CIVIL PROCEDURE

Case Digests by Marven C. Gorgonio

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1. RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT

a. Estipona v. Lobrigo, GR. 226679, 15 Aug. 15, 2017

Plea-bargaining was NOT one of the constitutional rights enumerated in the BOR.
Therefore it is a procedural right, only within the purview of the SC’s power to
promulgate laws.

Facts:
 Salvador Estipona, Jr. was indicted for violating Section 11 (illegal possession
of illegal drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act as he
was alleged to have been caught in possession of shabu.
 Initially, Estipona pleaded not guilty but later, with the assistance of the
Public Attorney’s Office, he filed a motion to withdraw his initial plea and with a
simultaneous motion to enter into plea bargaining.

 On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead,
to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time
offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates:
(1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
(2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
(3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches
of the government.
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," which provides:
Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision
on plea-bargaining.

Issue: Whether or not Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 is constitutional?

Held:
No. the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court. Congress has no authority to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure. Hence, Section 23 of RA9165, an act of Congress, is unconstitutional. First, it
violates the equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are
allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder
are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the
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constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative

of the Supreme Court.

b. Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, 14 Sept. 2005

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted
from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

Facts:
 Nyepes filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land before the
RTC - O. Mindoro. The petitioners filed various motions including (a) dismissal of
motion and (d) declaration of default of respondents.
 On February 12, 1998 the trial court upon motion for reconsideration by the
respondents granted the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground that
the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the
order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March
18, 1998; filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. On August 4,
1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late.
 Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that they
filed their notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that the
15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since
this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition and ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned the day they received the day
they received the order dismissing their complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners filed the notice of appeal within the reglementary
period.

Held:
Yes, petitioners' appeal was filed on time. The new period of 15 days eradicates the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of
notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed
from (July 22, 1998).

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
to appeal the decision of the trial court. On. the 15th day of the original appeal period
(March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a
motion for reconsideration. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
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practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of
the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

c. Alonso v. Villamor, GR L-2352 26 July 1910

Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be
no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record
of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been
prejudiced thereby.

Facts:
 On December 11, 1901, the defendants, the members of the municipal board of
the Municipality of Placer, wrote a letter addressed to the plaintiff who at that
time was the priest in charge of the church. The contents of the letter stated that
there was an order from the provincial fiscal saying that cemeteries, convents,
and other buildings erected on land belonging to the town belong to the town.
As such, they are notifying the priest that all revenues and products of the
church must be turned over to the treasury of the municipality. On the 13th of
December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein.

 The plaintiff protested against the occupation thereof by the defendants, but his
protests received no consideration, and he was removed from possession of the
church, its appurtenances and contents. The only defense presented by the
defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest,
was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds voluntarily
contributed by the people of that municipality, and that the articles within the
church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that,
therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.

 The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. In the defendants’ appeal, one of
the defenses presented was that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest.
The defendants assert that the court erred in permitting the action to be brought
and continued in the name of the plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the
name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located or in the
name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.

Issue: Whether or not the party plaintiff could be substituted with the real party in
interest.

Held:
Yes. The Court allowed the substitution of the plaintiff as the party in interest.
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Sec. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “No judgment shall be revered on
formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced real rights of the
excepting party”. Sec. 110 of the same code also provides that in furtherance of justice,
the court is empowered to allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding at any
stage of the action.

In this case, it is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff asserted the same in the
complaint, and maintained that assertion all through the record. He claimed no interest
whatsoever in the litigation. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the
diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation of the identity of another but is
simply to make the form express the substance that is already there.

It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and
decision in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as
party plaintiff, that the complaint be considered as though originally filed
by the Catholic Church, the answer thereto made, the decision rendered and all
proceedings in this case had, as if the said institution which Father Eladio Alonso
undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and that said decision of the court
below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to costs.

2. LAW, EQUITY, AND THE COURTS

a. Pacita David-Chan v. CA, G.R. No. 105294, 26 February 1997

Even petitioner's plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort to equity is possible
only in the absence, and never in contravention, of statutory law.

