Nothing Special   »   [go: up one dir, main page]
Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 135 views

    Knowing How

    Uploaded by

    Jonathan Hecht
    The document outlines the syllabus for a course on the nature of knowing how. The course will examine several perspectives on this topic: - It will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryle's argument that knowing how to do something does not consist of knowing the answer to a question. - It will then discuss the nature of knowing the answer to a question (knowing-wh) and introduce Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's account of knowing-how as a species of propositional knowledge. - Later topics will include debates around non-propositional views of knowing-how and issues like intellectualism about knowing-how vs. anti-intellectualism. - The course will also cover related topics

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Knowing How

    Uploaded by

    Jonathan Hecht
    135 views3 pages
    The document outlines the syllabus for a course on the nature of knowing how. The course will examine several perspectives on this topic: - It will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryle's argument that knowing how to do something does not consist of knowing the answer to a question. - It will then discuss the nature of knowing the answer to a question (knowing-wh) and introduce Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's account of knowing-how as a species of propositional knowledge. - Later topics will include debates around non-propositional views of knowing-how and issues like intellectualism about knowing-how vs. anti-intellectualism. - The course will also cover related topics

    Original Description:

    Copyright

    © Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)

    Available Formats

    PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The document outlines the syllabus for a course on the nature of knowing how. The course will examine several perspectives on this topic: - It will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryle's argument that knowing how to do something does not consist of knowing the answer to a question. - It will then discuss the nature of knowing the answer to a question (knowing-wh) and introduce Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's account of knowing-how as a species of propositional knowledge. - Later topics will include debates around non-propositional views of knowing-how and issues like intellectualism about knowing-how vs. anti-intellectualism. - The course will also cover related topics

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    135 views3 pages

    Knowing How

    Uploaded by

    Jonathan Hecht
    The document outlines the syllabus for a course on the nature of knowing how. The course will examine several perspectives on this topic: - It will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryle's argument that knowing how to do something does not consist of knowing the answer to a question. - It will then discuss the nature of knowing the answer to a question (knowing-wh) and introduce Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's account of knowing-how as a species of propositional knowledge. - Later topics will include debates around non-propositional views of knowing-how and issues like intellectualism about knowing-how vs. anti-intellectualism. - The course will also cover related topics

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    of 3

    Knowing How Jason Stanley Rutgers University both philosophers and laymen tend to treat intellectual operations as the

    core of mental conduct; that is to say, they tend to define all other mental-conduct concepts in terms of concepts of cognition. They suppose that the primary exercise of minds consists of finding the answers to questions and that their other occupations are merely applications of considered truths or even regrettable distractions from their considerations. -Ryle, The Concept of Mind Is knowing how to do something a matter of knowing the answer to a question? If so, what question? If not, in what does knowing how to do something consist? What issues hang on the resolution to these questions about the nature of knowing how? These will be the central questions that will occupy us this semester. We will begin by looking at Gilbert Ryles arguments for the thesis that knowing how to do something does not consist in knowing the answer to a question. On the view Ryle is attacking, knowing how to do something does involve knowing the answer to a question. So the next topic we will discuss is the topic of what it is to know the answer to a question that is, the nature of knowing wh generally (e.g. knowing who, knowing what, knowing why, etc.). We will use this material as a build-up to introducing the account in Stanley and Williamson (2001), and survey some of the subsequent critical literature. Finally, we will look at some of the debates in which a non-propositional notion of knowing-how plays a central role. Syllabus January 21 & 28: Ryle on knowing how Readings for first two seminars: Required: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Chapters 1-3 Gilbert Ryle, Knowing How and Knowing That Recommended: Selections from Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century Brian Weatherson, Doing Philosophy with Words Julia Tanney, Ryle, entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy February 4 & 11: Knowing-wh Required: Lauri Kartunnen, Syntax and Semantics of Questions, Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (1977) 3-44.

    Jeroen Groenendijk andMartin Stokhof, Semantic Analysis of Wh-Complements, Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (1982): 175-233 Bor, Stephen and Lycan, William. 1975. Knowing Who. Philosophical Studies 28, 299-344. Recommended: Selections from Groenendijk and Stokhofs 1984 dissertation. February 18 & 25: Indexical Modes of Presentation Required: John Perry, The Puzzle of the Essential Indexical Gareth Evans, Chapters 6 & 7, Varieties of Reference Christopher Peacocke, selections from Sense and Content David Lewis, Attitudes De Dicto and De Se March 4, 11, 25. Intellectualism about Knowing How Required: Stanley and Williamson (2001), Sections 1-3 Stephen Schiffer 2002. Amazing Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 99, 200-202. John Koethe 2002. Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 2002, 325-328. Ian Rumfitt. 2003. Savoir Faire. Journal of Philosophy 100, 158-166. Alva Noe 2005. Against Intellectualism. Analysis 65, 278-290. Tobias Rosefeldt 2004. Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That? Philosophical Investigations 27, 370-390. Jeremy Fantl, Knowing-How and Knowing-That, Philosophy Compass 3:3 (2008), 451-70. John Bengson and Marc Moffett 2007 Know How and Concept Possession Philosophical Studies 136, 31-57. John Bengson, Marc Moffett, and Jennifer Wright 2007 The Folk on Knowing How Daniel Sgaravatti and Elia Zardini, Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism, Grazer Philosophische Studien (2008) Jason Stanley (forthcoming) Knowing (How) April 1 & 8. Knowledge of Language Michael Dummett, What do I know when I know a Language? Elizabeth Fricker, Understanding and Knowledge of What is Said Dean Pettit, Why Knowledge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language Jennifer Hornsby, Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge Jason Stanley, Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech -More readings to be added later. April 15. Jonathan Schaffer visit

    Required reading: Jonathan Schaffer, Knowing the Answer April 22 & 29: Knowledge-wh and Jacksons Knowledge Argument David Lewis, What Experience Teaches Janet Levin, Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Lawrence Nemirow, Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, section 4 of Knowing How Yuri Cath, The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowing-How, Nous (March, 2009). Selections from William Lycan, Consciousness

    You might also like