Villasi v. Sps. Garcia
Villasi v. Sps. Garcia
Villasi v. Sps. Garcia
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judgment is fully satisfied. It is almost trite to say that execution is The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio Ricardo J.M. Rivera Law Office for petitioner.
legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded against any attempt Pelaez, Gregorio, Gregorio & Lim for respondents.
to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to PEREZ, J.:
savour the fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed pursuant to
be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party.
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 19 May
Civil Law; Property; Accession; While it is a hornbook
doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the 2009 Decision2 rendered by the Sixth Division of the Court of
ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587. The appellate court
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached affirmed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule is not without Quezon City, Branch 77, directing the Deputy Sheriff to
exception.—While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory suspend the conduct of the execution sale of the buildings
follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the levied upon by him.
right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which The Facts
is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially, Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi)
such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction,
convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building
not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption
located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao,
shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a
number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract
from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for
the principal. collection of sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City,
Same; Same; Same; When there are factual and evidentiary _______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-38.
evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are
2 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices
owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately.—The Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso, concurring. Id., at pp. 43-51.
rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this 3 Presided by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig. Id., at pp. 104-106.
Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of 633Branch 77. In its action docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-
the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated 8187, FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the
to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When amount of P2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid
there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building
accomplishment billings. Served with summons, Villasi filed
and the lot on which it stands are owned by different per-
632sons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building
an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the
or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action
obligation of its respective owner. against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only
resolution of the Court of Appeals. 28% of the project. After the pre-trial conference was
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terminated without the parties having reached an amicable [FGCI] is likewise hereby declared liable for the payment of
settlement, trial on the merits ensued. liquidated damages in the sum equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the
Finding that FGCI was able to preponderantly establish by contract price for each day of delay computed from March 6,
evidence its right to the unpaid accomplishment billings, the 1991.
No pronouncement as to costs.7
RTC rendered a Decision4 dated 26 June 1996 in FGCI’s favor.
While the trial court brushed aside the allegation of Villasi that Unrelenting, FGCI filed a Petition for Review
an excess payment was made, it upheld the claim of FGCI to on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 147960,
the unpaid amount of the contract price and, thus, disposed: asseverating that the appellate court erred in rendering the 20
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: November 2000 Decision. This Court, however, in a
1. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the sum of Resolution dated 1 October 2001, denied the appeal for being
P2,865,000.00 as actual damages and unpaid filed out of time. The said resolution became final and
accomplishment billings; executory on 27 November 2001, as evidenced by the Entry of
2. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the amount of Judgment8 made herein.
P500,000.00 representing the value of unused To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a
building materials; Motion for Execution of the 20 November 2000 Court of
3. Ordering [Villasi] to pay [FGCI] the amount of Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the
P100,000.00, as moral damages and P100,000.00 RTC.9 A Writ of Execution was issued on 28 April 2004,
as attorney’s fees.5 commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the 20
Elevated on appeal and docketed as CA-GR CV No. 54750, November 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
_______________
the Court of Appeals reversed the disquisition of the RTC in its 7 Id., at pp. 68-69.
Decision6 dated 20 November 2000. The appellate court 8 Id., at p. 70.
_______________ 9 Id., at pp. 72-74.
4 Presided by Judge Ignacio L. Salvador. Id., at pp. 54-61. 635
5 Id., at p. 61. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building
6 Id., at pp. 62-69.
located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by
634ruled that an overpayment was made by Villasi
and thereby Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots
directed FGCI to return the amount that was paid in registered under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
excess, viz.: 379193 and 379194. While the building was declared for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is
hereby GRANTED and the appealed decision in Civil Case
taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was
No. Q-91-8187 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the [FGCI] to return to Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). After the
[Villasi] the sum of P1,244,543.33 as overpayment under their mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on
contract, and the further sum of P425,004.00 representing execution of real property were complied with, a public auction
unpaid construction materials obtained by it from [Villasi]. was scheduled on 25 January 2006.