FACTS

 Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635 square meters,
situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by ICT No. 57596-R,
located around the property are the following:
o Northern and western sides: various business establishments
o Southern boundary: land of the Pineda family
o East-northeastern boundary: a lot with an area of approximately 161
square meters owned by private Philippine Rabbit Lines, which lied
between her property and the MacArthur Highway
 On September 29, 1987 petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition
with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private
respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to the
highway. In short, petitioner's lot was almost completely surrounded by other
immovable and cut off from the highway. Her only access to the highway was a
very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the
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aforementioned property of private respondent, which was now being

obstructed by the bus lines' construction of a concrete fence. Petitioner believed
she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the
said property of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private
respondent's property?

HELD:
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits that "the owner of an
estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the
existence of four requisites, namely:
(1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet
to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity is paid:
(3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest"

While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she
nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements
Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not "without
adequate outlet to a public highway" since she built a concrete fence on the southern
boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse,
during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could
use as a means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of
defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of
the concrete fence which she erected and pass through the property of the Pineda
family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioner's Report, has an
open space on the southern boundary of plaintiff's land.

The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement
because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda
property, The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a
valid tender of the proper indemnity, since her complaint contained no averment that
demand for the easement of right of way had been made after payment of the proper
indemnity.

b. Pepsico Inc v. NLRC, GR No. 51632, 07 Sept. 1999

A case applying equitable discretion because the Labor Code does not provide that a
terminated employee or one who has been terminated for cause should be given
financial assistance or separation pay.

Facts:
 Jose S. Lapid occupied the position of "Director of Leasing" in petitioner firm,
PEPSICO, Inc.
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 It having been discovered that he had purchased for PEPSICO various types of
machinery and equipment which he represented to be brand new but which,
on subsequent inspection were discovered to be if not second-hand, over-
valued, and that of twenty-four (24) lease agreements he had executed as
PEPSICO's Director of Leasing, fourteen (14) had turned out to be "bad
accounts," all said transactions involving an amount of more than P7 million, his
employer terminated his services on account of loss of confidence in his
competence and reliability.
 Lapid then filed a complaint against PEPSICO and Reginald M. Pointon (a
PEPSICO official, and member of its Credit Committee) with the Labor Regional
Office praying that his dismissal be pronounced illegal, and that he be reinstated
and paid damages. The verdict went against him, however. The Labor Arbiter
found, after a thoroughgoing analysis of the evidence, that Lapid was a
managerial employee, that there was sufficient basis for his employer's loss of
confidence in him, and, being a managerial employee, his dismissal required no
prior clearance from the Department of Labor.
 Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter ordered the payment to him of financial
assistance in the sum of P56,700.00
 On appeal, the NLRC reversed the judgment

Issue: Whether or not the Lapid is entitled for separation pay or financial assistance.

Held:
The SC has ruled that where the cause of the termination does not involve moral
turpitude or it does not involve the moral integrity of the employee, then there is a good
chance that the terminated employee is to be given separation pay by way of
financial assistance. And that, no doubt, is a good example of a case decided
applying equitable discretion.

In this case, financial assistance or "separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of

social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes
other than serious misconduct" but not where the cause for termination of employment
reflects on his personal integrity or morality. Such financial assistance is appropriate
considering that Lapid, who had served PEPSICO for a considerable length of time, is
now in his middle sixties, and is reportedly suffering from incurable emphysema and is in
difficult economic straits.

c. In re: Adoption of Stefanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, 31 March 2005
When the law is silent, it means there is no law prohibiting it.

Facts:
 In Aug. 2000, Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name
Astorga be changed to “Garcia” (her mother’s surname), and that her surname
Garcia to “Catindig” (his surname).
 In Mar. 2001, the trial court granted his petition, thereby freeing Stephanie from
all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural
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mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate
child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the FC, the minor shall be known as
“Stephanie Nathy Catindig”
 In Apr. 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration,
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural
mother “Garcia” as her middle name.
 In May 2001, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that there is no law
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of her biological mother as her
middle name.

Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

Held:
Yes, since there is no law also prohibiting Stephanie, being an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, to use her mother’s name, the Court finds no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so. The child should be permitted to use “Garcia” as her
middle name for the following reasons:
a. Use of surname is fixed by law – Art. 364-380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever
may be his status in life (legitimate, illegitimate, adopted, married, previously
married or a widow;
b. Law is silent as to the use of middle name – There is no law regulating the use
of a middle name, even the Art. 176 of the FC (as amended by RA 9255).
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
But as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the framers of the FC recognized the
Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name
as recorded in the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees.
c. The underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child – Being a
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother.

III. JURISDICTION

a. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

1. Faus & Fajardo vs. People, GR No. 167764, 09 October 2009

If an aggrieved party to libel is a private individual, he has two options in where to file
his complaint: (1) where the article was first published or (2) his actual residence at the
time of publication of the libelous article.

FACTS:
 Faus and Fajardo were the columnists and the editors of Panay News. They
published an article about Dr. Contejo, a physician who had misdiagnosed his
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patients. The article was published in Panay, since the principal office of the
newspaper company was in Panay.
 Dr. Contejo, on the other hand, practiced his profession in Iloilo. Dr. Contejo then
filed a case of libel against the writers in the RTC of Iloilo. When the case was at
the trial court level, Faus and Fajardo, did not file a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction. They even participated in the trial.
 Eventually, they were convicted. Aggrieved, they went to the CA, where they
were again convicted. In the proceedings in the CA, no question of jurisdiction
was raised. They ended up in the SC, where they finally questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC of Iloilo, who first heard the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Iloilo had jurisdiction

HELD:
No. It did not have jurisdiction. Under Article 360 of the RPC, if an aggrieved party to
libel is a private individual, he has two options in where to file his complaint: (1) where
the article was first published (Panay) or (2) his actual residence at the time of
publication of the libelous article. Since the information did not state clearly that Panay
News or the questioned article was fist printed and published in Iloilo. For indeed, it was
first published in Panay. And for another, in the criminal information, it was simply
averred that Dr. Contejo is a medical practitioner in Iloilo. It was not stated therein that
he was actually residing in Iloilo city at the time of the publication of the article. So
citing article 360 of the RPC, the SC dismissed the case, although without prejudice, for
want of jurisdiction.

ii. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, GR L-21450, 15 April 1968

An exception to the rule that jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law and
not by conduct of the parties.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction.
The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the
action or of the parties becomes unimportant in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

 Facts:
In June of 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was passed. Exactly a month after its
passage, or in July 1948, the Sps Tijam commenced a civil case in the CFI Cebu
against the Sps. Sibonghanoy to recover a debt worth P1908.
 Thereafter, on the basis of the prayer in the complaint, a writ of attachment was
issued by the court against properties of the defendants. However, the same was
soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
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 The CFI ruled in favor of the Sps. Tijam and issued a writ of execution against the
defendants and Manila Surety, respectively. Manila Surety objected to the lack
of demand and sought affirmative relief by requesting that its liability be lifted.
The writ was initially denied, but after proper demand, it was eventually granted.
 Manila Surety moved to quash due to lack of required summary hearing but
such was denied.
 In 1962, or 14 years later, Manila Surety appealed in the CA. CA affirmed CFI
decision.
 The following year, Manila Surety then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the CFI Cebu did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as RA 296 placed
actions where the demand does not exceed P2000 (without interest) in the
inferior courts, not the CFI.

Issue: Whether the CFI Cebu acquired jurisdiction over the case in light of RA 296

Held:
Yes. Although RA 296 had already removed actions for recovery where the demand is
lower than P2000 from the jurisdiction of the CFI, the issue was never raised until an
adverse decision 15 years later, thus allowing for jurisdiction through estoppel/laches.

According to the Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances necessitates the
application of estoppel and laches because:
1. The jurisdictional issue was only raised after an adverse decision was reached
in the CA.
2. They filed affirmative relief in the RTC and CA, especially when it sought to be
relieved of liability.

The Court accorded jurisdiction by estoppel, emphasizing the principle of laches.

Laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to

do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.

iii. Balibago Faith Baptist Church v. Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church GR 191527, 22
Aug. 2016
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined based on the allegations
or averments in the complaint. It can never be based, and it should never be based on
the allegations in the answer, or the allegations of the motion to dismiss.

Facts:
 Plaintiff PBSBC granted a contract of simple loan to plaintiff BFBC for the latter’s
purchase of the former’s property and BFBC started to possess the same and
hold their religious activities threat.
 While BFBC was in possession of the property, defendants Galvan, et.al, joined
the regular services of plaintiff BFBC. It turned out that defendants have an
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interest in the property and they formed and incorporated defendant FCJBC
and took control of the property.
 This prompted FBSBC and BFBC to file an action for unlawful detainer against
FCJBC and Galvan before the MTC

Issue: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case considering the
characterization of the case by the plaintiff in his pleading is one of unlawful detainer
and considering further that the nature of the action is one of forcible entry.

Ruling:
No, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The case is one of forcible entry. Sec. 1,
Rule 70 of the ROC provides in part that, when the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold, the person being deprived
may file any time within 1 year in the MTC for restitution of such possession.

The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of action in a complaint is not what the
designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the
complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than
the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part
of the complaint. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful
detainer or forcible entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible
entry, respectively. It cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of
the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.

In this case, the nature of the cause of action which shows that the case is one of
forcible entry is controlling for determining the jurisdiction of the court, and not the
characterization of the plaintiff of its allegation which shows that it is one of forcible
entry. Since the case is at bar is one of forcible entry, the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the case. The proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover possession before
the RTC.

iv. De la Cruz v. CA & Tan Te, 510 SCRA 103

Jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the initiatory pleading and the defenses in the
answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its determination. However, we relax
the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an exception in view of the special and
unique circumstances present.
Forcible Entry: one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for forcible entry.
Unlawful detainer: one unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

FACTS:
 The Reyes family owned the subject land; petitioner Lourdes DelaCruz was one
of their lessees.
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 In 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner’s
dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and
rebuilt their respective houses.
 Petitioner refused to vacate the lot despite several written demands of the Reyes
family. In 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba
Tan Te. Despite the said sale however, Dela Cruz still refused to give up the lot.
 In 1997, Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the Manila
MeTC after petitioner ignored another written demand to relinquish the premises
and after the parties failed to come up with a reconciliation agreement with the
barangay. Petitioner filed her answer and alleged among others that MeTC had
no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as
more than one year had elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry.
 The Manila MeTC rendered judgment in favor of Tan Te and ordered Dela Cruz
to vacate the premises.
 On appeal before the RTC, the RTC set aside the decision of the MeTC and
dismissed Tan Te’s Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not the
MeTC which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
 On appeal before the CA, the CA reversed the RTC. Dela Cruz’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied bu the CA. Hence, the present petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila MeTC has jurisdiction over Tan Te’s ejectment suit.

HELD:
YES, the Manila MeTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. The exclusive, original
jurisdiction over ejectment proceeding is lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for
forcible entry where one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial
court to acquire jurisdiction:
First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property.
Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or
legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or
building.

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer where one unlawfully
withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.

Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the
defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. The essential requisites of
unlawful detainer are:
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(1) the fact of lease by virtue ofa contract express or implied;

(2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession;
(3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after
expiration or termination of the right to possession;
(4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of
the lease and vacate the premises; and
(5) the action must be filed within one year from date of last demand received
by the defendant.

Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the TanTe ejectment
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner
Dela Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially
petitioner as lessee is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of
lease. When fire destroyed her house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but
petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and
stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the
continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold to
respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to
their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner
until she decided to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the
January 14, 1997 letter of demand.

Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was
instituted well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence,
the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint.

b. JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNTS

i. Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, 15 March 2008.

Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not
by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded.
Interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the cause of action,
not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the
Complaint, it must be included in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction
over petitioner’s case.

Facts:
 Lita Montalban obtained a loan from Elmer Gomez in the amount of P40,000 with
a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per month.
 Montalban failed to comply with her obligation so Gomez filed a complaint in
the RTC for sum of money. Summons was served but despite her receipt, she still
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failed to file an Answer. She was declared in default and upon motion, Gomez
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
 The RTC rendered a decision ordering Montalban to pay Gomez.
 Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that
there was no proper service of summons since there was no personal service.
She alleged that one Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre was not authorized to receive
summons and that her failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence (FAME).
 The Petition was set for hearing but counsel for respondent failed to appear
before the court hence the dismissal of the Petition.
 Montalban filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of the Petition
stating that counsel’s failure to appeal was unintentional to which the RTC
granted.
 To this instance, Gomez filed a Petition for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.

Held:
Yes. it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that respondent is
only liable to petitioner for the amount of P40,000.00 representing the principal amount
of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from
26 August 1998 until the present; and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Contrary to respondent's contention, jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on

the amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor be
affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of
the jurisdictional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action
as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and
awarded.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once
vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.

ii. Sante v. Hon. Claravall, G.R. No. 173915, 22 February 2010.

In the determination of the jurisdictional amount, is that interest, damages, litigation
expenses, costs and attorney’s fees must be excluded therefrom but the same should
be factored in or should be considered in computing the filing fee or docket fee which
should be paid.
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FACTS:
 Plaintiff filed a case in the RTC praying for payment of damages. Moral damages
= 350,000. Exemplary and atty.’s fees = 30,000.
 So it was argued by the defendant that considering that the amount demanded
is more than 300,000 and considering also the provision in Sec. 33, Par. 1, it should
be excluded.
 The defendant argued that the case should be filed in the MTC not the RTC
which has jurisdiction. Because of course, the amount of moral damages,
maximum of which, the highest amount is only 300,000 which is well within the
jurisdictional amount for the first level courts.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court stated that since at the time of the filing of the complaint
on April 5, 2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has already been adjusted to P
300,000.00, there is no doubt that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction
over the case since the total amount of damages being claimed by the
petitioner in the case was P 420,000.00.

The SC held in essence that the exclusion on the term damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount, applies to cases wherein the damages are
merely incidental to the main cause of action, just like in that situation. But where that is
the main cause of action or the main claim is for damages, then the amount of each or
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court and this is
illustrated in the second situation.

c. PAYMENT OF FILING FEES

i. Charles Cu-Unjieng v. CA, G.R. NO. 139596, 24 January 2006

Full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby rendering
the decision sought to be appealed final and executory. For sure, nonpayment of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as
provided under Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal.

FACTS:
 Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) owned a parcel of agricultural
land which it offered to sell at Php2.2M.
 Petitioner offered to buy the property for a lesser price of Php2.078M and paid
an earnest money of P103,915.27 as proof of his interest to buy the property.
However, UnionBank rejected petitioner’s offer because the land in dispute was
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law such that, the sale of such
land without the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform is null and void.
 Unable to accept UBP rejection of his offer, petitioner filed an action for specific
performance and damages against UBP before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
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petitioner’s complaint because the said court finds no perfected contract of sale
that transpired between the parties.
 Thereafter, petitioner appealed but was denied for nonpayment of the required
docket and other appeal fees. Notwithstanding, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied and the Court even expunged from the
record the appellant’s brief. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner is seeking for the relaxation of procedural rules by contending that his
failure to pay the appeal docket fees on time is a non-fatal lapse, or a non-
jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in order to attain
substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the blame to the RTC clerk of court
who allegedly made the erroneous computation of docket fees.

Issue: Whether or not the rules of procedure be relaxed on this case due to petitioner’s
failure to pay the appeal docket fees.

Held:
No. Rules of procedure are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed.

Even if the rules required that nonpayment of appellate docket fee is mandatory, the
Court recognizes that the failure to pay the appeal fees within the reglementary period
allows only discretionary and not automatic dismissal of the complaint, provided that
such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great
deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. Hence, in
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Mangubat, the late payment
of docket fees was admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules
by immediately paying the required fees six (6) days after the reglementary period filing
of the notice of appeal.

Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees in this case was effected by
petitioner only after four (4) months following the expiration of the reglementary period
to take an appeal. Petitioner acts, therefore, does not show his willingness to abide by
the Rules.

Hence, the Rules of Procedure cannot be relaxed in favor of petitioner.

ii. Manchester v. CA, 149 SCRA 562

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.

FACTS:
 Petitioner also alleged that respondent City Land forfeited their tender of
payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages amounting to
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P78,750,000.00 o Said amount was alleged in the BODY of the complaint but was
not reiterated in the PRAYER.

 Petitioner paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that their action
is primarily for specific performance and is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

 The Court ruled that there is an under-assessment of docket fees, and thus
ordered petitioner to amend its complaint.

 With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the amount of claim for
damages to P10M, which was again not state in the PRAYER (but stated in the
BODY).

In this case of Manchester, there was payment of docket fee as for the principal cause
of action but there was no payment of docket fee with respect to the answer - they
were praying for moral damages.

Citing section 33 paragraph 1 of BP 129 as amended, defendant moved that the case
be dismissed because the correct filing fee was not paid. Realizing his mistake, the
plaintiff in this case amended the complaint and filed the amended complaint, he
paid the balance of the docket fee. There was a deficiency that was not included in his
claim. Given the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff amended the complaint and
this time around, he paid the variance. So, when the plaintiff filed the amended
complaint, he only paid the amount corresponding to the deficiency or the balance.

Issue: Whether or not jurisdiction is acquired when correct docket fee has not been
paid.

Held:
No. As setted in the Magaspi case: “a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.” The Court held that in the
present case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. For all legal purposes, there is no original complaint that was duly filed
which could be amended. The order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. CA was
correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complain and not in the amended complaint.

Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from record.
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Note:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading.

The Supreme Court said the defect is not curable, or that the subsequent amendment
does not cure the defect even with the payment of the balance of the docket fee,
because the action has to be dismissed and that the court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the case. The remedy, said the Supreme Court, is to really file the complaint and
to pay again the complete amount of docket fees. Because of this, the docket fee
already paid by the plaintiff was FORFEITED in favor of the government. The plaintiff
would have to file AGAIN and pay AGAIN.

Indeed, there is a need for us to pay the correct docket fee upon the filing of the
complaint. Because, unless the same is done, your complaint is not deemed filed.

iii. Sun Insurance v. CA, 170 SCRA 274

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Facts:
 Sun Insurance filed a complaint in RTC for the consignation of a premium refund
insurance policy against Manuel Tiong, who was declared default for failure to
file the required answer.
 Manuel Tiong, on the other hand, filed a complaint in RTC for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Sun
Insurance. Although not explicitly stated in the complaint, the amount
(damages, atty’s fees, costs of suit) he prayed for amounted to P50,000,000.00.
But even with that huge amount, the docket fee paid by Manuel Tiong was only
P210.00.
 Later on, Manuel Tiong filed an amended complaint where he prayed that he
be award no less than P10,000,000 as actual and exemplary damages. But in the
body of the complaint, his pecuniary claim was around P44,000,000. The
complaint was admitted, which prompted the assessment and collection of
P39,786.00 docket fee.
 Manuel Tiong then filed a supplemental complaint, alleging an additional claim
of P20,000,000 in damages. This would make his claim a total of P64M. He also
paid an additional docket fee for his supplemental complaint of P80,000.00
 After the promulgation of the decision, Manuel Tiong also paid an additional
docket fee of P62,000 due to the reassessment of docket fee by the court. He
spent a total of P182,824.90 on docket fees.
 Regardless of this, Sun Insurance comes to court and assails the jurisdiction of RTC
on the ground that Manuel Tiong never paid the proper docket fee and
therefore the case was never even properly filed.
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Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction even if there was nonpayment of the
correct and proper docket fee.

HELD:
YES, the court acquired jurisdiction over the case.

The SC therefore said that a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, Manuel Tiong demonstrated his willingness to
abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation
of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on Manuel Tiong
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court.

It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional
docket fee as may be ordered. Nevertheless, Sun Insurance contend that the docket
fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.

This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized
docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.