1. G.R. No.

97906 May 21, 1992

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
Facts:

Private respondent Maximo Wong was adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent filed a petition to
change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong
embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a
Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that
he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and
social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his
former surname. Trial court granted the petition.

Republic through the Solicitor General opposed the decision. Solicitor General contends
that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends
were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition for change of name. Further, the
Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates
Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the
surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving
the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents.

Issue:
Whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of
name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.

Ruling: Change of name does not alter family relations, legal capacity or civil status

Yes. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the
effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless
be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an
incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. Among the grounds for change
of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; 25 (d) Having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her
alien parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; 27 and (f) When the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

It is a special proceeding to establish a person involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position
in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and, as such, strict compliance
with jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction therefor. For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name as
recorded in the civil register

We have heretofore held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in
one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name.
2. ALBERTO T. CHOMI vs. THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
 G.R. No. L-9203.  September 28, 1956
Facts:

Petitioner’s name in the civil register is Apolinario Arellano and his father’s name as Celerino
Arellano, instead of Alberto Arellano Chomi and Celerino Arellano Chomi, respectively. But he
was baptized and given name Alberto. Since then he had been known by the following name,
Alberto T. Chomi or Alberto Chomi. Hence, these proceedings were instituted for the purpose of
making changes, alleged to be corrections, in the birth certificate of the applicant.

Opposition was filed against the petition by the Solicitor General, who claims that the changes
sought to be made will involve a change in the name of the Petitioner as well as that of his
father, which changes are substantial in nature and that since only mistakes clerical in nature
are authorized to be made under Article 412 of the new Civil Code, if the Petitioner desires to
change his name the appropriate remedy should be by a petition under Act No. 1386 in relation
with Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of First Instance sustained the opposition of the Solicitor General, and denied the
petition.
Issue: Whether there was a mistake or error in the record of the petitioner’s entry of birth that
justifies a change in said entry.
Ruling:
No. The real name of a person is that given him in the civil register, not the name by which he
was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community, or which he has
adopted, and that the only remedy left to him in case he desires to change his name in the
register, which is his official name, is for him to file the special proceedings embodied in Rule
103 of the Rules of Court.
For the purposes of the law, the official name of Petitioner is Alberto Arellano. That is his name
in the eyes of the law. The mere fact that he was baptized by another name under which he has
since then been known and which he has used did not per se have the effect of changing his
name. The only way by which the name of a person can be changed, legally is for him to file the
special proceedings outlined in Act No. 1386 and now embodied in Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. These principles are presumed from the official establishment by the government of the
Civil Register which are necessary in the interest of conserving the means of identifying of
citizens and individuals to prevent the confusion that may ensue from indiscriminate use and
adoption of names.
Thus, the real name of petitioner is that what had given him in the civil register, not the name by
which he was baptized in his church or by which he has been known in the community, or which
he has adopted.
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and ANDREW BARRETTO
G.R. No. L-35605
October 11, 1984

Facts:

Andrew Barretto filed Special Proceeding No. 2742-R with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
for the change of his name from Andrew Barrette to Andrew Velez, alleging as reason for his
petition that Velez is the surname of his stepfather with whom he was living. His reasons for
asking for the change of his surname from Barretto to Velez is because: the use of the surname,
Barretto, by him has caused him embarrassment because, being a half-brother of many children
of his mother who bear the surname, Velez, people look down upon him as an illegitimate son.

Republic of the Philippines made an opposition to the petition, alleging that the proposed
change of name is unwarranted in the absence of any showing that the present surname of
respondent Andrew Barretto is ridiculous and/or tainted with dishonor. Further, the title and
caption of the petition for change of name and the order of publication failed to state and include
the proposed new name of the petitioner Andrew Barretto. It was also alleged in said motion
that the petitioner had no legal capacity to file the petition as he was then a minor.

The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition of respondent Andrew Barretto to
change his surname to Velez.

Issue: Whether the respondent Court erred in granting the petition.

Ruling: Yes. Order of publication must state cause for change of name.

Under Rule 103, Rules of Court, the formal requirements for a change of name:

(1) The petition for change of name and the order of publication and hearing thereon must
contain in its title or caption [a] the applicant's real name, [b] his aliases and other names, if any,
[c] and the name he seeks to adopt.

(2) And, there must be effective publication, i.e., such publication reciting, among others: [a] the
name or names of the applicant, [b] the cause for which the change of name is sought, and [c]
the new name asked for.

Failure to comply with the aforementioned requirements results in the lower court acquiring no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition.

