Arts.11, 12 and 15
Arts.11, 12 and 15
Arts.11, 12 and 15
MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
The following are modifying circumstances:
1. Justifying circumstances (6) - Art. 11; Battered woman syndrome under Sec. 26 of R.A. No.
9262 (VAWC);
2. Exempting circumstances (7) - Art. 12;
3. Mitigating circumstances (10) - Art. 13;
4. Aggravating circumstances (21) -Art. 14; and
5. Alternative circumstances (3) - Art. 15.
In addition to above:
1. Absolutory cause - these are exempting circumstances outside Article 12 such as certain
relatives who acted as accessories to the offenders and those covered by Article 332 for
crimes and relatives enumerated therein, among others.
2. Extenuating circumstances - these are mitigating but not found in Art. 13, e.g.,
abandonment in paragraph 3, Art. 333 and concealment of dishonor in Art. 255.
Exception: Art. 101. Where "in cases falling within subdivision 4 (avoidance of greater evil or injury) of
Art. 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to
the benefit which they have received.
Since there is no crime, there is no criminal; hence, he should not be called an "offender" but an
"actor".
An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article (Art.) 11 of the RPC admits to the
commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability.
a. SELF-DEFENSE
Basis: Self-defense includes primarily the defense of one's right to life and security. It also includes the
right to self-help with regard to the defense of one's right to peacefully possess property (CIVIL CODE,
Art. 429), and the right to protect one's honor and dignity which is not the least prized of man's
patrimony. The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world find justification
in man's natural instinct to protect, repel and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it
is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being.
Contrary to the conclusion of the CA that Gerry’s aggression had already ceased when he was
disarmed, the Supreme Court viewed that the aggression continued. It must be noted that the after
Cristina was able to take hold of the knife, he still continued to move towards her despite of her plea that
he should not come nearer. He grabbed her which could have precipitated her well-grounded belief that
her life was still in danger is he would be able to wrest the weapon from her. It was not farfetched to
presume that, being stronger, Gerry could have easily overpowered Cristina and killed her eventually.
The Court believes that Cristina’s means were reasonable because she had no other available
means or any less deadly weapon to repel the threat other than the knife in her hand, and she did not
have the time or sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and choose the weapon to be used. In
predicaments like this, human nature acts in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. And when it is
apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction that
act or to mitigate the liability of the accused. Moreover, the fact that Gerry was no longer armed does
not negate the reasonableness of the means employed by Cristina. Perfect equality between the
weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required.
The Court cannot sustain the trial court’s observation that it was Cristina who provoked her
husband when she suddenly pushed him. Her shoving him cannot be considered a sufficient
provocation to the act of aggression. Instead, Cristina acted on an opportunity to save herself from
what she had perceived to be a danger in her life.
Though the CA took the fact of Cristina’s flight and evasion of arrest for four (4) years against
her, the Supreme Court ruled that non-flight may not be construed as an indication of innocence either.
There is no law or dictum holding that staying put is proof of innocence. Cristina explained that she
took flight for fear of her safety because of possible retaliation from her husband’s siblings. The Court
finds her explanation acceptable, as she did not hide from the law, but from those who would possibly do
her harm.
Wherefore, the appeal was granted, and Cristina Samson was acquitted of the crime charged.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti, that there was unlawful aggression on Chu's part when he chased
Regalado, Lopez was not justified in stabbing Chu since as admitted by him, he did not see accused-
appellant Regalado anymore when he was able to catch up with Chu. The unlawful aggression of
Chu, had it indeed been present, had already ceased when upon reaching Chu, as Regalado, whom
Lopez allegedly wanted to protect, was no longer there. When an unlawful aggression that has begun
no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former
aggressor.
There was no reasonable necessity in the means employed by Lopez to repel Chu's alleged
aggression. The wounds sustained by Chu indicate that the assailant who inflicted the same was
more in a killing rage than one who was merely acting in defense of a relative. (more than 7 stab
wounds)
3. People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 130708, 22 October 1999;
Accused-appellant argues that since the victim is a Senior Police Officer 4 of the P.N.P. of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the latters act of attempting to draw his gun from his waist was not
just a mere threatening stance or posture or intimidating attitude. It already posed an imminent
danger to his life and limb that caused him to react immediately, otherwise he would have been
the victim. There was also a reasonable necessity to defend himself because when he stabbed the
late Sgt. Cara, he only acted according to what an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do.