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To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed I.
an Affidavit of Third Party Claim 10 and a Motion to Set Aside WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
Notice of Sale on Execution,11 claiming that they are the lawful APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
owners of the property which was erroneously levied upon by DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SUSPEND AND
HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE SALE ON EXECUTION OF
the sheriff. To persuade the court a quo to grant their motion,
THE BUILDINGS LEVIED UPON ON THE BASIS OF
the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the RESPONDENTS’ AFFIDAVIT OF THIRD-PARTY
levy was mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name CLAIM[;]
of FGCI. The motion was opposed by Villasi who insisted that II.
its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the Spouses Garcia WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
as shown by the tax declaration. APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
After weighing the arguments of the opposing parties, the THERE IS NO REASON TO PIERCE THE VEIL OF
RTC issued on 24 February 2005 an Order12 directing the [FGCI’S] CORPORATE FICTION IN THE CASE AT
Sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on BAR[;] [AND]
execution, to wit: III.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH SHERIFF OF THE
orders Deputy Sheriff Angel Doroni to suspend or hold in REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
_______________
abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution of the buildings 14 Id., at p. 112.
levied upon by him, until further orders from the Court.
13
15 Id., at pp. 43-51.
_______________ 16 Id., at p. 53.
10 Id., at pp. 76-78. 637BRANCH 77 SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO FILE THE
11 Id., at pp. 97-102.
APPROPRIATE NOTICE OF LEVY WITH THE
12 Id., at pp. 104-106.
13 Id., at p. 106. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY. 17
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18 Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.—If the Claiming that the sheriff mistakenly levied the building that
property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or
his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
lawfully belongs to them, the Spouses Garcia availed
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same themselves of the remedy of terceria under Section 16, Rule 39
upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, of the Revised Rules of Court. To fortify their position, the
the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment Spouses Garcia asserted that as the owners of the land, they
obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the
would be deemed under the law as owners of the building
property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be standing thereon. The Spouses Garcia also asserted that the
determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for construction of the building was financed thru a loan obtained
the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless from Metrobank in their personal capacities, and they merely
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of the filing of the bond.
contracted FGCI to construct the building. Finally, the
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the _______________
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his for damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor
claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court
claiming damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be
who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. appropriated for the purpose.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the 19 Gagoomal v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 192813, 18 January 2012, 663 SCRA
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such 444, 454-455.
20 Corpus v. Pascua, A.M. No. P-11-2972, 28 September 2011, 658 SCRA
638a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either 239, 248.
terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly 639Spouses Garcia argued that the tax declaration, based on an
taken hold of the property not belonging to the judgment debtor erroneous assessment by the City Assessor, cannot be made as
or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his basis of ownership.
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed For her part, Villasi insists that the levy effected by the
property. However, the person other than the judgment debtor sheriff was proper since the subject property belongs to the
who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not judgment debtor and not to third persons. To dispute the
precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his ownership of the Spouses Garcia, Villasi pointed out that the
claim.19 levied property was declared for tax purposes in the name of
Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments FGCI. A Certification issued by the Office of the City
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the Engineering of Quezon City likewise showed that the building
judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only permit of the subject property was likewise issued in the name
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in of FGCI.
court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the We grant the petition.
judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is
goes, one man’s goods shall not be sold for another man’s founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto,
debts.20
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before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the prove their ownership of the property. In contrast, Villasi was
release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru the
thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition. Worthy to
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession note is the fact that the building in litigation was declared for
thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya,21 we declared that for a taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the Spouses
third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must Garcias’. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations
first sufficiently establish his right on the property: are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute
[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to credible proof of claim of title over the property. 23 In Buduhan
answer for the obligation of the judgment debtor may invoke v. Pakurao,24 we underscored the significance of a tax
the supervisory power of the court which authorized such declaration as proof that a holder has claim of title, and, we
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after gave weight to the demonstrable interest of the claimant
summary hearing, the court may command that the property holding a tax receipt:
be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of
owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances,
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
however, is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties
concept
in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has _______________
indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment 22 Id., at pp. 406-407; pp. 382-383.
debtor. 23 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68946, 22 May
_______________ 1992, 209 SCRA 214, 227-228.
21 260 Phil. 401; 181 SCRA 378 (1990). 24 518 Phil. 285; 483 SCRA 116 (2006).
640The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of 641of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying
title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
of the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
restore the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
by the evidence. However, if the claimant’s proofs do not manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain
persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
possession thereto, the claim will be denied. (Emphasis and
22 the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention
underscoring supplied). to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of
their title, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have ownership. 25
a bona fide title to the building in question. Aside from their It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in
postulation that as title holders of the land, the law presumes actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes
them to be owners of the improvements built thereon, the coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax
Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.26 Quite
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significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same
between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the former’s person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the
representative Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we
Quezon City, where the subject property is located. This recognized the separate ownership of the land from the
circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in the name building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the
of FGCI. principal.
The explanation proffered by the Spouses Garcia, that the In Carbonilla v. Abiera,33 we denied the claim of petitioner
City Assessor merely committed an error when it declared the that, as the owner of the land, he is likewise the owner of the
property for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, appears to _______________
27 Solar Resources, Inc. v. Inland Trailways, Inc., 579 Phil. 548, 560; 557
be suspect in the absence of any prompt and serious effort on SCRA 277, 288 (2008).
their part to have it rectified before the onset of the instant 28 The reason is its soul.
controversy. The correction of entry belatedly sought by the 29 Florentino v. Rivera, 515 Phil. 494, 504; 479 SCRA 522, 532 (2006).
Spouses Garcia is indicative of its intention to put the property 30 Id., at p. 505; p. 532.
31 Torbela v. Rosario, G.R. Nos. 140528 and 140553, 7 December 2011,
beyond the reach of the judgment creditor. Every prevailing 661 SCRA 633, 675.
party to a suit enjoys the corollary right to the fruits of the 32 New Civil Code, Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by
judgment and, thus, court rules provide a procedure to accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
_______________ attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
25 Id., at p. 296; pp. 125-126 citing Ganila v. Court of Appeals, 500 Phil. 33 G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
212, 224; 461 SCRA 435, 448 (2005). 643building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence
26 Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 559 Phil. 169, 187; to buttress his position:
532 SCRA 391, 410 (2007).
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have
642ensure that every favorable judgment is fully satisfied.27 It is
proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other
almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit. piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens
Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio legis est anima,28 this certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
Court has zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession
rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of
fruit of his victory.29 A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with
nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party.30 Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the
the principal,31 that is, the ownership of the property gives the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the
right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right
over it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of
which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or
the building since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in
artificially,32 such rule is not without exception. In cases where comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced. 34
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In Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Felias,35 we ruled that while the corporate veil will not protect FGCI from its judgment debt.
building is a conjugal property and therefore liable for the Piercing will result in the identification of the Spouses Garcia
debts of the conjugal partnership, the lot on which the building as FGCI itself and will make them liable for FGCI’s judgment
was constructed is a paraphernal property and could not be the debt.
subject of levy and sale: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
x x x. In other words, when the lot was donated to Felisa by is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
her parents, as owners of the land on which the building was Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92587 are
constructed, the lot became her paraphernal property. The hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Deputy Sheriff is
donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over a hereby directed to proceed with the conduct of the sale on
building constructed on it. Therefore, at the time of the levy execution of the levied building.
and sale of the sheriff, Lot No. 107 did not belong to the
SO ORDERED.
conjugal partnership, but it was paraphernal property of
Felisa. As such, it was not answerable for the obligations of Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perlas-
her husband which resulted in the judgment against him in Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
**
favor of Caltex.
36 Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
_______________ aside.
34 Id., at p. 468. _______________
35 108 Phil. 873 (1960). ** Per Raffle dated 4 December 2013.
36 Id., at p. 877. 645
644The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On Notes.—Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a
instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring third-party claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit
judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on
from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery
which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be of ownership or possession of the property seized by the
treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and
may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its detention of the property. (Buado vs. Court of Appeals, 586
respective owner. SCRA 397 [2009])
Finally, the issue regarding the piercing of the veil of The remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section
corporate fiction is irrelevant in this case. The Spouses Garcia 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is
are trying to protect FGCI from liability by asserting that they, not deemed a stranger to the case filed against petitioner.
not FGCI, own the levied property. The Spouses Garcia are (Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 635 SCRA
asserting their separation from FGCI. FGCI, the judgment 357 [2010])
debtor, is the proven owner of the building. Piercing FGCI’s
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