The name Andrew Barretto, under which the petition for change of name was brought, is the
applicant's baptized name. There is no showing whether the same is also his real and official
name appearing in the Civil Registry. Thus, the present petition is not sufficient in form and
substance.

The name sought to be adopted does not appear in the title of the petition. Also, the same does
not appear in the title of the order of publication. These are jurisdictional defects.

In this case, the order of publication is defective for another reason: it does not cite the cause
for which the change of name is sought.

Consequently, the publication itself is defective on three counts: (1) the name Andrew Barretto
appearing therein may not be the petitioner's real name; (2) the cause for which the change of
name is sought does not appear therein; and (3) the name sought to be adopted does not
appear in the title or caption of the published order.

Further, the reason alleged by Andrew Barretto is not compelling enough to warrant the change
of name prayed for. Andrew Barretto filed his application in his own name. He was born on
November 10, 1948. At the time of the filing of his application on February 21, 1967, he was
only 18 years old. Being a minor, he would not have been qualified to do so.

TOPIC: Change of Name

4
OSHITA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-21180           March 31, 1967
ZALDIVAR, J:

FACTS:
Antonina B. Oshita filed a petition to have her name changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to
"Antonina Bartolome." The petition was signed by the petitioner herself and was "subscribed and
sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court. She is the legitimate daughter of Kishimatsu
Oshita, a Japanese citizen, now deceased, and Buena Bartolome, a Filipina; that upon reaching
the age of majority, Antonina elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that
being already a Filipino citizen she desired to have her family name changed from "Oshita" to
"Bartolome", the latter being the family name of her mother, and because she felt embarrassed
when introduced as one bearing a Japanese surname; that her older brother and sister, who had
earlier elected Philippine citizenship, have been using the surname "Bartolome" ; and that she
has no criminal record nor a pending tax liability. 

ISSUES:
WON Lack of verification is a ground for dismissal.

RULING: Yes, the lower court has jurisdiction over the petition.

 While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change of name
be verified, nevertheless, no provision exists in the rules which declares that such a requirement
regarding verification is jurisdictional. The absence of verification  is a mere formal, not
jurisdictional, defect, the absence of which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow
and act in the case. Verification is not a jurisdictional, but a formal, requisite.
Hence, the court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking, or act on
the pleading although it is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that the strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice or the law may
thereby be served. This view finds support in the ruling laid down by this Court in several
decisions.
Here, the petition was indeed not verified, but Lack of verification not a ground for dismissal
 5.Topic: Change of name
Republic of the Philippines vs Lee Wai Lam
GR No L-22607/30 July 1969

FACTS: Respondent Lee Wai Lam filed a petition for change of name from Lee Wai
Lam to William Lee alleging that his usual name before he entering the Philippines was
'William Lee' but when his Landing Certificate of Residence was issued, when he
landed here, it was merely mispronounced and misspelled to 'Lee Wai Lam'. The
Solicitor General opposed the petition upon the grounds, substantially, that the
necessity for the change had not been established. The lower court granted the petition,
holding that the grounds for the opposition of the Solicitor General are not obstacles to
the grant of the petition. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether there is a proper and reasonable cause or any compelling reason which
may justify the change of name?

HELD:NO

Change of name of a person is a matter of public interest. The State has an interest in
the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and change of
name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper
or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. 
Otherwise, the request should be denied.

In the given case, it simply appears that respondent wants to correct an alleged error
because his actual name in China was "William Lee" not "Lee Wai Lam". The alleged
error in placing the name or the respondent as Lee Wai Lam and not "William Lee" in
his Landing Certificate of Residence is not a convincing ground to warrant change of his
name. He has been using officially the name "Lee Wai Lam" all along, and he has not
been heard to complain that he has been prejudiced by the use of that name.

#6. Republic vs. Hernandez

GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent spouses filed a petition to adopt Kevin Earl Bartolome

and prayed in the same petition for the minor adoptee's first name to be
changed to Aaron Joseph, the name by which he was baptized in
accordance with religious practice and by which he has been addressed by
his family and friends since 1993.
 
The petitioner objected to the petition for adoption and the petitions for change
of name being combined into a single proceeding, arguing that they should
be treated and sought separately.

ISSUE: Grounds for change of name

whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change
of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in
the petition for adoption
RULING:

1) YES. The adoptee’s first name must not be changed.

 
The law allows the adoptee to carry the surname of the adopter as a matter
of right and obligation upon the issuance of the adoption decree. The
adoptee's given or proper name, on the other hand, must remain the same
as it was when he or she was first recorded in the civil registry.
 