It was the deceased who provoked accused-appellant to defend himself when the former uttered
invectives implicating him in the illegal logging activities in Salvacion, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya.
Where an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime, as in this case.
Consequently, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused which lies upon the prosecution is
shifted to the accused who must prove the elements of his defense. He has to justify the taking of
the victim's life by the standards of the law for such absolution. Otherwise, having admitted the
killing, conviction is inescapable. It is necessary that self-defense must be alleged with certainty
coupled with a strong, clear, sufficient and convincing proof that the killing is justified.
Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking an accident as a defense. Article
12(4) of the RPC contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something
legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to
someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of
a legal act. Accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at
Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At that
point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. Certainly, Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful,
being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
The fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his
hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of
Talampas’ felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus,
or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor
mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
The accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by the victim who, as
inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-appellant, was poised to kill the
latter. The danger to the accused-appellant's life was clearly imminent. It would not then be
proper nor reasonable to claim that he should have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in
the emergency in which, without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural
than to use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the instinct
of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense. It is settled that reasonable
necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of
attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which
will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person
attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense,
and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury.
There was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleiseher was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his
property rights.
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self
defense or defense of one’s rights under paragraph I of Article 11, RPC. When the appellant fired his
shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack.
However, the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all
on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims
and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was
no provocation at all.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the
deceased.
Passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his
house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being
closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing
down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so
aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun
and fire at the victims in defense of hit rights.
Appellant’s act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since-not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but
he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court takes judicial notice of the big difference in the physical built of the parties, private
complainant is shorter in height and of smaller built than all the accused, Victor Velasquez, Sonny
Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo. The said accused could have had easily held the
private complainant, who was heavily drunk as they claim, and disarmed him without the need of
hitting him.
The injuries which Jesus were reported to have sustained speak volumes:
-3 cms lacerated wound fronto-parietal area left
-1 cm lacerated wound frontal area left
- Abrasion back left multi linear approximately 20 cm
- Abrasion shoulder left, confluent 4x10 cm
- Depressed skull fracture parietal area left.
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to him by
petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to
neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed aggression.
Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of defense of a relative.
b. Defense of Relatives;
Basis: It is found not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but also upon the impulse of blood which
impels men to rush, on the occasion of great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood.
Requisites: Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.
Note: -Death of one spouse does not terminate the relationship by affinity established between the
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased.
-There is no distinction in the RPC whether the descendant should be legitimate or
illegitimate; when the law does not distinguish the courts cannot distinguish.
It has been held that when the accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-defense and,
hence, admits to killing the victim, the burden of evidence shifts to him. The rationale for this
shift is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily
establishes the fact of self-defense. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove his innocence
by clear and convincing evidence. For this purpose, he must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if the latter is weak, it could not be
denied that he has admitted to be the author of the victim's death.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of all of
its elements, which are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Similarly, for defense of a relative to prosper, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked,
that the person making the defense took no part in the provocation.
The defense failed to prove self-defense and defense of relative. After a careful examination
of the records, the Court finds that the defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the petitioners acted in self-defense or defense of relatives.
The defense would have this Court believe that the Napones proceeded to the place of Janioso
without any malice in mind and with the only goal of rescuing Calib. To refute the accusations
against them, they painted a picture of Salvador mercilessly attacking Senior who merely wanted
to carry his son who was then lying on the ground and covered with blood. They maintain that the
petitioners were forced to retaliate against Salvador who was unlawfully attacking their father.
c. Defense of Stranger;
Basis: The ordinary person would not stand idly by and see his companion killed without attempting to
save his life.
Stranger- Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives under par. 2 of Art. 11. A
person defending his common-law spouse or adopted child will fall under this paragraph
Note: The person who defends another should not have acted from an impulse of resentment.
Otherwise, this justifying circumstance cannot be appreciated Motive is relevant only in this kind
of defense
i. Mariano v. People, G.R. No. 224102, 26 July 2017;
To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment,
or other evil motive.
Petitioner was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. The victim himself,
Natividad, testified that he had no issues with petitioner before the incident. Thus, all the
elements to invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger were present in this case.
