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Culture of deception

Article  in  Behavioral and Brain Sciences · February 2011

DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X10003122 · Source: PubMed

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Gregory Gorelik Todd K Shackelford

Florida Atlantic University Oakland University
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Commentary/von Hippel & Trivers: The evolution and psychology of self-deception
accordingly engage in self-deception when its beneficial interper- These possibilities are not mutually exclusive. And there may
sonal consequences are most substantial? If so, through what be others.
means do individuals “know” that self-deception is likely to be More generally, the fact that social performances enhanced by
effective? More generally, how has selection shaped the pro- self-deception must be understood in the context of co-evolved
cesses that regulate self-deceptive tactics in ways that, ances- audience resistance to falsely enhanced performance has impli-
trally, enhanced net fitness benefits? Though self-deceptive cations for how self-deception should be studied. And beyond
processes have been studied by psychologists for decades, we that, at a basic theoretical level, it suggests ways in which an
will lack a deep understanding of them until researchers take appreciation for the evolutionary processes that have shaped
to heart VH&T’s fundamental point. self-deception should be deepened.
I take up here one component of self-deception’s functional
context that VH&T are surely aware of but do not explicitly
discuss in any detail. In the interpersonal context in which self-
deception operates, other-deception via self-deception may be
in the interest of the actor, but not being deceived by others is Culture of deception
typically in the interest of all target perceivers. That is, selection
should favor perceivers whose inferences are not readily manipu- doi:10.1017/S0140525X10003122
lated in the interests of others. Hence, self-deception not
only must be understood in an evolutionary framework, but it Gregory Gorelika and Todd K. Shackelfordb
also must be appreciated in the context of a co-evolutionary fra- a
Department of Psychology, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL 33431;
mework in which the targets of other-deceit must be assumed to b
Department of Psychology, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309.
have been subject to selection to avoid being deceived (e.g., Rice ggorelik@fau.edu
& Holland 1997). shackelf@oakland.edu
In the 30-plus years since the concept of self-deception was http://www.toddkshackelford.com/
introduced, biologists have developed sophisticated theories per-
taining to communication between organisms, now collectively Abstract: We examine the self-deceptive aspects of religion and
referred to as signaling theory (e.g., Searcy & Nowicki 2005). nationalism. By embracing various religious or political ideals, regardless
One core component of signaling theory is the concept of of their truth, our ancestors could have enhanced their confidence,
solidified their social ties, and manipulated their reproductive rivals.
honest signaling. The idea is that, for any signaling system to This use of culture as one’s extended phenotype may increase the
evolve, both senders and receivers must benefit, and for receivers spread of misinformation and create global webs of deception and self-
to benefit, the signal must contain accurate or “honest” infor- deception.
mation. If the signal is dishonest (e.g., the size of peacocks’
tails reveal nothing about the quality of their bearers), receivers If humans have evolved a capacity to deceive themselves so as to
should evolve to ignore it – that is, the signaling system should better deceive others, then human technologies, languages,
collapse (or fail to evolve in the first place). ideas, and traditions might display cultural manifestations of
In light of this notion, how have self-deceptive processes deceptive and self-deceptive adaptations. Deceiving oneself may
aimed to deceive others been maintained by selection? If percei- be easier if others are complicit in the deception. Collective
vers suffer from attending to performances rendered deceptive self-deception is manifested as groupthink and deindividuation,
by self-deception, why has selection not led them to ignore and it is likely mediated and enabled by various cultural
such performances? Perhaps most notably, why should percei- elements. Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) briefly discuss the
vers be fooled by false confidence bolstered by self-deception? social reinforcement of individual-level self-deception, but they
Several possibilities come to mind. do not elaborate upon the full implications of the cultural
First, most performances may well be honest portrayals of aspects of self-deception. We discuss the ways in which self-
earned or honest confidence. A signaling system that is basically deception may be expressed collectively in religious and political
honest (honest on average) can tolerate some level of dishonesty contexts, and we present several possibilities for how gene-
(e.g., Searcy & Nowicki 2005). culture co-evolution has affected human deception and self-
Second, in many circumstances it may be difficult for individ- deception.
uals to detect the difference between a performance backed by According to Dawkins’s (1982) concept of the extended pheno-
earned confidence and one enabled by self-deceived confidence. type, genes are selected for how well they code for an organism’s
An implication of the co-evolutionary nature of signaling systems ability to manipulate its environment. An organism’s environ-
is that perceivers should be attentive to cues of false confidence – ment includes other organisms, of both the same and different
for instance, through utilization of multiple cues and reliance on species. Therefore, organisms may be selected for how well
reputation based on past performance as well as current perform- they can manipulate other organisms, effectively using them as
ance. They should furthermore not tolerate false confidence even extended phenotypes of their own selfish genes. If humans
when the actor is unaware of its nature. (One reason why narcis- have competed with one another over reproductively relevant
sistic individuals have unstable interpersonal relations is because resources throughout their evolutionary history, then selection
their unearned arrogance leads others to reject them.) Yet one pressures may have sculpted adaptations by which humans
may be able to successfully perform with false confidence manipulate and deceive their reproductive rivals. In addition,
under conditions in which other information is lacking (such as given the human capacity for non-genetic transfer of information
one-shot interactions). This possibility once again underscores (i.e., culture), many cultural phenomena may display design fea-
the need for researchers to examine the contexts in which self- tures indicative of their use in deceiving oneself and others.
deception affects performance, including the audiences of Therefore, human genes may be selected for how well they
those performances in light of their desire not to be fooled. code for psychological programs that use cultural information
Third, confidence bolstered by self-deception may not, ulti- to deceive other humans. In effect, culture is part of our extended
mately, be other-deceptive. Individuals who have earned confi- phenotype and is an integral part of the environment to which
dence may nonetheless benefit by carrying off that confidence our genes have evolved.
by self-deceiving (e.g., not attending to their own shortcomings). Following this line of thought, we can investigate human
In this view, individuals who can best afford to self-enhance culture for features that enable its use during deception of
through self-deception are those who are viewed positively by oneself and others. Organized religion and nationalism display
others in any case. Ironically, in this view, self-deception facili- several exemplar features. In most ancestral contexts, religious
tates honest, not deceptive, social performance. or political self-deception may have benefited individual