The establishment of an adoptive relationship does not grant the adopter
the right to change the adoptee's first name. The automatic modification
thereof, based solely on the adoption thus granted, is beyond the scope of
an adoption decree.
 
Changing a person's given or proper name as documented in the civil
register constitutes a significant change in one's official or legal name and
cannot be allowed without a judicial order.
 
If a name change is desired, it can only be accomplished by filing and
strictly adhering to the substantive and procedural provisions for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
where the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds for the change can be
threshed out and accordingly decided.
 
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance
with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction for its adjudication.

7.Topic: Change of Name paki check

TAN vs REPUBLIC, 4 SCRA 1128

On March 12, 1959, Go Chang, is a Chinese citizen that was born in the Phils. He filed with the court a
verified petition for change of name to Jayme S. Tan.

After due hearing and notice or publication, the court ordered the Local Civil Registry to change the
name of appellee to Jaime S. Tan. However, in the petition filed by GO Chang, his name is to be changed
to Jayme S. Tan.

ISSUE: WON the difference in the spelling of Jayme and Jaime is a substantial defect.

YES.
Petitions for change of name being proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements of
publication is essential, for it is by such means that the Court acquires jurisdiction. Considering the
fact that the proceedings is one for change of name, the defect in the petition and the order, as to the
spelling of the name of the petitioner, is substantial, because it did not correctly identify the party to
said proceedings. virtua1aw library

It may be argued that the difference in the spelling is minor, that is the "i" has been erroneously
typewritten as "y", or vice versa. The difference of one letter in a name may mean the distinction of
identity of one person with that of another. If the projected change means so great to the petitioner, he
should, at least, have exerted efforts to correct the mistake, if it was a mistake at all.

8
G.R. No. L-18669. November 29, 1965.
TY BIO GIAO, v. REPUBLIC
DIZON, J.:

FACTS:
Ty Bio Giao filed a verified petition for a change of name, alleging that the name "Ty Bio Giao",
which is a derivative of the Chinese name of his ancestry, "carries, in the Visayan dialect, a
meaning and connotation which evoke derisive laughter and abusive comments from those who
hear the same, thereby causing embarrassment to the Petitioner" and has always been a
handicap in his social and business dealings; that he desires to have his name changed to
Vicente Ty, which was the name given to him by his parents when he was baptized and by
which name he is commonly known in the community.

ISSUES:
Whether the petition may be granted.

RULING: NO
A change of name may be authorized only when there is proper and reasonable cause therefor

 in the case at bar the petitioner failed to prove his allegation that his true name evokes
derisive laughter and abusive comments from those who hear the name pronounced,
thus embarrassing him no end. Neither did petitioner present sufficient evidence to
show how, and in what manner his name has been all these years a handicap in his
business dealings with others.

Petitioner admitted that during his residence in the Philippines he had used and had been
known under several names, without legal authority to do so. The possibility therefore exists —
should he be allowed now to change his name — that confusion would arise in the minds of
those who had previously known him under different names. In cases of this nature, the policy
of the courts should be to deny the application in the absence of clear proof that the change is
really necessary and will not in anyway serve any unlawful purpose, The State has an interest in
the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification, and the same should not be
changed for trivial reasons.

9. ONG PENG OAN vs REPUBLIC, 102 Phil. 468

Ong Peng Oan appeals from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (Case No. 16126)
denying his application to change his name to Vicente Chan Bon Lay, by which he allegedly is and
has been better known in social and business circles, since 1946.

The petitioner alleged that ever since his arrival in this country in 1922, he has been using the name
Vicente Chan Bon Lay, by which he is known in both business and social circles, hence, the reason
for the change. However, he admitted although at first he denied, that he has been convicted twice
for gambling.

In a certificate issued by Justice of the Peace, it appears that the herein petitioner, with the name of
Ong Pin Can, has criminal record, having been convicted twice already for certain violations of law.

The RTC denied the petition. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether the USE OF DIFFERENT NAME CONSTITUTE PROPER CAUSE TO CHANGE NAME

Ruling:NO

USE OF DIFFERENT NAME DOES NOT Per Se CONSTITUTE PROPER CAUSE TO CHANGE NAME

A person with a criminal record will have evident interest in the use of a name other than his own, in
an attempt to obliterate an unsavory record; hence, the mere fact that the applicant has been using a
different name and has become known by it does nit per se alone constitute "proper and reasonable
cause." or justification, to legally authorize a change of name.