Considering that petitioner was justified in stabbing Natividad under Article 11, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, he should be exonerated of the crime charged.
Note: Art. 101 provides that in cases falling within subdivision 4 of Art. 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received (BOADO).
-The greater injury spoken of should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor.
-The term "damage to another" covers:
1. Injury to persons and;
2. Damage to property
Euthanasia or mercy killing is condemned by law although the motive may be to
spare a hopeless patient from prolonged suffering. The killing could not be justified as
avoidance of a greater evil since ending the life of the patient is an evil greater than his
physical sufferings (CAMPANILLA).
Appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of
damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be
justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there
is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no
such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to
one’s self, then such course should be taken.
In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width, and the
place was well-lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or structures.
Appellant was a driver by occupation. However, appellant himself testified that when he shifted
to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching from in front of him he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might
run them over. He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful
available means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence
that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should
not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show
therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that
she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before
her mother could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to
the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-
grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy fear that her mother might
commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospitals threats or demands.
Notes: -In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes incomplete thereby
converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Arts. 13 and 69 (People
-The deceased who escaped from prison while serving sentence was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading the service of his sentence to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon on his hand, which compelled the policeman to resort to such
extreme means, which although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances (People
v. Delima,vi G.R. No. 18660, December 22, 1922).
-The executor of death convicts at the Bilibid Prison cannot be held liable for murder for the
executions performed by him because he was merely acting in lawful exercise of his office.
(People v. Delima, G.R. No. 18660, December 22, 1922)
ii. Cases:
1. People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 128116, 24 January 2001;
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of
a duty does not incur any criminal liability. Two (2) requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: (1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office, (2) the injury caused or the offense committed should be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty.
We find the requisites absent in the case at bar. Appellant was not in the performance
of his duties at the time of the shooting for the reason that the girls he was attempting to
arrest were not committing any act of prostitution in his presence. If at all, the only person he
was authorized to arrest during that time was Roberto Reyes, who offered him the services of a
prostitute, for acts of vagrancy. Even then, the fatal injuries that the appellant caused the victim
were not a necessary consequence of appellant's performance of his duty as a police officer. The
record shows that appellant shot the victim not once but twice after a heated confrontation
ensued between them. His duty to arrest the female suspects did not include any right to
shoot the victim to death.
While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking. Baxinela’s duty was to
investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was what
Baxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess
or the desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was not at all
resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo
posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.
Notes:-Par. 6 presupposes that what was obeyed by the accused was a lawful order. If the
subordinate obeyed an order which is illegal but is patently legal and he is not aware of its
illegality, he is not liable because then, there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good
faith.
-A soldier who acted upon the orders of superior officers, which he, as a military subordinate,
could not question, and obeyed the orders in good faith, without being aware of its illegality,
without any fault or negligence on his part, is not liable because he had no criminal intent and he
was not negligent.
ii. Cases:
1. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1997;
Tabuena and Peralta were acquitted of the crime of malversation. The very fact that they were
merely following the orders of a superior is a justifying circumstance.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly
comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done.
Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior – the former being then the President of the Republic
who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC.
Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts in obedience
to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate-superior relationship
between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the
MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one
government agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). Tabuena had no reason not to believe that the
55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC
(existence of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal and
Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because there would only be a
mistake of fact committed in good faith.
“Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.” Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is
malversation only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence
shall permit any other person to take such public funds. Where the payment of public funds has
been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom
the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is no
criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly but
not criminally liable. Maxim: actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not commited if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
Battery-any act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(b)).
Note: Only a certified psychologist or psychiatrist can prove the existence of the Battered
Woman Syndrome in a woman (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 6(2)).
Elements:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating Relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another. commits an Act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological Distress to her
Note:The existence of BWS in a relationship does not in itself establish a legal right of a woman
to kill her partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. It is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing
the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed.
In the present case there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben
and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior
and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went
to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was
no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. As to the appellant
contention under the theory of “battered woman syndrome” (BWS), the court held that a battered
wife is “a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior
by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman." The BWS is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence," which has three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase. In this case, Appellant fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle
of violence". No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court how the fatal
incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building
phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words,
she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern.
A crime is committed but the actor incurs no criminal liability because of the complete absence of
the conditions constituting free will or voluntariness of the act.
The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently
favorable to the accused. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
b. Justifying v. Exempting;
Justifying Circumstances Exempting Circumstances
As to effect on actor
It affects the act, not the actor It affects the actor, not the act
As to basis
There is no crime, hence there is no criminal There is crime, there is still no criminal
As to civil liability
No civil liability can arise from the acts or Civil liability arises from the crime committed
omissions complained of except in cases but shall be borne by persons other than the
falling Art. 11, par. 4, where the law imposes accused. (except Art. 12, par. 4and 7, where
civil liability upon persons benefiting from no civil liability may be imputable to any
the salvific act. person).
As to lacking elements
Criminal intent is lacking Intelligence and freedom are lacking
1. Imbecility or Insanity;
i. People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, 29 November 2017;
A scrutiny of the evidence presented by Pantoja fails to establish that he was
completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he fatally
stabbed the victim. The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession and
avoidance, requiring defendant to prove it with clear and convincing evidence.
For purposes of exemption from criminal liability, mere behavioral oddities cannot
support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a
total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed.
For the defense of insanity to prosper, two elements must concur: (1) that
defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or
discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately
preceding, the commission of the crime.
In this case, while the evidence of the accused does not show that he was completely
deprived of intelligence or consciousness of his acts when he committed the crime,
there is sufficient indication that he was suffering from some impairment of his mental
faculties; thus, he may be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished
willpower.
In the present case, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity.
As correctly observed by the CA, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in
June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and four years after the crime was committed on April
19, 2006. In People v. So, which is a case of recent vintage, this Court ruled that an inquiry into
the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the felony is committed. Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and
testified to by the defense witnesses, may not be relied upon to prove appellant's mental condition
at the time of his commission of the crime.
In any case, during cross-examination, Dr. Gilboy testified that for a number of years up to the
time that appellant killed Francisco, he had custody of and served as the guardian of his sister's
children. He took care of their welfare and safety, and he was the one who sends them to and
brings them home from school. Certainly, these acts are not manifestations of an insane mind.
On his part, Dr. Gerong testified, on direct examination, that he found appellant to have
"diminish[ ed] capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the
crime." "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or
discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Thus, on the
basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant
acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of
intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime.
Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by employing means and methods to ensure the
killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might
make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime
and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words,
evidence points to the fact that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before,
simultaneous to, and even right after the commission of the crime.
In this case, however, it is noteworthy that while accused-appellant was confined in a mental
institution in 2001, he was properly discharged therefrom in 2002. This proper discharge from his
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors
would not have allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the
presumption of sanity resumes and must prevail.
The defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's mental condition
when he committed the crime in March 2007. While there is evidence on record of his mental
condition in 2001 and in 2012, the dates of these two diagnoses are too far away from the date of
the commission of the offense in 2007, as to altogether preclude the possibility that accused-
appellant was conscious of his actions in 2007. Absent any supporting evidence, this Court
cannot sweepingly conclude that accused-appellant was mentally insane for the whole 11-year
period from 2001 to 2012, as to exempt him criminal liability for an act committed in 2007.
This conclusion is based not merely on the presumption of sanity, but bolstered by the
circumstances surrounding the incident. There are circumstances surrounding the incident that
negate a complete absence of intelligence on the part of accused-appellant when he attacked the
victim. First, he surprised the victim when he attacked from behind. This is supported by the
companion of the victim, who testified that while they were walking, they did not notice any
danger when they saw accused-appellant standing near the trimobile. Second, accused-appellant's
attempt to flee from the scene of the crime after stabbing the victim indicates that he knew that
what he just committed was wrong. And third, when the police officers called out to accused-
appellant to surrender, he voluntarily came out of the house where he was hiding and voluntarily
turned himself over to them.
The foregoing actions of accused-appellant immediately before, during, and immediately after he
committed the offense indicate that he was conscious of his actions, that he intentionally
committed the act of stabbing, knowing the natural consequence of such act, and finally, that such
act of stabbing is a morally reprehensible wrong. His actions and reactions immediately
preceding and succeeding the act of stabbing are similar if not the same as that expected of a fully
sane person.
Therefore, the Court finds no reasonable basis to reverse the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, that accused-appellant's culpability had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may
be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or
simultaneous to the crime. Dr. Pagaddu claimed that Verdadero had a relapse at the time of
stabbing. Maynard, Verdadero’s neighbor, observed that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound
mind before and after the stabbing incident. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard
perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had reddish eyes and
appeared to be drunk. These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that
drinking wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same
testimony that was used as basis for his previous diagnosis. The evidence on record supports the
finding that Verdadero exhibited symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the
stabbing incident.
While the report extensively discussed his condition in early 2013, it does not conclude that he
was afflicted with imbecility, or that he was unaware of what he was doing, at the time he raped
AAA. The report only concluded that at present, the patient is deemed INCOMPETENT to stand
the rigors of court trial. Unfortunately, such incompetence merely means that appellant's mental
state is not fit for trial. It does not mean that he was completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will at the time he committed the crime.
Appellant's actions at the moment of the rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was
committing, and that what he was doing was wrong.
Appellant AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating himself and AAA to facilitate the
commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring
that they would not be disturbed. Such precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was
in such a state that he could not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely
deprived of intelligence or will.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e.,
when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense
of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature
and consequences of his or her acts.
In this case, Umawid solely relied on the testimonies of Dr. Quincina and Dr. Juliana to
substantiate his plea of insanity. Records, however, reveal that Dr. Quincina’s testimony only
showed that he evaluated Umawid’s mental condition in May 2002, February 2003, and March
2003.18 In other words, he only examined Umawid six (6) months before the latter committed the
crimes and three (3) months and four (4) months thereafter. Notably, he admitted that his findings
did not include Umawid’s mental disposition immediately before or at the very moment when he
committed such crimes.19 As such, Dr. Quincina’s testimony cannot prove Umawid’s insanity.
Neither would Dr. Juliana’s testimony shore up Umawid’s cause as the former failed to attest to
the latter’s mental condition and even referred him to another doctor for further evaluation. Given
these circumstances, Umawid’s defense of insanity remained unsubstantiated and, hence, he was
properly adjudged by the RTC and the CA as criminally liable.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a
legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His
unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect.
In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be complete absence
or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified
person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering
from impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of
his acts. This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of
lucid intervals
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope
where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and
therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the
victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took
flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the
defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The
burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession and avoidance, and as such
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The evidence before the Court says that appellant was not insane during the commission of the
crime. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the
ground of insanity. In the absence of such proof, it will be presumed that the offender committed
the crime when he was sane. The presumption is in favor of sanity. The defense must prove
insanity beyond reasonable doubt.
It has been repeatedly held that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and congent reasons because
the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor
of witnesses while testifying in the case. The trial court had the privilege of examining the
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were
telling the truth or not. Moreover, the state should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity.
“The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the
act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts;
that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that
the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized
by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless
his insanity and absence of will are proved.”
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2)
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will.” But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather
than on a test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up
any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally
deprived of “freedom of the will,” i.e., without an accompanying “complete deprivation of
intelligence.”
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving
his affirmative allegation of insanity.
Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the
mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr.
Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition
during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on
or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based
on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor of the
appellant. The solicitor general concurs and notes that appellant, after having earlier given
himself up to a certain Col. Faltado, surrendered at midnight on May 20, 1992, or about an hour
after the stabbing incident, to Wilfredo Sevillano, former desk officer of the Batangas City Police
Station. Hence, the evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority
or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.
At the same time, however, the medical evidence of record does show that appellant Buenaflor’s
mental faculties were to some extent retarded or impaired in their development, which
impairment or retardation reflects a diminished level of responsibility for his criminal acts. The
mitigating circumstance contemplated in Article 13 (9) of the Revised Penal Code was present in
the case at bar:
(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will power of the
offender without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.
2. Art. 12(2) - the age of absolute criminal irresponsibility is increased from 9 to 15;
3. Art. 12(3) - for ages 15 or under, they are not only qualifiedly, but are now
absolutely exempted from criminal liability
Child Committing Serious Crimes -A child shall be deemed a neglected child under PD 603
and shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within the Bahay Pag-asa called the Intensive
Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC) if he/she is above twelve (12) years of age up to
fifteen (15) years of age and commits: (KIMP- CAR2D)
1. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped;
2. Infanticide;
3. Murder;
4. Parricide;
5. Carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped;
6. Destructive Arson;
7. Robbery with homicide or rape;
8. Rape; or
9. Drugs offenses under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165)
punishable by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment (Sec. 20-A, as amended by Sec.
6 of R.A. No. 10630). Repetition of Offenses by a Child A child who is above twelve (12)
years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an offense for the second time
or oftener and was previously subjected to a community-based intervention program, shall be
deemed a neglected child and shall undergo an Intensive Intervention Program supervised by
the local social welfare and development officer (Sec. 20-B, as amended by R.A. No. 10630).
A person over 15 years of age but below 18 years, unless the felon acted with discernment;
-Child who is above 15 but below 18 without discernment (Exempt from criminal liability but
should undergo Intervention)
(R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 22, as amended by Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 10630):Assessment of Discernment
-The social worker shall conduct an initial assessment to determine the appropriate interventions
and whether the child acted with discernment, using the discernment assessment tools developed
by the DSWD.
Discernment- mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this particular case, the
prosecution was able to prove the presence of discernment.
System of Diversion CICL shall undergo diversion programs (Sec. 31 of R.A. No. 9344)for the
kinds of diversion programs without undergoing court proceedings subject to the following
conditions where the imposable penalty for the crime committed:
1.Not more than six (6) years imprisonment
a. There is a victim - mediation, family conferencing and conciliation with law
enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance of LSWDO or other members of the
LCPC attended by the child and his/her family; or
b. In victimless crimes - diversion and rehabilitation program by the LSWDO in
coordination with the BCPC attended by the child and his/her family;
2. Exceeds six (6)years of imprisonment, diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
court.
3. If the CICL does not qualify for diversion (i.e.or offense if the child does and not his/her fall
under family any do not consent to a diversion, or upon consideration of the social worker and
determination of the prosecutor that diversion is not appropriate, the prosecutor shall conduct a
preliminary investigation and allege in the Information that the child acted with discernment
(R.A. No. 9344, Sec.33 as amended by Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 10630).
Automatic Suspension of Sentence -A child under 18 at the time of commission of the crime
who is found guilty shall be placed under suspended sentence without need of application even if
the child is already 18 or more at the time of pronouncement of guilt, unless declared disqualified
under P.D. No. 603.
The court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law such as drug and alcohol treatment (R.A. No. 9344,
Sec. 38).
The court shall dismiss the cases against the child whose sentence has been suspended and
against whom disposition measures have been issued (R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 39).
Note: Only when there is (1) refusal to be subjected to reformation or (2) when there is failure
to reform can the child be subjected to criminal prosecution and the judicial system.
Due to the accused-appellant’s age when the crime was committed, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. In accordance with the controlling
jurisprudence on the matter, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.
Thus, the ruling of the lower courts was affirmed and impose upon accused-appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was
qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A.
9344 provides that the same extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of 21 years old.
Sec. 6 of RA 9344 exempts a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age from
criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case,
"the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances include the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent
detection; and boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense are indicative of the then 17
year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful
action.
However, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a CICL should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act. The age of the CILC at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
i. Elements; (LDAW)
1. A person is performing a Lawful act;
2. With Due care;
3.He causes injury to another by mere Accident; and
4.Without fault or intention of causing it
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not
due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been
foreseen or controlled. Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident,
courts must take into account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault
or negligence.
From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were present. The participation of petitioner,
if any, in the victim's death was limited only to acts committed in the course of the lawful
performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster,
the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots - - all of which led to
the death of the victim - - were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner.
-The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who
acts not only without will but against his will.
-The duress, force, fear, or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded belief in death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
-Passion and obfuscation cannot amount to irresistible force (REYES). The person who used the
force or created the fear is criminally and primarily civilly liable, but the accused who performed
the act involuntarily and under duress is still secondarily liable (RPC, Art. 101).
The compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat. It must presuppose intimidation or threat, not
force or violence.
Appellant Morales' contention that their families were similarly threatened finds no support in the
evidence. The records are bereft of any showing that such threats to appellants' families were
made at all. We have held in People v. Borja. that duress as a valid defense should not be
speculative or remote. Even granting arguendo that Saldaña, Bautista, and Esguerra threatened to
harm appellants' families to coerce appellants to receive the ransom money at Gumi, Lubao, such
threats were not of such imminence as to preclude any chance of escape. In fact, as already
discussed, appellants had a real chance to escape when they went to Feliciano's van. Under the
circumstances, even if true, the fear that appellants allegedly suffered would not suffice to exempt
them from incurring criminal liability.
6. Failure to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause;
Basis: Lack of intent. Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence.
- It applies to felonies by omission.
-A priest cannot be compelled to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character (RULES
OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 24(d)
i. Elements; RFI)
1. That an act is Required by law to be done;
2. That a person Fails to perform such act; and
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or Insuperable cause.
ii. People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 46186, 80 September 1986,
Being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the
inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event. The act performed by the appellant in
the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing
so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later
abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened
by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, RPC).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her
child therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it
should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it
appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, she is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused
and convicted.
j. Absolutory causes: -those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment, there is no penalty imposed (People v. Talisic, G.R. No. September 5, 1997).
i. Examples of Absolutory Causes:
1. Spontaneous Desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already
constitutes a crime other than that intended (Art. 6(3));
2.Death and slight or less serious physical injuries inflicted under Exceptional circumstances
(Art. 247);
3.Attempted or frustrated Light felonies except those against persons or property (Art. 7);
5. Marriage of the offender and the offended party in casesof seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape (Art. 344);
6.Accessories whoareexempt from criminal liability by reason or relationship (Art. 20) andin
light felonies (Art. 16);
7.Adultery and concubinage if the offended party shall have consented or pardoned the offenders
(Art. 344).
9.Certain relatives exempt from criminal liability for Theft, swindling and malicious mischief-
(Art. 332);
10.Trespass to dwelling when the purpose of entering another's dwelling against the latter's will is
to prevent some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, or for
the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, or when entering cafes, taverns,
inns, and other public houses, while the same are open (Art. 280, par. 3)
ii.Instigation.
1. Entrapment v. Instigation;
Entrapment Instigation
As to nature
Employment ways and means in order to trap Means luring the accused into a crime that he,
capture the lawbreaker in the execution of his otherwise, had no intention to commit, in
criminal plan (People v. Gayoso G.R. "No. order to prosecute him.
206590, March 27, 2017).
As to origin of criminal intent
Originates from the mind of the accused and Originates from the inducer and not from the
the law enforcers merely facilitate the accused who had no such intention and would
apprehension of the criminal through not have committed it were not for the
schemes. prodding of the inducer.
As to criminal liability
Does not bar prosecution and conviction Leads to the acquittal of the accused. The law
enforcers act as active co-principals.
Illustration:
- A, a PDEA agent , gave B , a suspected pusher a P100-bill and asked him to buy some
marijuana cigarettes. Leads to the acquittal of the accused. The Law enforcers act as active co-
principals.
- If the one who made the instigation is a private individual, not performing public functions, both
he and the one induced are criminally liable for the crime committed; the former, as principal by
inducement; and the latter, as principal by direct participation.
2. Cases:
a. People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 88301, 28 October 1991;
The case of the prosecution is clear and positive. Ramos was caught in flagranti selling
marijuana. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the "buy-bust operation" or entrapment,
resorted to by the Narcotics agents has long been recognized as an effective means of
apprehending drug peddlers. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code,
(People v. Valmores, et al., G.R. No. 58635, June 28, 1983, 122 SCRA 922.) In the case
of People v. Y. Gatong-o, et al., G.R. No. 78698, December 29, 1988, 168 SCRA 716, We
defined entrapment as the "employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker" (also People v. Valmores, et al.).
"In entrapment, the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused. Nobody induces or
prods him into committing the offense. This act is distinguished from inducement or
instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes
a co-principal."
The fact that he had the prohibited drug with him and accepted the P50.00 as payment for
it clearly established a consummated sale of the illegal drug which is punishable under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
The law does not require the element of intent to sell or possess in order to obtain a
conviction. Nor is it essential that the ownership of the prohibited drug be established or
known. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the
consummation of the selling transaction.
