Inflation Targeting in Africa
Inflation Targeting in Africa
Inflation Targeting in Africa
Works
2012
Recommended Citation
Stephen A. O'Connell. (2012). "Inflation Targeting In Africa". Oxford Companion To The Economics Of
Africa. 359-364.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/256
This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.
Inflation Targeting in Africa
Stephen A. O'Connell
1. Introduction
In an inflation targeting (IT) framework, the central bank commits to a publicly
announced numerical range for inflation, subordinates other intermediate targets, and
institutionalizes its commitment through a set of mechanisms that emphasize transpar
ency and accountability for outcomes. Between 1989 and 2008, the number of central
banks practising full-fledged IT (FFIT) rose from zero to 27.^ South Africa became SSA s
first adopter in 2000, and in 2007 Ghana was the first low-income country in the world to
adopt the framework. Many other countries adopted elements of IT while retaining a
policy role for exchange rate or monetary targets; in SSA this list includes the region’s
two highest-performing economies, Botswana and Mauritius.
Ghana’s decision was consistent with a global pattern that has encouraged adoption of
FFIT at lower and lower levels of development. Durability has undoubtedly contributed:
as of 2009 no country had abandoned IT, despite the fact that very few adopters satisfied
all the preconditions emphasized in the early literature. But empirical studies also give
the framework high marks. On balance, the evidence suggests that inflation targeters
achieve more stable and somewhat lower inflation rates than non-targeters, with little or
no sacrifice in terms of employment and output; and that external shocks are somewhat
less likely to destabilize expectations (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007). The policy
literature has accommodated this ever more impressive track record by gradually
softening its concern for preconditions.^
In this chapter I review the logic of IT and examine its relevance for SSA. Issues like
fiscal dominance, supply shocks, and institutional development loom large in SSA,
relative to the constraints imposed—at least for now—^by high capital mobility. More
over Africa’s central banks have already substantially increased the attention given to
inflation in the conduct of monetary policy, and with considerable success. The appeal of
FFIT may—ironically—^be strongest in the CFA zone, where it would replace the most
successful inflation anchor the continent has ever known.
' I use the IMF’s online listing of de facto monetary policy anchors in April 2008. The total is 28 if the
European Central Bank (which has officially resisted being characterized as an inflation targeter) is included.
^ Freedman, Laxton, and Otker-Robe (forthcoming) review IT in theory and practice.
360 MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
monetary policy evaluation bore more directly on constrained discretion than on FFIT
per se, but acquired an important role in the internal discourse of inflation-targeting
central banks (Berg, Karam, and Laxton 2006).
^ Mali (rejoining in 1984), Equatorial Guinea (1985), and Guinea Bissau (1997) were willing to give up
their own currencies to join the zone.
^ The rand is the pivot of the Common Monetary Area, but Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland have no
influence over South Africa’s monetary policy.
362 MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
^ On the prevalence of exchange rate objectives in SSA, see IMF (2008: Table 2.1).
INFLATION TARGETING 363
consensus in favour of very low inflation in low-income countries.® This gives the welfare
logic of FFIT a distinctly second-best flavour in SSA: if credibility can be obtained
through other means, keeping inflation low and stable may not be the best way to use
it. However, where existing frameworks cannot be relied on to keep expected inflation
below (say) 15%, FFIT has a reasonable chance of targeting the policy distortion at its
source. The framework requires an explicit endorsement from the government, and it
directly educates the public that monetary policy cannot create high public-sector wages,
a competitive real exchange rate, or even cheap credit on a sustainable basis. This may be
the right path to credibility when external props are absent. South Africa provides an
example: without FFIT the Reserve Bank would undoubtedly be under even greater
pressure than it already is, following the populist transition within the ANC, to accom
modate the food and fuel price shocks of 2007-8.^
Third, since FFIT was never designed for low-income countries, their economic
structure raises unresolved questions. Does it make sense to target inflation when
exchange rates, food prices, and public-sector prices (utilities, fuel, and public-sector
wages) are more prominent—and verifiable—in the public eye? Can the framework be
deployed successfully when supply shocks are dominant and the GDP gap is difficult to
measure? Is there a role for exchange rate targets, given imperfect capital mobility and
the importance of export promotion? What operational policy rules can be used when
there is not a strong transmission from policy interest rates to aggregate demand, and
where (as in almost all African cases) central banks use balance sheet instruments rather
than interest rates? Ghana faces all of these questions (Sowa and Abradu-Otoo 2009). As
of late 2009 the Bank of Ghana had yet to achieve a target range that was already higher
and wider than that of any other targeter. Its struggles with transparency are palpable; in
some quarters the Bank describes itself as practising ITL rather than FFIT (IMF 2008: 5).
It remains to be seen whether the distortions implied by committing to a target that is
rarely met, of unclear salience, and difficult to forecast are fundamentally damaging to
economic stability—or are more than compensated by committing the fiscal authorities
to self-restraint and forcing the pace of institutional maturation within the central bank.
Finally, recent events are testing inflation targeting in new ways. A confluence of food
and fuel price shocks in 2007 and 2008 pushed virtually all targeters above their ranges in
2008—the first time a miss of this scope had occurred. The global financial crisis sharply
reversed this impetus, confronting industrial-country targeters with risks of deflation,
and generating massive rescue operations with uncertain implications for future price
stability. These developments have dampened the short-run enthusiasm for FFIT in
® Modest inflation allows large relative price changes to occur without outright deflation. The CFA
experience of 1980-94 suggests, surprisingly, that deflation is damaging to growth even in low-income
economies with small formal sectors.
’ Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger (2007) discuss macroeconomic management in South Africa.
364 MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Africa—fortuitously in my view, given the viability of existing ITL systems and the scope
for further improvements—while generating sharp reminders of the necessary regu
latory complements to any successful monetary policy framework.
■ REFERENCES
Berg, Andrew, Philippe Karam, and Douglas Laxton, 2006. ‘A practical model-based approach to
monetary policy: overview’, IMF Working Paper 06/80, Washington, DC.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. ‘Inflation targeting: a new framework for
monetary policy?’. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11.2, 97-116.
Frankel, Jeffrey, Ben Smit, and Federico Sturzenegger, 2007. ‘South Africa: macroeconomic
challenges after a decade of success’, RWP 07-121, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
Freedman, Charles, Douglas Laxton, and Inci Otker-Robe, forthcoming. On Developing a Full-
Fledged Inflation Targeting Regime: Doing What You Say and Saying What You Do. Carleton
University and IMF.
International Monetary Fund, 2008. Ghana: Selected Issues. Country Report No. 08/332.
Washington, DC.
Masson, Paul, and Catherine PattiUo, 2005. The Monetary Geography of Africa. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
Meltzer, Allan, 2005. ‘Origins of the Great Inflation’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review
87.2, part 2, 145-75.
Mishkin, Frederic S., and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007. ‘Does inflation targeting make a differ
ence?’, NBER Working Paper No. 12876, Cambridge, Mass.
Sowa, Nii Kwaku, and Philip Abradu-Otoo, 2009. ‘Inflation management and monetary policy
formation in Ghana’, in Gill Hammond, Ravi Kanbur, and Eswar Prasad (eds). Monetary
Policy Frameworks for Emerging Markets. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Stone, Mark R., 2003. ‘Inflation targeting lite’, IMF Working Paper 03/12, Washington, DC.
Taylor, John B., 1993. ‘Discretion versus policy rules in practice’, Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series in Public Policy 39, 195-214.
Woodford, Michael, 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.