24 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:1

 Commentary/von Hippel & Trivers: The evolution and psychology of self-deception
members, but there was a risk of exploitation if some individuals Deceiving ourselves about self-deception
accepted the benefits of membership without paying the costs of
helping other members. In such instances, the institution in doi:10.1017/S0140525X1000227X
question could have been used as a tool by which some individ-
uals manipulated others. If manipulators benefited by their Stevan Harnad
manipulation, then manipulative traits may have proliferated Institut des sciences cognitives, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal,
throughout human populations (until the costs of manipulation QC H3C 3P8, canada; School of Electronics and Computer Science, University
outweighed the benefits). At the same time, the cultural tools of Southampton, SO17 1BJ Southampton, United Kingdom.
that manipulators used to express their manipulative traits harnad@ecs.soton.ac.uk
might have been refined and passed down the generations http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/people/harnad
alongside the genetically coded, manipulative psychological pro-
grams. In this way, genes and culture depend on each other for Abstract: Were we just the Darwinian adaptive survival/reproduction
the evolution and expression of deceptive and self-deceptive machines von Hippel & Trivers invoke to explain us, the self-deception
adaptations. problem would not only be simpler, but also nonexistent. Why would
unconscious robots bother to misinform themselves so as to misinform
Various design features of religious and political institutions
others more effectively? But as we are indeed conscious rather than
may be indicative of their role in deception and self-deception. unconscious robots, the problem is explaining the causal role of
As described by VH&T (sect. 5.5.2, para. 1), insecure societies consciousness itself, not just its supererogatory tendency to misinform
display higher rates of religious belief, because belief in God itself so as to misinform (or perform) better.
may provide individuals with a sense of control over their
lives. Assuming that this sense of control was advantageous Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) are deceiving themselves – with
for our ancestors because it enabled the manipulation of the help of adaptivist psychodynamics and a Darwinian Uncon-
reproductive rivals, it should then be no surprise that humans scious. They have not proposed an adaptive function for self-
are willing and able to accept as true certain fantastic doctrines deception; they have merely clad adaptive interpersonal behav-
and dogmas. Likewise, religion and nationalism exhibit a iour in a non-explanatory mentalistic interpretation: I can per-
strength-in-numbers effect that facilitates collective self-decep- suade you more convincingly that I am unafraid of you (or
tion. The costs of religious or political misinformation may not better fool you into thinking that the treasure is on the right
offset the benefits of joining and supporting such institutions. rather than the left, where it really is) if I am unaware of – or
Therefore, the deception of individual members is made “forget” – my own fear (or the fact that the treasure is really on
easier by the pervasiveness of self-deception within these the left rather than the right).
institutions. Sure. But then in what sense am I afraid at all (or aware where
There are other features of organized religion and nationalism the treasure really is)? If I feel (hence act) afraid, then you detect
that portray self-deceptive qualities. The avoidance of infor- it. If I don’t feel the fear (or the sinistroversive urge), then I don’t
mation that threatens or could weaken a religious or political act afraid, and you don’t detect any fear (because there is nothing
institution is ubiquitous. This is seen when totalitarian regimes there to detect).
limit the types of media that are available to the public, or So in what sense am I “self-deceived”? (Ditto for left/right.) Is
when religious followers avoid being exposed to competing doc- it always self-deception not to feel afraid (or not to remember
trines or scientific facts (i.e., evolution by natural selection). If that the treasure’s on the right), when I “ought to” (or used to)?
exposed to threatening information, followers may attempt to The same is true of “self-enhancement”: Yes, I am more con-
rationalize away whatever threat they were exposed to or be skep- vincing to others, hence more influential on their behaviour, if I
tical of this information. In this way, patriots from one nation may behave as if I expect to succeed (even when I have no objective
doubt the veracity of a rival nation’s messages and ideas by calling grounds for the expectation). But in what sense am I self-
them propaganda. Likewise, creationists sometimes tie them- deceived? In feeling brave and confident, when I “ought to”
selves into psychological knots in attempting to explain away be feeling fearful and pessimistic? Shouldn’t organisms all
the evidence for evolution (when they do not deny or ignore simply be behaving in such a way as to maximize their adaptive
this evidence altogether). chances?
Derogation of others and enhancement of oneself are also In fact, what does what organisms feel have to do with any of
common features of nationalism and religion. Some examples this at all (apart from the entirely unexplained fact that they do
of this include the American motto “one nation, under God,” indeed feel, that their feelings are indeed correlated with their
or the belief that one is a member of the “chosen people” or of adaptive behaviour, and that their feelings do indeed feel
the “master race,” while dehumanizing members of other causal to them)? The feelings themselves (i.e., consciousness)
nations or religions. Furthermore, optimism about the future is are much harder to situate in the adaptive causal explanation –
pervasive within religious and political circles. This optimism unless you believe in telekinesis (Harnad 2000)! (Hence, I feel
can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy if one is motivated to that VH&T have bitten off a lot more here, phenomenally, than
action by the promise of a political utopia or a heavenly paradise, they can ever hope to chew, functionally.)
but it also can be used to manipulate members into acting against The treasure is the best example of all, because that is about
their own interests. Likewise, such cultural modes of self- facts (data) rather than just feelings: Suppose I did indeed
enhancement may increase one’s confidence and lead to social “know” at some point that the treasure was on the left – in the
solidarity with one’s community, but they also may bring about sense that if at that point I could have reached for it without
social conflict and war. risk of being attacked by you, I would have reached for it on
According to VH&T, convincing oneself that a lie is true the left. But, according to VH&T, it was adaptive for me to
while knowing that it is false at some psychological level is “forget” where the treasure really was, and to believe (and
the most extreme form of self-deception. Religion, in particu- behave as if) it was on the right rather than the left, so as to
lar, may use the consequent cognitive dissonance to its advan- deceive you into heading off to the right so I could eventually
tage by pointing to this internal conflict as evidence of its grab the treasure on the left and dart off with it.
veracity. The constant struggles to retain one’s faith or to But isn’t the true adaptive design problem for the Blind
remain spiritual amid the onslaught of secularism seem to be Watchmaker – apart from the untouched problem of how and
essential features of modern Judaeo-Christian practices. In why we feel at all (Harnad 1995) – a lot simpler here than we
this way, religion may be an especially useful cultural tool are making it out to be (Harnad 2002)? And are we not deceiving
by which individuals manipulate their rivals by imposing ourselves when we “adapt” the adaptive explanation so as to
self-deception upon them. square with our subjective experience?

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2011) 34:1 25

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