Working paper 524

Implications of geoengineering for

developing countries
Darius Nassiry, Sam Pickard and Andrew Scott
November 2017

• Climate geoengineering – deliberate, large-scale intervention in the Earth’s atmosphere to mitigate climate
change – has gained increasing attention. Two main kinds of intervention have been proposed: carbon
dioxide removal (CDR), which reduces atmospheric CO2 levels; and solar radiation management (SRM),
Key messages which increases the Earth’s reflectivity.
• As climate-related weather extremes continue and if progress towards decarbonisation proceeds at its
current pace, policy-makers may begin to consider geoengineering, particularly SRM, as an emergency
‘plan B’ to reduce adverse effects of climate change.
• The cross-border nature of geoengineering points to the need to engage developing countries in
discussions about research, governance and potential deployment, as well as the need for a new approach
for decision-making about geoengineering.
• So far engagement by developing countries in discussion about geoengineering has been limited. More
support is needed to enable developing countries to assess the costs and benefits of geoengineering,
including the potential for unintended consequences.
• Longer term, any geoengineering research and governance arrangements that are agreed and put into
practice may have important implications for climate governance and broader interventions to manage risks
associated with other planetary boundaries.

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Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge input from the following experts, who provided comments and feedback to an earlier
version of this paper: Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, Senior Program Director, Carnegie Climate Geoengineering Governance
Initiative (C2G2, in his personal capacity); Lili Fuhr, Head of Ecology and Sustainable Development Department,
Heinrich Böll Foundation; Linda Schneider, Senior Programme Officer for International Climate Policy, Heinrich Böll
Foundation; Shelagh Whitley, Head of Climate and Energy Programme, Overseas Development Institute; and Emily
Wilkinson, Senior Research Fellow, Risk and Resilience Programme, Overseas Development Institute.

3
Contents

Acknowledgements 3

List of boxes, figures and tables 5

1. Introduction 6

2. Types of intervention and potential benefits 8

2.1.  Carbon dioxide removal 8
2.2.  Solar radiation management 8
2.3.  Potential benefits 9

3. Risks and uncertainties 10

4. Relevance to developing countries 12

4.1.  Resource and capacity needs 13
4.2.  Information and technical requirements 13
4.3.  Modelling of potential impacts 13
4.4.  Decision-making tools 13

5. Governance implications 14
5.1.  International aspects of governance 14
5.2.  Domestic aspects of governance 16

6. Directions for policy research 17

References 19

For further reading 21

Appendix 1: Sources of funding for geoengineering research (based on preliminary desk review) 23

Appendix 2: Summary of CDR options 24

Appendix 3: Different levels of intervention of SRM 25

Appendix 4: Summary of potential impacts of various geoengineering interventions 26

4
List of boxes, figures and tables

Boxes

Box 1. Potential impacts on and representation of developing countries 12

Box 2. Self-regulatory principles 14

Figures

Figure A1: Illustration of different levels of intervention of SRM 25

Tables

Table A1: Summary of CDR options 24

Table A2: Summary of potential impacts of various geoengineering interventions 26

5
1. Introduction
The parties to the Paris Agreement on climate Change on geoengineering (see, for example, Royal Society, 2009;
agreed to limit ‘the increase in the global average Shepherd and Parker, 2016; and IPCC, 2011, 2012).
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels Views on whether geoengineering is needed are divided.
[while] pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase Proponents highlight that most IPCC scenarios that yield a
to 1.5°C.’1 However, the climate pledges, or Nationally 1.5°C future rely not only on ambitious global mitigation
Determined Contributions (NDCs), underpinning the Paris but also on the removal and storage or sequestration of
Agreement are not yet adequate to fulfil its goals. As UNEP large amounts of GHGs. Geoengineering opponents note
(2016) noted, NDCs ‘represent a first start to initiate the that mitigation efforts alone could stabilise the climate, and
required transition, but are far from being consistent with view geoengineering as a distraction from a commitment to
the agreed upon long-term temperature goals’. rapid decarbonisation. Geoengineering research, however,
The Paris Agreement is also closely linked to the continues to gain momentum and attract funding from
Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United governments and foundations (see Appendix 1). Harvard
Nations in 2015. Taking urgent action to combat climate University recently initiated a Solar Geoengineering
change is Goal 13. This is closely linked with policies and Research Program,4 Carnegie Council launched a Climate
actions to achieve other Goals and driven by the need to Geoengineering Governance Initiative (C2G2),5 and
avoid reversing development progress, which could occur universities such as Stanford and Oxford have active
as a result of temperature increases and other climate- geoengineering research programmes.6 As a sign of this
related risks (see, for example, Granoff et al., 2015). momentum, the second international Climate Engineering
Recent extreme weather events highlight the risks Conference took place in Berlin in October 2017.
and potential negative impacts associated with climate Except for efforts such as the Solar Radiation
change (McKibben, 2017; McMahon, 2017; Santini, Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI),7 which
2017). Developing countries, which are least responsible is relatively small, research on the feasibility of
for historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, will likely geoengineering is undertaken mainly by institutions in
bear the brunt of the economic impacts of climate-related industrialised countries. Experts from member countries
shocks, as well as of other adverse effects that are likely of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
to intensify as a result of climate change (IPCC, 2012). Development (OECD) dominate debate about the
Developing countries are also least able to recover from effectiveness and potential consequences of geoengineering
such shocks and to adapt to a rapidly changing climate interventions. Developing country participation in
(Fuhr, 2016b). geoengineering research and policy discussion has been
Geoengineering or climate engineering2 – the deliberate mainly limited to large emerging economies with strong
large-scale alteration of the Earth’s environment to science and technology capabilities. Yet the potential
counteract climate change3 through GHG removal or impacts of geoengineering are global in nature, affecting
altering the Earth’s reflectivity (or albedo effect) – is all countries, and will vary across different regions. This
receiving increasing attention from policy-makers and suggests a need for inclusive debate and decision-making
researchers as a potential means to mitigate the impacts about geoengineering, as well as for more significant
of climate change. Authoritative organisations like the support for research into the potential impacts of
UK’s Royal Society and the Intergovernmental Panel on geoengineering on developing countries.
Climate Change (IPCC) have published significant work This working paper focuses on geoengineering as a
potentially significant climate and development policy issue

1 http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf

2 This paper uses geoengineering as shorthand for climate engineering; however the terms are interchangeable.

3 This definition is adapted from Royal Society (2009) and Lempert and Prosnitz (2011).

4 https://geoengineering.environment.harvard.edu

5 https://www.c2g2.net

6 http://gcep.stanford.edu/research/geoengineering.html, http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk

7 See SRMGI (http://www.srmgi.org/).

6
for developing countries. It raises questions that developing future policy research that would be required to ensure
country policy-makers, who may not yet be engaged with inclusive governance of climate geoengineering research
climate geoengineering, may soon need to consider. In and potential interventions.8
view of current trends, this brief also suggests areas for

8 Potential resources for future research have been identified on a preliminary basis in Appendix 1.

7
2. Types of intervention and
potential benefits
Geoengineering can be considered as two types of Such a scale could then create competition with other
intervention: carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which resources, as Craik and Burns (2016) note: ‘Delivery
addresses one of the main causes of climate change of a relatively modest three gigatons of carbon dioxide
by extracting carbon from the atmosphere; and solar equivalent negative emissions annually could require a land
radiation management (SRM), which aims to reduce global area [equal to] 7 to 25 percent of agricultural land and 25
warming by preventing sunlight from reaching the Earth.9 to 46 percent of arable and permanent crop area.’
Each type is described in further detail below.

2.2.  Solar radiation management

2.1.  Carbon dioxide removal SRM, or ‘albedo modification’, aims to reduce incoming
CDR – including ‘negative emissions technologies’ such solar radiation, which warms the planet, and includes
as afforestation, bioenergy with carbon capture and interventions such as the injection of aerosols into the
storage (BECCS), carbon sequestration by algae and stratosphere, launching reflectors in space, modifying
biochar, and direct air capture – aims to remove CO2 clouds by injecting sea water, and increasing the reflectivity
from the atmosphere, thereby reducing the atmospheric of the Earth’s surface (see Swart and Marinova, 2010, for a
concentrations of CO2 (see Swart and Marinova, 2010, summary).
for an overview). If effective, CDR would gradually limit By contrast to CDR, SRM technologies in theory
the increase in average temperatures. CDR methods vary provide a near-immediate effect on global temperatures.
depending on how CO2 is absorbed from the atmosphere They are therefore sometimes described as a potential
and where it is ultimately stored. Both ocean-based and ‘stop-gap measure’ or a last-resort tool to ‘buy time’
land-based interventions can have impacts that cross (Barrett, 2008; Victor et al., 2009; Keith, 2000). SRM
national borders (even though they may be located within interventions, such as the injection of stratospheric
a specific territory), especially when projects are considered aerosols, are considered relatively inexpensive in
cumulatively. Appendix 2 presents an overview of some operational terms compared to CDR. However, SRM
commonly proposed CDR interventions. only treats the symptoms of climate change by reducing
To have a significant effect on GHG concentrations – radiative forcing, not the main cause (i.e., elevated GHG
and, as a result, average global temperatures – the scale concentrations).
of interventions would need to be large. According to the SRM began to gain research attention after
Royal Society (2009): Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen published an essay on
geoengineering, thereby opening the field for policy
[Effective CDR would] require the creation consideration (Crutzen, 2006). A wide range of SRM
of an industry that moves material on a scale methods have since been proposed, modelled and analysed
as large as (if not larger than) that of current on a theoretical basis. The range of proposed methods
fossil fuel extraction, with the risk of substantial varies according to whether they reflect or deflect incoming
local environmental degradation and significant solar radiation and whether the intervention is in space, the
energy requirements. Enhanced weathering might atmosphere, or at the Earth’s surface.
[meanwhile] require mining on a scale larger than One category of potential intervention involves placing
the largest current mineral extraction industry, and reflectors in space, either in orbit close to the Earth or at
biologically based methods might require land at the mid-point between the gravitational pull of the Earth
a scale similar to that used by current agriculture and that of the Sun. Even if technically feasible (Royal
worldwide. Society, 2009), the logistical and governance challenges
associated with such an endeavour mean we have neither

9 Issues regarding whether a proposed technology or methodology can be classed as geoengineering depend on a range of factors, including whether
the technology in question is sufficiently large scale, whether its (primary) aim is to modify the climate and at what scale, typically blurring the line
between mitigation, geoengineering, and unrelated processes that affect the climate indirectly. Boucher et al. (2014) note that this is such an issue that
it would be better to divide geoengineering into five types of intervention overall; however, this approach does not seem to have been widely adopted.

8
practical experience nor a plan for it, and it is not widely intervention may be large and concentrated (for example,
discussed today. covering significant areas of equatorial deserts with special
A second category of SRM involves injection of aerosol reflective materials) or relatively small and diffuse (for
particles into the upper atmosphere to directly reflect example, painting roofs white), though for small-scale
radiation to mimic the effects observed of aerosols caused interventions to have a material effect, many of such
by volcanic eruptions. Such particles tend to remain in interventions would be required.
the atmosphere for an extended period and could lead to Different SRM interventions are illustrated in Appendix 3.
wide-ranging adverse impacts, such as potential changes
in rainfall patterns across regions. Although effects of
volcanic eruptions have been well studied, and are in
some ways comparable to stratospheric aerosol injection, 2.3.  Potential benefits
substantial uncertainties remain, not least because many In theory, geoengineering offers the potential to counteract
aspects of natural, sporadic aerosol injection have little or limit the negative effects of anthropogenic GHG
in common with the potential for continual, managed emissions and/or their associated climate impacts. Both
injection of human-made particles.10 CDR and SRM could theoretically be applied to help lower
A third category involves ‘cloud whitening’ by spraying global temperatures, both during the transition to net-zero
small particles into the atmosphere to boost clouds’ ability emissions and later, if emissions trajectories do not decline
to reflect radiation that would otherwise be absorbed by enough.
water or land. This involves using cloud-condensation The complexity of and uncertainty within global climate
nuclei – microscopic particles needed for cloud formation – models mean the precise impact of SRM interventions
to increase the number of small droplets, in order to boost on limiting global warming is less clear. Because some
the reflectivity of clouds. As with other methods, questions SRM options offer the potential to be targeted, they
remain unanswered regarding the cumulative impacts of could help counteract specific climate change-related
widespread use, including on weather patterns, the physical feedback mechanisms (for example, using cloud whitening
health of humans and other ecosystem dynamics. or seeding to limit Arctic melting), but unintended
A fourth SRM category involves surface interventions. consequences are largely unknown and hard to predict.
Land, the built environment, ecosystems and the ocean By contrast, CDR may offer a way to compensate for the
could be manipulated at the Earth’s surface to increase continuation of some GHG-intensive activities (such as
their reflectivity. The scale of surface-based SRM concrete and steel production, or aviation) for which there
may be no readily available low-carbon alternative.

