
concern of the focal actor is to avoid the emergence of Trojan actors. The focal actor
should be guaranteed a stable status.
This research has limitations that should be addressed in future work. In the Smart ID
Card project, it is evident that the actor-network failed to achieve stability, and mobiliz-
ation was not achieved. Accordingly, this paper analyzes only how different actors
betrayed the actor-network (leading to its failure) rather than considering the mobilization
moment in full terms. To explore the full strength of ANT, it would be ideal to select a case
presenting all four of the moments. Moreover, to expand the findings of this case study
regarding e-government failure, future research should consider different types of ICT pro-
jects by different types of organizations and in different countries. It is also necessary to
contrast successful cases with the Smart ID Card project in Thailand.
Acknowledgements
We thank the Review Editor, Gerald Grant, and the two reviewers for their constructive and detailed
comments, which helped us to improve our work and ultimately make it publishable.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Panom Gunawong is a lecturer in the School of Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and
Public Administration at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Dr Gunawong holds a Ph.D. in Develop-
ment Informatics from the University of Manchester, UK. His core areas of research are e-govern-
ment, social media in public administration, failure analysis and actor-network theory.
Ping Gao is with the Global Development Institute, the University of Manchester. His research
focuses on IT innovation and standardization, especially in the Chinese context and from govern-
ment perspective.
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(Continued)
173
Continued.
174
Analytical
Articles: authors, titles, and outlets Research focus Research findings Framework approach Method
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175
(Continued)
Continued.
176
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