A change of name is a privilege and not aright. Thus, where prior convictions exist, it is the court’s
duty to consider carefully the consequences of the change of name, and to deny the same reason are
shown.

The decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.

10.Alba vs CA 465 SCRA 495

FACTS:

respondent filed a petition in RTC Manila for cancellation of entries in the birth
certificate of petitioner minor, to wit: (1) minor’s surname ‘Herrera’; (2) his filiation as father; and
(3) marriage to minor’s mother, Armi, alleging they are false and that he married only once with
Ezperanza Santos.
the RTC issued an Amended Order re -scheduling the hearing of petition to 26 February 1997.
Copy of which was published in ‘Today’ in its Jan 20, 27, and Feb 3,1997 issues, and were also
sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St.,Ermita, Manila (address per minor’s birth certificate), Local
Civil Registrar and Solicitor General. During the hearing, only OSG appeared but filed no
opposition, while Armi was not present for she did not receive the Order, the address
provided being wrong. , the RTC granted the petition which became final.
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment with CA
Issues:1.Whether or not jurisdiction over Armi’s person was NOT acquired
Ruling: Proceeding in rem; jurisdiction over the person of petitioner not required
THE JURSIDICTION OVER ARMI’S PERSON WAS ACQUIRED.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that
the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law;
or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective.

In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the
latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil
registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
with the proper Regional Trial Court.[28] Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It
is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

11. UYGUANGCO vs. CA 178 SCRA 684

Respondent Graciano Bacjao Apolinario, claiming to be an illegitimate son of the

deceased Apolinario Uyguangco, filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners.
Respondent alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia
Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina,
Misamis Oriental, at the latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here
he received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High School,
where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without objection
from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from
1967 to 1973.

In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an
admission from respondent Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in
Art. 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of the deceased Uyguango. On the
basis of this admission, petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that he
could no longer prove his filiation under the civil code. On the other hand, the
respondent insists that that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in
continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or of his family."

Issue:
WoN respondent can prove his filiation as an illegitimate child by showing that he is "in
continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or of his family."
Held:
NO. The Court held that while it is true that the illegitimate child is now allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation
through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the
claim of his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.

12. LIGAYA GAPUSAN-CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROSPERO

PARCON, respondents.

G.R. No. L-46746 March 15, 1990

Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate on April 6, 1966. Petitioner Ligaya Gapusan-Chua,
claimed  to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased, instituted judicial
proceedings for the settlement of the latter’s estate.  The Court appointed Ligaya as Special
Administratrix of Felisa Parcon’s estate.  Felisa’s surviving husband denied that  Ligaya was
an acknowledged natural child of the deceased wife. Ligaya presented among other proofs,
the following documents:
a)Felisa’s sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya was named and
described as daughter of Felisa;
b)Felisa’s application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her daughter;
c)GSIS check in the sum of P505.50 paid to Ligaya as her share in the death benefits due
the heirs of Felisa;
       d) a family photograph, showing Ligaya beside the deceased.
Respondent's  averrement :  petitioner  cannot claim that she was acknowledged as a
natural child of the deceased as she was named by the same a “adopted daughter”  in
various documents.
The probate court ruled in favor of Ligaya while the Court of Appeals set the lower court’s
decision aside.
 
ISSUE : Whether  or  not  Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities and her application for
insurance are "authentic writings" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-
Chua as her natural child, even if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her
lifetime, to recognize her as such.

HELD:

Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of

Felisa.
Judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made :  1) of a person who is of age,
only his consent being necessary; or 2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of
birth or in a will.  On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is
effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an
authentic document.  In any case the individual recognized can impugn the recognition within four
years following the attainment of his majority.  Each of these writings is undoubtedly an "authentic
writing" within the contemplation of Article 278. "An authentic writing' for purposes of voluntary
recognition . . . (is) understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother),
including "a public instrument" (one acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official
with the formalities required by law) and, of course, a public or official document in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
  The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings , and hence, conformably with the legal
provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during
Ligaya's minority. The question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval negated the effect
of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the
writings were made.

13. DE JESUS vs ESTATE OF JUAN GAMBOA DIZON

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized document, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died intestate in March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations
and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgement
that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of
the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent,

including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina
de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ recognition as being illegitimate children of the
decedent is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a
separate action for judicial approval

HELD:
No. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing the civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required.

