Premiliminary Title Amos Bellis V Bellis 20 SCRA 358 GR L-23678 June 6, 1967 Bengzon, J.P., J. Doctrine
Premiliminary Title Amos Bellis V Bellis 20 SCRA 358 GR L-23678 June 6, 1967 Bengzon, J.P., J. Doctrine
Premiliminary Title Amos Bellis V Bellis 20 SCRA 358 GR L-23678 June 6, 1967 Bengzon, J.P., J. Doctrine
excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will
have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules
on presumptive death, reads: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
END
Mercado v Espiritu; 37 Phil 215; GR L-11872; Dec 1, 1917;
TORRES, J.
Doctrine
The annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land was sought on
the ground that two of the four parties thereto were minors, 18 and 19
years old, respectively, on the date when the instrument was
executed, but no direct proof of this alleged circumstance was adduced
by means of certified copies of the baptismal certificates of the two
minors, nor any supplemental proof such as might establish that in fact
they were minors on that date. Held: That the statement made by one
of the adult parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made in
a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said their father
kept during his lifetime and until his death, is not sufficient to prove
the plaintiffs minority on the date of the execution of the deed.
The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and
adolescence and are near the adult age when they pretend to have
already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, and
they cannot be permitted after wards to excuse themselves from
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to seek their
annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.) The judgment that holds such
a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors
property nor the rules laid down in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March
1, 1875.) This doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of
section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determines cases of
estoppel.
Facts
The Petitioners are DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO.
The Defendant is JOSE ESPIRITU who is the administrator of the estate
of the deceased Luis Espiritu.
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and
Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of
Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita
Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of
land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot,
municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in
paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had
since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their
father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about
the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa
Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the
sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and
their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said
land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half
of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of
this share, that is, one-fourth of said land, to the plaintiffs, and the
other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part
of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes
of rice per annum, which, at P2.50 per cavanes was equivalent to P450
per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from
1901 until the time of his death.
Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in
plaintiffs favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of
their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares
of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products
thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per
annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the
deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution they
were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further
reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of
deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said
deed.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even
circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud,
deceit, violence or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in
the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910.
Issue/s
Is the contract valid even If the petitioners were minors who
merely alleged that they were capacitated to enter into the contract?
Held
Yes. The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down
the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be
of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the
provisions of Law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the said
notarized document was attended by any violence, intimidation, fraud,
or deceit.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said
judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with the costs against the
appellants.
END
administer his property," citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the entire
provision hereunder quoted: When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an
agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to
represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be
observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by
the absentee has expired. Petitioner also puts forward that the word
"incapacity" would be limited to mean "minority, insanity, imbecility,
the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction."
He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of this definition,
which is hereunder quoted: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements.
Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention
are not among the instances covered by the terms "absence or
incapacity," as provided under the SPA he executed in favor of
respondent Locsin.
The issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale
since respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA issued in
his, Joaquin and Holifena's favor. He alleged that the authority of the
afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the
following conditions: (1) in the event of the petitioner's absence
and incapacity; and (2) for the limited purpose of applying the
proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner's subsisting
obligations with the companies adverted to in the SPA.
Issue
Is there a perfected contract of sale between petitioner Olaguer
and respondent Locsin over the shares?
Held
Yes. In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to
that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity"
under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of
attorney by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations.
Limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA
ineffective.
On the other hand, defining the terms "absence" and
"incapacity" by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable
construction, that is, "the state of not being present" and the "inability
to act," given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend
stockholders' meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner, to sell the
shares of stock, and other related acts. This construction covers the
situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This
Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 30 June 2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the
shares of stock in favor of respondent Locsin. No costs.
END
FAMILY RELATIONS
Tenebro v CA; SCRA; GR 150758; Feb 18, 2004; YNARESSANTIAGO, J.
Facts
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage
with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until
the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
Issue/s
Is petitioner Tenebro guilty of bigamy despite his contention that
the marriage was void ab initio even if it was not judicially declared as
such when he contracted the second marriage?
Held
Yes, he is guilty of bigamy. This argument is not impressed with
merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
by law".
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written
consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void. Thus:
- Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 20, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67090 which affirmed with
modifications the March 7, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 80, and its August 31, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the
recovery by petitioner Titan Construction Corporation of the amounts it
paid to Martha S. David in the appropriate action before the proper
court.
END
Trinidad v CA; 289 SCRA 188; G.R. No. 118904; Apr 20, 1998;
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts
The petitioner is ARTURIO TRINIDAD. Whereas the defendants are
the COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased), and LOURDES
TRINIDAD.
Unson v Navarro; 101 SCRA 183; G.R. No. L-52242; Nov 17,
1980; BARREDO, J.
Facts
The petitioner is MIGUEL R. UNSON III. Whereas the defendants
are HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO and EDITA N. ARANETA. Petitioner and
private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that
marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971.
However, as stated in a decision rendered on August 23, 1974 in Civil
Case No. 7716 of respondent judge himself, on July 13, 1974 they
executed an agreement for the separation of their properties and to
live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court.
The parties are agreed that no specific provision was contained
in said agreement about the custody of the child because the husband
and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of
December 26, 1979 ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria
Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private
respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later,
further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by