Pp. v. Samson: Reasonable Necessity of The Means Employed
Pp. v. Samson: Reasonable Necessity of The Means Employed
Pp. v. Samson: Reasonable Necessity of The Means Employed
Samson
Cristina and Gerry were married to each other. On June 27, 2002,
Cristina and her children were at home watching television when
Gerry, drunk, arrived home. He asked her if she cooked food, to
which she replied no as she had no money to buy food. Gerry
scolded her, uttered words against her, then slapped her. When
Cristinas father, who resides nearby arrived, and pacified them.
Gerry returned, however, and poked a knife at her neck. Cristina
pleaded for her life, but Gerry persisted. Gerry then slapped her
twice. Cristina was able to take the knife when she pushed him to
the ground. Cristina asked him not to come near her, and pointed
the knife at him, but Gerry suddenly grabbed her, and that was the
time the knife went in contact with his chest. She shouted for help
when she saw her husband bloodied, and Rodolfo, her father, and
Allan, her brother came and brought Gerry to the hospital. Allan
testified that he heard yelling and shouting at her sisters house.
After fifteen minutes of screaming, they heard Cristina cry for help.
They immediately went to the house and saw her holding Gerry, and
requested them to bring Gerry to the hospital. However, Gerry was
declared dead on arrival.
After four years, Cristina was arraigned and held for trial for
Parricide. The RTC convicted her. In its view, there was no longer
any threat to her life before she stabbed her husband Gerry. Though
there was an existent danger as there was an altercation before the
stabbing incident, the imminence of such danger ceased when, as
admitted by her, Gerry already put down the knife. The RTC even
concluded that it was she who provoked him when she suddenly
pushed him to the ground. She then took the knife and told him not
to come near her. When he grabbed her, she stabbed him. After she
took hold of the knife, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
to speak of that would necessitate the need to kill. The CA affirmed
the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not Cristina may be held liable for Parricide.
Ruling: Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance,
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the criminal
act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the
accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however,
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing
grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while
the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the
accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused.
According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after
falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the
gun fell, and it exploded hitting Generoso Miranda.
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on
the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran
after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan
found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel
arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew.
Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two
ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz,
helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be
brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine
General Hospital but he expired on the way.
[After analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the trial
court found that: When the accused took the gun from his car and
when he tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the
accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple for the
possession of the gun that it went off hitting Generoso Miranda at the
stomach. The court believes that contrary to the testimony of the
accused, he never lost possession of the gun for if he did and when
the gun fell to the ground, it will not first explode or if it did,
somebody is not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet would
not be perpendicular or horizontal.]
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. After a reinvestigation, however, the information
was amended to homicide with the use of a licensed firearm, and he
was separately charged with illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.
On arraignment, Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide
case, but moved to quash the information for illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to quash was
denied, whereupon he filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed and the joint trial
of the two cases was ordered.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of
firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating
circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor;
CA: Affirmed.
Pp. v. Narvaez
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by
treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22,
1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into
his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he
heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He
addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house
and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with
"No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium,"
and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was
running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior
to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)
was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land
settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of
the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers
wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At
time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On
June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting
was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite
the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and ceiling of the walls of
the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the
part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the
person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first
issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the
violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil
code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art.
13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender
and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is
homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable
on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was not
deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted
instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete
defense, it can be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arrest mayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is
unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiary imprisoned for nonpayment of
civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to
fines only and not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification
Facts: The couple had a rough marriage. Soon after, Caballero left,
and Boholst and her daughter was left to the support of her parents.
That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C
is incredible
Contradictory statements
One night, after carolling, Boholst met Caballero who upon seeing
her, manhandled her. There were an exchange of words and later on,
Caballero was already holding her by the hair and slapping her face
until her nose bled.
Caballero pushed her to the grounds, and to stop herself from falling,
she held on to his waist. As she did so, she grasped the knife tucked
by the left side of his body.
The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not
disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified by the
witnesses
She fell to the ground then Caballero knelt over her and chocked her
saying that he will kill her. Because she had no other recourse, she
pulled out the knife of her husband and thrust it at him, hitting the
left side of his body near the belt line.
When she was finally free, she ran home and on the way, she threw
the knife.
In the morning, she surrendered to the police and presented the torn
and blood-stained dress she wore that night. The police officer
accompanied her to look for the weapon but when it can no longer
be found, she was advised to just give any knife and she did (now
marked Exhibit C).
(According to the Prosecutions witness, Caballeros friend)
On the night of the incident, Boholst was already waiting for
Caballero, and when he approached her, she suddenly stabbed
Francisco her with the knife marked by the prosecution as Exhibit C.
His friends brought him to the hospital where he was later
interviewed by the police officer confirming that his wife stabbed
him. But because he needs blood transfusion, he needs to be
transferred to another hospital. He died on the way.
Issue: Did Boholst act in legitimate defense of her person?
Held: Yes. The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and
convincing:
out
by
her
As she was flat on her back and and her husband choking her, she
had no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left
side of her husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back
portion just below the waist, as also described by the attending
physician as the left lumbar region.
The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife was
drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her testimony, for as she
lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was quite
natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in the left
side of the mans belt and thrust it at that section of the body
nearest to her hand at the moment.
This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the
prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the wound should have
been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than
at his back.
The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her
husband and for several months prior to the incident, she appeared
resigned to her fate. She also surrendered herself immediately the
morning after.
The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches
as stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region