Cognition, 10 (1981) 145-150 145

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Capturiq attention

JOHN JONIDES*

DAVID E. IRWIN
University of Michigan

The first chapter of WilheLn Wundt’s text, An Introduction to Psychokogy,

is devoted to the topic of attention. This reflects attention’s prominent role
in the history of investigatio:ls of cognition and perception. And deservedly
so. Humans and other animals are limited processors of information. l%ctiuse
of this, a proper understanding of tl\e inner workings of mental mechanisms
that transform and diges,t information must include a description ol the pro-
cesses by which certain sources of input are selected fcr further analysis
while others are ignored.
Although research on the topic of si:iective attention has been fairly eciec-
tic in its choice of paradigms and specific phenomena, recent research has
concentrated especially on two issues. The first concerns spatial allocation of
processing resources, and the second tocusses on details of processing when
there is little limit on our capacity to engage in mental activity. Below we
briefly review developments in each of these areas and tentatively offer some
promoses for the near future. i

Spatial selectivity

In 19 12, Wundt commented: ‘If . . we practice letting our attention wander

over . . .different pa.& of the field of vision while keeping the same fixation-
point, it will soon be clear to us that the fixation-point of attention and the
fixation-point of the field of vision are by no means identical’ (p. 20).
This early work coupled rith ihe research of Purkinje and Helmhoitz on
related issues has, from time to time in the history of perceptual research,
spurred psychoiogi&s to inquire about the processes involved in attending
to spatial locations. Speriing’s (1960) research with the partial report tech-
niqde and Cherry% (1953) studies of dichotic listening can, perhaps, be pin-
pointed as the developments that have renewed concern with this problem.

*Reprint requests should ix sent to J. Jonides, hychology Depaatmed, University of Michigan,

Human Performance Center, 330 &ukar~Rd., Ann Arbor, Mich. 48104, U.S.A.
146 John Janides and David E. Irwin

In the ensuing years, research by various investigators has uncovered some

of the details of the processes involved in selectively attending to spatially
defined stimuli (e.g., Eriksen and Hoffman, 1973; Hoffman, 1979; Jonides,
in press; Posner, 1980). One of the most important findings is that spatial
sele.cc::ity for visual as well as auditory stimuli can be accomplished without
any overt change in the peripheral sense organs (Eriksen and Hoffman, 1973;
Jonides, 1980; Pasner, Nissen and Ogden, 1978). This fact has led to a
debate about thi: locus of selectivity in the processing stream, a debate that
in many ways mimics the debate concerning the adequacy of selective atten-
tion models tha.r have been developed since Broadbent’s (1958) seminal
work in this area. For example, Shiffrin and his colleagues (Shiffrin and
Gardner, 1972; Shiffrin, McKay and Shaffer, 1976) have argued that selec-
tion occurs in short-term memory after early perceptual analysis has been
completed.. The experiments of others, hc’wever, indicate a selectivity thah
is difficult to reconcile with a memory interpretation, since the tasks in
which the selectivity occurs place only trivial memory demands on subjects
(e.g., Bashrinki and Bacharach, 1980; Jonides and Somers, Reference note 11;
Posner et aZ., 1978; Shaw and Shaw, 1977). Resolution of this conflict re-
quires further investigation, and a coherent synthesis of a growing body of
research.
One essential component of a theory of selectivity will be a model of the
actual mechanism of selection, regardless of its locus in the processing stream.
While some of the papers cited above allude to such a mechanism, to date
there has been insufficient attention to this problem. Shaw and Shaw (1977)
proposed a general moclel of selectivity that has the important feature of
being general across specific tasks. Jonides (1980) has tested specific versions
of this model that seem to narrow the space of remaining alternatives to an
interesting subset-namely, those in which processing occurs in parallel over
a variety of spatial loci and can be focussed on one of these loci by internal
guidance or by external stimuhrs control (Jonides, in press). But it is clear
that more specific models need to be proposed and tested before progress
can be made on this problem.
Once we have a better understanding of the mechanics underlying spatial
seiectivity in vision, the reiationship between shifts of attention to local
spatial regions and shifts of the eyes to spatial locations may be uncovered.
Interesting parallels between these phenomenn suggest that they may share
some fundamental mechanisms in ccmmon (see e.g., Jonides, in press, and
Todd and Van Gelder, 1979, for disc?.:qzions of internal versus external con-
trol over the body’s and the mind’s eye movements). Although eye move-
ments seem to be neither necessary (Eriksen and Hoffman, 1973; Jonides,
1980; Posner ef al., 1978) nor sufficient (Klein, 1980; Remington, 1980)
 Ca.qturingattention 147

conditions :for attention movements, the question of whether movements of

attention can facilitate the programming or execution of subsequent eye
movements has received less study (Todd and Van Gelder, 1979).
Neurophysiological research by Wurtz and colleagues (Goldberg and VWurtz,
1972; Mohler and Wurtz, 1976; Wurtz and Mohler, 1976) suggests a further
basis for pursuing the connection between attention shifts and eye move-
ments. Their work has suggested that cells in the superficial layers of the
superior colliculus are involved in the control of both eye and attention
movements. Several other investigators, however, have found evidence that
cells in the parietal lobe are involved in shifts of spatial attention, indepen-
dent of eye movements (e.g., Robinson, Goldberg and Stanton, 1978).
Further research in this area has important implications for models of se!ec-
tive attention and saccade guidance and control (e.g., Mays and Sparks,
1980).

Automaticity
In a sense, a second recent Zicus of attention research has not been on at-
tention at all, but ra:her its absence. The topic is nicely introduced by a
quote from William James’ Principles of Psychology :
‘If an act became no easier after being done several times, if the careful 3rec”ion
of consciousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is
evident that the whcle activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or two deeds
-that no progress could take place in development. A person might be occupied
all day in dressing and undrc~sing himself; the attitude of his body would absorb all
his attention and energy; the washing of his hands or the fastening of a button
would be as difficult to him on each occasion as to the child on its first trial; and
he would, furthermore, be completely exhausted by his exertions. For :rrhile auto-
matic acts are accomplished with comparatively little weariness, the conscious
effort of the will soon produces exhaustion.’
During the past several years, psychologists have rediscovered this distinc-
tion between processes that are under strategic control and those that are
automatic, especially in the domain of perceptual and cognitive tasks. One
might argue that strategically controlled processes typically constitute our
most impressive armament against complex problems, and that they stand
in contrast to the more stereotyped activities that have been identified as
automa.tic. Even in their relative stereotypy, however, automatic processes
are not a mere cedilla in our mental lives, as James indicated: They form a
crucial part of our processing repertoire becauc- they require little effort and
attention to execute. Consequently, we are left free to devote our sophisti-
cated mental machinery to the ttasks that require it.
148 John Janides ard David E. Inuirt

These considerations have led psychologists in recent years to concentrate

on the development of automaticity in processing. The highlights of this
work can be found in LaBerge (1975), Logan (1978), Schneider and Shiffrin
(1977), and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) among other places. The empirical
work in these yapers tries to identify the Iearning regimens that are necessnry
and/or sufficient for automaticity to develop.
This is obviously one of the crucial issues that must be addressed in re-
search on automaticity, and so it is not surprising that the vast majority of
work on this topic sin;;e Bryan and Harter’s (1899) early study has concen-
trated on developmen”,. But some might argue that this emphasis has been
premature because the successfui study of automaticity first requires a well-
specified, theoretically-motivated set of criteria that can be used to identify
when a process has become automated. Only a few investigators have tried
to estaalish such criteria with any empirical tests of their adequacy (see
Jonides, in press; Jonides, note 2; Logan, 1978; Regan, 198 1). Consequently,
it seems reasonable to prescribe a substantial emphasis on this problem
before further work on the d.evelopment of automaticity proceeds apace.
The benefit of a well-defined set of empirical criteria will extend beyond
the study of development to another important aspect of automaticity, its
generality. As is reasonable, most of the available research on automatic
processing has demonstrated its development within a single task corrtext, or
at best witnin the context of two tasks that are very closely related (e.g.,
Schneider and Shiffrin, 1977). While this is an important first step, it leads
one to ask about the extent to which an automatic process once developed
will transfer to a new task situation. Clearly, automaticity would lose much
of its current play if there were convincing evidence that automatic proces-
szs are completely task specific. Of course, it will not be straightforward to
test the generality of automatic processes since cognitive psychology does
not yet have a taxonomy of processes that participate in various t;ask per-
formances. Nevertheless, this problem should attract some empirical atten-
tion over the coming years, as it has already begun to do (Benjamin and
Jonicfes, Reference note 3).
We can identify one final theoretical issue about autabmaticity that is
worth noting as weli. There seems to be an undercurrent of belief in the liter-
ature that automatic and non-gutomatic processes are not merely ends of a
continuum, but are qualitatively different from one anoihler. The case for
this belief has not been made, however. Indeed, judging from the course of
previous theoretical arguments about incremental versus all-or-none leaning,
it will not be a case that is easy to make. Nevertheless, it iis a fundamental
question whose answer will help determine the form of specific models of
automatic processes that are proposed.
 Capturing attention 149

Summary

The topics of spatial selectivity and automaticity have formed the focus of
much rece,It research on attention, both in our laboratory and elsewhere.
They do not, of course, nearly exhaust the possible areas for further research.
For example, Triesman’s (Triesman and Gelade, 1980) research on the appli-
cation of ‘focal attention’ to encodi;;g is certain to excite interest, especially
because it seems to contradict much of the recent work on automaticity.in
encoding (e.g., Egeth, 1977). Alsc, there is a growing concern that phenom-
ena investigated ir the experimental laboratory have direct application in the
‘real world’. This suggests that advances in attention research may lead to
advances in the diagnosis and treatment of a range of pathological conditions
that may be due in part to attentional deficits, including autism, schizo-
phrenia, and various kinds of brain trauma. Whatever these additional devel-
opments, to reach an understanding of the mechanisms underlying spatial
selectivity and automaticity would be an important theoretical breakthrough
in the decade ahead.

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