Here the petitioners attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolina de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy
of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

14. Pablito Taneo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108532
March 9, 1999

Facts:
Petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died
on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left
the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906.The
subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private
respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the
same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling,
transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of
conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Private respondent refuted petitioners’ contentions alleging that he lawfully
acquired the subject properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a
private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale on February 12, 1966.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of
the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution
Held: NO
The applicable law, therefore,  in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration
of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite.  Nonetheless, the law provides
certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment.

The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment, except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of
Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record
of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction
of the building.[12]
The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos
owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares.  By the very definition of the law that
the “family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and the
land on which it is situated,” [13] it is understood that the house should be constructed on
a land not belonging to another.  Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo
Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of
their property but to no avail.

15. GOMEZ vs STA INES

473 SCRA 25

FACTS:

Mary Josephine Gomez and Socorro Gomez-Salcedo filed a complaint against

Marietta Sta Ines to seek redress for damages suffered by them due to acts
and omissions committed by Marietta as early as 1977 when she assumed
management and supervision of their deceased mother’s rice land.

Sta. Ines was declared in default. After judgement became final and
executory, RTC issued a writ of execution and the property registered in the
name of Marietta Sta Ines was sold at public auction.
Marietta’s husband, Hinahon Sta Ines, and their children filed a complaint for
annulment of sale on the ground that the house and lot sold during auction
is their family residence and thus exempt from execution.

Hinahon and Marietta claimed the property was their family home from the
time they occupied the same as a family residence in 1972 and that under
the Family Code there is no longer any need to constitute the said property
as family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, because it became such
by operation of law. 

ISSUE: Whether herein respondents, husband and children of the owner of the levied
property, may validly seek the annulment of the sale of said property 

HELD:

No.
In the case at bar, the house and lot of respondents was not constituted as a
family home, whether judicially or extra-judicially, at the time Marietta
incurred her debts. 

Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon

the effectivity of the Family Code on 03 August 1988, thus, the debts were
incurred before the constitution of the family home.  

16.Reyes vs. Alejandro 141 SCRA 65

FACTS:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing the petition
filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband Roberto Reyes declared
an absentee.

In a petition Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto
L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April
1962 and since then had not been heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further
alleged that her husband left no will nor any property in his name nor any debts.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes
left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. 

Issue

Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes

Held

No. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is because of his properties which
have to be administered by a representative appointed by the Court ; the spouse of the absentee is
asking for separation of property or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an
classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her. The petition to declare the husband an
absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the
wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings.

In this case, since there were no properties to speak of, it was right for the court
to dismiss the case

17.MALICDEM VS REPUBLIC
12 SCRA 313

FACTS:

A petition for change of name of the minor Henry Tomelden to Henry Malicdem was filed by the
spouses Juan Malicdem and Saturnina Aquino before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
alleging that they were the legitimate parents of said minor, but following the local belief that to
break the chain of mortality of their children, which had been plaguing their family, their
remaining child had to be sold.

Henry was then registered in the civil registry as the son of Lope Tomelden and Eugenia Aquino,
Saturnina's sister; that the minor has been living with them since birth, and although he uses the
surname Tomelden he knows that petitioners are his real parents; and said minor, now wishes to
use his true name Henry Malicdem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanroblesvirtual law library

After due publication and notice to interested parties, the petition was heard, during which the
petitioners, the minor, and Eugenia Aquino, who was named as his mother in the record of birth,
testified to the facts alleged in the petition. Thereafter, the court granted such petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the action taken by the lower court which granted the petition for a change of name is
proper

RULING:

Yes the action taken is proper. As stated under the Civil Code any entries made in the civil
register are only prima facie  evidence of the facts. Thus, the correction or cancellation thereof,
in proper cases and by judicial order, is allowed.

In the instant case after weighing the evidence presented found that, notwithstanding the entry in
the civil register, the minor is really the legitimate child of petitioners, and therefore, should bear
the surname of his father. The Solicitor General further contends that if it is true that the minor is
the legitimate child of the Malicdems, this proceeding is unnecessary and should have been
dismissed as the legitimate child is entitled as of right, to bear the surname of his legitimate
father.
Thus, the name Henry Tomelden should be change to Henry Malicdem following the petition
granting the change of name.

18.TOPIC: UNAUTHORIZED FALSE ENTRY MAY BE CANCELLED BY COURT

ALISOSO VS. LASTIMOSO
G.R. No. L-19659. May 31, 1965

FACTS:

Leonilo Lastimoso was registered by one Lucila Q. Lastimoso to be the child of petitioner-
physician Policarpio C. Alisoso before the Local Civil Registrar of Pinamungajan, Cebu. After
having been informed of said false entry, petitioner immediately contacted Tarcela Lastimoso,
mother of Leonilo, to ascertain if said entry was made with her knowledge and consent.