10 Researchers at Harvard University have begun a five-year programme on this intervention, because, as two of the project’s researchers note, ‘It would
be reckless to deploy solar geoengineering based on today’s limited research’ (Keith and Wagner, 2016).

9
3. Risks and uncertainties
The immediate risks associated with geoengineering beyond transitioning from technologies that emit GHGs,
depend on the mode of operation, scale, period of the and by uncertainty about the range of possible impacts
project, and location, among many other factors. The of geoengineering could have on the Earth’s systems.
impacts of geoengineering options also involve significant However, even if research proceeds, one of the key
uncertainties, particularly with regard to unintended challenges will be the scale of experimentation needed to
consequences, potentially at a similar scale to the produce meaningful results. Robock et al. (2010) argue
intervention itself (see Box 1 and Appendix 4). The full that ‘geoengineering cannot be tested without full-scale
economic impact of geoengineering interventions includes implementation’.
indirect or external costs and benefits, which are not Decisions about geoengineering should take its impacts
presently known. into account; these effects are better understood for
The risks and uncertainties associated with SRM are CDR than they are for SRM; see, for example, Burns
significant. While the primary, direct, averaged impacts of and Nicholson (2017) and Williamson (2016). A recent
SRM may be estimated relatively accurately at a theoretical report by the secretariat of the Convention on Biological
level, substantial uncertainties exist with regard to regional Diversity (Williamson and Bodle, 2016) provides a
secondary and non-radiative effects, including effects, detailed breakdown of the impacts of each of the major
for example, on monsoon patterns (Hegerl and Soloman, geoengineering techniques, with a focus on their impact
2009). on biodiversity. Such impacts may vary in their location,
Potential downsides of SRM include changes in time and manifestation; for example, stratospheric aerosols
regional weather patterns that could lead to droughts in injected in the northern hemisphere could contribute
Africa and Asia, damage to the ozone layer, continued to droughts in the Sahel, while if they were released in
ocean acidification, impacts on natural ecosystems and the southern hemisphere they could ‘green’ the region
agricultural crops, impacts on tropospheric chemistry, (Haywood et al., 2013). Besides the expected consequences,
diminished radiation for solar power, and the risk of any geoengineering option could create unintended
human error, in addition to other factors detailed below impacts, both environmental and non-environmental (Liu
(Robock 2008, 2014a, 2014b; Robock et al., 2010; ETC and Chen, 2015). It is unclear how such impacts might be
Group, 2017a). Uncertainties associated with the potential factored into decision-making.
impacts of SRM reflect limitations in our understanding In addition, some geoengineering interventions may be
of global climate dynamics, including the formation and best or only suited to specific locations, potentially setting
behaviour of clouds (Royal Society, 2009) and how the up uneven impacts and benefits, as well as distributional
climate interacts with other natural systems (Robock, and equity issues. For example, SRM may be most effective
2008). closer to the equator.
For proponents of geoengineering research, these The potential for these largely non-climate impacts led
uncertainties are one main reasons to conduct research; the Convention on Biological Diversity to oppose field-
in their view, options should not be dismissed until testing of geoengineering in 2010, which has constituted
empirical data on wider impacts are available (see, for a de facto moratorium also on deployment (CBD, 2010).
example, Horton et al., 2016). However, as Russell et al. In December 2016, the Convention reaffirmed its stance
(2012) note, reducing uncertainty will be difficult because against geoengineering:
physical differences between potential interventions mean
it is difficult to generalise about the impacts of a specific until there is an adequate scientific basis on
intervention: which to justify such activities and appropriate
consideration of the associated risks for the
[T]he interconnectedness of many ecosystem environment and biodiversity and associated social,
processes across a wide range of spatial and economic and cultural impacts, with the exception
temporal scales leads to systems of such complexity, of small scale scientific research studies that would
that outcomes are difficult to predict as the systems be conducted in a controlled setting (Decision X/33,
move outside any previously observed states. paragraph 8, subparagraph (w)).11
The main justification for geoengineering research The potential moral hazard involved in geoengineering
is to have some way to avoid runaway climate change, represents a major reason not to pursue any such

11 For more detail on this decision, taken at COP10, see the full text of decision X/33. See also decision XI/20. Both are available at https://www.cbd.
int/decision/cop/?id=12299.

10
interventions, particularly SRM. As Heinrich Böll or indirectly).13 Unmanaged, sudden termination of SMR
Foundation observers note, ‘[g]eoengineering functions could lead to rapid warming of the climate, causing a
as the “perfect excuse” for high carbon emitters to avoid temperature rebound. Such a change could affect tipping
real GHG reductions’ (ETC Group, 2016).12 Olson (2011) points, and ecosystems may be unable to adapt fast
explains: ‘The belief that an easy technological fix for enough. Concern about dependence on SRM and shocks
global warming is available could undermine our political that may occur upon discontinuation led the IPCC to note
and social resolve to deal with the underlying cause of the that once SRM starts, it may be impossible to stop without
problem by reducing green-house gas emissions’. This has causing widespread harm from climate change effects
already begun to occur with a number of groups opposed (IPCC, 2007).
to mitigation options adopting pro-geoengineering stances. Further, because the impacts of geoengineering cross
Lin (2013) states that it is ‘likely that geoengineering national borders, the ability to manipulate climate
efforts will undermine mainstream strategies to combat and other natural systems could be misused (see, for
climate change’. example, Robock, 2008; 2015). This could give rise to
Another concern is the so-called ‘termination effect’ ‘weaponisation’ if states were to exercise control over
(Armeni and Redgwell, 2015). If we rely on CDR to the weather, leading to natural disasters or disruptions to
limit GHG emissions and meet our carbon budget, or crop production in other nations (Radford, 2013; Fuhr,
SRM to limit temperature increases, what happens if 2016a).14 Although 85 countries, including the US, have
these interventions end? Just as CDR and SMR are, signed the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition
respectively, slow and fast to have an impact on global of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
warming, the impact of turning off these technologies Modification Techniques (ENMOD), it is not clear whether
would likely be different. Stopping CDR would lead to a the Convention would in fact prevent such a possibility
net increase in GHG emissions because emissions would from occurring (Armeni and Redgwell, 2015).
stop being removed from the atmosphere (either directly

12 For more on the moral hazard dimensions of deterring mitigation, see McLaren (2016).

13 This could be particularly important if we ‘overshoot’ our emissions budget and then rely on net negative emissions to hold us to a 2°C carbon
budget

14 Depending on the technology, it is also possible that geoengineering facilities themselves would require military security.

11
4. Relevance to developing
countries
The potential impacts of geoengineering are relevant will be most vulnerable to any negative side effects
to all countries and regions.15 Immediate concerns for that geoengineering experiments might have.
developing countries may involve the potential direct and
Box 1 provides an overview of the potential impacts of
indirect physical impacts of geoengineering, both intended
geoengineering on developing countries, focusing on Asia.
and unintended; and the degree to which developing
Moreover, formal governance and associated
countries are engaged as partners in decision-making on
international policy and institutions for both the
research, development, deployment and measurement
development and the deployment of geoengineering remain
of geoengineering interventions, as well as the response
inchoate, putting developing countries at a significant
to any unforeseen impacts. Given the potential military
disadvantage in terms of engagement in policy-making.
applications of geoengineering, implications for peace and
Most research in this field has so far been carried out in
security should also be considered.
developed countries (Laplaza, 2017; McLaren, 2017), with
For some developing countries, the unintended
limited representation from developing countries.16
consequences of geoengineering could be particularly
Emerging markets and developing countries
harmful and inequitable. As Olson (2011) points out:
may respond in different ways to the potential of
populations living at the edge of subsistence – those geoengineering. Their positions may be informed more
with the least capacity to adapt to the impacts of by geopolitical perspectives and the impacts they expect
climate change and almost no voice in international climate change to have than by economic comparisons
deliberations – are precisely the populations that between theoretically modelled interventions. Individual
countries will have distinct priorities regarding and views

Box 1. Potential impacts on and representation of developing countries

‘The interconnected monsoons of South, East, and Southeast Asia together shape the climates of 20 countries
representing approximately half of the global population. Natural analogues and climate model simulations
suggest that climate engineering, specifically proposed solar radiation management (SRM) technologies, could
severely influence monsoonal precipitation. [...]
‘The monsoonal rainfalls’ intimate links to biophysical, economic, public health, and agricultural systems
underscore the scope and scale of climate engineering’s potential implications for the world’s most climate
vulnerable populations. The simultaneous potential to offset adverse impacts of climate change and to severely
disrupt hydrological cycles casts these technologies as both cornucopian and catastrophic. As such, the rhetorical
appeals of climate engineering research proponents and opponents alike invoke the effects of theoretical monsoon
manipulation on highly vulnerable populations. Notably, however, these appeals underscore a major shortcoming
of climate engineering research and policy discourse: the voices of these populations are glaringly absent. […]
‘Thus far, developing countries have largely been absent from climate engineering discussions. […] Even as the
academic research communities in developed countries recognize the need to engage broader stakeholders such
as public authorities, policy communities, and lay citizens, public engagement has yet to meaningfully extend out
of the Global North. The meagre engagement with developing countries has been limited to scientists and other
technically-literate experts.’
Source: Laplaza (2017).

15 The Action Group on Erosion, Technologies and Concentration (ETC Group) has produced reports of simulations of the regional implications of
geoengineering. See ETC Group (2014a, 2014b and 2014c).

16 In addition, only 1 of the 33 speakers at the recent, prestigious geoengineering conference was not from a European or US institution, and even that
speaker was a British expatriate based in China (https://www.grc.org/climate-engineering-conference/2017/).

12
of how, or indeed whether, to manage natural systems
that may be formed as much by history and culture as by 4.2.  Information and technical
geographic location and weather patterns. requirements
Countries’ scientific and technological capabilities Should any geoengineering interventions be undertaken,
will determine their ability to engage in discussions on including research, a country’s ability to understand (or
geoengineering research, as well as their technical capacity detect) any impacts will depend on the pre-existence of
to undertake geoengineering research or interventions. baseline atmospheric measurements and the reliability
Consequently, support for geoengineering, and the of any third-party data used for verification. Moreover,
capacity, expertise and will to engage in discussion about actually carrying out such measurements requires
its potential risks and benefits, will vary among countries significant levels of technological knowledge and the ability
(Williamson and Bodle, 2016). For example, the strategic to access and manage specialized expertise. Developing
interests of China and India, as large economies vulnerable countries need to be able to communicate implications of
to a range of climate impacts and with enough resources geoengineering, which in turn means being able to produce
to manage a geoengineering intervention themselves, may information and decision-making tools available in an
be quite different from those of Burkina Faso or Myanmar, accessible format to support policy-makers facing difficult,
which may currently be less able or willing to engage uncertain, and potentially impactful choices.18
with the relevant issues. Moreover, such interests may be
conflicting or even directly opposed as Laplaza (2017)
notes in the context of the interdependence between the
monsoons in India and China: 4.3.  Modelling of potential impacts
A country’s ability to model the impacts of changes in
If one state wishes to augment the intensity of its weather patterns caused by geoengineering interventions,
monsoon to boost agricultural productivity (as and the resulting effects on its population, resources, and
China might) or mitigate the threat of increasingly wider economy will affect the robustness of evidence-
frequent and intense flooding events (as India based policy. This is likely to be particularly important
might), it could conceivably do so at the expense of in countries where rain-fed agriculture represents a
the other. significant portion of the economy. Similarly, from a
In view of these risks, some developing countries have security perspective, it is important to be able to analyse
already expressed their support for the ‘precautionary the potential impacts from geoengineering interventions
principle’17 by calling for a moratorium on field undertaken by another country, and whether countries are
geoengineering experiments during the opening week able to prevent others from undertaking geoengineering
of the 10th Conferences of Parties (COP 10) to the interventions outside of their own borders that may
UN Convention on Biological Diversity (Leahy, 2010). nonetheless have domestic effects.
Still, both India and China are developing national
geoengineering research programmes (Bala and Gupta,
2017; Liu and Chen, 2015).
4.4.  Decision-making tools
The broad range of potential implications mean that
countries may need to develop their existing decision-
4.1.  Resource and capacity needs making tools. For example, countries may need to
The ability to engage in and critically assess geoengineering assess whether the future potential of geoengineering
research or potential deployment, even theoretically, interventions will lead to domestic and/or international
would require significant financial resources and technical delays in climate mitigation actions, thus raising the
capacity, including with regard to the capacity and/ potential long-term costs of climate change damage
or technical expertise needed to monitor, measure, and (moral hazard). Or, alternatively to evaluate whether
attribute impacts caused by geoengineering interventions. geoengineering developments (or their potential
Issues here are clearly linked to a country’s existing application) will affect investment in adaptation measures.
resources, including whether existing efforts (e.g.,
regarding weather monitoring) can be repurposed to
provide geoengineering-related information.

17 The precautionary principle is the notion that risk should be avoided, even when its likelihood seems remote. It has long been enshrined in
environmental and sustainable development (see O’Riordan and Cameron, 2013). For example, in 1992, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development was agreed as: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’ (Read and O’Riordan, 2017).

18 For example, an overshoot in temperature in the absence of stratospheric SRM (for technical, operational and/or political reasons) and potential
deployment of stratospheric SRM without fully knowing its likely impacts.

13
5. Governance implications
Debate is ongoing as to whether geoengineering will
be necessary, and whether research into potential Box 2. Self-regulatory principles
interventions should be conducted.19 However, pressure
to move geoengineering from research to practice may To calm fears of geoengineering proponents ‘going
increase if climate conditions worsen, as projected, given rogue’ (Olson, 2011), researchers adopted plans to
the current level of ambition, and if political commitment self-regulate. The consensus formed at the Asilomar
to rapid decarbonisation does not strengthen in line with Conference in 2010 followed the approach taken
the Paris Agreement goals20. Next year’s IPCC report, by genetics researchers in the same location in the
1970s and drew on the previously suggested Oxford
which will focus on a 1.5°C future, may further draw
Principles (see below). Recently the Geoengineering
attention to geoengineering as a necessary climate policy
Research Governance Project released a code of
option if the Paris Agreement’s objectives are to be
conduct for geoengineering research (Hubert, 2017).
fulfilled. So far, attention has focused on the governance
of geoengineering research rather than on deployment, Asilomar Principles (2010)
giving rise even at this smaller scale to a wide range of 1. Promoting collective benefit
questions, including how research can be self-regulated.
2. Establishing responsibility and liability
Box 2 summarises geoengineering researchers’ approaches
to adopting principles for self-regulation. 3. Open and cooperative research
Given the slow pace of decarbonisation and the limited 4. Iterative evaluation and assessment
timeframe for meaningful action (see Figueres et al., 2017), 5. Public involvement and consent
interest in ‘emergency measures’, including geoengineering,
as a ‘plan B’ may build (see Swart and Marinova, 2010). Oxford Principles (2009)
Geoengineering may capture policy-makers’ attention 1. Geoengineering to be regulated as a public good
as a potential ‘back-up’ plan if rapid decarbonisation 2. Public participation in geoengineering decision-
proves impractical. Interest in or pressure to undertake making
geoengineering could come from developed countries that 3. Disclosure of geoengineering research and open
foresee a risk of radical socio-economic change in the publication of results
absence of intervention, countries suffering from climate-
4. Independent assessment of impacts
related weather disasters or facing existential questions
because of sea-level rise, or developing countries that have 5. Governance before deployment
significant experience with weather manipulation, such
Source: http://blogs.nature.com/news/2010/11/asilomar_
as China (Liu and Chen, 2015).21 If climate conditions geoengineering_confer.html and http://www.geoengineering.
continue to deteriorate, policy-makers may need to form ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/principles/
views on how geoengineering should be governed in
practice. Governance issues can be broadly framed in terms
of their international and domestic aspects.

interventions in terms of preventing damage by climate-

5.1.  International aspects of governance related extreme weather, even if such intervention runs
against the wishes of other countries. This would require
If geoengineering enters the climate policy mainstream,
a multilateral approach to governance, though it is not
important governance questions will arise for both
clear that the United Nations Framework Convention on
developed and developing countries. Unless representation
Climate Change (UNFCCC) would present an effective
of all countries can be developed to legitimise decisions,
model for this approach, particularly if countries were
some countries could justify their geoengineering
to view the timeframe for decision-making as limited.

19 See Armeni and Redgwell (2015) pp. 9–10 for an example of the varying viewpoints on the need for geoengineering. For an overview of the
associated ethical implications, see https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2012/12/the-ethics-of-geoengineering-part-2/.

20 A recent report showed that two-thirds of major emitting countries will not meet their NDCs with current policies. (Kuramochi et al., 2017)

21 For examples of this, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing_Weather_Modification_Office, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-weather-

idUSKCN0ZU0CE and http://fortune.com/2017/01/24/china-government-artificial-rain-program/.

14
Governance could be even more exclusive and problematic the legal and regulatory implications of
in the event of an ‘emergency’ intervention by a group or geoengineering governance are not limited to the
body, such as the UN Security Council, which may not intuitive realm of environmental controls. Rather,
have the technical competence or expertise, breadth of they are likely to require a much deeper analysis
representation, or mandate to take potentially irreversible of other areas of international regulation, such
planetary-level decisions. As noted above, these issues may as international trade, food security, intellectual
be particularly acute for developing countries, which so far property rights, and international security.
have had limited representation in geoengineering research
For developing countries, which may bear more of the
and policy discussions.
risks and whose vulnerability may be used as a justification
Even before considering specific options for the
for intervention, how decisions are made, with regard to
governance of geoengineering, Hamilton (2013) raises a
developing a potential governance framework, is at least
number of questions in relation to SRM that could apply
as important an aspect of governance. Olson (2011) notes
to other types of geoengineering intervention:
that ‘it may well be even more difficult to reach agreement
Those who defend solar radiation management on geoengineering than on emissions reductions’, raising
research as a form of preparation for a crisis have the prospect of unilateral intervention:
yet to provide answers to the following questions:
No international institutions or arrangements exist
What are the criteria for a climate emergency
to authorize field tests or deployments or to make
requiring rapid intervention? Who would determine
decisions about ‘where the thermostat should be
that an emergency exists? Who would authorize the
set’. The results of geoengineering initiatives could
emergency response, and from where would they
be geographically uneven, producing angry losers
derive their legitimacy? Who would decide that the
as well as winners. The north-south divisions so
emergency is over?
evident at the Copenhagen Summit would almost
These questions remain relevant even without a ‘climate certainly be intense around geoengineering. Finally,
emergency’ or crisis: Who decides? Under what conditions some people believe for religious or philosophical
precisely would intervention be justified? Under what reasons that it is wrong for humans to interfere so
conditions and how would an intervention end? fundamentally with the Earth’s natural processes.
The adequacy of existing regulations to govern
Because it remains unclear how decisions involving
interventions varies according to the type of proposed
geoengineering will be made, particularly for developing
intervention. Even if geoengineering interventions are
countries, interested and affected parties, as well as policy-
undertaken within national boundaries, in aggregate if not
makers, need to begin to engage in dialogue on how, when,
individually, they will likely have trans-boundary impacts.
and by whose agency geoengineering may develop.
It is not clear whether national regulations (for example,
Whether potential interventions are intended to alter the
for environmental impact assessment) or international
global climate, are ‘targeted’ to the local climate or have
conventions and treaties would be adequate. For
wide-ranging impacts, the governance of geoengineering is
interventions that themselves cross national boundaries, it
highly context-dependent, and current treaties, laws and
seems unlikely that international laws would be adequate,
regulations do not fully cover any proposed geoengineering
particularly for interventions outside national jurisdictions,
practices (Armeni and Redgwell, 2015). From a legal
such as on the high seas or in the upper atmosphere.
perspective, this lack of a general rule in relation to
Many governance issues related to geoengineering
geoengineering means some interventions can use parts
remain unresolved, both for research and for deployment.
of existing regulations23 while others (like atmospheric or
The broad range of technical, political and ethical issues
space-based SRM interventions) would require entirely
involved in research suggests the need to bring together a
new international agreements (for an overview of treaty
diverse range of practitioners from different disciplines –
options, see Swart and Marinova, 2010).
from engineers and climate scientists to philosophers and
The precautionary principle, adopted at the Rio Summit
sociologists and ecologists and economists. A review of the
in 1992, has provided a general rule for environmental
legal literature ‘emphasizes the unfeasibility, and arguably
governance and international environmental agreements
undesirability, of any kind of one-size-fits-all approach to
and, as noted in a detailed review, ‘has been included in
geoengineering governance’ (Armeni and Redgwell, 2015),
almost all recent treaties and policy documents relating
which adds to the complexity of the challenge ahead and
to the protection and preservation of the environment,
has led opponents of geoengineering to call for a complete
and it is widely accepted [as] intrinsic to international
ban.22 As Armeni and Redgwell (2015) observe:

22 The ETC Group (2016) state that: ‘Demands for geoengineering experiments, as well as suggestions to consider geoengineering proposals “case-by-
case”, are slippery slopes. They obscure the core issue: all geoengineering proposals attempt to modify the global climate, and should therefore remain
the subject of global UN negotiations. CBD [the Convention on Biological Diversity] must affirm the precautionary approach. Open-air experiments
on geoengineering should not be allowed.’

23 For example, the London Convention and Protocol was adopted to prohibit marine geoengineering except for legitimate scientific research, while the
1976 ENMOD Convention could be further adopted, enforced, or updated to prevent weaponisation.

15
environmental policy’ (Stakeholder Forum for a ‘safe operating space for humanity’ (Steffen et al., 2015;
Sustainable Future, 2011, p. 93 and numerous other Morton, 2015).
places). In this dynamic and uncertain context, it is not
clear that the existing governance institutions provide a
sufficiently robust and comprehensive framework for the
issues that will arise in relation to potential geoengineering 5.2.  Domestic aspects of governance
interventions. On which current institution can developing Current practices suggest that countries that seek to
countries rely to take decisions on SRM interventions with undertake geoengineering research or deployment may do
their interests in mind? Developing countries may need to so within their domestic boundaries, irrespective of barriers
push for either a new UN agency or a new international or impediments that may be in place under international
body, in which their interests are effectively represented, to law. All countries may wish to consider questions like those
collect current and future data, manage the implementation posed at a meeting of researchers and policy-makers in
of potential interventions, monitor programme activity, India (Bala and Gupta, 2017): ‘What should our country’s
and report on both intended and unintended results. role be in developing a global governance framework for
Finally, the fact that potential impacts of conventionally geoengineering?’ and ‘What should our country’s stand be
defined geoengineering interventions are wide-ranging on geoengineering, nationally and internationally?’25
means that the scope of ‘management’ is wider than To address such questions may require answering
governance of the climate system (Dalby, 2015; see also more technical questions like: ‘What would the effects
Box 1 in Olson, 2011). While the UNFCCC model may be be on our country?’ and in turn, ‘What resources do we
relevant for GHG emissions and climate impacts, it may need to develop to understand the potential impacts of
not be well suited to taking decisions on, or managing, geoengineering on our country?’, ‘How would we know
other aspects of geoengineering. Moreover, resolution of if our country were being affected by geoengineering?’ or
governance questions for geoengineering may serve as a ‘What could we do if a country was implementing these
template for how to manage other planetary boundaries24 interventions against our wishes?’26 These questions do not
– the framework for the Earth system that defines a form an exhaustive list but asking them represents a first
step in the engagement process (Olson, 2011).

24 See http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries.html and http://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/planetary-boundaries/

planetary-boundaries/about-the-research/the-nine-planetary-boundaries.html

25 To be clear, answering these questions should not be interpreted as a passive acknowledgement that geoengineering should go ahead at all.

26 This has been termed the ‘free-driver problem’. For more details, see Weitzman (2012).

16
6. Directions for policy
research
Geoengineering has been proposed as a potential 4. What support initiatives are there to assist developing
technological solution to the divergence between the countries, how do they interlink and how could they be
GHG reductions needed to avoid catastrophic climate enhanced?
change and the emissions trajectories currently forecast. 5. What options and/or strategies are, or may be, available
Planet-level interventions have the potential to create to developing countries to ensure that their voices are
significant impacts, both positive and negative. The heard in international geoengineering dialogue? How
diverse nature of these impacts means that many aspects could current international and regional structures be
of geoengineering present new challenges that cross many used to ensure inclusive decision-making and equitable
disciplines: the effectiveness and feasibility of proposed outcomes for developing countries?
technologies remains uncertain and important governance
issues remain unresolved. Proponents of geoengineering As momentum builds around geoengineering,
research continue to push for more recognition at an developing countries should take steps to engage actively
international level. However, many policy-makers have in research and policy discussions, to ensure their interests
not yet been exposed to or involved in the issues raised by are represented both in the governance structures in which
geoengineering. any decisions about geoengineering are taken in the future,
Given that most work has been carried out in a small and in the decisions themselves. They should be supported
group of developed countries, and that policy-makers to do this. Legitimacy demands that developing countries
may need to address this issue in the foreseeable future, have a significant and proportional voice in geoengineering
it is vital to ensure that developing countries are well decisions, even at the experimental stage, implying that a
prepared to make certain that their interests are taken new approach may be needed for climate decision-making.
into consideration in decision-making on geoengineering Exploration of the full range of governance issues,
proposals. including research, deployment and monitoring of
In view of this priority, on the basis of initial research, it technologies such as SRM, represents an important
will be important to answer the following questions: potential focal area for future research that, if undertaken
1. How do developing country governments, businesses in a transparent and inclusive manner, would complement
and citizens perceive geoengineering? What is the level and enhance ongoing initiatives. For example, SRMGI
of awareness and knowledge about geoengineering and aims to connect developing country actors across society
its potential impacts? nationally and across borders, C2G227 promotes effective
2. What is required to enable developing countries to make governance by shifting the discussion from researchers
informed decisions about research into geoengineering to society and policy-makers,28 and the Heinrich Böll
or the potential deployment of geoengineering Foundation and the ETC Group (2017b) recently proposed
interventions? What do developing countries believe a set of requirements for legitimate geoengineering
they will need in order to engage in these discussions? governance.29
How could gaps in knowledge, resources or capacity be Existing approaches, such as multilateral agreements
filled? (for example, UNFCCC), may be useful, but these are
often slow processes and there is no guarantee that
3. How are different developing countries engaging or
agreement will be reached. The forum for these discussions
preparing to engage with international discussions
is therefore not obvious, even among candidates such
about geoengineering?
as UNFCCC, the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN General

27 See https://www.c2g2.net/c2g2-priorities/

28 For example, by convening the Climate Engineering Conference series, see http://www.ce-conference.org

29 These included, among other things, the precautionary principle, respect for existing international laws, multilateral, transparent and accountable
deliberations, and an agreed global multilateral governance mechanism (ETC Group, 2017b).

17
Assembly or one of its bodies, or possibly regional bodies governance in the short- to medium term, as well as
(for example, the South Asian Association for Regional broader potential implications for planetary conditions
Cooperation (SAARC), the Association of Southeast in the long term, a new multilateral approach may be
Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the African Union). Given needed to ensure inclusive decision-making consistent with
that geoengineering has profound implications for climate sustainable development.

18
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For further reading

This policy brief provides a high-level overview of the most important issues that geoengineering brings up for policy-
makers. Much has been written on geoengineering across many disciplines. To avoid duplication and to ensure this brief
is accessible and concise, this paper does not focus on technical detail. The following reading list includes more detailed
analyses in different areas and may serve as a starting point for interested readers and further policy research.

General
Allen, M.R., Frame, D.J., Huntingford, C., Jones, C.D., Lowe, J.A., Meinshausen, M. and Meinshasen, N. (2009)
Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne, Nature 458: 1163–1166. (https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19407800).
IEA (2015) Energy and climate change: world energy outlook special briefing for COP21. Paris: IEA/OECD (http://www.
iea.org/media/news/WEO_INDC_Paper_Final_WEB.PDF)
IPCC (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation (SREX). A special
report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press (http://www.ipcc.ch/report/srex/ and https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/
SREX_Full_Report.pdf).

21
Honegger, M., Münch, S., Hirsch, A., Beuttler, C., Peter, T., Burns, W., Geden, O., Goeschl, T., Gregorowius, D., Keith, D.,
Lederer, M., Michaelowa, A., Pasztor, J., Schäfer, S., Seneviratne, S.I., Stenke, A., Patt, A., Wallimann-Helmer, I. (2017)
Climate change, negative emissions and solar radiation management: it is time for an open societal conversation. St.
Gallen: Risk-Dialogue Foundation (https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/137059/1/Risk_Dialogue_Foundation__CE-
Dialogue_White_Paper_17_05_05Publ.pdf).
Horton, J.B., Keith, D.W. and Honegger, M. (2016) ‘Implications of the Paris Agreement for CDR and solar
geoengineering’. Viewpoints, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School
(https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/160700_horton-keith-honegger_vp2.pdf ).
Morton, O. (2015) The planet remade: how geoengineering could change the world. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Robock, A. (2008) ‘20 Reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea’, Bulletin of the atomic scientists 64(2): 14–18.
(http://thebulletin.org/2008/may/20-reasons-why-geoengineering-may-be-bad-idea).

Legal issues
Armeni, C. and Redgwell, C. (2015) ‘International legal and regulatory issues of climate geoengineering
governance: rethinking the approach’. Climate Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series: 021. Oxford:
Geoengineering Governance Research (http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/perch/resources/
workingpaper21armeniredgwelltheinternationalcontextrevise-.pdf).
Burns, W. (2016) ‘The Paris Agreement and climate geoengineering governance: the need for a human rights-based
component’. CIGI Paper No. 111. Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation (https://www.
cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/CIGI%20Paper%20no.111%20WEB.pdf).
Craik, A.N. and Burns, W. (2016) Climate engineering under the Paris Agreement: a legal and policy primer. Waterloo,
ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation (https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/
GeoEngineering%20Primer%20-%20Special%20Report.pdf).

Ethical issues
Nicholson, S. (2013) ‘The promises and perils of geoengineering’, in Worldwatch Institute (eds), State of the World 2013.
Washington, DC: Island Press.
Robock, A. (2012) ‘Is geoengineering research ethical?’, Security and Peace 30 (4) 226–229 (http://www.jstor.org/
stable/24233207).

Technical issues
Royal Society (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty. London: The Royal Society
(https://royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2009/8693.pdf).
Williamson, P. and Bodle, R. (2016) Update on climate geoengineering in relation to the Convention on Biological
Diversity: potential impacts and regulatory framework. Technical Series No. 84. Montreal, QC: Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity.
IPCC (2011) Meeting report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Expert Meeting on Geoengineering.
IPCC Working Group III Technical Support Unit. Potsdam: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (https://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/EM_GeoE_Meeting_Report_final.pdf).

Political economy issues

Olson, R.L. (2011) Geoengineering for decision makers. Washington, DC: Science and Technology Innovation Program,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Geoengineering_
for_Decision_Makers_0.pdf).
Swart, R. and Marinova, N. (2010) ‘Policy options in a worst case climate change world’, Mitigation and adaptation
strategies for global change 15(6): 531–549 (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-010-9235-0).

22
Appendix 1: Sources of funding for geoengineering
research (based on preliminary desk review)30

Governments •• Sloan Foundation

•• Academy of Finland’s research programme on climate •• The Carbon War Room
change (FICCA) •• The InterAcademy Panel
•• German Federal Ministry of Education and Research •• The Open Philanthropy Project
•• Japanese Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of •• The Royal Society
Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology •• The World Academy of Sciences
•• Research Council of Norway •• Zennström Philanthropies
•• UK Research Councils
ŊŊ Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(EPSRC), Natural Environment Research Council Sources:
(NERC), Economic and Social Research Council Environmental Defense Fund (https://www.edf.org/climate/
(ESRC), Arts and Humanities Research Council geoengineering)
(AHRC), Science and Technology Facilities Council Gordon Research Conferences (https://www.grc.org/
(STFC) climate-engineering-conference/2017/)
•• US Open Philanthropy Project (https://www.
ŊŊ National Aeronautics and Space Association (NASA), openphilanthropy.org/research/cause-reports/
NSF, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National geoengineering#footnote7_16rrdhe)
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) have The Climate Geoengineering Governance (CGG) project
all been involved (http://geoengineering-governance-research.org)
•• UNESCO (previous funders to SRMGI) The ETC Group (http://www.etcgroup.org/funding)
The Guardian (https://www.theguardian.
Private institutions/individuals/foundations com/environment/2017/mar/29/
criticism-harvard-solar-geoengineering-research-distorted)
•• Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation The Keith Group (Harvard University) (https://keith.seas.
•• Carnegie Council (funding C2G2 Initiative) harvard.edu/FICER)
•• Children’s Investment Fund The Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals
•• Environmental Defense Fund Project (http://www.iagp.ac.uk)
The Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative
•• Heinrich Böll Foundation
(http://www.srmgi.org/about/)
•• Hewlett Foundation The Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering
•• Norfolk Charitable Trust Project (http://spice.ac.uk)

30 Additional research will be necessary to identify which organisations are actively engaged in funding ongoing geoengineering research.

23
Appendix 2: Summary of CDR options

Table A1: Summary of CDR options

Land Ocean
Biological Afforestation and land use Iron/phosphorous/nitrogen fertilisation
Biomass/fuels with carbon sequestration Enhanced upwelling
Physical Atmospheric CO2 scrubbers (‘air capture’) Changing overturning circulation
Chemical (‘enhanced weathering techniques’) In-situ carbonation of silicates Alkalinity enhancement (grinding, dispersing and
Basic minerals (incl. olivine) on soil dissolving limestone, silicates, or calcium hydroxide)

Source: Royal Society (2009)

24
Appendix 3: Different levels of intervention of SRM

Figure A1: Illustration of different levels of intervention of SRM

Incoming solar
irradiance reduced
Solar radiation reflected to by space-based
space increased by solar radiation
atmosphere-based solar management
radiation management
Solar radiation reflected to
space increased by cloud
albedo solar radiation
management
Solar radiation absorbed by
atmosphere may be reduced or
Solar radiation absorbed by increased by statosphere-based
atmosphere increased by solar radiation management
surface-based solar radiation
management

Solar radiation
reflected to space
increased by
surface-based solar
radiation
management

Solar radiation absorbed at surface

reduced by all SRM methods

Source: Based on Royal Society (2009)

25
Appendix 4: Summary of potential impacts of
various geoengineering interventions

In their 2009 report, the Royal Society reviewed of each intervention and examples of the more detailed
literature pertaining to each of the main geoengineering impacts when viewed through a specific lens (equally valid
options, evaluating their likely costs, anticipating their lenses that we have not assessed here could include ethical,
environmental impacts and estimating the likelihood of political, or economic impacts).
unexpected environmental impacts. In more recent work, Note: impacts may be positive or negative (or a
Williamson and Bodle (2016) specifically focused on the complex mixture of both), depending on the context of the
potential impacts on biodiversity. intervention (for example, its size, location or duration).
Here, key points from both reports are summarised to
provide both a general perspective on the consequences

Table A2: Summary of potential impacts of various geoengineering interventions

Intervention Anticipated impacts Potential unexpected Potential impacts on Potential effectiveness

impacts biodiversity
Carbon dioxide removal Reduction in atmospheric Various Various Slow, but works in
CO2 concentrations direct opposition to
anthropogenic GHG
emissions (root cause of
climate change)
Reforestation/ Afforestation/ Changes in surface albedo, Competition with other land Significant land use changes Limited – requires substantial
Land use management for land use, localised ecosystem uses (and knock-on impacts could adversely affect existing land area to have meaningful
carbon sinks/ Biomass-based impacts e.g. on food prices or water ecosystems. Knock-on effects impact (note current rate of
interventions (including resources), CO2 release could impact neighbouring deforestation).
BECCS and biochar) during transition period, land areas directly and connected
grabs, risk of impermanence areas indirectly (e.g. weather
(CO2 leaking back to patterns)
atmosphere)
Enhanced weathering (land/ Significant impacts Mainly biodiversity-related Primary and secondary Limited/moderate – cost and
ocean) associated with mineral impacts on ecosystems scale (and impacts of the
extraction (mining) uncertain latter) are challenges
Ocean manipulation Localised (bio-) chemical GHG release, route to Primary and secondary Limited/moderate – cost,
(fertilisation with iron, perturbations, increased permanent storage uncertain impacts on ecosystems scale and demonstration
phosphorus, or nitrogen, or acidification of mid- and deep uncertain emissions reductions are
promoting mixing) ocean. Significant impacts challenges
associated with mineral
extraction (mining)

Air capture Impacts associated with Impermanence (CO2 leaking Impacts of conflicting or Limited/moderate – cost
competition for resources back to atmosphere) changing resource use and scale are major issues.
(e.g. land and water) depending on storage Currently depends on
solution deployment of wider (fossil-
fuelled) carbon capture and
storage

26
Intervention Anticipated impacts Potential unexpected Potential impacts on Potential effectiveness
impacts biodiversity
Solar radiation Reduction in amount of All SRM methods suffer Various Rapid, but does not address
management solar radiation absorbed from the termination effect increased atmospheric
at the surface (leading to and are likely to impact GHG concentrations.
lower increase in surface regional climate and Globally averaged SRM
temperature) other associated natural can mask large regional
systems (e.g. precipitation, climate changes (because
hydrological cycle, carbon of spatial difference
cycle, nitrogen cycle) between SRM impacts and
GHG impacts)
Land-/ Ocean-based methods Increased reflection of solar Impacts on existing land Context dependent (whitening Limited/ moderate (depends
radiation from the surface use/ land users/ ecosystem buildings  limited impacts; on coverage and net increase
services adding reflective foam to in reflectivity)
ocean surface  severe
impacts on many species)
Atmosphere-based methods Reduction of total light Long atmospheric residence Material added to the High potential for limiting
reaching surface/ increase in time atmosphere means atmosphere has potential temperature increase,
proportion of diffuse light dislocation between for localised pollution effects potentially at cost of spatially
perturbation and response. (e.g. ozone degradation) unequal impacts on climate
Significant regional inequities and other natural systems.
Space-based methods Reduction of total light Unknown Unknown High potential for limiting
reaching surface/increase in temperature increase.
proportion of diffuse light Technically feasible but
politically unlikely.

27
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