Final REPORT - CSWG Study 1.1

CLIMATE SUSTAINABILITY WORKING GROUP (CSWG) G20 2022
STOCKTAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

OF SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY, INCLUDING IMPACTS ON NDC
IMPLEMENTATION
Final Report
September 2022
STUDY 1.1
STOCKTAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACTS OF SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY, INCLUDING IMPACTS ON
NDC IMPLEMENTATION
Indonesia, September 2022
Recover Together, Recover Stronger
Authors :
Contributors :
Acknowledgments
Authors
This report is a joint publication by Cambridge Econometrics, the Global Green Growth
Institute (GGGI), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
GmbH, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the United Nations Children’s
Fund (UNICEF), and the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy. These
institutions work together through research, policy assistance, and support for innovative
solutions targeted at climate action via achieving the Paris Agreement by 2030 and net-zero
emission targets by mid-century as well as fulfilling the 2030 Agenda.
Contributors
We thank the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia for its
pivotal framing perspectives and detailed comments on the content of the report.
This project is mainly funded by the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection (BMUV) through the International
Climate Initiative (IKI), in coordination with Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) and NDC
Partnership (NDCP).
________________________________________
Copyright © 2022
This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part for educational or non-profit

purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided that the source is
acknowledged.
Disclaimer
The authors do not make any warranty, either express or implied, or assume any legal liability
or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of
such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed of the information
contained herein or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.
The views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect
those of the Government of Indonesia or project funders.
Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 v

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vi
List of Abbreviations vii
Executive Summary viii
1 Introduction 1
2 Methodology 4
2.1 Data Sources 4
2.2 Definitions 4
2.3 Analyses 6
2.3.1 Analysis 1. Stocktake of recovery measures and its contribution

to long-term mitigation and adaptation goals 6
2.3.2 Analysis 2. Modeling the impacts of recovery measures on

the achievement of the Paris Agreement targets 7
3 Stocktake of Recovery Measures 12

3.1 Contribution of Recovery Spending to Mitigation Objectives 13
3.1.1 Spending by sector 14
3.1.2 Positive and negative spending 15
3.1.3 Transformational effect of spending 17
3.1.4 Multilateral spending 17
3.1.5 Spending with no climate impact 17
3.2 Contribution of Recovery Spending to Adaptation Objectives 18
3.3 Sector Recovery Measures’ Positive Impact on Mitigation and Adaptation 19
3.3.1 Buildings 19
3.3.2 Transport 20
vi Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

3.3.3 Energy 20
3.3.4 Agriculture, land use & forestry 21
4 Contribution of Recovery Efforts to NDC Implementation 22
4.1 Planning and Development of Climate Policies 22
4.1.1 Mitigation 22
4.1.2 Adaptation 23
4.2 Government Coordination 24
4.3 Mobilization of Finance 25
4.4 Capacity Development for the Implementation of Climate Policies 27
4.5 Recovery Spending on Climate, Environment, and Social Development 28
5 Current and Potential Recovery Scenarios 30
5.1 GHG Emissions Reduction Impacts 31
5.1.1 Scenario 1: G20 recovery (i.e., current recovery spending) 31
5.1.2 Scenario 2: G20 recovery under fiscal constraints 32
5.1.3 Scenario 3: G20 recovery with extended funding for

green measures in G20 developing countries 35
5.1.4 Contribution to the Paris Agreement goal and

aggregated G20 NDC targets 36
5.1.5 Sectoral contribution to emissions reductions 37
5.2 Macroeconomic Impacts of G20 Recovery Spending 38
5.2.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 38
5.2.2 Employment 39
5.3 Impact of the Current High Energy Prices 42
5.4 Results Overview 42
6 Recommendations to Drive NDC Achievement Through a Sustainable Recovery 44
7. References 49
8. Annexes 61
Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 vii

List of Figures
Figure 1. Total COVID-19 spending by G20 members, 2021 (USD billions)

Figure 2. Recovery spending by type as a share of GDP by G20 members
Figure 3. Distribution of green recovery spending per sector, 2021 (USD billions)
Figure 4. Recovery spending per contribution type toward long-term climate goals, 2021
(USD billions)
Figure 5. Distribution of recovery spending per sector and G20 group, 2021 (USD billions)
Figure 6. Comparative resilience of G20 members and recovery spending link to adaptation
Figure 7. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending, 2020–2050 (%
emissions savings against baseline)
Figure 8. Energy transition roadmaps and climate policy baskets
Figure 9. Global GDP and economy-wide employment in the two 1.5°C scenario variants
Figure 10. Global energy sector jobs (2019) under the 1.5°C scenario and PES (2030)
Figure 11. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending per economic sector
(-12% axis vs -100% axis)
Figure 12. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending per economic sector,
2020–2050 (% emissions savings against baseline)
Figure 13. Impact of recovery measures on GDP, 2020–2050 (% difference from baseline)
Figure 14. Impact of recovery measures on employment, 2020–2050 (% difference from
baseline)
Figure 15. Impact of recovery measures by sector, 2020–2050 (% difference from baseline)
List of Tables
Table 1. Additional spending distribution across green measures

Table 2. Overview of simulated scenarios
Table 3. Modeled percentage reduction in CO2 emissions in 2030 compared to the baseline
scenario per economy
Table 4. Overview of simulation results, measured in % difference from the baseline
scenario
viii Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

List of Abbreviations
CH4 Methane
CO2 Carbon dioxide
DFI Development finance institution
EV Electric vehicle
E3ME Energy-environment-economy macro-economic
GCF Green Climate Fund
GDP Gross domestic product
GGGI Global Green Growth Institute
GHG Greenhouse gas
GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH
ICT Information and communication technology
IFI International financial institution
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
LT-LEDS Long-term low emissions development strategies
MDB Multilateral development bank
MRV Measurement, reporting and verification
NAP National adaptation plan
ND-GAIN Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NDC Nationally Determined Contribution
PES Planned Energy Scenario
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 ix

Executive Summary
This stocktaking report aims to inform G20 members on how to upscale their recovery
efforts to continue to pursue a sustainable, resilient, and inclusive recovery from the
negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, this report first assesses to what
extent the G20 members’ announced recovery spending supports the achievement of the
international climate targets. Second, the report discusses the mitigation and socioeconomic
implications of different recovery scenarios. Third, the report provides recommendations
on how sustainable recovery efforts can further support the achievement of the Paris
Agreement.
This report bases its findings on two assessments. First, a macro-econometric model
assesses the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions and socioeconomic impacts of
the announced recovery measures under three scenarios: (1) the G20 recovery scenario
(current spending), (2) the G20 recovery scenario with fiscal constraints reflecting a more
conservative iteration, and (3) the G20 recovery scenario with extended support, reflecting
higher ambitions in comparison with the initial G20 recovery scenario. The modeling results
show to what extent G20 recovery measures to date can aid in limiting the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue further
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C.1 Second, a literature review is conducted
to evaluate how recovery measures from G20 members create an enabling environment
for implementing the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The report examines
how recovery measures have strengthened multiple aspects of the Glasgow Climate Pact
(Decision 1-CMA.3), including capacity-building, coordination for implementation, and
development of innovative financing mechanisms.2
The insights of this report—focused mostly on climate impacts—are complemented by the

findings from the report The role of mitigation-adaptation co-benefits for creating a more
resilient future for all, which examines the contribution of the G20 announced recovery
efforts toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
This report divides its findings and recommendations into six action areas, each of which
requires attention to advance an even sustainable recovery and to employ recovery efforts
that facilitate the achievement of international climate targets. The action areas include (1)
reinforcing the positive climate impacts derived from the announced G20 recovery spending
beyond 2025; (2) ensuring equal support for both adaptation and mitigation recovery
actions; (3) overcoming fiscal constraints for future recovery support; (4) maintaining long-
term sustainable employment, especially green jobs, generated from recovery spending; (5)
measuring the effectiveness of sustainable recovery spending; and (6) tackling compound
risks.
1 UNFCC. “Glasgow Climate Pact.” Accessed June 15, 2022.

2 UNFCC. “Glasgow Climate Pact.”
x Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic caused a deep social and economic crisis with substantial
negative implications for achieving international climate targets.
Despite signals of recovery from the G20 members during the first quarter of 2022,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts a continuous trend of economic
slowdown.3 The G20’s cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate exceeded its
pre-pandemic (Q4 2019) level in Q1 2022.4 In addition, G20 labor markets experienced a
recovery at the beginning of 2022, with unemployment rates below pre-pandemic levels
for most G20 advanced economies.5 However, the IMF forecasts a 0.9% decrease in G20’s
cumulative GDP growth rate for 2022.6
Nevertheless, G20 climate policies, although improved and leading to slower growth in
emissions, remain insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement.7 The unique opportunity to
shift G20 economies toward a low-carbon development pathway through green recovery
efforts has not been sized. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from multiple G20 members have
surpassed pre-pandemic levels.8, 9 In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a long-
term disruption of efforts and resources that address climate-driven challenges. COVID-19
has shifted attention and resources toward ending the pandemic and away from addressing
climate change as a top priority, particularly in developing countries.10
To recover from the socioeconomic crisis, the G20 Presidencies in 2020 and 2021 highlighted
the importance of paving the way toward an inclusive, low-carbon development pathway.
Strengthening the alignment between sustainable finance, recovery, and impact investment
agendas was prioritized.11 The G20 Riyadh Summit set fundamental principles and
commitments to support recovery and achieve strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive
growth. The G20 Rome Leaders’ Declaration focused on strengthening G20 members’ actions
to implement the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda and the G20 Support to COVID-19
Response and Recovery in developing countries.
Since then, the G20 members have pledged approximately USD 14 trillion on rescue and
recovery measures to stimulate the economy, develop resilience in the health systems, and
support employment creation.12 However, only 6% of the total G20 announced spending
(USD 860 billion) directly addresses climate change.11
3 “Facing a Darkening Economic Outlook: How the G20 Can Respond.” IMF. Last modified July 13, 2022.
4 OECD. “G20 GDP growth continues to slow in the first quarter of 2022.” Last modified September 30, 2021
5 ILO. “Monitoring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment in the G20.” Last modified November 25, 2021.
6 “Facing a Darkening Economic Outlook: How the G20 Can Respond.” IMF.
7 Nascimento, Leonaro, Takeshi Kuramochi, and Niklas Höhne. “The G20 emission projections to 2030 improved since the
Paris Agreement, but only slightly.” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 27, no. 39 (2022).
8 IEA. “Global CO2 emissions rebounded to their highest level in history in 2021.” Last modified Mach 8, 2022.
9 DW. “Climate change: EU emissions surpass pre-pandemic levels.” Last modified May 16, 2022.
10 Eurasia Group. “Top Risks 2021.” Last modified 2021.
11 G20 Research Group. “Leader’s Declaration.” Last modified November 21, 2020.
12 Nahm, Jonas M., Scot M Miller, and Johannes Urpelainen . “G20’s USD 14 trillion economic stimulus reneges on emissions
pledges.” Nature, 24, no. 3.
Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 1

Research studies tracking global recovery spending found that G20 governments could
further seize the opportunity to restructure their economies toward a low-carbon transition
through recovery measures. Many of these studies highlighted the need for G20 members
to address policy coherence and policy gaps to strengthen a sustainable recovery, better
integrate nature and biodiversity13 in their recovery plans, reevaluate environmentally
friendly vs. business-as-usual measures to pursue a more ambitious transformation, and
further understand the long-term impacts and opportunities of sustainable recovery.
Furthermore, the G20 group has been exhorted by the IMF to avoid a two-track economic
recovery between developed and developing countries. Developing countries with tight
fiscal space and rising levels of debt experience limitations on the type and pace of recovery
they can pursue. These limitations can widen inequality and hinder a country’s ability to
achieve more ambitious climate objectives.14 A two-track economic recovery could result
in slower and less definite actions to confront climate-related challenges, particularly in
low- and middle-income countries. Avoiding a two-track economic recovery would require
better recovery planning, improved access, and extended economic stimulus and technical
assistance for developing countries.
To inform G20 members on how to better design and implement recovery plans that can
support the achievement of international climate and development targets, it is necessary
to understand the current and potential impacts of their recovery measures on mitigation,
adaptation, and socioeconomic development (e.g., employment creation, impact on GDP).
Additionally, G20 members need to continuously measure the progress of their recovery
pledges and adjust plans when progress falls short of ambition. Nevertheless, there is a
paucity of information on mitigation—particularly at a sectoral level—and advancements in
adaptation because of recovery pledges being implemented.
This report aims to address the knowledge gap in the impacts of recovery measures on climate
targets and the macroeconomic situation among G20 members. It aims to provide evidence-
based insights that will contribute to the continuation of the efforts undertaken during the
previous G20 summits in 2020 and 2021. Moreover, it aims to derive recommendations to
better fight the systemic and global climate crisis through sustainable recovery efforts.
For this purpose, this report is divided into five sections:
Methodology lists the primary data sources and explains the undertaken analyses.
Stocktake of Recovery Measures takes stock of G20 members’ announced recovery spending
up to the first quarter of 2022. Additionally, it summarizes the contribution of announced
recovery measures to achieving long-term mitigation and adaptation objectives. Finally, it
identifies good practices of sector-specific recovery measures.
13 This report focuses mainly on the impacts of COVID-19 on achieving climate targets (i.e., mitigation and adaptation). It
limits its analysis of the COVID-19 effects on achieving biodiversity targets and the relationship between biodiversity
targets and socio-economic co-benefits. This is because the report was commissioned and aims to inform the Climate
Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) of the G20, which does not cover the topic of biodiversity.
14 Georgieva, Kristalina. “Urgent Action Needed to Address a Worsening ‘Two-Track’ Recovery.” Last modified July 7, 2021.
2 Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

Contribution of Recovery Efforts to NDC Implementation outlines how recovery measures
have contributed to the creation of an enabling environment for NDC implementation in
five areas: (a) planning and development of climate policies, (b) government coordination,
(c) finance mobilization, (d) capacity development and resilient institutions, and (e) effective
monitoring and regulatory frameworks. In addition, the section highlights opportunities to
further utilize recovery measures as enablers for NDC implementation for each of those
cross-cutting areas.
Current and Potential Recovery Scenarios establish different recovery scenarios to quantify the
medium- and long-term impacts of the G20 announced recovery measures on CO2 emissions
reductions, employment creation, and GDP. The section discusses how the different recovery
scenarios can help close the gap to limit global warming to well below 2°C, and to 1.5oC,
compared to pre-industrial levels. The modeling of future recovery scenarios indicates the
level of change required in recovery plans from the G20 members to support achieving the
Paris Agreement goal.
Recommendations to Drive NDC Achievement Through a Sustainable Recovery provides policy

recommendations for G20 members to (a) improve recovery measures to support the
achievement of the Paris Agreement and (b) ensure an inclusive recovery.

2. Methodology
2.1 Data Sources
The study uses the Global Recovery Observatory15 database, last updated on December 16,
2021 (referred to as Observatory), as the main data source. The Observatory has compiled
the announced national fiscal policy interventions of all G20 members since January 2020.
The Observatory was selected over other data sources16 because it has the highest depth
and coverage of global recovery spending and provides the most granular data available. It
introduces a temporal component to GHG considerations, includes social impacts of policies,
and uses a significantly more granular categorization of spending (based on a classification
of fiscal policy measures of 40 archetypes and 158 sub-archetypes) than other COVID-19
recovery databases.
The data from the Global Recovery Observatory17 was complemented with data from
the OECD Green Recovery Database (last updated in April 2022) and reports from the
International Energy Agency Sustainable Recovery Tracker (last updated in March 2022)18 to
verify recovery measures up to the first quarter of 2022.
In addition, this study utilizes primary data on recovery spending and recovery measure case
examples from surveys submitted to all G20 members. The survey was partially answered by
seven G20 members—Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States—and one G20 permanent guest, Spain. The survey responses related
to recovery spending were compared against the latest data from the Observatory. The
survey questionnaire and a comparison of country responses about recovery spending can
be found in Annexes 1 and 2.
Finally, secondary data—such as country-specific recovery plans, Nationally Determined

Contributions (NDCs), national adaptation plans (NAPs), Sustainable Development Goal
(SDG) indicators, and socioeconomic indicators—were used as input for the modeling and
for assessing the impact of recovery measures to create an enabling environment for the
implementation of NDCs.
2.2 Definitions
The study utilizes the following definitions aligned with the Global Recovery Observatory
methodology:
15 Global Recovery Observatory. “Draft Methodology Document.” Last modified February 1, 2021.
16 For the development of this report, the most cited COVID-19 recovery trackers, tools, and reports were reviewed,
including ADB’s COVID-19 Policy Database; ‘Greenness of Stimulus Index’ by Vivid Economics (2020); the Global Recovery
Observatory led by the Oxford University Economic Recovery Project and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP); ING’s
Green Recovery analysis, which focused on major economies in the Asia-Pacific region; the Climate Action Tracker, which
has tracked recovery policies from China, the EU, India, South Korea, and the USA; IMF’s Fiscal Monitor; the OECD COVID-19
Recovery Dashboard; and WRI’s a Typology for Facilitating a Paris-Aligned COVID-19 Recovery. Additionally, sector-specific
tools and reports were reviewed, such as the Energy Policy Tracker (2022), IRENA’s Post-COVID recovery: An agenda for
resilience, development, and equality; and IEA’s World Energy Outlook Special Report on Sustainable Recovery (2020).
17 OECD. “Assessing environmental impact of measures in the OECD Green Recovery Database.” Last modified April 21, 2022.
18 IEA. “Sustainable Recovery Tracker.” Last modified April 2022.

l Rescue measures are defined as a short-term fiscal policy designed for emergency
support to keep people and businesses afloat. They include, among others, temporary
liquidity support to businesses and public entities, temporary life and livelihoods
cash transfers, and tax and payment relief cuts.
l Recovery measures are defined as medium- or long-term fiscal policy incentives or
investments to boost economic growth, which are considered part of the COVID-19
recovery efforts of a country. They include, among others, worker retraining and job
creation policies; investments in education, health care, infrastructure, and research
and development; disaster preparedness; and capacity building.
l GHG emissions are the atmospheric release of CO2, methane (CH4), and other
gases that create a warming greenhouse effect. The baseline for assessing the net
GHG emissions impact of recovery measures is the national emissions rate with no
intervention, as expected at the time of policy intervention.
l Short-term net GHG impact relates to the immediate period of the implementation
or the development period of a measure (e.g., the construction of a wind turbine will
lead to increased consumption of concrete and steel in the short term). In contrast,
long-term effects on climate relate to the period after one year of implementation
(e.g., the construction of wind turbines will compensate for the emissions it caused
during development and have a positive net effect).
l Green recovery spending refers to investments in recovery measures that positively
impact GHG emissions and/or the environment. Green recovery spending can fall into
the archetypes listed on Annex 3 and the positive sub archetypes listed on Annex 4 .
l Adaptation readiness refers to the country’s ability to leverage investments and
convert them to adaptation actions. The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
(ND-GAIN) measures overall readiness by considering three components: economic
readiness, governance readiness, and social readiness.
o Economic: captures the ability of a country’s business environment to accept
investment that could be applied to adaptation that reduces vulnerability
(reduces sensitivity and improves adaptive capacity).
o Governance: captures the institutional factors that enhance the application of
investment for adaptation.
o Social: captures factors—such as social inequality, information and communication
technology (ICT) infrastructure, education, and innovation—that enhance the
mobility of investment and promote adaptation actions.
l The study classifies G20 countries into two groups: developed economies (i.e.,
Australia, Canada, South Korea, the United States, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union) and developing economies (i.e., China,
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and

Argentina), following the United Nations Country Classification.19
2.3 Analyses
The report consists of two independent analyses complemented by a literature review.
The first analysis uses the Global Recovery Observatory’s database of recovery measures,
taxonomy, and methodology to assess the net GHG emissions impact of the G20 member
states’ recovery measures in four specific sectors (i.e., transport, building, energy, and
agriculture and forestry). In addition, it compares the level of climate vulnerability and
adaptation readiness to the recovery spending linked to adaptation of each G20 member.
The results of this analysis are shown in section 3. A literature review on how recovery
measures have contributed to creating an enabling environment for implementing the NDCs
complements the findings of the analyses. The results of this literature review are shown in
section 4. Finally, the second analysis inputs the Global Recovery Observatory’s database of
recovery measures into the E3ME model to compute three recovery scenarios. The results of
this analysis are shown in section 5.
2.3.1 Analysis 1. Stocktake of recovery measures and its contribution to long-term

mitigation and adaptation goals.
First, for mitigation, all G20 members’ recovery measures from the Global Recovery
Observatory are classified into four sectors (i.e., energy, agriculture and forestry, transport,
and buildings). The sector classification is based on the direct impact on the emissions
reduction and/or increase of the recovery measure to a respective sector. The industrial
sector is not considered because the measures included in the database are likely to have
an indirect effect, rather than a direct effect, on industry emissions through changes in
consumption. Annex 3 shows the alignment between policy sub-archetypes from the Global
Recovery Observatory and the four sectors.
Each classified recovery measured is assigned either a positive, negative, or long-term

neutral effect on climate using the Global Recovery Observatory’s Likert scale. A summary
of the Observatory methodology can be found at the beginning of the Annex section. The
analysis assesses the green recovery spending disaggregated by economic sectors and their
climate impact.
Second, for adaptation, the recovery measures without a direct effect on GHG emissions
related to health, education, green market creation, communication, and social and cultural
sectors were considered to have an impact on adaptation readiness and were counted as
recovery spending linked to adaptation.20
19 UN. “Statistical Annex.” Last modified 2021.

20 Spending on adaptation was estimated using the Global Recovery Observatory, considering the following recovery policy
archetypes and sub archetypes: X: Worker retraining and job creation (1 Green worker retraining and job creation),
Z: Health care investment (non-infrastructure) (1 General medical investment), : Communications infrastructure
investment (1 Broadband investment, 2 Remote working infrastructure investment, 3 Civil cybersecurity programs, and 4
Implementation of digital programs), : Local (project-based) infrastructure investment (1 Urban development programs),
A: Natural infrastructure and green spaces investment (1 Public parks and green spaces investment, 2 Tree planting and
biodiversity protection, 3 Ecological conservation initiatives, 4 Waterway protection and enhancement, and 5 Agricultural

The report compares the level of climate vulnerability and adaptation readiness to the
recovery spending linked to the adaptation of each G20 member. The level of climate
vulnerability and adaptation readiness of each G20 member was estimated based on the
ND-GAIN Country Index.21
Limitations of the analysis

l There are inherent limitations to the data collected by the Observatory. For example,
as the data has not been updated since December 2021, it might miss some longer-
term policies that are still targeting recovery but have been put into place with longer-
term aims. For instance, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act is not included in
the Observatory data.22 In addition, the database is somewhat subjective by design
(i.e., the classification of policies to archetypes is based on expert judgment), and
some definitions lack granularity and exact specification. Nevertheless, based on
current knowledge, this database provides the best available and most detailed data
on recovery spending induced by the COVID-19 crisis.
l Limiting the assessment to the direct effect of GHG emissions ignores that some
recovery measures have a different mitigation potential. Recovery measures will
be assessed with the same score and thus sometimes misrepresent the picture of
the assessment. For example, a measure to support airlines with green conditions
is evaluated as positive because the scenario has a positive impact compared to no
intervention. By the same logic, building new homes with green conditions or new
energy infrastructure is also positive. From a climate policy perspective, however, the
recovery measures mentioned as examples have a different relevance, which is not
reflected in the GHG effect assessment but discussed qualitatively on section four.
2.3.2 Analysis 2. Modeling the impacts of recovery measures on the achievement of

the Paris Agreement targets.
About the model
The modeling of impacts of the G20 recovery measures to achieve the 1.5°C target of the
Paris Agreement was carried out using Cambridge Econometrics’ E3ME macro-econometric
model. The E3ME model has previously been used extensively to assess the socioeconomic
and environmental impacts of climate policies. Being an E3 model, or energy-environment-
economy model, E3ME is capable of capturing energy and emission impacts of economic
policies, such as the recovery policies considered.
uplift), A: Other large-scale infrastructure investments (3 Large-scale space infrastructure), A: Disaster preparedness and
capacity building investment (1 Future epidemic reaction capabilities, 2 Disaster-response infrastructure (shelters, food-
stocking, water supplies), 3 Anti-flood, fires, and other climate adaptation measures), A: Clean research and development
investment (2 Agriculture R&D programs).
21 Chen, C., I. Noble, J. Hellmann, J. Coffee, M. Murillo, and N. Chawla. “Country Index Technical Report – University of Notre
Dame Global Adaptation Index.” Last modified November 2015.
22 According to https://recovery.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/tracking/ on 14/07/2022.

E3ME is global in scope and produces results for 70 regions (covering each G20 member
separately), with 43 industrial sectors in each region. The two-way linkages between the
economy, wider society, and the environment are key features of the model. Another core
feature of the model is its treatment of technology in power generation, steel, land transport,
and household heating. E3ME fully incorporates Future Technology Transformation (FTT)
sub-models of new technologies that are needed for the low-carbon transition.23
The macro-econometric specification of the E3ME model provides a strong empirical basis
for analysis and is not limited by many of the restrictive assumptions common to computable
general equilibrium models. For example, E3ME does not assume fully rational behavior nor
optimal utilization of resources as a starting point and, therefore, incorporates real-world
features such as involuntary unemployment. The depiction of the financial sector in E3ME
(including endogenous money) is recognized by central banks as an accurate representation.
Again, this is a favored behavior for modeling recovery measures as the crisis has created a
situation where involuntary unemployment and an increased output gap (i.e., the economy
performing below its potential) are evident.
E3ME can be used to assess a wide variety of scenarios, which include stimulus or austerity
measures as well as policies relating to the efficient use of resources in the economy. Further
information, including the entire methodology manual, may be found on the model’s website
at www.e3me.com.
How the E3ME model assesses the impacts of recovery measures

Recovery measures aim at stimulating demand in the economy through public spending
and might have positive, negative, or neutral impacts on climate and the environment. The
modeling does not judge the environmental outcome of the simulated policies a priori.
Rather, it takes the approach of using the E3ME model to simulate the economic policy and
then infer from the model results what is the expected environmental outcome of the given
policy. For example, recovery investments in renewable energy will likely produce positive
environmental outcomes, while investments in fossil fuels will likely produce negative
ones. In the case of neutral policies, the environmental outcome is entirely dependent on
the existing economic and energy structures (and interactions from policies implemented
at the same time). An advantage of the multi-regional, country-specific, and sector-specific
simulation that E3ME is capable of is that environmental impacts of neutral policies will
be dependent on country-specific structures within the model. For example, a simple
VAT reduction policy may have vastly different environmental impacts in a country with a
decarbonized energy system than in one that is reliant on fossil fuels only. The model is able
to capture and show this difference.
23 The FTT framework is discussed in detail in Mercure, Jean-François. “FTT: Power: A global model of the power sector
with induced technological change and natural resource depletion.” Energy Policy 48 (2012): 799-811. https://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421512005356.

Information on G20 recovery measures, including the amount in USD, was taken from the
Global Recovery Observatory database and modeled at the main archetype level for each
of the G20 members. The full list of Global Recovery Observatory’s recovery spending
archetypes used can be found in Annex 4.
Scenarios
Six scenarios were developed to understand how G20 recovery measures contribute to
or undermine the achievement of NDCs and long-term climate targets (i.e., 1.5°C and 2°C
targets) (See Table 1). The modeling results of each scenario include socioeconomic impacts
(i.e., GDP, investment impacts, and employment generation) and emissions mitigation
potential for the recovery scenarios by country and by sector. Modeling results are presented
as differences from the baseline.
Baseline: Business-as-usual baseline

It incorporates the latest data on the economy, jobs, energy demand, and emissions,
considering the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. It also includes government rescue measures
that have already been implemented during the pandemic, such as spending on medical
emergencies and direct support to workers and businesses during lockdowns. It is assumed
that the world economy will follow the business-as-usual policies (pre-COVID-19) after the
pandemic, and low-carbon technologies will continue to diffuse at the rates observed in the
historical data. All other scenarios are compared against this baseline.
Pathway 1: Global 1.5°C scenario

The world’s transition to the 1.5°C compatible pathway is modeled through a series of
ambitious green stimulus programs (energy efficiency investment, renewable subsidies,
feed-in tariffs, public procurements of new low-carbon technologies) and supporting climate
policies (carbon and energy tax and phase-out regulations). The complete list of the 1.5°C
policies is given in Annex 5.
This emissions pathway is likely to go beyond the existing NDCs’ commitment. Given the
urgent need to respond to the threat of climate change, it is assumed that climate policies
will kick off immediately. In this scenario, additional revenues are raised through carbon
taxation and are expected to be used to fund green stimulus programs.
Pathway 2: Global 2°C scenario

A global 2°C compatible pathway was modeled as a further comparison point. The pathway is
built on the global 1.5°C pathway but has minor differences in the geographical distribution
of measures implemented for reaching the climate pathway. This represents the reality that
some regions are more likely to adopt climate mitigation measures than others.

Scenario 1: G20 recovery
This scenario models all recovery measures from the G20 members listed in the Global
Recovery Observatory database. Recovery measures are additional to any government
rescue measures included in the baseline. The objective of this scenario is to understand the
emissions impacts of the G20 recovery measures. Emission outcomes from this scenario are
compared against the baseline, the 1.5°C pathway, and the 2°C pathway.
This scenario assumes that the total amount of recovery spending is spread between 2022
and 2024, and national governments fund the recovery spending through government
borrowing where budget deficits are incurred (no austerity assumptions later).
Scenario 2: G20 recovery under fiscal constraints

Developing countries may find it more difficult to mobilize domestic financial resources for
recovery spending than developed countries. Therefore, this scenario provides an alternative
to Scenario 1 and assumes that only half of the recovery measures are implemented in G20
developing countries to reflect their fiscal constraints.
Scenario 3: G20 recovery with extended funding for green measures in G20 developing
countries
This scenario assumes a more ambitious recovery, especially in G20 developing countries,
focusing on green measures. The scenario doubles the total current recovery spending in
G20 developing countries (i.e., increasing announced G20 recovery spending by 12.6%) and
allocates it solely under green recovery measures, distributed across the Global Recovery
Observatory archetypes following global spending shares (see Table 1).
Table 1. Additional spending distribution across green measures
Green market creation24 23.7%

Clean transport infrastructure investment 34.1%
Clean energy infrastructure investment 16.3%
Building upgrades and energy efficiency infrastructure investment 5.2%
Natural infrastructure and green spaces investment 14.0%
Clean research and development investment 6.7%
Source: Cambridge Econometrics Modelling, March–July 2022
24 Green market creation includes investments in capacity building for a green and sustainable pathway, increasing energy
market participation for renewables and investing in transitional or modernization technologies.

Sensitivity Analysis
As a sensitivity, a high energy price version of the G20 recovery scenario is simulated.
The results of the sensitivity scenario are compared against a baseline with the same
increased prices (i.e., a business-as-usual baseline with higher energy prices). The sensitivity
considers the impact of highly increased global natural gas prices due to recent geopolitical
developments.25 Therefore, when the report describes results from the sensitivity run
and compares them to results from the standard run, the comparison focuses on marginal
differences due to the policies (and their interaction with energy prices) rather than the
impact of heightened energy prices.
Limitations of the analysis

l This assessment provides an overview of plausible scenarios and a general impact
assessment before a detailed ex-post analysis per country is made. It does not
produce accurate forecasts of outcomes.
l Non-fiscal policy measures, such as monetary and macro-financial measures or
exchange rate and balance of payments measures, are not considered in the
assessment as they are not included in the Global Recovery Observatory,26 with the
database being utilized as the primary data source.
l The low data availability on the timeline of implementation of recovery measures led
to the assumption that recovery measures are spread out in 2022–2024, which might
not entirely reflect the reality of developing countries.
l The G20 recovery plan scenario assumes all policies/measures included in the Global
Recovery Observatory database are fully implemented (the different extents of
implementation are considered in the sensitivity analysis).
l The scenarios do not make explicit assumptions about the financing of the measures.
l The G20 recovery plan scenario focuses on recovery measures but excludes the
latest climate policies and targets announced at COP26. These policies and targets
are included implicitly in the global 1.5°C scenario, supported by additional climate
policies required to achieve long-term net-zero targets globally.
l The E3ME model is simulation based, meaning the model outcomes are path-
dependent and are influenced by policy inputs. The results of the 1.5°C and 2°C
scenarios and their associated economic and job opportunities should therefore
be interpreted as a possible pathway, and not as optimal pathways. In contrast to
general equilibrium economic models, E3ME does not seek the least-cost way to
meet temperature targets.
25 The price assumption for natural gas employed is based on the April 2022 edition of the World Bank’s Commodity Markets
Outlook, assuming that global prices develop in line with the most extreme European price trajectory until 2024 and then
largely stagnate.
26 Global Recovery Observatory. “Draft Methodology Document.” Last modified February 1, 2021.

3. Stocktake of Recovery Measures
As of December 2021, spending on rescue measures (81%) announced by G20 members
overweighs spending on recovery measures (19%), adding up to a total investment
of USD 17.8 billion (see Figure 1). Even though both types of expenditures—rescue and
recovery—may support a sustainable recovery, this report solely focuses on assessing
spending on recovery measures as this has the highest potential to generate long-term
impacts.
Figure 1. Total COVID-19 spending by G20 members, 2021 (USD billions)

Source: Developed by Wuppertal Institute with data from Global Recovery Observatory, last updated
Dec. 2021
By the end of 2021, G20 members of developed countries announced on average

4.5 times more spending on recovery in relation to their GDP than G20 members of
developing countries (Figure 2). This is partially due to their tighter fiscal constraints
and focus on social and economic rescue measures. The difference in magnitude of
recovery spending between G20 members of developed and developing countries is
likely to continue. In 2022, G20 members of developing countries aim to normalize public
spending to pre-pandemic levels to strengthen their fiscal health, while several G20
members of developed countries have announced an increase in recovery expenditure. For
example, due to receding government spending, Argentina expects a slowing economic
recovery in 2022.27 Equally, the Indonesian 2022 budget saw a reduction in COVID-19
recovery support.28 Moreover, even though economic recovery is identified as a key pillar
underpinning the improvement of its fiscal outlook, Saudi Arabia’s government budget is
27 Zepeda, Mariana. “Argentina’s economic recovery will slow in 2022 as government spending recedes.” Frontierview. Last
modified October 7, 2021.
28 World Bank. “Indonesia Economic Prospects (IEP), June 2022: Financial Deepening for Stronger Growth and Sustainable
Recovery.” Last modified June 22, 2022.

decreasing.29 On the contrary, Japan has announced a record budget of approximately USD
797 billion (JPY 107.6 trillion) for the fiscal year 2022, reflecting an increase in spending
on social security and addressing the spreading of the COVID-19 Omicron variant.30
Figure 2. Recovery spending by type as a share of GDP by G20 members

Dec. 2021
3.1 Contribution of Recovery Spending to Mitigation Objectives

By the end of 2021, green recovery spending represented nearly 29% of the total
recovery spending (Figure 1). Approximately 62% (USD 614 billion) of the green recovery
spending of all G20 members has a positive long-term contribution toward climate goals,
32% (USD 315 billion) has no current climate contribution, and only 7% (USD 68 billion) has a
negative climate contribution (Figure 4).
Green recovery spending is expected to increase slightly. During the first quarter of 2022,
several G20 members announced additional green recovery spending. India stated it would
spur the 2022–23 budget to sustain economic recovery and to boost economic growth.31
The EU pledged its highest annual budget ever, dedicating USD 320 billion (EUR 313 billion)
toward recovery—as the top priority to lay the foundation of a more resilient union. The
second priority of this budget is the continuation of a green and digital transformation.32
Even though its spending levels are returning to normal, Canada announced USD 9 billion
(CAD 12 billion) in their 2022 budget for new green spending and incentives that aim to
make adopting clean technologies more affordable over the coming years.33
29 KPMG. Saudi Arabia budget report 2022. Last modified December 16, 2021.
30 Nippon.com. ”Japan’s Record ¥107.6 Trillion Budget for Fiscal 2022.” Last modified January 17, 2021. https://www.nippon.
com/en/japan-data/h01206/
31 Times of India. “Budget 2022-23 bets on spending spur to sustain eco recovery.” Last modified February 1, 2022.
32 European Parliament. “EU Budget 2022 approved: investing more for a strong recovery.” Last modified November 24, 2021.
33 The Conversation. “What the 2022 federal budget says about Canada’s commitment to a green recovery.” Last modified
April 8, 2022.

3.1.1 Spending by sector.
Recovery spending with a direct impact on climate shows an imbalance across sectors.
G20 members will spend approximately 70% of the total recovery budget in the
transport and energy sectors. Green recovery spending was mostly allocated to economic
sectors that directly impact climate. About 49% of the total green recovery spending by G20
members was focused on the transport sector, followed by 21% on the energy sector, 16%
on agriculture and forestry, and 14% on buildings (Figure 4).
There are multiple reasons why allocating a high share of recovery spending in the
transport and energy sectors can drive a fast, inclusive, and green recovery. However,
balancing green recovery spending across sectors is necessary to ensure resilience and
a shift toward an inclusive low-carbon development pathway. The electricity generation
and transport sectors have the highest potential for a low-carbon transition34 because
they represent the highest share of GHG emissions among G20 members. Moreover, the
energy and transport sectors have a high share of the workforce in both G20 developing and
developed countries and are key sectors for developing societal resilience.35, 36 However,
other sectors should not be disregarded. For instance, recovery spending on sustainable
agriculture and forestry practices may reduce agriculture’s carbon footprint, capture the
excess carbon generated by other industries and generate substantial co-benefits for
biodiversity.37 In addition, higher support to primary economic sectors might accelerate the
reduction of inequality and promote social mobility, particularly in developing countries
where support to the most vulnerable population is a priority.
The imbalance of green recovery spending across economic sectors seems to prevail in
2022 recovery budget allocations. Recovery measures announced in 2022 are still focused
on energy, ground transport, and buildings. According to the Energy Policy Tracker, the
United Kingdom announced four new recovery policies with a total commitment of around
USD 11.9 billion, targeting the buildings and power generation sectors. The United States
also announced two new recovery policies with a total commitment of USD 520 million for
the buildings and power generation sectors.38 Equally, Canada and Australia announced
new energy-related recovery measures. Moreover, under the current geopolitical situation,
G20 policymakers are reviewing energy security incentives to assure a green transition in a
publicly supported way.
34 Climate Transparency. “G20 GHG emissions per sector.” Last modified 2021.
36 World Economic Forum. “Jobs of Tomorrow: The Triple Returns of Social Jobs in the Economic Recovery.” Last modified May
2022.
37 World Economic Forum. Here’s how we can use agriculture to fight climate change. Last modified September 20, 2019.
38 Energy Policy Tracker.2022. “G20 countries.” Last modified August 17, 2022.