Here, the evidence clearly established that the police operatives employed entrapment, not
instigation, to capture appellant and her cohorts in the act of selling shabu. It must be recalled that
it was only upon receipt of a report of the drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from the
confidential informant that a buy-bust team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu
were made. Also, appellant testified that she agreed to the transaction of her own free will when
she saw the same as an opportunity to earn money. Notably too, appellant was able to quickly
produce a sample. This confirms that she had a ready supply of the illegal drugs. Clearly, she was
never forced, coerced or induced through incessant entreaties to source the prohibited drug for
Carla and PO3 Cariño and this she even categorically admitted during her testimony.
-Those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and
effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. The alternative circumstances are:
(RID) Relationship; Intoxication; and Degree of instruction and education of the offender
The basis of the alternative circumstances is the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions
attending its commission.
a. RELATIONSHIP shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the:
a. Spouse;
b. Ascendant;
c. Descendant;
d. Legitimate, natural, or adopted Brother or Sister;
e.Relative by Affinity in the same degree of the offender .
-"In the same degree" refers to the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of the offender's
spouse or the spouse of the offender's ascendant, descendant, or brother or sister. Relatives by
Affinity Includes in-laws, stepfather, or stepmother, stepchild and the like. It is the duty of the
stepparents to bestow upon their stepchildren a mother's/father's affection, care and protection.
Application of Relationship:
1. Crimes against property
a. Mitigating in the crimes of:
i. Robbery (Arts. 294-302);
ii. Usurpation (Art. 312);
iii. Fraudulent Insolvency (Art. 314); and
iv. Arson (Arts. 321-322, 325-326).
If the offense of serious physical injuries is committed by the offender against his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his legitimate other descendants,
relationship is aggravating. But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by
a parent upon his child by excessive chastisement
c. Aggravating
i. Homicide or murder: relationship is aggravating regardless of degree
ii. Rape: aggravating where a stepfather raped his stepdaughter or in a case where a
father raped his own daughter
To determine the proper penalty, the court applied Article 63 of the RPC which states that the
greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is
present one aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating
circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty of death
must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the RPC. Since it is only
relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it is not an aggravating
circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Habitual Drunkard-one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. Even if
intoxication is not habitual, it is aggravating when subsequent to the plan to commit the crime
i. People v. Pinca, G.R. No. 129256, 17 November 1999;
Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of
decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the
contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an
aggravating circumstance. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must
present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission
of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that
person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic
drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
Appellant belatedly pleads in his Reply Brief that intoxication should mitigate his
penalty. He cannot simply rely on those statements of the prosecution. He himself must
present convincing proof of the nature and the effect of his intoxication. What appears
undisputed in the records, however, is that he had a glass of beer prior to the murder incident.
Under normal circumstances, a glass of beer is not so intoxicating as to diminish a man's
rational capacity. It was not proven at all that such amount of alcohol blurred his
reason. This element is essential for intoxication to be considered mitigating
ii. People v. Mondigo, C.R. No. 167954, 31 January 2008;
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of intoxication as having
mitigated his crimes because "the stabbing incident ensued in the course of a drinking
spree." For the alternative circumstance of intoxication to be treated as a mitigating
circumstance, the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, not
subsequent to a plan to commit a felony and the accused's drunkenness affected his
mental faculties. Here, the only proof on record on this matter is appellant's testimony that
before Damaso, Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of
beer." The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed,
and the absence of any independent proof that appellant's alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at the time
he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.
As an alternative circumstance, it does not refer only to literacy but more to the level of
intelligence of the accused. It refers to the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full
significance of one's acts.
Mere illiteracy is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance. There must be also lack of
intelligence, which must be proved positively and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference.
Generally, lack of sufficient education is a mitigating circumstance in almost all crimes, however,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule which, although not making it mitigating, it also does not
make it aggravating, to wit: (PC-TRM)
a. Crimes against Property, e.g. arson, estafa, theft, robbery
b. Crimes against Chastity;
c. Treason - because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citizen, however unlettered
or uncultured he may be.
d. Rape and
e. Murder or homicide; to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed to
know and feel.
The mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery.
Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi-
uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Court in the Maqui
case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large
cattle.