Tarcela, in an affidavit, declared that she had not authorized anyone to register said child in the
office of the above civil registrar, nor did she personally register, nor caused to have said child
registered, in said office. Said Lucila Q. Lastimoso was not the midwife nor the nurse who
attended the delivery of Tarcela Lastimoso, nor did she have any authority to report to the local
civil registrar the false statement abovementioned. Petitioner was never married to Tarcela
Lastimoso as was made to appear in said entry, for the truth was that he was already married to
one Irenea Hermosisima whom he married on March 25, 1951. The record of the parish church
of Pinamungajan, Cebu also disclosed that while the mother appearing therein of said child is
Tarcela Lastimoso the father appeared recorded as "no conocido" or unknown.

Hence, the petitioner filed before the CFI of Cebu a petition to strike out his name in the
aforementioned child’s birth certificate. It was granted. However, the Solicitor General
maintained that the petition was without cause of action as the correction sought to be made did
not partake of a clerical error as contemplated in Article 412 of the new Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the statement in said birth certificate identifying Policarpio C. Alisoso as the
father of said child was valid and whether the Local Civil Registrar was justified in making the
corresponding entry in its records.

RULING:

No, the statement in said birth certificate identifying Policarpio C. Alisoso as the father of said
child was not valid and the Local Civil Registrar was not justified in making the corresponding
entry in its records.

In case at bar, it appeared that the entry was false and unauthorized because the petitioner was
not the father of the minor child Leonilo Lastimosa nor had any amorous relations with the
child’s mother Tarcela Lastimosa, as declared in her affidavit, and that Lucila Q. Lastimoso, who
was neither the attendant nurse nor midwife during delivery, was a mere interloper bereft of
authority to make such entry.

Considering that the above facts were undisputed, the order to strike out petitioner’s name in
the minor child’s birth certificate was deemed proper.

19. G.R. No. L-60413 October 31, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Judge, Br. I, C I, Nueva Vizcaya, HEIRS OF CASIANO SANDOVAL, HEIRS
OF LIBERATO BAYAUA, JOSE C. REYES, and PHILIPPINE CACAO AND FARM PRODUCTS, INC.,
respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel of land originally part of Santiago that has been
transferred to Nueva Vizcaya but was opposed by the respondents.

After 20 years, a compromise agreement was reached between the respondents and sps Casiano and Sandoval which
was approved by the court.

Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed a complaint before the court to annul the decision
rendered by the court a quo for being void and made in excess of jurisdiction and further contended that the Heirs of
Sandoval did not present any evidence to support their claims of ownership or registration, nor did the government
agencies involve have a authority to enter into the compromise agreement, and finally, that he was not notified of the
proceedings and so had not opportunity to take part therein.

As for the Heirs, they asseverate that the land is not a public land as the possessory information title in their name
and of their predecessors-in-interes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent's evidences can be considered as proof that the land is a private land.
(walang issue na related sa topics natin)

RULING:

NO because under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden
of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. 

Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired
by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title,
or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain.  

In the case at bar, it appears that the principal document relied upon and presented by the applicants for registration,
to prove the private character of the large tract of land subject of their application, was a photocopy of a certification
of the National Library and obviously not constituting primary evidence of ownership. 

It is an inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the private character of the land in question.

20. G.R. No. 146963             March 15, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, GUIMBA, NUEVA ECIJA,
petitioners,
vs.
PETRONIO L. BENEMERITO, respondent.

Respondent's Petronio L. Benemerito filed for correction of entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S.
Benemerito, by changing the name of his father appearing therein from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L.
Benemerito, and the date of marriage of the minor’s parents from 01 September 1989 to 25 January 1998.

After due notice and hearing, the trial court granted the petition but was opposed by the government on the ground
that substantial changes, such as the date of marriage of parents, name of the father, or filiation of the child and
whether legitimate or illegitimate, could only be threshed out in adversarial proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entry in the certificate of live birth should be granted.

No.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code provides for the procedure by which an
entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected and that it may only be used to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.

A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly
misspelled, among others. On the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The "corrections" sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven Lee could hardly qualify as just
clerical errors for it can possibly affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or both respondent
and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of
the regular adversarial, proceedings, where all interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified, and allowed to be
heard before the proposed changes in the birth certificate are effected.

Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the instant case fell much too short of the requirements.
Nowhere in the records would it appear that all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings.