INTERPRETATION

NITAFAN V. CIR (152 SCRA 284)

- Petitioners David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A. Savellano were duly appointed and
qualified Judges of the Regional Trial Court in NCR. They seek to prohibit the respondents
Commissioner of Internal revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
- Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries. The petitioners argue that this is contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "during their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased." More so, they claim that it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: W/N the salaries of the judges/justices may be decreased by income tax

HELD: YES.
- The clear intent of the Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of
exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to
equality among the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the course
of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, especially with regard to Commissioner
Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries
of members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This
intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as
approved and ratified in February, 1987.
- The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and
Endencia vs. David, which declared that the salaries of members of the Judiciary are exempted from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their
continuance in office. Hence, Justices and Judges do not fall within the constitutional protection
against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
- In comparing the 1935, 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, the petitioners pointed out that the 1987
Phil. Const. does not contain a provision which says that “the salary of the Chief Justice and of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which
shall not be decreased during their continuance in office,” which was inserted only in the 1973 Phil.
Const. With this reason, the petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original
concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
- However, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate such contention. During the
debates on the draft Article, two Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax
exemption, pointing out that in effect, such exemption will be a violation of the principle of uniformity
in taxation and the equal protection clause. Though, it was rebutted by the principle of the judicial
independence, the latter did not prevail.
- The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.

DOCTRINE: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting
it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
CITIZENSHIP
POE-LLAMANARES V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)
- Petitioner was found abandoned as a newborn infant in Iloilo in 1968. She was reported and
registered as a foundling and upon reaching the age of five, she was adopted by celebrity spouses FPJ
and Susan Roces. Upon reaching the age of 18, she became a registered voter and eventually obtained
a Philippine Passport. She initially enrolled and pursued studies in UP but opted to continue her
studies abroad where she graduated in 1991 from Boston College. She married Llamanzares, a dual
citizen (PH-US) and immediately went back to the U.S. where she eventually gave birth her eldest
child. The others were born in the Philippines. In 2001, she became a naturalized American citizen and
obtained a U.S. Passport.
- FPJ suddenly suffered a medical condition which eventually resulted to his death. His untimely demise
caused her to move and return to the Philippines in 2005 where she and her husband started planning
their resettlement. They facilitated the transfer of their children's schools, coordinated with property
movers for relocation of furniture and cars from the U.S. As early as 2004, she already had quit her job
in the U.S.
- In 2006, she took her Oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 9225
and reacquired her Philippine citizenship. Eventually she became a registered voter again and her
Philippine passport was renewed.
- In 2010, President Aquino appointed her as MTRCB. Before assuming such post, she executed an
affidavit of renouncing her American citizenship.
- In 2012, she run for Senate and won. Notwithstanding her unfinished term in the Senate, she was
eyeing the presidency in the May 2016 elections. She is one of the leading candidates in recent
surveys but the issue on her citizenship and residency takes a toll on her campaigns. In the
Constitution, the President must be a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, and having lost
her Filipino citizenship, the Comelec cancelled her certificate of candidacy. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. W/N a foundling is considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
2. W/N the status of a natural-born citizen may be regained.

HELD:
1. YES.
- The SC ruled that as a foundling, the petitioner must be given the benefit of the presumption that she
is a natural-born. The SC relied on the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to determine
whether or not a foundling can be presumed to be a Filipino. Tracing its way back to the Spanish Code,
foundlings have already been benefited by the presumption of being a natural-born Filipino. More so,
it was explained that such intent was maintained to avoid discrimination against foundlings. In
determining their kind of citizenship, SC aptly regarded them as natural-born citizens as they do not
need to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. This was expressed in R.A.
No. 8043 wherein foundlings are considered to be Filipino children who may be adopted.
- Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has been interpreted by SC as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the state. Article 15 of the UDHR
states that “everyone has the right to nationality,” and “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” Similar declarations may be found in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
 Political Rights (ICCPR). Hen ce, the state has the obligation to consider the petitioner a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

2. YES.
- The SC affirmed petitioner’s reliance on RA no. 9225 and on the case of Bengson III v. HRET which
establishes that the natural-born status of a Filipino citizen may be reacquired even if lost.
- R.A. No. 9225 was passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even
if it had been once lost. Hence, it is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.

Dissenting opinions
- On the first issue, other SC Justices found it is worrisome that SC included premises which may be
discarded. In the resolution, the SC gave weight to the report of the Solicitor General's statistical
report. In the report, there is a 99.83% probability that any child born in the Philippines during that
decade is a natural-born Filipino. It was based on the ratio of the number of foreigners in relation to
the Filipino population during that decade. Moreover, the SC relied on the circumstantial evidence of
the nationality of POE's parents based on the fact that she was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church
and that POE has typical Filipino features.
- On the second issue, other SC Justices urged the revisiting of Bengson III v. HRET which assumed a
particular claim to be true simply because its opposite cannot be proven. In the majority decision of
the case, it was opined that respondent Cruz cannot be considered a naturalized Filipino because he
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship. Article VI,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]atural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Hence, it would be arguing from ignorance if the reason why POE was considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen is because of the fact that she cannot a naturalized Filipino citizen. It
ignores the fact that being a natural-born Filipino citizen has its own requirements to satisfy before a
person may be considered as such.

DOCTRINE: Definition of natural-born citizen Filipinos is found in the 1987 Phil. Const.: Sec. 2. Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. In the following section, it
grants the legislative the authority on how Philippine citizenship (it does not say natural-born status)
may be lost or reacquired: Sec.3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law.