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Trinidad, Mikhail Matrix B. 2E 1. Tuason V.S Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-9372 December 15, 1914

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TRINIDAD, MIKHAIL MATRIX B.

2E

1. Tuason v.s Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-9372 December 15, 1914

In accordance with this section, no act of the parties themselves can transfer the ownership of real estate
under the Torrens system. That is done by the act of registration of the conveyance which the parties have
made. It is clear, therefore, that the property in question, so far as the plaintiff is concerned, was not
transferred by the conveyance from Vicente Rodriguez and Gregoria Baroto Cruz to the defendant in 1911.
Their instrument amounted simply to a contract for a conveyance which would become a conveyance
when it was registered in accordance with the requirements of Act No. 496. Being nothing more than a
contract for the sale of land, it had no effect upon the purchase made by the plaintiff in 1913, she having
bought for value and in good faith and her conveyance having duly registered as required by law.

2. Cruz v.s Court of Appeals and Suzara, G.R. No. 120122 November 6, 1997

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any
question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the
time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. 5 Every registered owner and every
subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the property free from all encumbrances
except those noted in the certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further what the
Torrens title on its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire
rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to
inquire in every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the
evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness
of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate
to determine the condition of the property. Even if a decree in a registration proceeding is infected with
nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is
protected. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the
time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim of another person.

3. Cruz vs. Leis, G.R. No. 125233 March 9, 2000

Where a parcel of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership
of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto,
issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the
heirs of the deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is
not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with
notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title.
To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system."

It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the
consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership.
Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed
the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale
is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to
the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of
the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law
absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in the vendee a retro, his
failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership
for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title.

4. Campillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56483 May 29, 1984

The case of Leyson vs. Tanada, 2 invoked by the private respondent is not in point. In that case, a notice
of lis pendens was inscribed at the back of the certificate of title of the land subject therein before it was
sold at public auction. Necessarily, the purchaser at public auction is bound by the outcome of the pending
case referred to therein. Since it turned out that the judgment debtor is merely a co-owner of the property
sold at public auction, then the puchaser thereat is not entitled to the entirety of the land. As the Court
held: "The interest acquired by a purchaser in an execution sale is limited to that which is possessed by
the debtor. If there is more than one person owning property in common and an execution against one
only is levied thereon, the sale effected by the Sheriff under such execution operates exclusively upon the
interest of the execution debtor, without being in any wise prejudicial to the interest of the other owners.
The result in such case merely is that one new owner in common is substituted for the owner whose
interest is alienated by process of law."

While it may be true as stated in the aforesaid case of Leyson vs. Tanada, that purchasers at execution
sales should bear in mind that the rule of caveat emptor applies to such sales, that the sheriff does not
warrant the title to real property sold by him as sheriff, and that it is not incumbent on him to place the
purchaser in possession of such property, still the rule applies that a person dealing with registered land
is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property and he is merely
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. Hence, the petitioner herein, as the purchaser in the execution sale of the registered
land in suit, acquires such right and interest as appears in the certificate of title unaffected by prior lien
or encumbrances not noted therein. This must be so in order to preserve the efficacy and conclusiveness
of the certificate of title which is sanctified under our Torrens system of land registration.

5. Cruz vs. Cabana, G.R. No. L-56232 June 22, 1984

As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals 2 "it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in
good faith in registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of [the above
quoted] Article 1544." As the writer stressed in his concurring opinion therein, "(T)he governing principle
here is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of
the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as provided by the Civil Code and that is
where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first. Such knowledge of
the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them, to register first her
purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first
sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer
being able to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he
must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's
rights) — from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing
registration, by delivery of possession. The second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence
or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through prior registration
as provided by law."

6. Naawan Community Rural Bank. vs. CA, G.R. No. 128573. January 13, 2003

Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made
with the Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding the status of the vendors title. No liens or
encumbrances were found to have been annotated on the certificate of title. Neither were private
respondents aware of any adverse claim or lien on the property other than the adverse claim of a certain
Geneva Galupo to whom Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject property. But, as already
mentioned, the claim of Galupo was eventually settled and the adverse claim previously annotated on the
title cancelled. Thus, having made the necessary inquiries, private respondents did not have to go beyond
the certificate of title. Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Title would
be rendered futile and nugatory.

Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence required by law in ascertaining the
legal status of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over the subject property and found no flaws
therein, they should be considered as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.

7. Egao vs. CA G.R. No. L-79787 June 29, 1989

Sec. 51, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529), formerly Sec. 50 of the Land Registration
Act (Act No. 496) expressly provides that the registration of the Deed is the operative act that binds or
affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. The law requires a higher degree of prudence from
one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, when the land object of the transaction is
registered land. While one who buys from the registered owner need not look behind the certificate of
title, one who buys from another who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not only the
certificate of title but all factual circumstances necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in
the title of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. Failing to exercise caution of any kind
whatsoever is tantamount to bad faith.18

Deeds of sale of patented lands, perfected within the prohibited five (5) year period are null and void (Sec.
124, Public Land Act). No title passed from the Egaos to Marfori which could be validly transferred to
herein respondents Bontilao and Dignos. Nemo dat quod non habet (nobody can dispose of that which
does not belong to him).

8. Lozano vs. Ballesteros G.R. No. 49470 April 8, 1991


the adverse claimant must state the following in writing: a. his alleged right or interest; b. how and under
whom such alleged right or interest is acquired; c. the description of the land in which the right or interest
is claimed, and d. the certificate of title number 2. the statement must be signed and sworn to before a
notary public or other officer authorized to administer oath; and 3. the claimant should state his residence
or the place to which all notices may be served upon him.

The lower court quoted in part the adverse claim filed by the plaintiffs, to wit: "That this adverse claim is
being filed prior to the filing of a court action because all the properties above-described formerly belong
to my husband, the late Augusto Lozano." (Record on Appeal, p. 32) However, the lower court noted that
"the adverse claim filed and annotated on the back of the title of Marciana de Dios and later to the title
of the herein defendant, did not meet the requirements provided for in Section 110 of Act 496, that is
setting forth fully how or under whom the heirs of Lozano acquired the property." We adhere to the lower
court’s findings and find appellee’s position meritorious. A cursory reading of the aforequoted adverse
claim filed by the plaintiffs shows that the same has failed to comply with the formal requisites of Section
110 of Act 496, more specifically the appellants’ failure to state how and under whom their alleged right
or interest is acquired. Thus, the effect of such non-compliance renders the adverse claim non-registrable
and ineffective

9. Tirado vs. Sevilla G.R. No. 84201 August 3, 1990

The purpose of filing notice of lis pendens is to charge strangers with notice of the particular litigation
referred to in the notice; and if the notice is effective, a third person who acquires the property affected
by the lis pendens takes same subject to the eventuality of the litigation. But when the adverse right fails
in such litigation, the lis pendens loses its efficacy.

To require Ong and Uy to go beyond the lis pendens annotation or to look beyond TCT No. 10299 would
be to impose an additional burden on Ong and Uy since the lis pendens annotation sufficiently served its
purpose.

Moreover, the lis pendens annotation, although considered a "general notice to all the world, . . . it is not
correct to speak of it as a part of the doctrine of notice, the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by
notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights
to the property in dispute so as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not
notice."

10. Shiochi vs. Gozon G.R. No. 169900 & March 18, 2010

Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon
order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the
registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
the request of Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira,
the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.

Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered that Alfredo’s
donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family
Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse.
Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.1avvphi1

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