Figure 3. Distribution of green recovery spending per sector, 2021 (USD billions)
Dec. 2021
3.1.2 Positive and negative spending.

G20 developing countries’ efforts in green recovery were hampered due to competing
priorities for addressing the health impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, it
is observed that almost 90% of the green recovery spending with a positive long-term
contribution toward climate goals comes from G20 members of developed countries
(Figure 4). The imbalanced spending on recovery measures with a direct positive impact on
climate between G20 members from developed and developing countries creates a two-
track recovery. This imbalance hinders the achievement of international climate targets as
future emitters are more likely to perpetuate business-as-usual and high-carbon activities.
Figure 4. Recovery spending per contribution type toward long-term climate goals, 2021 (USD billions)
Source: Developed by Wuppertal Institute with data from Global Recovery Observatory, last updated Dec.
2022

Moreover, more than 95% of the recovery spending with negative long-term impacts
on climate in G20 developing countries is concentrated in the energy sector (Figure 5).
In response to the COVID-19 crisis, significant public investment commitments for fossil
fuel-intensive activities in the energy sector were established, mostly by G20 developing
countries, potentially missing opportunities for a low-carbon transition.39 For example, in
China, the provincial government of Hubei announced a CNY 90 billion investment over three
years (2020–2022) in the coal, oil, gas, and electricity sectors to recover by increasing the
energy supply capacity of the province’s energy sector.40 In Argentina, offshore activities,
promotion of investment in hydrocarbons through law, and supporting activities in the Vaca
Muerta natural gas reservoir are examples of long-term commitments to supporting fossil
fuels. In Mexico, there is dedicated support for the national oil and gas company, PEMEX, as
well as new refineries and thermal power plants. Brazil committed to building new thermal
power plants and providing incentives for investment in hydrocarbon and coal-related
activities.41
Figure 5. Distribution of recovery spending per sector and G20 group, 2021 (USD billions)
Dec. 2021
39 IISD. “Doubling Back and Doubling Down: G20 scorecard on fossil fuel funding.” Last modified November 9, 2020.
41 SEI. “Pandemic recovery efforts undermine a just energy transition in Latin America.” Last modified November 7, 2021.

3.1.3 Transformational effect of spending.
Some of the announced recovery spending with a positive impact on climate has long-
term financial allocations, enabling a low-carbon transition. For example, Australia
announced that beginning in 2021–2022, the government will provide AUD 1.6 billion for
low emissions technology over ten years and AUD 20.1 million to deliver a comprehensive
Global Resources Strategy over two years. In India, the government of Kerala announced a
50% reduction in motor vehicle tax for electric, fuel cell, and total hybrid battery electric
vehicles (EV) for five years in the state’s 2021–2022 budget. In July 2020, South Korea
announced to commit KRW 160 trillion (USD 133 billion) to the K-New Deal, which aims for
long-term carbon neutrality, a green transition of infrastructure, a low-carbon energy supply,
and innovation in the green industry.42 However, green recovery spending with a positive
impact on climate and short- to medium-term financial allocations was predominantly in
G20 developed countries. For example, Canada pledged to invest CAD 287 million over two
years to continue the Incentives for the Zero-Emission Vehicles (iZEV) program until March
2022. The United Kingdom provided a Bus Recovery Grant (BRG) of GBP 226.5 million, which
ran from September 2021 to April 2022, and provided up to GBP 56 million for the Light Rail
and Tram Recovery Grant (LRTRG), which was under implementation from July 20, 2021 to
April 5, 2022.
3.1.4 Multilateral spending.

Implementing cross-sectoral and cross-country recovery measures could reduce sectoral
and geographic imbalances of recovery spending. This recovery approach also avoids
implementing stand-alone recovery measures, which may not have a long-lasting impact,
by encouraging synergies. For example, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, of which
Indonesia is a member, launched the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF)
to strengthen cross-sectoral and regional collaboration against the COVID-19 pandemic
impacts.43 The ARCF coordinates a regional recovery response through a cross-sectoral
and cross-pillar approach that maximizes the synergies of the ASEAN market integration,
avoiding the duplication of recovery efforts within the region and ensuring all recovery
efforts are long-term oriented.44
3.1.5 Spending with no climate impact.

Recovery spending with no climate contribution in sectors that have a direct impact
on climate is considered an untapped opportunity to be converted into spending with
a positive long-term climate contribution. For example, recovery spending for building
upgrades without green conditions will not contribute to long-term climate goals and may
contribute to the short run negatively. However, linking the building upgrades to green
requirements may trigger a long-term positive contribution.
43 ASEAN. “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community encourages stronger cross-sectoral collaboration towards COVID-19 recovery.”
Last modified March 16, 2021.
44 ASEAN. “ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework.” Last modified 2020.

3.2 Contribution of Recovery Spending to Adaptation Objectives
By the end of 2021, G20 members had limited announced recovery spending linked
to adaptation. According to Krishnan and Brandon, only four G20 members (i.e., South
Korea, China, the UK, and France) explicitly considered investing in adaptation or climate
resilience in their recovery plans.45 It is acknowledged that not all spending linked to
adaptation and supporting recovery was announced, particularly by G20 developing
countries.46 For example, Indonesia increased its budget toward coast resilience, aiming to
support a sustainable recovery through a blue economy program.47 An imbalance between
mitigation and adaption spending indicates that recovery packages lack a systemic response
to the interaction of crises, including climate change, biodiversity loss, and the economic
consequences of COVID-19.48
Moreover, based on the announced recovery spending, it is observed that G20 developing
countries spend significantly less on recovery measures that directly or indirectly
support adaptation and adaptation readiness, despite their higher vulnerability to
climate change, than G20 developed countries. G20 members have different levels of
vulnerability to the adverse impacts of climate change and adaptation readiness.49 G20
developing countries have the highest vulnerability to climate change but the lowest level of
readiness.50 These countries are considered to have the greatest adaptation challenges and,
therefore, have a greater need for investment to improve readiness and a greater urgency
for adaptation action than G20 developed countries.51 However, G20 developing countries
have a considerably lower recovery spending on adaptation than developed countries. The
increase in magnitude and frequency of climate shocks, in combination with the health
crisis of COVID-19 and low recovery-related spending, may worsen poverty and inequality in
developing countries, hindering an inclusive recovery (Figure 7).52
G20 members allocated recovery spending on measures that combine pandemic

preparedness with long-term strategies for climate adaptation. Recovery spending on
adaptation prioritizes food security, disaster risk prevention, access to improved sanitation
and clean drinking water, employment creation for the purpose of ecosystem restorations,
and infrastructure development, including nature-based solutions, resilient roads, and
buildings. During 2019–2022, recovery measures for the agricultural sector address
45 N. Krishnan and Brandon (forthcoming). “Are COVID-19 Stimulus Packages Building Climate Resilience?”
46 The low number of accounted recovery spending linked to adaptation is due to multiple reasons. For example, the launch
of adaptation programs/ programs that do not necessarily emphasized its linked with recovery. The launch of adaptation
projects or programs in a different timing than recovery packages, etc.
47 OECD. “Sustainable Ocean Economy Country Diagnostics of Indonesia.” Last modified April 2021.
48 Ringsmuth, Andrew K., Ilona M. Otto, Bart van den Hurk, Glada Lahn, Christopher P.O. Reyer, Timothy R. Carter, Piotr
Magnuszewski et al. “Lessons from COVID-19 for managing transboundary climate risks and building resilience.” Climate
Risk Management 35 (2022).
49 Tilleard, Simon, and James Ford. “Adaptation readiness and adaptive capacity of transboundary river basins.” Climatic
Change 137 (2016): 575–591.
50 Climate Transparency. “Climate Transparency Report: Comparing G20 Climate Action Towards Net Zero.” Last modified
2021.
51 Chen, C., I. Noble, J. Hellmann, J. Coffee, M. Murillo, and N. Chawla. “Country Index Technical Report – University of Notre
Dame Global Adaptation Index.” Last modified November 2015. .
52 IDB. “The Inequality Crisis: Latin America and the Caribbean at the Crossroads.” Last modified 2020.

adaptation and mitigation simultaneously.53
COVID-19 recovery packages have the potential to support G20 members’ needs for
adaptation investment and action, generating a durable economic benefit and reducing
climate vulnerability. However, the evidence presented in the AGR21 report indicates
recovery efforts are becoming a lost opportunity for adaptation.54, 55, 56
Figure 6. Comparative resilience of G20 members and recovery spending link to adaptation
Source: Developed by GGGI with data from Global Recovery Observatory, last updated Dec. 2021
3.3 Sector Recovery Measures’ Positive Impact on Mitigation and Adaptation

3.3.1 Buildings
G20 recovery measures in the buildings sector with a positive effect on long-term climate
goals are linked to green retrofitting programs, such as daylighting, electrification, and
energy efficiency improvements. The most significant investments are taken by France
(USD 9.4 billion), the United States (USD 9.1 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 5.7 billion),
and South Korea (USD 5.2 billion).
Green retrofitting recovery measures have the potential to accelerate the energy
transition and meaningfully contribute to achieving climate neutrality goals. The most
successful green retrofitting recovery measures focus on deep (or staged deep) renovations
and on the creation of frameworks for skills development, certification, awareness raising
54 UNEP. “Adaptation Gap Report 2021: The gathering storm – Adapting to climate change in a post-pandemic world.” Last
modified November 1, 2021
55 Richmond, Morgan, June Choi, Paul Rosane, Matthew Solomon, Bella Tonkonogy (CPI) Dominic Molloy, Felipe Larrain,
and Jennifer Jacobowitz Rae (GCA). “Adaptation Finance in the Context of Covid-19: The Role of Development Finance in
Promoting a Resilient Recovery.” Global Center on Adaptation. Last modified January 2021.
56 Global Center on Adaptation. “Global scientists call for economic stimulus to address climate adaptation and COVID.” Last
modified January 22, 2021.

and support for citizens, and attracting private finance.57
Countries with preexisting energy efficiency and building upgrade programs saw higher
impacts by directing stimulus there. The use of preexisting structures may reduce the
time and resources required to launch a widespread spending program.58 An example of
increasing funding to an existing program is a USD 7 billion worth upgrade—equivalent to
nearly 20% of the recovery measures of the sector with a positive contribution to long-term
climate goals—for the Weatherization Assistance Program in the United States (See Annex
6, Example 1).
3.3.2 Transport
Approximately 57% of G20 members’ recovery spending with a positive contribution
toward climate goals is linked to the transport sector. More than 70% of the total recovery
spending in the transport sector was directed toward expanding existing infrastructure, 15%
toward new public transport systems or line expansions, 4% to EV charging infrastructure,
4% to cycling and walking infrastructure, 4% to fuel efficiency initiatives, and 3% to others.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and Mexico have allocated the most spending in this
sector as a share of GDP.
Recovery spending on the transport sector, aiming to promote a behavioral change by

increasing daily mobility with public transport or zero-emission options, is preferable
to speed up a low-carbon development pathway. An example of a behavioral change local-
level recovery action in the transport sector was the establishment of a temporary bike
lane. Initially put forward by Mexico, due to its success, the intervention was replicated in
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru (Annex 6, Example 3).
3.3.3 Energy
According to data from the Global Recovery Observatory, recovery spending contributing
positively toward long-term climate goals in the energy sector ranges from R&D programs
(16% of total recovery spending with positive climate impacts for the energy sector) to
new or refurbished facilities to generate electricity from renewable sources (14%), carbon
capture and storage/utilization (13%), other initiatives to reduce GHG emissions from
existing fossil fuel assets (12%), hydrogen infrastructure (11%), and new or refurbished
nuclear-fueled power generation plants (10%). Very little spending was recorded for battery
and storage infrastructure or biofuels (4%). The great variety of green investments reflects
the various needs for a successful transition of the energy sector: expanded transmission
and distribution networks, smart grids, and storage are enablers for renewable energy
penetration. As a share of GDP, South Korea stands out particularly positively, mostly
resulting from the Korean Green New Deal (See Annex 6, Example 2).
57 Green Recovery Tracker. 2021.

58 Oxford University. “Are We Building Back Better? Evidence from 2020 and Pathways to Inclusive Green Recovery Spending.”
Last modified 2021.

3.3.4 Agriculture, land use & forestry
Most of the recovery spending linked to agriculture, land use and forestry was deployed
by the United States (USD 92 billion), followed by the European Union (USD 24.6 billion)
and China (USD 23.7 billion). Recovery measures in this sector focus mainly on promoting
ecological conservation initiatives. The most common recovery measures in this sector
include wildfire risk reduction programs; air and water pollution prevention; soil protection
programs; habitat restoration activities, such as planting trees and protecting biodiversity;
investing in water management systems; and developing public parks and green spaces.
Due to its high employment creation potential, as well as its impacts on SDGs, recovery
spending linked to the agriculture, land use and forestry sector was prioritized by
G20 developing countries. Annex 6, Example 4 shows an Indian recovery measure that
simultaneously fosters biodiversity, job creation, and tribal community support.

4. Contribution of Recovery Efforts to NDC Implementation
Multiple tools, databases, and periodic reports track climate action and NDC pledges in
different countries. However, few studies have assessed the impacts of COVID-19 responses
on the enabling environment for NDC implementation. The most prominent examples
are the Climate Action Tracker,59 the Global Carbon Project,60 the UNDP Climate Promise
Progress Report,61 and a scientific report by Rochedo et al.62
This section synthesizes the existing literature on how recovery measures have contributed
to the creation of an enabling environment for NDC implementation in five cross-cutting
areas: (1) planning and development of climate policies, (2) government coordination, (3)
mobilization of finance, (4) capacity development for the implementation of climate policies,
and (5) more effective monitoring and impact measurements. In addition, it highlights further
opportunities to utilize recovery measures as enablers for NDC implementation under those
cross-cutting areas.
4.1 Planning and Development of Climate Policies

The alignment between national recovery plans and climate policies (i.e., NAPs, NDCs, LT-
LEDS, and net-zero targets) has reinforced governments’ response to economic and health
needs while prioritizing the achievement of the Paris Agreement.
G20 countries are aligning and integrating NDC measures and strategies with COVID-19
recovery plans. For instance, Indonesia is generating data and evidence on the linkages
between NDCs and green recovery, and Turkey’s climate and recovery measures are directly
linked to socioeconomic impact assessments. Other G20 members are increasingly using
NDCs to make a socioeconomic case for ambitious climate action, including focusing on
jobs.63 However, opportunity areas remain unseized.
4.1.1 Mitigation
The required updating of the NDCs in 2020 and 2021 created the opportunity to
integrate more ambitious climate actions and integrate recovery measures to lower
emissions by 2030. However, many G20 members have not increased their previous
pledges or sufficiently synergized recovery packages and NDCs. By the end of 2021,
most G20 members had submitted their updated NDCs, reflecting on the impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Australia made the most recent submission in June 2022 and Brazil in
59 Climate Action Tracker. Accessed June 23,2022. https://climateactiontracker.org/.

60 Global Carbon Project. “Global Carbon Budget 2021 CO2 emissions rebound towards pre-COVID levels.” Last modified
2021.
61 UNDP. “UNDP Climate Promise Progress Report.” Last modified April 2021.
62 Rochedo, Pedro, Panagiotis Fragkos, Rafael Garaffa, Lilia Caiado Couto, Luiz Bernado Baptista, Bruno S.L. Cunha, Roberto
Schaeffer, and Alexandre Szklo, “Is Green Recovery Enough? Analyzing the Impacts of Post-COVID-19 Economic Packages.”
Energies, 14, no. 17 (2021): 5567.
63 UNDP. Impacts of COVID-19 on raising ambition of national climate pledges under the Paris agreement, or Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs).

April 2022. India has yet to submit any updates on its 2016 NDC. Out of all G20 members,
11 (i.e., Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, the EU,64 Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
South Korea, the UK, and the US) claimed stronger mitigation targets than their previous
NDC, five (i.e., Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Turkey) did not increase their mitigation
targets, and one (i.e., Mexico) reduced their mitigation target.65 Of the 11 G20 members
with increased ambitions, members that have practiced renewable energy, like Canada and
the EU, show strong synergies between their green recovery measures and NDCs. Other
G20 members show conflicting support between their NDCs and recovery measures. For
example, countries that still use fossil fuels as a main source of energy—including Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico—bolster fossil fuel consumption in their economic recovery packages.
The pursuit of a green and resilient economic recovery partially motivated G20 members
toward net-zero pledges. However, these are yet to be formalized in the NDCs. For
example, China, Indonesia, and South Africa announced net-zero targets but have not yet
reflected them in their NDCs. Moreover, contrary to Canada, the European Union, Japan,
and the United Kingdom—which committed to legally binding net-zero emissions targets by
2050—the United States has not announced any legally binding net-zero pledges. Moreover,
seven G20 members are yet to state net-zero targets (i.e., Australia, India, Mexico, Russia,
South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey). It is estimated that if all G20 members adopt mid-
century net-zero emissions commitments and align their NDCs with a 1.5°C pathway, end-of-
century global warming could be limited to 1.7°C.66
4.1.2 Adaptation
After a delay in the development and implementation of NAPs due to the pandemic,
G20 members ramped up efforts to develop and revise adaptation policies. Five G20
members published or reviewed at least one national-level adaptation planning instrument.
The Russian Federation published its first National Adaptation Action Plan. South Africa
published new adaptation policies that significantly updated previous versions from 2006
and 2011, respectively, and launched its National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy in
September 2021. South Korea amended its National Strategic Plan for Climate Change
Adaptation (2021–2025). Argentina decreed the creation of the regulation for the External
Advisory Council to oversee the National Plan of Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate
Change (2022) and continue the development of the plan up to 2030 and the long-term low-
emissions resilient development strategy up to 2050, which is scheduled to be presented at
the UNFCCC COP 27.
It is observed that G20 members’ recovery and NAPs could further mutually reinforce
actions on five adaptation fronts: (1) strategic assessment of compound risks, (2)
disaster risk prevention and risk management systems, (3) the role of adaptation in
increasing population health and reducing risks for infectious disease, (4) reinforced
64 Included in the EU’s NDC: Germany, France, and Italy.

65 Climate Action Tracker. Accessed June 10, 2022. https://climateactiontracker.org/.
66 Climate Analytics and World Resources Institute. “Closing the gap: The impact of G20 Climate Commitments on Limiting
Global Temperature Rise to 1.5°C.” Last modified September 2021.

local-level interventions, and (5) A wider application of nature-based solutions across
G20 members to support adaptation as well as mitigation objectives should be pursued.
Opportunity area
In line with their net-zero pledges, G20 members should play a leading role in developing
their LT-LEDS. LT-LEDS can guide recovery plans through their long-term trajectory and help
with the allocation of financial resources. However, several G20 members are yet to submit
their LT-LEDS (i.e., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, Australia, and Brazil).
4.2 Government Coordination

A critical requirement for aligning climate policies with sustainable recovery plans is
extensive coordination within national institutions, between different government
levels, and between stakeholders.67 To allow for this complex coordination and the timely
development of recovery plans in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, G20 members established
new coordination mechanisms. These coordination mechanisms can be maintained and
leveraged to facilitate NDC implementation as they are agile, capable of delivering results
under time constraints, and facilitate cross-sectoral prioritization.
The establishment of multi-ministerial technical task forces in charge of the economic

recovery response to the COVID-19 crisis increased government coordination in a limited
amount of time. The multi-ministerial approach ensured the alignment of government
priorities and facilitated the identification of synergies across sectors. It also avoided the
implementation of stand-alone measures. For example, Italy established an Experts’ Task
Force for Reconstruction, which aimed at identifying practical and systemic solutions. This
task force also considered cross-cutting issues such as gender.68
Subnational-level coordination was also strengthened to facilitate a green recovery.

For example, the decentralized cooperation between local government officials resulted in
the replication of best recovery practices across EU cities. Similarly, the Alliance of Mexican
Governors for Climate engaged in dialogues to promote an inclusive recovery through
subnational coordination, allowing synergies between states and knowledge transfer of
best green recovery practices.69 These subnational coordination efforts should be further
encouraged to ease the implementation of local- and provincial-level NDC measures.
Moreover, independent task forces for recovery strengthened the coordination between
government and civil society. For example, Canada’s Task Force for a Resilient Recovery is an
independent group of finance, policy, and sustainability leaders that develops analyses and provides
recommendations to the Canadian government on how to seize green recovery opportunities.70
67 UNDP. 2020. “Building the Economy of Tomorrow: Using NDCs to Inform Green Recovery.”
68 Jakubowska, Joanna, Ondřej Plevak, Patrik Szicherle and Zuzana Gabrizova “Drafting national recovery plans: A laborious
exercise for Visegrad countries.” EURACTIV. Last modified February 10, 2021.
69 WRI Mexico. “Abre la Alianza de Gobernadores Mexicanos por el Clima diálogos por la recuperación.” Last modified August
23, 2020.
70 Task Force for a Resilient Recovery. 2020. “Let’s build back better.”

Opportunity area
Greater coordination between the different levels of governments needs reinforcement
to encourage the scale-up or replication of subnational recovery and NDC actions. To do
so, G20 members should leverage their Green Recovery Task Forces by integrating a regional
perspective within their mandates. Moreover, recovery plans aligned with NDCs, NAPs, and
LT-LEDS should include subnational targets or geographically differentiated measures for
mitigation and adaptation.
4.3 Mobilization of Finance

The COVID-19 pandemic increased the financing gap for NDCs, with earlier estimates of
government funds available for mitigation and adaptation projects sharply reduced as
government budgets were diverted to large emergency relief programs.71, 72 In addition, the
recent geopolitical developments will likely further divert financial resources and reduce the
speed of sustainable global recovery and implementation of the climate agenda. However,
some recovery efforts have increased the availability and access to sustainable finance
for the implementation of recovery measures and NDCs in the face of the current fiscal
constraints.
Global green recovery initiatives have increased access to finance from multilateral
financial institutions. For example, in a move to enhance collaboration in adaptation amid
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Adaptation Fund (AF), the Climate Investment Funds, the
Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the Global Environment Facility released a joint statement to
support developing countries on the road to a climate-resilient recovery from COVID-19.73
In line with this statement, the AF received unprecedented support with a record USD 356
million in new pledges—triple what it raised in 2020 and nearly triple its USD 120 million
fundraising goal for 2021. G20 member contributors included for the first time the United
States (USD 50 million), Canada, the European Union (USD 100 million), and new pledges
from Germany (USD 50 million to AF and to USD 100 million GCF).
The use of innovative financing mechanisms74 has increased, expanding private sector
financing and allowing developing countries and Least Developed Countries to have
a more stable funding source for their recovery measures and NDCs.75 As a recovery
response to the COVID-19 crisis, G20 members promoted innovative financing instruments
(i.e., blended finance, sustainable bonds, and the redistributive allocation of Special Drawing
71 ADB. “Green Finance Strategies for Post-COVID-19 Economic Recovery in Southeast Asia.” Last modified October 2020.
72 Convergence. “The State of Blended Finance 2021.” Last modified 2021.
73 Adaptation Fund. “Adaptation Fund: Key Achievements of 2021 and Entering 2022 with Promise.” Accessed June 15,2022.
74 According to the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development, innovative financing includes those sources
and mechanisms that are not covered by traditional aid flows such as ODA. Two sub-categories of innovative financing
ara distinguished: (i) innovative financing sources generating new funds for sustainable development, and (ii) innovative
financing mechanisms contributing to enhance the efficiency, impact, and leverage of existing resources (public, private,
or under the form of public-private partnerships).
75 Gautam, Deepali, Rohit Goel, and Fabio Natalucci. “Sustainable Finance in Developing countries is Enjoying Rapid Growth,
But May Bring Risks.” IMF. Last modified March 1, 2022.

Rights) as a priority under the Saudi Arabian and Italian presidencies.76 G20 efforts, in
combination with the changes in financial markets, have resulted in an unprecedented 185%
increase in the worldwide issuance of sustainability bonds volume since 2019.77 Similarly,
the annual capital flows of blended finance have increased by almost 200% since 2019.78
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) have
also assumed a leading role in promoting innovative finance mechanisms to support G20
members’ recovery plans. For example, to advance the development of more resilient water
systems in Brazil, supporting adaptation and recovery simultaneously, the International Finance
Corporation supported the first sustainability-linked loan in the Brazilian water sector.79
G20 members are using the recovery experience as an opportunity to build stronger
public finance systems, which are crucial for a strong recovery. Ministries of finance are
implementing emergency policies and procedures to withstand the fiscal and social impacts
in the event of a disaster as well as to ensure the effective delivery of exceptional payments.
Moreover, governments are increasingly switching toward performance-based budgeting, using
accrual basis accounting, and applying performance budgeting systems at the sectoral level.80
Similarly, innovative Climate Budget Tagging schemes are being implemented. For example,
Indonesia has used Climate Budget Tagging to track climate-related expenditures in the
national budget since 2016. This tool allows the government to monitor its climate spending,
make informed decisions about future budgetary allocations, and prioritize climate spending.81
Opportunity areas (further details in finance track of the G20)

To increase finance mobilization for a green recovery, countries should pursue further
integration across the planning, performance-based budgeting, and reporting.
To reduce future fiscal constraints for recovery measures, countries should prioritize
recovery investments in economic sectors that might have positive impacts on future
fiscal revenues or widen the tax base by reducing informality. For example, cash transfer
recovery programs for forestry restoration can be deployed, in combination with social
protection schemes focused on integrating the informal economy into the sector, thus
reducing tax evasion and supporting mitigation as well as adaptation.
Allow DFIs to lead the collaboration with the private sector to drive more capital. DFIs can
leverage private sector finance through innovative financing instruments, partner with local
development banks, and complement the support with technical assistance to governments
in a more effective fashion than governments.
76 Berensmann, Kathrin. “How Can the G20 Support Innovative Mechanisms to Mobilise Financial Resources for LDCs in a Post-
Pandemic World?” IAI. Last modified 2021.
77 Jones, Liam. “Sustainable Debt Tops $1 Trillion in Record Breaking 2021, with Green Growth at 75%: New Report. Climate
Bonds.” Last modified April 25, 2022.
78 Convergence. “The State of Blended Finance 2021.” Last modified 2021.
79 Hanway, Cheryl Edelson, and Henri Blas. “Private sector financing can accelerate a green recovery for cities. World Bank.”
Last modified October 21, 2021.
80 Gurazada, Srinivas. “Public Financial Management in the Post-COVID World.” PEFA. June 10, 2022.
81 OECD. “Sustainable Ocean Economy Country Diagnostics of Indonesia.” Last modified April 2021.

4.4 Capacity Development for the Implementation of Climate Policies
Technical support tools, guidelines, and overall capacity for implementing recovery projects,
innovative financing measures, government coordination, and enforcement of climate
policies are often lacking. UNFCCC identified three capacity gaps in integrating sustainable
recovery elements into coherent NDC implementation and planning: (1) limited articulation
and communication strategies at the country level and development of project proposals,
(2) mobilization of financial resources for NDC implementation and deficiencies in national
regulatory frameworks related to financial systems, and (3) a lack of analysis of labor market
trends.82 Recovery efforts have slightly contributed to closing two of these capacity gaps.
Articulation and communication strategies at the country level and development of

project proposals. The accelerated increase in sustainable finance has increased the demand
for investment-ready sustainability projects. Consequently, countries are being forced
to increase their capacity and knowledge to prioritize green projects within the national
planning, packaging adaptation actions into project proposals for funding, identifying
synergies sectors, enhancing their long-term capacity for planning, and developing bankable
green projects. Countries have received support for capacity development in these areas
from financial institutions. For example, under the GCF Readiness Programme, the GCF
supports developing countries in advancing their climate-resilient recovery strategies and
incorporating them into their NDCs.83 This is done by providing a readiness grant, increasing
the budget allocation of a current readiness grant, or via GCF technical experts’ support.
Moreover, the GCF Readiness Programme is being highlighted to increase countries’ capacity
for sustainable recovery project formulation.
Capacity to mobilize financial resources for implementing NDCs. Better prepared

projects are the catalyst to attract increased flows of green capital. However, countries lack
the knowledge and capacity to scale up innovative financial mechanisms. As part of their
reinforced support for a sustainable recovery, MDBs have scaled up their capacity-building
assistance to structure blended financing.
Opportunity area
Lack of analysis of labor market trends. Despite the importance of skills development
to ensure both a sustainable recovery and a low-carbon transition, it is estimated that
funding for skills training (green and non-green skills) in G20 members states’ recovery
plans amounts to about 3% of the total recovery budget, while funding for green skills
training accounts for approximately 1%. Recovery expenditure related to skills development
is primarily deployed by G20 advanced economies (i.e., China, the UK, the US, Canada, the
EU, France, and South Korea). Moreover, the quantification of existing and potential green
jobs, as well as the assessment of labor markets to anticipate green skill requirements for
NDC implementation, is still insufficient, particularly in G20 developing countries and for
adaptation-related activities.
82 UNFCCC. “11th Durban Forum on Capacity-building.” Last modified June 8, 2022.

83 GCF. “Guidance Note – GCF Readiness Support to Climate Resilient Recovery.” Accessed June 10, 2022.

Therefore, best case examples of skills development programs for addressing labor market
trends need to be emulated in G20 developing countries. For example, the United Kingdom
launched the Green Jobs Taskforce84 as part of its Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial
Revolution85 to transform the job market so it can support the government’s plan to Build
Back Better86 and net-zero targets. The taskforce brings together government, industry,
the education sector, and other stakeholders to assess the skills needed for a low-carbon
transition, provide recommendations for the upcoming national net-zero strategy, and
direct apprenticeship courses and standards for reskilling.
A low number of recovery measures focused on adaptation-related research. Recovery

plans in the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, France,
Canada, and China include substantial support for research programs. According to the
International Energy Agency Sustainable Recovery Tracker, recovery policies in force and
ended supporting research focused mostly on circular economy and on low-emission
transport and energy technologies, such as clean hydrogen technologies, EV supply chains,
energy storage, alternative fuels, and direct air capture.87 Recovery support for research
related to adaptation and effective measures for resilience pales in comparison to the support
for mitigation technologies. G20 countries could reallocate recovery funds to overcome the
knowledge barriers. Recovery funds should help develop an understanding of climate change
impacts at the local and sectoral levels, the potential for effective climate risk reduction, the
assessment of systemic risks, and the development of adaptation technologies.
4.5 Recovery Spending on Climate, Environment, and Social Development

As a response to the COVID-19 crisis, G20 members leveraged their open and digital
government solutions to increase transparency on the response to disease control and
the allocation of public resources for recovery. As a member of the Open Government
Partnership, the Republic of Korea is an example of using technology to secure public
transparency and openness during the COVID-19 crisis.88
However, the lack of transparency for budget allocation and data gaps on the impacts
of recovery measures remain a constraint for the development and implementation of
recovery plans as well as NDCs.
Opportunity area
Most of the G20 members do not seem to have any recovery-related indicators to
measure recovery impacts.
84 GOV.UK. “Green Jobs Taskforce.” Accessed June 10, 2022.

85 GOV.UK. “The Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution (HTML version).” Last modified November 18, 2020.
86 GOV.UK. “Build Back Better: our plan for growth.” Last modified March 3, 2021.
87 IEA. “Sustainable Recovery Tracker.” Last modified 2021.
88 Sharon, Alita. “South Korea looks to tech to combat Covid-19”. OpenGov Asia. Last modified March 14, 2020.

G20 members that have specifically established indicators to quantify the climate
impact of recovery measures are Canada, the United States, and the European Union.
The Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard of the European Union includes a set of 14 common
indicators that are used to report national recovery progress and plans for all EU countries.
The identified indicators cover all six EU policy pillars, and eight indicators involve the pillars
of green transition and smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. This includes indicators such
as annual primary energy consumption savings, additional operational capacity installed for
renewable energy, and populations benefiting from protection measures against floods,
wildfires, and other climate-related natural disasters.89 Countries like the United States
or Canada have program-specific indicators. For example, the US Department of Energy
has indicators to measure energy intensity and energy performance. The Canadian Expert
Panel on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience recommends a suite of 54 indicators
across five different areas.90 Among these five areas is reducing climate-related hazards and
disaster risks, as well as building climate resilience through infrastructure, which include
four objectives and corresponding indicators for each objective.
Certain G20 members, including Russia, Indonesia, and Italy, use indicators that can
be linked to the SDG-related socioeconomic indicators—such as the growth rate of real
income, the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, welfare, and household consumption—
to track the impact of their NAPs.91 Other examples of what countries reported as measures
include having indicators to monitor the budget allocation in the economic recovery of the
most vulnerable sectors (Mexico) or, more generally, reporting the recovery momentum and
potential brakes in the coming months of 2022 (Brazil).92
Ex-ante and ex-post assessments need to be built into recovery measures to ensure that
their impacts can be monitored over time.93 This is particularly important for adopting
evidence-based policies for a sustainable recovery and engaging stakeholders in decision-
making.
89 European Commission. 2021. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2106. Official Journal of the European Union.
Accessed June 10, 2022.
90 Expert Panel on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Results. “Measuring progress on adaptation and climate
resilience: recommendations to the Government of Canada.” Last modified 2018.
91 Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia (LPEM FEB UI) and BAPPENAS. “Thinking Ahead: Indonesia’s
Agenda on Sustainable Recovery from COVID-19 Pandemic.” Last modified December 2020; Elcano Royal Institute. “Italy’s
National Recovery and Resiliency Plan’s climate impact.” Last modified December 16, 2021.
92 Eco Emerging. “A recovery in loss of momentum.” Last modified 2022.

5 Current and Potential Recovery Scenarios
Green recovery measures have the potential to support decarbonization and resilience
activities, advancing NDC implementation and the achievement of the Paris Agreement.94
Therefore, there are multiple studies assessing the future impacts of COVID-19 recovery
spending on the international climate goals. For example, Rochedo et al. assessed the
financial gap between pledged recovery packages and the investment needs to reach
the Paris Agreement goals on a global level. Dafnomilis et al. examined the contribution
of recovery measures to reducing global CO2 emissions. While Pollitt et al., Hummelen et
al. and Shan et al. all have analyzed the impact of possible recovery measures on global
emissions as well as on the economy concluding that sufficient green recovery measures can
contribute reaching climate goals.
This section assesses the impacts of the G20 announced recovery spending on the
international climate goals for 2022–2050. It uses the E3ME macro-economic modeling to
assess (1) the expected GHG emission reductions derived from recovery spending and (2)
the expected macro-economic impacts (i.e., GDP and employment) of the recovery spending.
To this end, six different scenarios were developed, as shown in Table 2. Scenario 1 is used
as the baseline, scenarios 2 and 3 are climate trajectories, and scenarios 4, 5, and 6 directly
focus on recovery.
Table 2. Overview of simulated scenarios
G20 recovery measures Mitigation

Scenario Further information
included pathway
Baseline: Business- None None l Business-as-usual

as-usual (BAU) pathway
baseline
l Follows historical
emission and
technology adoption
trends
Pathway 1: Global None 1.5°C by 2100
1.5°C scenario compatible
pathway
Pathway 2: Global None 2°C by 2100

2°C scenario compatible
pathway
94 World Bank. “Impacts and Lessons Learned Supporting NDC Implementation.” Last modified 2021.

Scenario 1: G20 All G20 recovery measures from N/A l Assumes recovery
Recovery the Global Recovery Observatory measures are
database deployed during 2022
and 2024
l As a sensitivity, a
high energy price
version of this
scenario is simulated
to reflect the ongoing
geopolitical situation
Scenario 2: G20 l As the G20 recovery scenario N/A

recovery under assumes, 100% of the recovery
fiscal constraints measures from G20 advanced
economies are deployed
l But only 50% of the recovery
measures of G20 developing
countries are deployed
Scenario 3: G20 l As the G20 recovery scenario N/A

recovery with assumes, 100% of the recovery
extended funding measures from G20 advanced
for green measures economies are deployed
in G20 developing
l But recovery spending of
countries
G20 developing countries
is double, and it is spent on
green measures
5.1 GHG Emissions Reduction Impacts

5.1.1 Scenario 1: G20 recovery (i.e., current recovery spending).
The G20 current recovery spending (Scenario 1) leads to average emissions savings of around
1% compared to the baseline (approximately 0.3 GtCO2 per year). This saving is persistent,
achieved by 2025, and stable until 2050. This scenario includes all identified G20 recovery
measures and not just green spending, so increases in emissions from higher economic
activity are also included.
The main reasons for the limited reduction in emissions from the current recovery spending
are:
l A low recovery spending on mitigation measures. Up to the end of 2021, less than
30% of the total recovery spending was classified as having a positive impact on
reducing GHG emissions.
l A short-term impact of current recovery spending. The impact of the COVID-19
recovery response to climate change mitigation depends on long-term trajectory
shifts. However, the current recovery spending is expected to last just a few years.
Moreover, the economic crisis and lockdown restrictions linked to the COVID-19
pandemic in 2020 led to a temporary decline of only 5.4% in energy-related CO2

emissions (1.9 billion tons of CO2)—comparable to the annual emissions reduction
rate needed to achieve the 1.5oC target. However, emissions soon rebounded to near
pre-pandemic levels in 2021.95 To achieve the 1.5°C target, global emissions would
have to be reduced at a comparable rate every year.
l Policies being incoherent with recovery efforts. Without supporting policies, green
recovery alone will not lead to large emissions reductions. For example, spending
support for electricity generation from wind and solar will not be as effective as
when accompanied by a coal phase-out policy or a carbon tax to help speed up the
transition.
Figure 7. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending, 2020–2050 (% emissions savings
against baseline)
5.1.2 Scenario 2: G20 recovery under fiscal constraints.

A fiscal constraints scenario (Scenario 2) was set up to understand the impacts of reduced
implementation of recovery packages in G20 developing countries with little fiscal headroom.
Scenario 2 assumes the same structure of recovery measures as the current recovery scenario
(Scenario 1), but it limits the magnitude of recovery spending in G20 developing countries
to 50%.
The G20 recovery scenario under fiscal constraints (Scenario 2) leads to an average
emissions savings of 0.87% compared to the baseline for 2022–2050. The difference
between the fiscal constraint and current recovery spending scenarios (Scenario 1) is
small because total recovery spending is dominated by high-income G20 countries that are
95 Global Carbon Project. “Global Carbon Budget 2021 CO2 emissions rebound towards pre-COVID levels.” Last modified
2021.

not subject to the same fiscal pressures in this scenario. Since the share of green recovery
spending in G20 developing countries is also comparatively small, the emissions outcomes
remain similar to the current recovery spending scenario (Scenario 1). For example, under
the current G20 recovery spending scenario (Scenario 1), it is observed that the European
Union, Japan, and the United States show the highest emissions reduction contributions
because their green measures have a much larger share in total recovery spending. Recovery
spending from G20 developing countries tends to have lower climate contributions (Table
3). Therefore, when assuming fiscal constraints, the climate contribution of G20 developing
countries will not represent a big percentage change.
Table 3: Modeled percentage reduction in CO2 emissions in 2030 compared to the baseline scenario
per economy
Germany -3.81
Japan -3.75
United Kingdom -3.68
South Korea -3.17
United States -2.49
France -2.28
European Union -1.79
Italy -1.02
Mexico -0.92
Australia -0.78
China -0.64
Canada -0.63
South Africa -0.39
Saudi Arabia -0.3
Indonesia -0.02
Russia -0.02
India 0.00
Brazil 0.03
Turkey 0.09
Source: Cambridge Econometric modelling, March–July 2022
Countries with limited fiscal headroom may prioritize short-term growth and employment
over an emissions reduction despite larger benefits in the long term. Therefore,international
financial support is key to enabling developing countries to adopt long-term emissions
reduction policies. IRENA’s modeling of the Planned Energy Scenario (PES) on the World
Energy Transitions Outlook (2021) explores the socioeconomic impacts of implementing
such policies under a scenario of limited international financial support to developing
countries that might be subject to fiscal constraints (see Box 1).

BOX 1 (1/2) Impact of selected policies on the distribution of socioeconomic outcomes:
IRENA analysis
The 2021 edition of the World Energy Transitions Outlook (WETO) (IRENA, 2021) focused on the
differential socioeconomic outcomes wrought by the two main scenarios: the Planned Energy
Scenario (PES) and the 1.5°C scenario. The policy basket stipulated in the 2021 edition of WETO
embraced relatively high carbon prices, aligned with the 1.5°C climate goal, and limited flows of
international cooperation (USD 290 billion/year, or three times current pledges) through 2050.
The global results improved GDP, jobs, and welfare. But regional or national socioeconomic
disparities emerged between developed and developing countries, and these were in part linked
to fossil fuel dependence. Indeed, a few countries—mainly developing countries or fossil fuel-
dependent ones—saw dips in GDP when comparing the two scenarios: the 1.5°C scenario and PES.
In the 2022 edition of WETO (IRENA, 2022), a sensitivity analysis was carried out to better
understand the implications of differing policies on economies and societies. Policy basket A
(PB-A) entails a high carbon tax and low international cooperation (i.e., limited flows of funds
to developing countries, although higher than current pledges). Policy basket B (PB-B) imposes
a lower carbon tax (but higher than real-world levels) combined with stronger international
cooperation.
Figure 8. Energy transition roadmaps and climate policy baskets
At the global level, both variants of the 1.5°C scenario enhance GDP in similar ways. Global GDP
is 0.4% to 0.5% higher in the 1.5°C scenario than in the PES by 2030 (Figure 9, left bars) with
both policy baskets. The policy baskets have nearly neutral effects on a global scale. In both
models, GDP is 2.2%–2.3% greater than in the PES, on average, from now until 2030. PB-B, on
the other hand, promotes employment more than basket A, rising from 0.9% to 1.2% in 2030.
PB-B provides 1.6% more jobs across the economy than in the PES, on average, between now and
2030, while PB-A creates 1.2% more jobs.
This disparity can be explained by the increase in public investment and expenditure in labor-
intensive sectors in developing nations that receive international assistance. When looking at
policy baskets at the regional and country levels, various pictures emerge: a few countries are
marginally worse off, while many others gain greatly. Improved budgetary freedom given by
increased international engagement under basket B benefits recipient developing countries
greatly. It enables social demands to be met and structural inequities to be eliminated, hence
increasing the likelihood of popular acceptance of transition policies.

BOX 1 (2/2) Incidence of selected policies on the distribution of socioeconomic outcomes:
IRENA analysis
Figure 9. Global GDP and economy-wide employment in the two 1.5°C scenario variants
The number of people working in the global energy sector by 2030 could rise from 106 million
under the PES to 139 million under the 1.5°C scenario (Figure 10). Job losses in conventional energy
jobs (i.e., fossil fuels and nuclear) are more than offset by gains in renewables and other energy
transition-related technologies (i.e., energy efficiency, power grids and flexibility, hydrogen). By
2030, the total number of renewable energy jobs more than doubles from 17.4 million in the
PES to 38.2 million in the 1.5°C scenario, while other energy transition-related sectors rise from
45.8 million to 74.2 million.
Figure 10. Global energy sector jobs (2019) under the 1.5°C scenario and PES (2030)
Additionally, welfare improves at a significantly faster rate than GDP and jobs. By 2030, both
1.5°C scenario policy baskets produce significant improvements over the PES, of approximately
20%, and much higher by mid-century. The primary purpose of this policy basket sensitivity
analysis is to determine whether there is room to improve the distribution of transition burdens
and benefits. The fact that both policy packages have identical results for GDP, economy-wide
employment, and welfare at the global level suggests that distributional changes can be made
while global socioeconomic growth is maintained.

5.1.3 Scenario 3: G20 recovery with extended funding for green measures in G20
developing countries.
Doubling the recovery spending of G20 developing countries and allocating it to green
interventions leads to emissions savings of around 1.7% compared to the baseline.
Emissions savings in Scenario 3 are 0.7 percentage points higher than in the current recovery
spending scenario (Scenario 1).
Changes in the magnitude of the simulated recovery spending in G20 developing

countries highly influence the emissions-saving results. In the fiscal constraints scenario
(Scenario 2), the total recovery spending is 6.3% lower than in the current recovery spending
(Scenario 1), while in the extended green recovery (Scenario 3), total recovery spending is
12.6% higher. In both cases, the reduction or addition is focused on G20 developing countries.
Decreasing the spending in these countries by 6% shrinks the mitigation impacts of recovery
measures disproportionately, by 10–12%. Nevertheless, increasing the recovery spending by
about 12% and focusing it on green measures almost doubles the emissions reduction in the
short term (70% increase).
5.1.4 Contribution to the Paris Agreement goal and aggregated G20 NDC targets.
Although G20 recovery packages provide emissions abatement, they are rather far
from the scale that would be needed to contribute substantially to the climate goals
of the Paris Agreement. The simulations show that large-scale action and transformation
would be required to achieve the 1.5°C and 2°C targets. Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 show that the
recovery packages, although involving considerable spending with some green elements, do
not reach the scale necessary to significantly contribute to this transformation.
The emissions reductions in the current recovery spending scenario (Scenario 1) have a
limited contribution to putting the G20 members on a pathway consistent with the 1.5°C
or 2°C targets.96 For comparison, the 1.5°C scenario requires an immediate 12% emissions
reduction, compared to the baseline, in year one (2022), rising up to 52% in 2030. Meanwhile,
the 2°C compatible scenario would require an approximate 9% emissions reduction by year
one, with a 41% reduction by 2030. However, the current recovery spending scenario only
leads to an immediate 0.45% emissions reduction in 2022, peaking at 1.6% in 2028.
Likewise, the GHG emissions reductions estimated from scenarios 2 and 3 have a limited
contribution to the combined updated NDC pledges of the G20. The saving of 0.4 GtCO2
from the baseline in 2030, from scenarios 2 and 3, is a small contribution to the aggregated
G20 NDC pledge. Moreover, while reductions in the case of an extended green recovery
(Scenario 3) are higher, the achieved 0.7 GtCO2 reduction is still a limited contribution. To
reach their combined NDC ambition, the G20 members must keep their emissions in 2030
relatively flat compared to 2015. However, despite a 6% drop in 2020 due to the pandemic,
emissions of G20 members are now higher than their 2019 levels and are expected to rise
under the business-as-usual scenario.
96 This is one of the possible pathways based on cumulative emission results and outcomes of policy inputs, between 2017
and 2100. The E3ME model is simulation based and does not produce a cost-optimal scenario.

It is relevant to highlight that the aggregated NDC mitigation effect of the G20 members
is insufficient to reach the 1.5oC Paris Agreement target in the coming ten years—making
up for 66% of the total emissions gap (23 GtCO2e) to reach the target. The updated G20
members’ NDC targets are aligned with a 2.4°C pathway by the end of the century.97
Figure 11. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending per economic sector (-12% axis
vs -100% axis)
5.1.5 Sectoral contribution to emissions reductions.

Across all scenarios, recovery measures lead to the highest emissions reductions in
transport, followed by electricity generation, and buildings. This is in line with the share
of recovery spending for each sector. While emissions reductions are related to the amount
of spending dedicated to individual measures, investing in affordable and widely deployable
technologies generates more emissions reductions as the unit cost of abatement could be
lower. For example, EVs could be more effective in mitigation as the technology is closer to
a tipping point where the costs of EVs are becoming much more affordable. Solar and wind
are often cost-competitive technologies for electricity generation, while renewable heating
or hydrogen are still far more expensive than fossil fuel alternatives.
To lower the abatement cost of more expensive technologies being supported by recovery
measures and to achieve higher emissions reductions, supporting policies will be needed on
top of the spending.
97 Climate Action Tracker. “Global Update.” Last updated September 15, 2021.

Figure 12. Emissions reductions associated with G20 recovery spending per economic sector, 2020–2050
(% emissions savings against baseline)
Source: Cambridge Econometrics modelling, March July 2022
5.2 Macroeconomic Impacts of G20 Recovery Spending

5.2.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Scenario 1: G20 Recovery
G20 recovery measures deliver positive GDP impacts, boosting GDP by around 1.6%
(compared to the baseline) between 2022 and 2024. However, these increases are not
sustained long term, declining sharply around three years after the introduction of the
recovery measures.
To sustain the positive GDP impacts of recovery measures in the long term, it is necessary
to implement supporting policies. Recovery measures are expected to create long-lasting,
sustained effects on the economy (i.e., trigger structural reforms). However, in the absence
of supporting policies, G20 recovery measures fail to initiate structural reforms, limiting the
macroeconomic effects to the multiplier impacts of spending during the stimulus period and
leading to a visible short-term decline.
In contrast, it is observed that the 1.5°C trajectory, which assumes a high degree of supporting
policies, delivers much larger and longer-lasting impacts on GDP (compared to the baseline),
reaching a peak of nearly 3% above the baseline scenario in 2028, with a much more gradual
decline throughout the 2030s. The initial boost in GDP in the 1.5°C trajectory is driven mainly
by the large amount of low-carbon investment that is needed for a transition. In the long

term, G20 GDP continues to improve due to an improved trade balance from a reduction in
fossil fuel imports. Moreover, despite higher energy prices, overall expenditure on energy
bills would be lower due to energy savings.
Figure 13. Impact of recovery measures on GDP, 2020–2050 (% difference from baseline)
Other recovery scenarios
GDP impacts are somewhat lower in the fiscal constraint scenario, around a 1.5% GDP
boost, and somewhat higher in the extended green recovery scenario, a 1.7% GDP boost.
The relatively small changes are largely due to the lower weight of developing countries
(who are mostly affected) in the G20 total GDP.
5.2.2 Employment
Scenario 1: G20 Recovery
The recovery measures also deliver net positive employment impacts, around 8.1 million
jobs in 2024, but like GDP impacts, they are also unsustainable in the long term due to
the nature of recovery spending and the lack of supporting policies. This is in contrast
with the 1.5°C trajectory, where additional employment benefits are much greater, up to a
net 44.1 million jobs at its peak. The difference in employment creation between the G20
recovery scenario and the 1.5°C trajectory is explained by the nature of the scenarios: for the
1.5°C pathway, a large-scale, sustained transition is necessary, while the recovery measures
are concentrated in a few years and do not necessarily have sustained growth effects.

Figure 14. Impact of recovery measures on employment, 2020–2050 (% difference from baseline)
Other recovery scenarios
The recovery scenario with extended funding for green measures (Scenario 3) produces
more long-standing employment benefits than the current spending G20 recovery scenario
(Scenario 1). While Scenario 1 (current spending) peaks in the year 2024, Scenario 3 (extended
spending) has two peaks: one in 2024 and one around 2028. In 2024, scenarios 1 and 3 produce
similar employment results (8.1 million and 8.6 million, respectively). However, Scenario 3
induces transitionary processes in G20 developing countries; therefore, its outcome by 2028
is much more prominent. By 2028, the employment gains of Scenario 1 (current spending)
are down to 3.3 million compared to the baseline, while Scenario 3 (extended spending)
boosts a higher employment of 9.6 million compared to the baseline. Considering what
has been discussed earlier, a 12.6% increase in the magnitude of overall G20 recovery
spending creates about 6 million more jobs (three times the employment impact by
2028) that remain stable over a decade.
Sectoral contribution to employment
Employment benefits are unevenly distributed across industries. Sectoral distributional

impacts are exceptionally small and short-lived in the current recovery spending scenario
(Scenario 1, changes in total employment are less than 0.5% in any given sector at any
time). During the employment creation peak in 2024, more jobs are created in consumer-
related sectors since most of the recovery spending aims at stimulating consumer demand.
In agriculture and forestry,98 nature-based recovery measures boost employment, with a
particularly strong effect in G20 developing countries. This is highlighted even more when
98 The agricultural sector includes forestry and related services, which includes the creation and maintenance of green spaces
and natural infrastructure.

green policies are boosted in G20 developing countries under the extended recovery support
scenario (Scenario 3). In this case, agricultural and forestry employment will increase by over
2% by 2030. As was previously discussed, the extended green recovery scenario (Scenario 3)
also leads to more sustained employment effects. Job losses are observed in all scenarios in
the mining and utilities sector due to green recovery spending.
As a reference point, the 2oC trajectory brings much stronger employment impacts than any
of the recovery scenarios (scenarios 1,2, and 3). Here it can be observed that the transition
to a low-carbon pathway creates a high-scale restructuring of the economies. Similar to the
recovery scenarios, the mining and utilities sector loses a substantial part of its jobs (up to
15%) in the 2oC trajectory. However, job creation in other sectors (in absolute terms) offsets
these losses, resulting in overall net job gains.
Figure 15. Impact of recovery measures by sector, 2020–2050 (% difference from baseline)

5.3 Impact of the Current High Energy Prices
A sensitivity analysis was carried out assuming higher energy prices than in the initial
scenarios 1 to 3. In particular, the sensitivity analysis considered the impact of higher global
natural gas prices to simulate the uncertainty in markets and recent developments in energy
policy and global geopolitics.
To determine the marginal impacts of higher energy prices (global context) on mitigation, GDP,
and employment, the following method was used. First, a baseline scenario and a recovery
scenario with high energy prices were set up in addition to the standard baseline scenario
(Scenario 1) and the standard current spending recovery scenario (Scenario 1). Second, the
differences between the baseline with high energy prices and the recovery scenario with
high energy prices were compared against the differences between the standard baseline
scenario and the standard recovery scenario.
The sensitivity test resulted in negligible differences across the cases. GDP and employment
impacts are within 0.1 percentage point between the standard and high energy price cases.
However, there are some relevant differences in emissions reductions at the country level.
Especially in European countries with substantial natural gas usage (i.e., Germany and the
UK), emissions reduction impacts of the recovery scenarios are somewhat weaker (up to 0.6
percentage point) in 2020–2035, coinciding with higher natural gas prices. The reason for
the weaker impacts is that the consumption of natural gas has already diminished due to its
high price.
For recovery measures in general, given the uncertainties across fossil fuels and their
pricing and market, there may be a case for an “organic” switching, from fossil fuels to other
energy sources in some economic sectors. However, it could also become more difficult
for policymakers to create policies that can bring further emission abatement—as the low-
hanging fruits might disappear.
5.4 Results Overview

Table 4 below shows an overview of the key results. The main scenario, current recovery
spending (Scenario 1), creates an approximate 1% sustained emissions reduction impact; it
also has positive, small economic and job impacts, but these largely diminish over time and
are concentrated around the implementation of the stimulus.

Table 4. Overview of simulation results, measured in % difference from the baseline scenario
Reduction of CO2 Economic activity

Scenario Employment (jobs)
emissions (GDP)
Short
Long term Short Short
term Long term Long term
(by 2050) term term
(by 2025)
Scenario 1: G20
-0.94 -1.01 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.09
recovery
Scenario 2: G20
recovery under fiscal -0.83 -0.91 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.06
constraints
Comparison: Scenario 1
-12% -10% 0% -8% -25% -33%
vs Scenario 2
Scenario 3: G20
recovery with extended
funding for green -1.73 -1.64 0.37 0.17 0.24 0.16
measures in G20
developing countries
Comparison: Scenario 1
84% 62% 32% 31% 50% 78%
vs Scenario 3
Climate scenarios for comparison
1.5oC pathway -31.28 -87.64 2.63 0.38 1.43 0.86
2oC pathway -19.86 -75.7 1.39 0.52 0.95 0.78

6 Recommendations to Drive NDC Achievement Through a
Sustainable Recovery
To ensure an inclusive recovery that supports the achievement of the Paris Agreement,
individual and joint G20 actions are recommended to focus on six areas of intervention.
1. Reinforcing the positive climate impacts derived from the announced G20 recovery
spending beyond 2025.
As of 2022, G20 members have announced a recovery spending of about USD 3.45 trillion.
However, only 33% of the total announced recovery spending has a direct impact on
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and supporting adaptation. The long-term
emissions reductions derived from the current recovery spending are moderate, closing
the emissions gap by only 1% for the 1.5°C scenario during 2022–2050. The modeling of a
G20 recovery scenario with extended support indicates that increasing recovery spending
by approximately 13%, with a focus on green measures and G20 developing countries, can
boost emissions reductions by 62% by 2050, compared to the base case scenario.
The recommendations below address the main reasons why the announced recovery
spending has a limited contribution to emissions reductions.
a. Recovery spending is concentrated in G20 developed countries, with 64% of the
total recovery spending having been announced. Therefore, recovery support that
encourages a structural low-carbon transformation of future emitters should be
increased.
b. Across all G20 members, recovery spending is mostly focused on two economic
sectors, energy and transport, while other sectors (e.g., industry, forestry, and waste
management) receive less support. A more balanced spending across sectors could
accelerate an inclusive recovery.
c. Recovery spending allocation could further pursue long-term behavioral shifts in
consumption or production by addressing the following:
l Prevalence of stand-alone green recovery measures, which offer ambiguous
long-term market signals or incentives for long-term sustainable growth.
l Prevalence of green recovery spending with short-term financial allocations,
limiting a long-term low-carbon transition.
l Prevalence of a top-down approach to recovery, which does not scale up local-
level measures.
The lack of alignment between current climate and economic development policies
and recovery measures potentially hinders action, financial flows, and impact. Conflicts
between existing policies and recovery support are particularly observed in emission-
intensive sectors such as electricity generation. Announced recovery spending should
reinforce climate policies and provide a coherent low-carbon development pathway.

l Allocate resources to identify cost-optimal interventions—complementary to
planned or ongoing projects—to reduce emissions in the current least supported
sectors, such as industry, forestry, and waste management.
l Seek cross-sectoral and cross-regional integration of recovery measures to avoid
stand-alone, short-term interventions with limited impact on a long-term behavioral
shift.
l Promote a bottom-up approach to the design and implementation of recovery
measures. A bottom-up implementation of recovery measures might adequately
consider existing local initiatives, increasing efficiency and effectiveness as efforts
focus on specific actions and incentivize subnational governments to hold a stake in
the social protection response. This could be done by increasing vertical integration
or coordination between different government levels so local interventions can be
scaled up at a national level.
l Ensure policy coherence between recovery efforts and a low-carbon pathway. This
can be done by identifying synergies, assessing trade-offs, and detecting political
barriers to individual interventions before allocating resources.
2. Ensuring balanced support for both adaptation and mitigation recovery actions.
There is an imbalance of recovery spending between mitigation and adaptation interventions

in both G20 developed and developing countries. For example, only four G20 members
explicitly considered investing in adaptation or resilience in their recovery plans (i.e., China,
France, the Republic of Korea, and the UK). The imbalance between recovery spending on
mitigation and adaptation could lead to slower and less definite actions to confront climate-
related challenges and compound risks, particularly for the more vulnerable G20 members.
There is also a risk of missing out on the social and environmental co-benefits that adaptation
recovery measures can provide. Therefore, the recommendations below seek to guide the
use of recovery funds for both adaptation and mitigation measures.
l Prioritize and/or assign potential new recovery support based on:
- finance gaps/needs assessment studies
- dependence of the intervention on public resources
- potential contribution to the SDGs
- historic recovery support to the sector
l Improve alignment of recovery measures with NDCs, NAPs, and economic priorities,
and incorporate the effect of recovery interventions into the long-term plans to
reduce emissions (e.g., LT-LEDS).
l Utilize recovery resources to overcome the knowledge barriers to adaptation by
increasing support for adaptation-related research.
l Increasing the understanding of climate change impacts at a geographically more
granular level, as well as at a sectoral level, the potential for effective climate risk

reduction, and the systemic risks of climate change would enable effective adaptation
interventions and the development of adaptation technologies.
l Increase the availability of financial resources for G20 developing countries,
prioritizing those with high vulnerability to and low preparedness to address the
negative impacts of climate change.
3. Overcoming fiscal constraints for future and ongoing recovery support.
G20 developing countries face tight fiscal constraints on implementing long-term recovery
measures. The fiscal constraints recovery scenario of this analysis shows a 9.3% reduction in
the already moderate impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) mitigation and a 36% reduction in the
employment impacts, compared to the base case.
Furthermore, G20 developing countries with tight fiscal space and rising levels of debt
experience limitations on the type and pace of recovery they can pursue. These limitations
can widen inequality and hinder a country’s ability to achieve more ambitious climate
objectives. A two-track and two-speed economic recovery could result in slower and less
definite actions to confront climate-related challenges.
Limited public and international funds mean the private sector is crucial in supporting
sustainable recovery measures. The recommendations below seek to increase the efficiency
of public sector spending as well as leverage private sector financing and its engagement in
recovery measures.
l To crowd in private finance for recovery, focus on developing a pipeline of investment-
ready sustainability projects that can easily access blended finance or utilize the
innovative financing mechanisms already supported by G20 members.
l Prioritize investments in economic sectors that might have future impacts on fiscal
revenues or widen the tax base by reducing informality while seeking mitigation or
adaptation benefits. For example, cash transfer programs for forestry restoration, in
combination with social protection schemes, seek to promote the integration of the
formal economy. Formal employment would raise tax revenue.
l Incorporate the ongoing recovery spending into the country’s annual budget
through a Climate Budget Tagging and performance-based budgeting approach. A
performance-based budgeting approach can improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of public expenditure for recovery. Moreover, it would facilitate the linkage of recovery
spending focused on mitigation and adaptation with the future annual budget allocation
for sustainable activities.
l Reallocate international support or extended economic stimulus and technical
assistance to developing countries to address the two-track and two-speed economic
recovery from the pandemic, focusing on countries with high fiscal constraints and
high climate vulnerabilities.

4. Maintaining, medium term (5–14 years) and long term (15–20 years), the positive
impacts of recovery spending on job creation, with a focus on green jobs.
G20’s announced recovery measures will deliver net positive employment impacts, boosting
GDP by around 1.5% between 2022 and 2024 and supporting approximately 3.7 million jobs
in 2025 (employment peak). However, these impacts are not sustained long term, declining
sharply around three years after effective spending. Without supporting policies and
actions to maintain long-term growth, the impacts of recovery spending will be limited to
multiplier impacts of expenditures during the stimulus period. For example, it is estimated
that extended recovery support can boost outcomes, with employment impacts being 80%
higher in 2050, compared to the base recovery scenario.
Moreover, despite the importance of skills development to ensure an inclusive recovery and
a low-carbon transition, it is estimated that G20 recovery spending on green skills training
amounts to approximately 1% of the total recovery budget and is particularly modest in G2O
developing countries.
Therefore, the recommendations below aim to maximize the creation and long-term
maintenance of green jobs linked to recovery measures and to further support the
development of a labor market for a low-carbon development pathway.
l Avoid stand-alone job creation, skilling, reskilling, or training interventions by
developing recovery policies with a cross-sectoral approach that considers the
diverse labor requirements and impacts across sectors. A cross-sectoral approach
could increase the employment multiplier effect on investment.
l Boost private sector participation in skilling, reskilling, and training programs
by linking recovery measure support to SMEs and entrepreneurship to recovery
measures supporting labor market development. Linking employment generation
sources with skills development recovery programs (i) reduces the risk of mismatching
skill demands with skills development, (ii) encourages the population to undertake
continuous learning, and (iii) helps reduce the gap between high-skill and low-skill
employees.
l Utilize a bottom-up approach to devise recovery measures linked to skilling, reskilling,
and training that successfully targets vulnerable populations and most unattended
sectors.
l Promote the inclusion of green job creation in climate targets at the national level.
l Promote knowledge sharing between G20 members to emulate the best examples
of skills development programs for addressing future labor market demands.
l Ensure the continuous measurement and monitoring of green jobs creation linked
to recovery measures by increasing countries’ capacity to define, quantify, and
analyze green jobs and future labor market needs. Accurate national data and
analyses on employment inform policymakers on potential actions to improve labor
markets, facilitate the identification of job creation opportunities, and represent the
precondition for a continuous improvement process.
5. Measuring the effectiveness of sustainable recovery spending by improving
reporting, disclosure, and continuous tracking of recovery measures.
Only three countries out of all G20 members have explicitly stated indicators to measure
the climate impact of their recovery measures. These members are Canada, the European
Union, and the United States. The following recommendations aim to promote the consistent
quantification of recovery impacts across G20 members to support the development of
data-informed policies and allow for continuous improvement of recovery measures.
l Increase transparency in announced and implemented resources tagged as recovery

by (i) systematically and consistently recording recovery spending and (ii) making
the information publicly available. Open data on recovery spending can support
policy decisions based on technical assessments and facilitate the improvement of
interventions.
l Implement cross-ministerial/cross-sectoral technical groups to evaluate recovery
targets in coordination with national climate and development objectives.
l Establish a standard definition of what constitutes recovery spending and set global
indicators or recovery to ensure comparability between countries. These definitions
and indicators could be linked to existing SDG indicators and climate targets.
6. Tackling compound risks.
Individual recovery measures by themselves make it difficult to tackle compound risks

exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. Not addressing compound risks leads to more
significant and sustained adverse impacts on lives, livelihoods, and ultimately sustainable
development outcomes.99 The following recommendations aim to prompt the uptake of a
multi-dimensional risk recovery approach.
l Increase resource allocation for the development of disaster risk management

frameworks/strategies that can better prepare the country to identify and implement
resource deployment strategies, governance directives, and policy responses for a
combination of environmental, socioeconomic, and political risks.
l Strengthen transboundary recovery efforts capable of increasing resilience in
multiple areas simultaneously (i.e., environmental, economic, and social).
99 Refers to eradicating extreme poverty; reducing all poverty by half; implementing social protection systems; ensuring
equal rights to ownership, basic services, technology, and economic resources; and building resilience to environmental,
economic, and social disasters.

7. References
Adaptation Fund. “Adaptation Fund: Key Achievements of 2021 and Entering 2022 with
Promise.” Accessed [Month, day year]. https://www.adaptation-fund.org/adaptation-
fund-key-achievements-of-2021-and-entering-2022-with-promise/.
ADB. “Green Finance Strategies for Post-COVID-19 Economic Recovery in Southeast

Asia.” Last modified October 2020. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/
publication/639141/green-finance-post-covid-19-southeast-asia.pdf.
ADB. “Implementing a Green Recovery in Southeast Asia.” ADB Briefs No. 173. Last
modified March 2021. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/684966/
adb-brief-173-green-recovery-southeast-asia.pdf.
ASEAN. “ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework.” Last modified 2020. https://asean.

org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ASEAN-Comprehensive-Recovery-Framework_
Pub_2020_1.pdf.
ASEAN. “ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Encourages Stronger Cross-Sectoral

Collaboration Towards COVID-19 Recovery.” Last modified March 16, 2021. https://
asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-socio-cultural-community-encourages-
stronger-cross-sectoral-collaboration-towards-covid-19-recovery/.
Bapna, Manish, and Christina Chan. “3 Shifts to Advance Adaptation and Resilience in
2021.” World Resources Institute. Last modified January 25, 2021. https://www.wri.
org/insights/3-shifts-advance-adaptation-and-resilience-2021.
Berensmann, Kathrin. “How Can the G20 Support Innovative Mechanisms to Mobilise
Financial Resources for LDCs in a Post-Pandemic World?” IAI. Last modified 2021.
https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2149.pdf.
Bindoff, N.L., W.W.L. Cheung, J.G. Kairo, J. Arístegui, V.A. Guinder, R. Hallberg, N. Hilmi et al.
“Changing Ocean, Marine Ecosystems, and Dependent Communities.” In IPCC Special
Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. 447–587. Accessed June
10, 2022.
BMWi Germany. “The National Hydrogen Strategy.” Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Energy. Last modified June 10, 2020. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/
Publikationen/Energie/the-national-hydrogen-strategy.html.
Bonaudo, Thierry, Amaury Burlamaqui Bendahan, Rodolphe Sabatier, Julie Ryschawy,

Stéphane Bellon, François Leger, Danièle Magda, and Muriel Tichit. “Agroecological
principles for the redesign of integrated crop-livestock systems.” European Journal
of Agronomy 57, 43–51. Last modified July 2014. doi:10.1016/j.eja.2013.09.010.

Brás, Teresa Armada, Júlia Seixas, Carvalhais Nuno, and Jonas Jägermeyr. “The
severity of drought and heatwave crop losses tripled over the last five decades
in Europe.” Environmental Research Letters, 16, no. 6. Last modified June 2021.
doi:10.1088/1748- 9326/abf004.
Chen, C., I. Noble, J. Hellmann, J. Coffee, M. Murillo, and N. Chawla. “Country Index
Technical Report – University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index.” Last
modified November 2015. https://gain.nd.edu/assets/254377/nd_gain_technical_
document_2015.pdf.
Chik, Holly. “COP26: China’s carbon emissions set to pass pre-pandemic levels.” South
Morning China Post. Last modified November 4, 2021. https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/science/article/3154745/cop26-chinas-carbon-emissions-set-pass-pre-
pandemic-levels.
Climate Action Tracker. Accessed June 10, 2022. https://climateactiontracker.org/.
Climate Action Tracker. “Global Update.” Last updated September 15, 2021. https://
climateactiontracker.org/publications/global-update-september-2021/.
Climate Analytics and World Resources Institute. “Closing the gap: The impact of G20
Climate Commitments on Limiting Global Temperature Rise to 1.5°C.” Last modified
September 2021. https://climateanalytics.org/media/closingthegap_web.pdf.
Climate Transparency. “Argentina Fact Sheet.” Last modified 2021. https://www.climate-

transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CT2021-Argentina.pdf.
Climate Transparency. “Climate Transparency Report: Comparing G20 Climate Action

Towards Net Zero.” Last modified 2021. https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/CT2021-Highlights-Report.pdf.
Climate Transparency. “G20 GHG emissions per sector.” Last modified 2021. https://www.
climate-transparency.org/media/g20-ghg-emissions-per-sector.
Climate Watch. “Historical GHG Emissions.” Accessed June 10, 2022. https://www.
climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions?end_year=2018&regions=G20&sectors=total-
including-lucf&start_year=1990.
Convergence. “The State of Blended Finance 2021.” Last modified 2021. https://www.
convergence.finance/blended-finance/2021#market-trends.
DW. “Climate change: EU emissions surpass pre-pandemic levels.” Last modified May 16,
2022. https://www.dw.com/en/climate-change-eu-emissions-surpass-pre-pandemic-
levels/a-61813791.
Eco Emerging. “A recovery in loss of momentum.” Last modified 2022. https://economic-

research.bnpparibas.com/html/en-US/recovery-loss-momentum-1/26/2022,44954.

Elcano Royal Institute. “Italy’s National Recovery and Resiliency Plan’s climate impact.” Last
modified December 16, 2021. https://www.google.com/l?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&sou
rce=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwibs9W9zob4AhXIq1YBHaqdAWMQFno
ECAcQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.realinstitutoelcano.org%2Fwp-content%2Fu
ploads%2F2021%2F12%2Fari107-2021-leonardi-bellisai-italys-national-recovery-and-
resiliency-plans-climate-impact.pdf&usg=AOvVaw1usxvSGf0AcTjTLjjg7Az_.
Enerdata. Based on data received directly from Enerdata. 2021.
Energy Policy Tracker. “G20 countries.” Last modified August 17, 2022. https://www.
energypolicytracker.org/region/g20/.
EU Council. “G20 Rome Leaders’ Declaration.” Last modified October 31, 2021. https://
www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2021/10/31/g20-rome-leaders-
declaration/.
Eurasia Group. “Top Risks 2021.” Last modified 2021. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/

upload/top-risks-2021-full-report.pdf.
Euroasia Group. “Top Risks 2022.” Last modified 2022. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/

upload/EurasiaGroup_TopRisks2022.pdf.
European Commission. “Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2021/2106.” Official

Journal of the European Union. Accessed June 10, 2022. https://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/common_indicators.
html?lang=en.
European Commission. Impact Assessment: Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition.

2020.
European Parliament. “EU budget for 2022: ‘Recovery is number one priority.’ ” Last
modified November 24, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/
society/20211021STO15513/eu-budget-for-2022-recovery-is-number-one-priority.
European Parliament. “EU budget 2022 approved: investing more for a strong recovery.”
Last modified November 24, 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20211118IPR17624/eu-budget-2022-approved-investing-more-for-a-strong-
recovery
Expert Panel on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience Results. “Measuring progress
on adaptation and climate resilience: recommendations to the Government of
Canada.” Last modified 2018. https://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.
html?url=https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/eccc/En4-329-2018-
eng.pdf
Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia (LPEM FEB UI) and
BAPPENAS. “Thinking Ahead: Indonesia’s Agenda on Sustainable Recovery from

COVID-19 Pandemic.” Last modified December 2020. https://www.google.com/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj3_
cPiwIb4AhWRIqYKHQ43Br4QFnoECAYQAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fsdgs.bappenas.
go.id%2Fthinking-ahead-indonesias-agenda-on-sustainable-recovery-from-covid-19-
pandemic%2F&usg=AOvVaw1wFjDr2w3_AwSYNJkV7Jr2.
FAO. “FAO COVID-19 Response and Recovery Programme: Asia and the Pacific – Boosting
smallholder resilience for recovery.” Last modified 2021. https://doi.org/10.4060/
cb1518en.
FAO. “State of the World’s Forests: Enhancing the Socioeconomic Benefits from Forests.”
Last modified 2014. http://www.fao.org/3/i3710e/i3710e.pdf.
FAO. “The Impact of Disasters and Crises on Agriculture and Food Security: 2021.” Last
modified 2021. https://doi.org/10.4060/cb3673en.
Gautam, Deepali, Rohit Goel, and Fabio Natalucci. “Sustainable Finance in Developing
Countries Is Enjoying Rapid Growth, But May Bring Risks.” IMF. Last modified March 1,
2022. https://blogs.imf.org/2022/03/01/sustainable-finance-in-emerging-markets-is-
enjoying-rapid-growth-but-may-bring-risks/.
GCF. “FP173: The Amazon Bioeconomy Fund: Unlocking private capital by valuing
bioeconomy products and services with climate mitigation and adaptation results
in the Amazon.” Last modified October 7, 2021. https://www.greenclimate.fund/
project/fp173.
GCF. “FP180: Global Fund for Coral Reefs Investment Window.” Last modified October 7,
2021. https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp180.
GCF. “Guidance Note – GCF Readiness Support to Climate Resilient Recovery.” Accessed
June 10, 2022. https://www.greenclimate.fund/sites/default/files/document/gcf-
guidance-note-climate-resilient-recovery.pdf.
Georgieva, Kristalina. “Facing a Darkening Economic Outlook: How the G20 Can Respond.”
IMF. Last modified July 13, 2022. https://blogs.imf.org/2022/07/13/facing-a-
darkening-economic-outlook-how-the-g20-can-respond/.
Global Carbon Project. “Global Carbon Budget 2021 CO2 emissions rebound towards pre-
COVID levels.” Last modified 2021. https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/global/
images/carbonbudget/Infographic_Emissions2021.pdf
Global Center on Adaptation. “Global scientists call for economic stimulus to address
climate adaptation and COVID.” Last modified January 22, 2021. https://gca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/08/Groningen-Science-Declaration.pdf.
Global Center on Adaptation. “State and Trends in Adaptation Report 2021: Africa: COVID
Recovery.” Last modified 2021. https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/GCA_
STA21_Sect1_COVID-Recovery.pdf

Global Recovery Observatory. “Draft Methodology Document.” Last modified February 1,
2021. https://recovery.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/20210201-
Global-Recovery-Observatory-Draft-Methodology-Document-.pdf.
González, Lorena, Nisha Krishnan, Caitlin Smith, Julie Bos, and Nalalia Alazya. “Accelerating
Paris-Aligned Financial Flows: A Typology for Facilitating a Paris-Aligned COVID-19
Recovery.” Working Paper. World Resources Institute. Last modified September 15,
2021. https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.21.00047.
Government of Canada. “Completed measures to respond to COVID-19.” Accessed June

10, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/economic-response-plan/
completed-measures-respond-covid-19.html.
Government of the Republic of Korea. “Korea’s Smart Grid Roadmap 2030: Laying the
Foundation for Low Carbon, Green Growth by 2030.” Smart Grid Initiative of Korea,
Korea Smart Grid Institute, Ministry of Knowledge and Economy, 2012.
GOV.UK. “Build Back Better: our plan for growth.” Last modified March 3, 2021. https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/build-back-better-our-plan-for-growth.
GOV.UK. “Government announces the £40 million green jobs challenge fund.” Press release.
Last modified June 30, 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
announces-40-million-green-jobs-challenge-fund.
GOV.UK. “Green Jobs Taskforce.” Accessed June 10, 2022. https://www.gov.uk/

government/groups/green-jobs-taskforce.
GOV.UK. “The Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution (HTML version).” Last
modified November 18, 2020. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-ten-
point-plan-for-a-green-industrial-revolution/title.
Gurazada, Srinivas. “Public Financial Management in the Post-COVID World.” PEFA.

Accessed June 10, 2022. https://www.pefa.org/news/public-financial-management-
post-covid-world-published-imf-pfm-blogs.
G20. “Boosting MDBs’ investing capacity – An Independent Review of Multilateral

Development Banks’ Capital Adequacy Frameworks.” Last modified 2022. https://
g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/CAF-Review-Report.pdf. G20 Research Group.
“Leader’s Declaration.” Last modified November 21, 2020. http://www.g20.utoronto.
ca/2020/2020-g20-leaders-declaration-1121.html.
Hanway, Cheryl Edelson, and Henri Blas. “Private sector financing can accelerate a green
recovery for cities. World Bank.” Last modified October 21, 2021. https://blogs.
worldbank.org/ppps/private-sector-financing-can-accelerate-green-recovery-cities.
Hochman, Zvi, David L. Gobbett, and Heidi Horan. “Climate trends account for stalled wheat
yields in Australia since 1990.” Global Change Biology, 23, no. 5 (2017). doi:10.1111/
gcb.13604.

Hwang, Yu-sil et al. “Korean New Deal (5): Utility and Renewable Energy. Business Korea.”
Last modified July 15, 2020. http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.
html?idxno=49019.
IDB. “The Inequality Crisis: Latin America and the Caribbean at the Crossroads.” Last
modified 2020. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/The-
Inequality-Crisis-Latin-America-and-the-Caribbean-at-the-Crossroads.pdf.
IEA. “Global CO2 emissions rebounded to their highest level in history in 2021.” Last
modified March 8, 2022. https://www.iea.org/news/global-co2-emissions-rebounded-
to-their-highest-level-in-history-in-2021.
IEA. “Sustainable Recovery Tracker.” Last modified 2021. https://www.iea. org/reports/

sustainable-recovery-tracker.
IEA. “Sustainable Recovery Tracker.” Last modified April 2022. https://www.iea.org/

reports/sustainable-recovery-tracker.
IEA. “The Future of Hydrogen.” Last modified June 2019. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-

future-of-hydrogen.
IISD. “Ahead of G20 Summit, Leading Research Organizations Tracking Global Recovery
Spending Call on Governments to Green COVID-19 Stimulus.” Last modified October
29, 2021. https://www.iisd.org/articles/g20-recovery-spending-trackers-urge-green.
IISD. “Doubling Back and Doubling Down: G20 scorecard on fossil fuel funding.” Last
modified November 9, 2020. https://www.iisd.org/publications/g20-scorecard.
IISD. “How Green Is India’s Stimulus for Economic Recovery?” Last modified March 23, 2021.
https://www.iisd.org/publications/green-india-stimulus-economic-recovery.
ILO. “Monitoring the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment in the G20.” Last
modified November 25, 2021. https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-
works/multilateral-system/g20/reports/WCMS_829961/lang--en/index.htm.
IRENA. World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Pathway. Abu Dhabi: International
Renewable Energy Agency, 2021.
IRENA. World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Pathway. Abu Dhabi: International
Renewable Energy Agency, 2022.
ISD. “The Data Is in—Governments Must Green Their COVID-19 Recovery to Keep Global
Temperature Rise to 1.5°C.” Last modified October 29, 2021. https://www.iisd.org/
articles/covid-19-green-recovery-trackers-statement.
Jakubowska, Joanna, Ondřej Plevak, Patrik Szicherle and Zuzana Gabrizova. “Drafting
national recovery plans: A laborious exercise for Visegrad countries.” EURACTIV. Last
modified February 10, 2021. https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/
drafting-national-recovery-plans-a-laborious-exercise-for-visegrad-countries/.

Jones, Liam. “Sustainable Debt Tops $1 Trillion in Record Breaking 2021, with Green
Growth at 75%: New Report. Climate Bonds.” Last modified April, 25, 2022. https://
www.climatebonds.net/2022/04/sustainable-debt-tops-1-trillion-record-breaking-
2021-green-growth-75-new-report#:~:text=At%20a%20Glance%202021%3A%20
Sustainability%20Bonds&text=Sustainability%20volumes%20reached%20a%20
record,increase%20when%20compared%20to%202020.
Keane, Jodie, Yue Cao, Beatrice Tanjangco, and Rebecca Nadin. “Driving a green recovery
in developing countries: what role is China playing?” ODI. Last modified July 13, 2021.
https://odi.org/en/publications/driving-a-green-recovery-in-developing-countries-
what-role-is-china-playing/.
KPMG. Saudi Arabia budget report 2022. Last modified December 16, 2021. https://home.
kpmg/sa/en/home/insights/2021/12/saudi-arabia-budget-report-2022.html.
Lee, Jae-Hup, and Jisuk Woo. “Green New Deal Policy of South Korea: Policy Innovation for
a Sustainability Transition.” Sustainability, 12, no. 23. (2020). https://doi.org/10.3390/
su122310191.
Masters, Jeff. “Third-costliest year on record for weather disasters in 2021: $343 billion
in damages.” Yale Climate Connections. Last modified January 25, 2022. https://
yaleclimateconnections.org/2022/01/third-costliest-year-on-record-for-weather-
disasters-in-2021-343-billion-in-damages/.
Matiu, Michael, Donna P. Ankerst, and Annette Menzel. “Interactions between temperature
and drought in global and regional crop yield variability during 1961-2014.” PLoS
One, 12, no. 5 (May 16, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0178339.
México ¿cómo vamos? “Presupuesto Federal PARA LA RECUPERACIÓN.” Last modified

2021. https://mexicocomovamos.mx/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/MCV_Ago2021_
Reporte-PresupuestoFederal-BOOK_WEB.pdf.
Moore, Charles. “Vision or Division? What do NECPs tell us about the EU power sector in
2030.” Ember. Last modified November 9, 2021. https://ember-climate.org/insights/
research/necp7/.
Moore, Frances C., and David B. Lobell. “The fingerprint of climate trends on European crop
yields.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 112, no. 9 (February 17, 2015): 2670-2675. doi:10.1073/pnas.1409606112.
Morgavi, Hermes, Alvaro Pina, and Enes Sunel. “Increasing public investment to strengthen
the recovery from the pandemic: A glass only half-full.” Ecoscope. Last modified
March 7, 2022. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2022/03/07/increasing-public-investment-
to-strengthen-the-recovery-from-the-pandemic-a-glass-only-half-full/.
Nascimento, Leonaro, Takeshi Kuramochi, and Niklas Höhne. “The G20 emission projections
to 2030 improved since the Paris Agreement, but only slightly.” Mitigation and

Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 27, no. 39 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11027-022-10018-5.
Nahm, Jonas M., Scot M, Miller, and Johannes Urpelainen. “G20’s USD 14 trillion economic
stimulus reneges on emissions pledges.” Nature, 24, no. 3 htpps://doi.org/10.1038/
d41586-022-00540-6.
Nippon.com. ”Japan’s Record ¥107.6 Trillion Budget for Fiscal 2022.” Last modified January
17, 2021. https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h01206/
OECD. “Assessing environmental impact of measures in the OECD Green Recovery

Database.” Last modified April 21, 2022. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-
responses/assessing-environmental-impact-of-measures-in-the-oecd-green-recovery-
database-3f7e2670/.
OECD. “G20 GDP growth continues to slow in the first quarter of 2022.” Last modified
September 30, 2021. https://www.oecd.org/sdd/na/g20-gdp-growth-Q1-2022.pdf.
OECD. “G20: Global cooperation and strong policy action are needed for a sustainable
recovery.” Last modified November 22, 2020. https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/
g20-global-co-operation-and-strong-policy-action-needed-for-a-sustainable-recovery-
oecd.htm.
OECD. “OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19). Biodiversity and the economic
response to COVID-19: Ensuring a green and resilient recovery.” Last modified
September 28, 2020. https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/
biodiversity-and-the-economic-response-to-covid-19-ensuring-a-green-and-resilient-
recovery-d98b5a09/.
OECD. “OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19). Key findings from the update
of the OECD Green Recovery Database.” Last modified 2021. https://www.oecd.
org/coronavirus/policy-responses/key-findings-from-the-update-of-the-oecd-green-
recovery-database-55b8abba/.
OECD. “Sustainable Ocean Economy Country Diagnostics of Indonesia.”

Last modified April 2021. https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD(2021)5&docLanguage=En.
Oxford University. “Are We Building Back Better? Evidence from 2020 and Pathways to
Inclusive Green Recovery Spending.” Last modified 2021. https://wedocs.unep.org/
bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/35281/AWBBB.pdf.
Reeves, Matthew C., Brice B. Hanberry, Hailey Wilmer, Nicole E. Kaplan, and William K.
Lauenroth. “An Assessment of Production Trends on the Great Plains from 1984 to
2017.” Rangeland Ecology and Management, 78 (September 2021): 165–179. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.rama.2020.01.011.

Richmond, Morgan, June Choi, Paul Rosane, Matthew Solomon, Bella Tonkonogy (CPI)
Dominic Molloy, Felipe Larrain, and Jennifer Jacobowitz Rae (GCA). “Adaptation
Finance in the Context of Covid-19: The Role of Development Finance in Promoting
a Resilient Recovery.” Global Center on Adaptation. Last modified January 2021.
https://gca.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/GCA-Adaption-in-Finance-Report.pdf.
Ringsmuth, Andrew K., Ilona M. Otto, Bart van den Hurk, Glada Lahn, Christopher P.O.
Reyer, Timothy R. Carter, Piotr Magnuszewski et al. “Lessons from COVID-19
for managing transboundary climate risks and building resilience.” Climate Risk
Management 35 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2022.100395.
Rochedo, Pedro, Panagiotis Fragkos, Rafael Garaffa, Lilia Caiado Couto, Luiz Bernado
Baptista, Bruno S.L. Cunha, Roberto Schaeffer, and Alexandre Szklo. “Is Green
Recovery Enough? Analyzing the Impacts of Post-COVID-19 Economic Packages.”
Energies, 14, no. 17 (2021): 5567. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14175567.
Rondeau, Renee. J., Karin L. Decker, and Georgia A. Doyle. “Potential Consequences
of Repeated Severe Drought for Shortgrass Steppe Species.” Rangeland Ecology
and Management, 71, no. 1 (January 2018): 91–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
rama.2017.07.002.
SEI. “Pandemic recovery efforts undermine a just energy transition in Latin America.” Last
modified November 7, 2021. https://www.sei.org/perspectives/pandemic-recovery-
just-energy-transition-latin-america/.
Sharon, Alita. “South Korea looks to tech to combat Covid-19.” OpenGov Asia. Last
modified March 14, 2020. https://opengovasia.com/south-korea-looks-to-tech-to-
combat-covid-19/.
Shen, Longlin, and Liu, Xiuguo. “Phenological changes of corn and soybeans over the U.S. by
Bayesian change-point model.” Sustainability, 7, no. 6 (2015): 6781-6803. https://doi.
org/10.3390/su7066781.
Smale, Dan A., Thomas Wernberg, Eric C. J. Oliver, Mads Thomsen, Ben P. Harvey, Sandra C.
Straub, Michael T. Burrows et al. “Marine heatwaves threaten global biodiversity and
the provision of ecosystem services.” Nature Climate Change, 9, no. 4 (March 4, 2019):
306. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-019-0412-1.
Sonwa, D.J., A. Dieye, E-H. El Mzouri, A. Majule, F.T. Mugabe, N. Omolo, H. Wouapi et al.
“Drivers of climate risk in African agriculture.” Climate and Devopment, 9, no. 5
(2017): 383-398. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2016.1167659.
S&P Dow Jones Indices. “Country Classification Methodology.” Last modified August 2021.
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/index-policies/methodology-country-
classification.pdf.

Tan, Qinghua, Yujie Liu, Liang Dai, and Tao Pan. “Shortened key growth periods of soybean
observed in China under climate change.” Scientific Reports, 11, no. 1 (April 14, 2021):
8197. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-87618-9.
The Conversation. “What the 2022 federal budget says about Canada’s commitment to a
green recovery.” Last modified April 8, 2022. https://theconversation.com/what-the-
2022-federal-budget-says-about-canadas-commitment-to-a-green-recovery-180453.
The White House. “President Biden’s FY 2023 Budget Reduces Energy Costs, Combats the
Climate Crisis, and Advances Environmental Justice.” Press Release. Last modified
March 28, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2022/03/28/
president-bidens-fy-2023-budget-reduces-energy-costs-combats-the-climate-crisis-
and-advances-environmental-justice/.
Thornton, Philip K., and Mario Herrero. “Climate change adaptation in mixed crop-livestock
systems in developing countries.” Global Food Security-Agriculture Policy Economics
and Environment, 3, no. 2 (2014): 99-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2014.02.002.
Tilleard, Simon, and James Ford. “Adaptation readiness and adaptive capacity of
transboundary river basins.” Climatic Change 137 (2016): 575–591. https://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-016-1699-9.
Times of India. “Budget 2022-23 bets on spending spur to sustain eco recovery.” Last
modified February 1, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/budget-2022-23-
bets-on-spending-spur-to-sustain-eco-recovery/articleshow/89278542.cms.
UN. “Statistical Annex.” Last modified 2021. https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/

wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2022_ANNEX.pdf.
UNCC. “Secretary-General’s Statement on the IPCC Working Group 1 Report on the Physical
Science Basis of the Sixth Assessment.” Last modified August 9, 2021. https://unfccc.
int/news/secretary-general-s-statement-on-the-ipcc-working-group-1-report-on-the-
physical-science-basis-of.
UNDP. “UNDP Climate Promise Progress Report.” Last modified April 2021. https://www.
undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2021-05/undp-climate-promise-progress-
report-april-2021.pdf.
UNEP. “Adaptation Gap Report 2021: How COVID-19 is impacting adaptation

efforts.” Last modified 2021. https://wedocs.unep.org/xmlui/bitstream/
handle/20.500.11822/37300/AGR21_CVDEN.pdf.
UNEP. “Adaptation Gap Report 2021: The gathering storm – Adapting to climate change in
a post-pandemic world.” Last modified November 1, 2021. https://www.unep.org/
resources/adaptation-gap-report-2021.

UNEP. Green Recovery.” Last modified March 25, 2021. https://www.unep.org/fr/
node/29133.
UNFCCC. “11th Durban Forum on Capacity-building.” Last modified June 8, 2022. https://
unfccc.int/11th-meeting-of-the-durban-forum-on-capacity-building.
UNFCC. “Glasgow Climate Pact.” Accessed June 10, 2022. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/

files/resource/cop26_auv_2f_cover_decision.pdf.
U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Intensity Indicators. Accessed May 24, 2022. Retrieved
from: https://www.energy.gov/eere/analysis/energy-intensity-indicators
van Bodeghom, Arend Jan, and Esther Koopmanschap. “The COVID-19 pandemic
and climate change adaptation: Some perspectives from alumni of the WCDI
Climate Change Adaptation course.” Wageningen Centre for Development
Innovation. Last modified July 2020. https://www.wur.nl/web/file?uuid=c3299daa-
1c27-41fa-bf5f-40dd9c1a92c2&owner=497277b7-cdf0-4852-b124-
6b45db364d72&contentid=521938.
Van der Zee, Bibi. “More than 400 weather stations beat heat records in 2021.” The
Guardian. Last modified January 7, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/
jan/07/heat-records-broken-all-around-the-world-in-2021-says-climatologist.
Vivid Economics. “Fund Nature, Fund the Future: EU Recovery Plans miss the triple win
opportunity for nature, climate, and the economy.” Last modified June 2021. https://
www.vivideconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Fund-Nature-Fund-the-
Future.pdf.
WA.gov.au. “WA Recovery Plan: Western Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic
has been world leading.” Last modified March 1, 2022. https://www.wa.gov.au/
government/publications/wa-recovery-plan.
WMO. “State of the Global Climate 2021 WMO Provisional report.” Last modified 2021.
https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10859.
World Bank. “Impacts and Lessons Learned Supporting NDC Implementation.”

Last modified 2021. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/35412/The-World-Bank-NDC-Support-Facility-Impacts-and-Lessons-
Learned-Supporting-NDC-Implementation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
World Bank. “Indonesia Economic Prospects (IEP), June 2022: Financial Deepening for
Stronger Growth and Sustainable Recovery.” Last modified June 22, 2022. https://
www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/indonesia-economic-
prospects-iep-june-2022-financial-deepening-for-stronger-growth-and-sustainable-
recovery.

World Economic Forum. “Here’s how we can use agriculture to fight climate change.” Last
modified September 20, 2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/here-s-
how-we-can-use-agriculture-to-fight-climate-change/.
World Economic Forum. “Jobs of Tomorrow: The Triple Returns of Social Jobs in the
Economic Recovery.” Last modified May 2022. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_Jobs_of_Tomorrow_2022.pdf.
WRI Mexico. “Abre la Alianza de Gobernadores Mexicanos por el Clima diálogos por
la recuperación.” Last modified August 23, 2020. https://wrimexico.org/news/
abre-la-alianza-de-gobernadores-mexicanos-por-el-clima-di%C3%A1logos-por-la-
recuperaci%C3%B3n.
Zepeda, Mariana. “Argentina’s economic recovery will slow in 2022 as government spending
recedes.” Frontierview. Last modified October 7, 2021. https://frontierview.com/
insights/argentinas-economic-recovery-will-slow-in-2022/.
Zhang, Shuai, Tao, Fulu, and Zhao Zhang. “Rice reproductive growth duration increased
despite the negative impacts of climate warming across China during 1981-2009.”
European Journal of Agronomy, 54 (March 2014): 70-83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
eja.2013.12.001.

8. Annexes
1. Summary – Global Recovery Observatory Methodology
The database of the Global Recovery Observatory contains policy items that are assessed,
along with archetypes and sub-archetypes, for potential environmental impact (e.g., GHG
emissions, air pollution, natural capital), social impact (e.g., wealth inequality, quality of life,
rural livelihood), and economic impact (e.g., multiplier, speed of implementation). The policy
items are first mapped to 40 exhaustive and mutually exclusive archetypes as well as 158
sub-archetypes. To assess GHG emissions, both short term and long term (i.e., high increase,
increase, little net change, decrease, high decrease), a five-point Likert scale is used. A three-
point Likert scale is used for all other assessments (i.e., improve, little net change, regress).
Within the broad archetype categories, sub-archetypes are used to account for assessment
variation.
GHG assessments include a temporal component, where the net effect is assessed both
in the short term (while policies are being implemented) and long term (following policy
implementation). This allows for greater nuance in green assessments and ensures that non-
uniform emission life cycles are considered. Although long-term emissions certainly have
a higher significance, short-term emissions are often politically relevant as governments
strive to meet year-by-year emissions targets under international agreements. Clean energy
infrastructure, for example, can be recognized for its short-term GHG impacts, such as
through material use, and for its long-term effects of reducing GHG emissions through the
provision of clean energy. Therefore, it is important to identify varied emissions profiles.
GHG emissions describe the atmospheric release of CO2, CH4, and other gases that create a
warming greenhouse effect. The Global Recovery Observatory adopts the national rate of
emissions with no intervention, as expected at the time of policy intervention, as a baseline
for assessing the GHG emissions impact of archetypes. Short-term and long-term GHG
emissions impacts are assessed separately on the five-point Likert scale. On this scale, -2
reflects a large increase in GHG emissions, -1 reflects a moderate increase, 0 reflects little
or no change, +1 reflects a moderate decrease, and +2 reflects a large decrease. A negative
score implies that the national rate of emissions is likely to increase, in comparison to a
scenario where the investment is not made, and a positive score implies that the national
rate of emissions is likely to reduce, compared to a scenario where the investment is not
made.

1. Survey Questionnaire – Impact of a Sustainable Recovery in G20 Countries
Survey - Impacts of a sustainable recovery in G20 countries
IMPORTANT - READ BEFORE STARTING
This survey aims to collect and validate data on green recovery expenditure and its impacts
on NDCs (mitigation and adaption) across all G20 member countries.
Your response will be used only for the preparation of the Climate and Sustainability Working
Group Study (Output 1.1): Stocktaking of economic, social, and environmental impacts
of sustainable recovery, including impacts on NDC implementation.
Delegates of the Climate and Sustainability Working Group are kindly invited to submit
answers by Friday 29 April 2022.
The survey has 5 sections:

1. Contact Information
2. Validation of Green Recovery Expenditure
3. Budgeting Process for Green Recovery
4. Impacts of Green Recovery on Adaptation
5. Efforts to Measure Impacts of Green Recovery
The survey can be answered by more than one ministry or government agency simultaneously
as more than one entry may be submitted and not all sections of the survey have to be
responded to in order to submit a response.
For any questions and comments, please reach out to Diana Quezada, GGGI -Green Recovery
Lead –diana.quezada@gggi.org.
1. CONTACT INFORMATION
This survey might be followed by a brief interview, based on the availability of the respondent
1. Country
____________________________________________________________________
2. Full Name of Respondent
____________________________________________________________________
3. E-mail
____________________________________________________________________

4. Organization
____________________________________________________________________
5. Are you available to be contacted for further clarifications?
qYes qNo
2. GREEN RECOVERY SPENDING

The Climate and Sustainability Working Group Study (Output 1.1) utilizes the latest data
on Green Recovery Expenditure published by the Global Recovery Observatory. (https://
recovery.smithschool.ox.ac.uk/tracking/)
We aim to identify potential discrepancies between the Global Recovery Database and
official national data.
Definitions used by the study
l Rescue Spending - Spending on short-term measures designed for emergency

support to keep people and businesses alive
l Recovery Spending - Spending on long-term measures to boost economic growth
l Green Recovery Spending - Spending on measures that promote by themselves or

have conditionalities for the mitigation of GHG emissions, adaptation against climate
change impacts.
6. What is the total announced recovery spending in your country since March 2020 as
of the end of March 2022?
____________________________________________________________________
7. Do you monitor the environmental and climate impact of recovery spending? If so,
what proportion (%) of your announced recovery spending do you considered green?
____________________________________________________________________
8. Provide links or upload any national documents that can help us corroborate the
total recovery announced spending provided above.
(E.g., List of policy/programme/projects/interventions approved for green recovery

across all economic sectors, budgetary documents, recovery plans with investment
amounts stated)
____________________________________________________________________
9. Space to provide links and/ or a brief explanation to uploaded documents on question 8
____________________________________________________________________

10. Provide links or upload the latest national green recovery or recovery plan/ roadmap/
strategy published.
(If your country does not have a recovery plan please provide the links to / name of
the policy documents being utilized to guide recovery)
____________________________________________________________________
11. Space to provide links and/ or a brief explanation to uploaded documents on question 10
____________________________________________________________________
3. GREEN RECOVERY BUDGETING

This section aims to assess how countries are incorporating their green recovery spending into
their national budget planning process? and Which policy measures are being implemented
to finance green recovery?
Definitions used by the study
l Rescue Spending - Spending on short-term measures designed for emergency

support to keep people and businesses alive
l Recovery Spending - Spending on long-term measures to boost economic growth
l Green Recovery Spending - Spending on measures that promote themselves or have

conditionalities for the mitigation of GHG emissions, and/or adaptation against
climate change impacts.
l Green Budget for Green Recovery Spending - National or Subnational Budget

allocated for Green Recovery Measures
12. What is the total green recovery budget in your country as of the end of March 2022?
(USD Billion)
____________________________________________________________________
13. Does your country have any planned or ongoing policy/program/project/intervention

for integrating green recovery budget into the ongoing budgeting process?
qYes qNo
If yes, briefly describe the green recovery budgeting policy/initiative. (Name of

Initiative, Status, Timeline of Implementation, Lead Institution, Objective, Relationship
with Green Recovery, etc.)
14. Upload any national documents that could help us corroborate the information
provided above.
____________________________________________________________________

4. IMPACTS OF GREEN RECOVERY ON ADAPTATION
15. Mark the square if your country has implemented at least one green recovery
intervention related to adaptation (Columns) incurring on one or more categories of
recovery impact (Rows)
Resilience Resilience Resilience Conservation Sustainable Water Development Circular Prevention Implementation
in food in food in food and/ or use of resource of resilient Economy and of risk disaster
production production production restoration terrestrial management infrastructure management management
systems systems systems of natural and marine of negative systems
(agriculture/ (Animal (Fisheries capital biodiversity impacts
Crop and Yields and and of climate
Production) Livestock) Aquaculture ecosystem change on
Production) services the human
health and
wellbeing
Governance
(Includes:
Awareness-
raising,
Capacity
Building,
Enhanced
Policy ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Framework,
Education,
Collaboration,
Public
Procurement,
Regulation,
Strategy)
Job Creation ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Other Social
Benefits (Incl.
Better Work
Environment,
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Gender
Equality, Wage
Improvements,
etc.)
Environment ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Finance/
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Investments
Infrastructure
and ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Technology
Economy and
Businesses
(Incl. Support
to SMEs,
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
Economic
Efficiency, and
sustainable
production)
Others :
16. Please provide a case example for each of the recovery interventions related to
adaptation (columns) marked as “yes” in the matrix above. (Briefly describe, add links
and/ or upload relevant documents)
____________________________________________________________________
17. Upload any documents to respond to question 16.
____________________________________________________________________

18. Please provide the number of total estimated beneficiaries from the -announced
recovery interventions related to adaptation- (columns) marked as “yes” in the matrix
above? (Million People
Resilience in food production systems (Agri)
____________________________________________________________________
Resilience in food production systems (Livestock)
____________________________________________________________________
Resilience in food production systems (Fisheries)
____________________________________________________________________
Conservation and/or restoration of natural capital
____________________________________________________________________
Sustainable use of biodiversity or ecosystem services
____________________________________________________________________
Water management
____________________________________________________________________
Circular economy
____________________________________________________________________
Development of resilient infrastructure
____________________________________________________________________
Implementation of risk disaster management systems
____________________________________________________________________
Prevention and management of negative impacts of climate change on human health

and wellbeing
____________________________________________________________________
19. If available, please provide Impact Assessments or similar documents that establish
the impact of the announced recovery policies.
____________________________________________________________________

5. EFFORTS TO MEASURE IMPACTS OF GREEN RECOVERY
The Climate and Sustainability Working Group Study (Output 1.1) aims to measure green
recovery impacts and progress in the different areas of adaptation via selected Global SDG
indicators or country-specific indicators.
Thus, this section aims to identify key green recovery indicators and the number of people
who benefited from recovery measures focused on adaptation in each G20 country.
20. Which indicators are you using to track the impact of your recovery policies? Please,
list all indicators or provide a link to the relevant documents.
____________________________________________________________________
21. Upload any national documents that can support the response to question 19
____________________________________________________________________
22. Has your country estimated the potential averted costs/losses from climate change
through the implementation of green recovery total or individual interventions? If
yes, please explain the indicators used for that identification, or add link to relevant
documents
___________________________________________________________________________
23. Has your country considered alignment between, or contribution of, green recovery
plans and interventions to Sustainable Development Goals? If so, how? Please explain
or add link to relevant documents
____________________________________________________________________

2. Survey Responses – Recovery Spending Compared with Observatory Data
Green Recovery Spending

Country What is the total announced recovery spending Budget mentioned in the
in your country since March 2020 as of the end of Global Recovery Obser-
March 2022? vatory
Germany 130 billion Euro Total spending: USD

1,357.74 billion
Recovery spending: USD
92.23 billion
Green Spending: USD 0.04
billion
Indonesia The Indonesian government spent a recovery budget Total spending: USD 84.35
with a total amount of IDR 658.6 trillion. (USD 45.2 billion
billion) in 2021, whilst realisation for 2022 until April Recovery spending: USD
2022 reached IDR 29.3 trillion. (USD 2 billion), or 6.4% 0.15 billion
of the total 2022 budget allocation of IDR 455.62 Green spending: USD 0.00
trillion (USD 31.4 billion). billion
Japan ・JPY 8,320.9 billion (total amount for 2020 specifical- Total spending: USD
ly relating to green recovery). 1,292.56 billion
・JPY 9,192.8 billion (total amount for 2021 specifical- Recovery spending: USD
ly relating to green recovery). 286.08 billion
・JPY 106,609.7 billion (the FY2021 Budget Frame- Green spending: USD 0.12
work, not specially for green recovery but the total billion
amount of the budget).
Russian Fed- The recovery spending according to the National Re- Total spending: USD 40.76
eration covery Plan accounts for RUB 6.4 trillion in total and billion
includes 42 Strategic Initiatives (for example: initia- Recovery spending: USD
tives that have a positive impact on adaptation in the 0.77 billion
areas of agriculture, fisheries and food production, Green spending: USD 0.00
inland water transport infrastructure, infrastructure billion
and transport in connection with the adaptation mea-
sures started in 2019).
Spain EUR 79,603,000,000 Total spending: USD

1,249.97 billion
207.15 billion
Green spending: USD 0.06
billion
Saudi Arabia Total spending: USD
100.52 billion
4.21 billion
Green spending: USD 0.00
billion
United States The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), signed by Total spending: USD
President Biden on November 15, 2022, provides 5,455.07 billion
roughly USD 1 trillion in funding that aims to rebuild Recovery spending: USD
America’s roads, bridges, and rails; expand access to 1,118.77 billion
clean drinking water; ensure every American has ac- Green spending: USD 0.49
cess to high-speed internet; tackle the climate crisis; billion
advance environmental justice; and invest in commu-
nities that have too often been left behind.

3. List of Recovery Archetypes from the Global Recovery Observatory to Be
Utilized in the Report
Further definitions of the spending archetypes can be obtained from the GRO methodology
document: 20210201-Global-Recovery-Observatory-Draft-Methodology-Document-.pdf
(ox.ac.UK).
R Targeted recovery cash transfers
S Tourism and leisure industry incentives
T Electric vehicle incentives
U Electronic appliance and efficiency incentives
V Green market creation
W Other incentive measures
X Worker retraining and job creation
Y Education investment (non-infrastructure)
Z Health care investment (non-infrastructure)
Social and cultural investment (non-infrastructure)
Communications infrastructure investment
Traditional transport infrastructure investment
Clean transport infrastructure investment
Traditional energy infrastructure investment
Clean energy infrastructure investment
Local (project-based) infrastructure investment
Building upgrades and energy efficiency infrastructure investment
Natural infrastructure and green spaces investment
Other large-scale infrastructure investments
Armed forces investment
Disaster preparedness and capacity building investment
General research and development investment
Clean research and development investment

4 List of Selected (sub-)Archetypes to Be Utilized
5. Global 1.5°C Policies
The following policies are applied to all countries from 2021 onward in the global 1.5°C
scenario. Policies marked with * are considered green stimulus policies.
Power sector policies:
• Feed-in tariffs for onshore and offshore wind generation (solar PV does not benefit
from additional support policies beyond what is already in place).*
• Subsidies for investment costs for other renewables (geothermal, concentrated solar
power, biomass, wave, and tidal), excluding hydro and solar PV. *
• Regulation of coal and gas generation. Coal is regulated so that new plants not fitted
with CCS cannot be built, but existing plants can run to the end of their lifetimes. All
remaining coal plants are forced to shut down in 2040. Gas plants all shut down by
2050.
• Public procurement for CCS on coal, gas, and biomass plants installations in many
developed and middle-income countries where this does not already exist.*

• The use of BECCS (bioenergy with carbon capture and storage) is supported by existing
policies and the introduction of further public procurement policies to publicly fund
the building of BECCS plants in all countries endowed with solid biomass resources.*
• Hydro is regulated directly in most regions to limit expansion, given that in most parts
of the world, the number of suitable sites is limited, and flooding new sites faces
substantial resistance from local residents.
Road transport policies:

• Ban on the use of inefficient petrol and diesel vehicles.
• Capital cost subsidies on EVs. *
• Tax on petrol and diesel use in road transport.
• Tax on the purchase price of high-carbon vehicles.
• Public procurement programs for supporting the diffusion of EVs.*
• Yearly vehicle taxes linked to emissions.
Household heating policies:

• Taxes on household use of fuels for heating (coal, oil, and gas).
• Capital cost subsidies for heat pumps and solar water heaters.*
• Public procurement policies to increase the market share of the heat pump industry.*
• Ban on the sale of new coal, oil, and inefficient gas boilers.
Steel sector policies:

• Ban on the construction of new inefficient coal-based steel plants.
• Capital cost subsidies for new lower carbon plants, such as biomass and hydrogen-
based iron ore reduction and smelting, and to fit CCS to existing high-carbon steel
plants.*
• Subsidies on the consumption of low-carbon energy carriers.*
• Public procurement to build new low-carbon steel plants to develop markets in which
they do not exist.*
Cross-sectoral policies (except sectors already mentioned above):

• Energy efficiency investments for end users are assumed to change in line with the IEA
(2019), with corresponding investments in the respective sectors.*
• A global carbon price is applied to all end fuel users. The carbon price is exogenous and
starts from USD 17 in 2020, rising to USD 250 in 2050 in real term.

6. Examples of Recovery Measures with a Positive Impact on Climate and
Adaptation
Example 1. The Weatherization Assistance Program in the United States

The United States installed in 1976 the Weatherization Assistance Program to reduce
energy costs for low-income households by increasing the energy efficiency of
their homes while ensuring their health and safety. During the global financial crisis
recovery, as well as during the COVID-19 pandemic recovery, investments in energy
efficiency retrofits played a stimulatory role through an extended Weatherization
Assistance Program. For the United States, expansion of existing programs, rather
than investment in new programs, may reduce implementation costs and maximize the
chances of success. Moreover, expanded programs could catalyze swift job creation
in construction and manufacturing (E2, 2020). To ensure that economic returns are
maximised (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012) and that marginalized populations who carry
a disproportionate health and economic burden during the pandemic can reap the
highest benefits, a careful targeting is required.
The United States can be seen as a key example of a country that is likely to benefit
from stimulus investments in energy efficiency retrofitting programs. With one of
the highest per-capita energy consumption rates in the world (World Bank, 2014),
such energy efficiency programs can both reduce costs for low- and middle-income
individuals and reduce GHG emissions.
Example 2. The Korean Green New Deal

The Korean Green New Deal aims to reduce GHG emissions by 16.2 million tons, relying
on green industry innovation, the construction of green infrastructure, and green
energy (Lee et al., 2020; Hwang et al., 2020). As explained by Oxford University (2021),
the green energy component of the program includes investment in renewable energy
production (wind and solar), hydrogen investment, and, in distinction to other nations,
smart grid investment. Building on the South Korean Smart Grid National Roadmap,
smart grids could support higher renewable energy penetration, bring more efficient
electricity distribution by enabling demand response capabilities, and in this way use
EVs to bolster a smart city ecosystem (see Government of the Republic of Korea, 2012).
Furthermore, it is notable that South Korea’s green energy spending plan aims to
“support a fair transition” and thereby cushion displaced workers (Lee and Woo, 2020).
Another example for this kind of inclusive policy is Spain: The Spanish government
earmarked parts of their recovery spendings to a “just and inclusive energy transition,”
emphasizing a green transition that promotes job creation and provides targeted
support to sectors and communities whose livelihoods may be affected by the transition.

Example 3. Mexico (mainstreamed in Argentina, Colombia, Peru) – Improving cycling
infrastructure for healthy people and cities
In July 2020, GIZ Mexico’s Cities and Climate Change program assisted the
implementation of a temporary bike lane for the city of León. Inspired by the public’s
positive response to the measure, the Mexican government supported further
municipalities in implementing pop-up bike lanes through technical assistance in the
design process, operations, communication strategies, monitoring and evaluation
(Juliet Phillips, Felix Heilmann, 2021).
Building on the insights of the Mexican experience, the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) published a guide on how to set up pop-up bike lanes and announced a plan
to support three more cities in other Latin American countries: Fusagasugá and Tunja in
Colombia, and Santa Fe in Argentina. According to IISD research, investments in cycling
infrastructure are also a good opportunity to create green jobs.
The processes of planning and implementing pop-up bike lanes were characterized
by fast decision-making and trial-and-error approaches. Implementation was realized
through low-cost interventions. The focus on key routes for commuters and routes into
community centers was critical to ensure residents’ needs were met and bike lanes
were accepted.
Example 4. Creating employment and supporting biodiversity protection through

national economic stimulus programs
In May 2020, India announced as part of its Aatma Nirbhar Bharat stimulus-oriented
reform campaign that it would encourage the simultaneous fostering of biodiversity,
job creation, and tribal community support by allocating over USD 800 million from
its Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (CAMPA).
The campaign aims to support employing tribal and Adivasi people (collective term for
tribes of the Indian subcontinent) for plantation work, forest management, and wildlife
protection management. Consequently, it aims to reduce unemployment in rural and
tribal populations while avoiding market-based financing of stimulus activities as it
unlocks existing, idle public funds (Philips, Heilmann. 2021).
Concern has been raised in the past that afforestation under CAMPA has promoted
monocultures rather than biodiversity. However, some recent projects have ensured a
higher level of biodiversity, such as Dhubri’s biodiversity park, which is set to have one
thousand plant species (egreenwatch, 2021).
The campaign can be seen as a good example on improved representation of tribal
representatives’ decision-making processes. The World Resources Institute highlights
the need to consider the complex people-environment relationships that govern land
restoration projects, taking into consideration the Indian caste system and how it
affects decision making (Singh, Shelar. 2020).

Final REPORT - CSWG Study 1.1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Final REPORT - CSWG Study 1.1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Final REPORT - CSWG Study 1.1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CLIMATE SUSTAINABILITY WORKING GROUP (CSWG) G20 2022

STOCKTAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

STOCKTAKING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL

Indonesia, September 2022

Recover Together, Recover Stronger

This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part for educational or non-profit

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 v

List of Abbreviations vii

Executive Summary viii

2.1 Data Sources 4

2.3.1 Analysis 1. Stocktake of recovery measures and its contribution

2.3.2 Analysis 2. Modeling the impacts of recovery measures on

3 Stocktake of Recovery Measures 12

3.1.1 Spending by sector 14

3.1.2 Positive and negative spending 15

3.1.3 Transformational effect of spending 17

3.1.4 Multilateral spending 17

3.1.5 Spending with no climate impact 17

3.2 Contribution of Recovery Spending to Adaptation Objectives 18

3.3 Sector Recovery Measures’ Positive Impact on Mitigation and Adaptation 19

vi Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

3.3.4 Agriculture, land use & forestry 21

4 Contribution of Recovery Efforts to NDC Implementation 22

4.1 Planning and Development of Climate Policies 22

4.2 Government Coordination 24

4.3 Mobilization of Finance 25

4.4 Capacity Development for the Implementation of Climate Policies 27

4.5 Recovery Spending on Climate, Environment, and Social Development 28

5 Current and Potential Recovery Scenarios 30

5.1 GHG Emissions Reduction Impacts 31

5.1.1 Scenario 1: G20 recovery (i.e., current recovery spending) 31

5.1.2 Scenario 2: G20 recovery under fiscal constraints 32

5.1.3 Scenario 3: G20 recovery with extended funding for

5.1.4 Contribution to the Paris Agreement goal and

5.1.5 Sectoral contribution to emissions reductions 37

5.2 Macroeconomic Impacts of G20 Recovery Spending 38

5.2.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 38

5.3 Impact of the Current High Energy Prices 42

5.4 Results Overview 42

6 Recommendations to Drive NDC Achievement Through a Sustainable Recovery 44

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 vii

Figure 1. Total COVID-19 spending by G20 members, 2021 (USD billions)

Table 1. Additional spending distribution across green measures

viii Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 ix

The insights of this report—focused mostly on climate impacts—are complemented by the

1 UNFCC. “Glasgow Climate Pact.” Accessed June 15, 2022.

x Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 1

For this purpose, this report is divided into five sections:

2 Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

Recommendations to Drive NDC Achievement Through a Sustainable Recovery provides policy

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 3

Finally, secondary data—such as country-specific recovery plans, Nationally Determined

4 Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022

Climate Sustainability Working Group (CSWG) G20 2022 5

2.3.1 Analysis 1. Stocktake of recovery measures and its contribution to long-term

Each classified recovery measured is assigned either a positive, negative, or long-term