ASSIGNMENT # 1

14. SO v. REPUBLIC
Facts:

He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual
income of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single,
able to speak and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of
Declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473. On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the
petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons
concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The
entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered published once a week for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of general circulation
in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice be posted
in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9 During the hearing,
petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as
the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties
and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated
by law. Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner
for ten (10) years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates
at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member
of some school organizations and mingled well with friends. The RTC granted the petition on
June 4, 2003.
Issue:

Whether or not Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino
citizen
Ruling:

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a
nation by clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws,
there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a)
administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to
C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by
Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien. First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are
separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens regardless of class while the latter
covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any
other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and
loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To reiterate, the
intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative
rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to
liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What
the legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native
born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications. In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden
of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral character but also the good moral
character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible persons.56 Within the purview of the
naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual who has not been previously
convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not
perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must be credible
is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must have
a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a
good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that
respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC decision because of its failure to oppose the
petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court
upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate
of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason
can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to
oppose the petition before the lower court.
15. POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC
Facts:

Grace Poe-Llamanzares wishes to run for the Office of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines. However, she's a foundling. Her parents are unknown. Mr. and Mrs. Militar who
found the infant Grace in a church gave her to Mr. and Mrs. Poe, her adoptive parents.

Under the Constitution, no person who is not a natural-born citizen shall serve as President of
the Philippines.
Issue:

Is Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen or something in between?

Ruling:

Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino.
16. ALTAREJOS v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in
the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose
Almiñe Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the
COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that "petitioner was not a permanent resident of
or immigrant to a foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter from the
Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S.
resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration and an Immigration Certificate of Residence
issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation
as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to
respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171
specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in
the Bureau of Immigration." On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and attached new documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for
repatriation, which thus entitled him to run for an elective office. COMELEC denied the motion
for reconsideration on grounds that the evidence which can be considered in the Motion for
Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and is already a part of
the records, in which the new evidence submitted by the respondent has just recently been
submitted. Based on the information relayed to by the COMELEC, petitioner's namewas
retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence,
the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy was never implemented.
Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division.
Ruling:

The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration."
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of
Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only on February 18, 2004,
and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty
position, but before the elections. It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age.
The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First
Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied
with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving
compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration,
when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. The COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a
motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above
provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were
submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which
are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent was
not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.
17.
Facts:

In an amended petition for repatriation, a prayer was granted from a lower court

I. Authorizing petitioner's son, Edgardo Sy Tiongsa, to take his oath of allegiance to

the Republic of the Philippines, at such time and place as may be set forth in the
judgment; and thereafter
II. An order issue directing the Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration, Manila or his
representative, to revoke, cancel or void the Alien Certificate of Registration and
Immigration Certificate of Residence of petitioner, Consolatrix Kho Sy and her minor
child, Edgardo Sy Tiongsa
There was a motion for reconsideration based on alleged procedural deficiencies arising from
lack of conformity to the then applicable rules and regulations promulgated by the Department
of Justice. The lower court pointed out that there was no sufficient basis for the allegation of
such procedural flaws. In the appeal to this Court, it was even pointed out that repatriation,
on the assumption of the mother being a Filipino citizen prior to her marriage, may be obtained
"by the simple expedient of taking the required oath of allegiance and its filing with the proper
civil registry (Sec. 4, Com. Act No. 63, as amended), without need of resorting to judicial
proceedings."
In the an order denying the motion for reconsideration by respondent Judge Teodulo C.
Tandayag, the argument that there was "no satisfactory evidence" presented by the mother
to support her claim for citizenship was rejected. The appeal lacks merit.
Issue:

Whether or not the repatriation of a mother, Consolatrix Kho Sy, entitles her minor son, Edgar
Sy Tiongsa, to a declaration that he is entitled to Philippine citizenship
Ruling:

This contention could not be sustained because Consolatrix Kho Sy has proven in open Court
that she was born in Iligan City on September 7, 1921 of a Filipino father who is already dead
and a Filipino mother who is still alive so that she is a natural born citizen of the Philippines;
that she was employed as a public school teacher in Iligan; that she was a registered voter of
Precinct No. 6, Iligan, in the 1946 elections; that all her sisters and brothers are Filipino citizens.
The petitioner, Consolatrix Kho Sy, has, therefore, satisfactorily proven that she was a Filipino
citizen by birth and continued to be such until her marriage to her Chinese husband on
November 15, 1947, and that she has not taken any oath of allegiance to any foreign state,
country or sovereign."

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from must be affirmed, declaring Consolatrix Kho Sy
repatriated and Edgardo Sy Tiongsa, her son, entitled to Philippine citizenship.
 ASSIGNMENT # 2

1. BENGSON v. HRET
Facts:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative in the said election.
Issue:

WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
 2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines.
The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act
of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
2. DJUMANTAN v. DOMINGO
Facts:

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.He then
embraced and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the
Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of
Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was
merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed
an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,” for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two
children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however, subsequently
dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner
was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation
case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the
second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.
Issue:

Whether or not the Djumantan’s admission and change of immigration status from temporary
to permanent resident legal.
Ruling:

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage
of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications for
temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent
their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of
the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple
tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much
less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a
citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not
ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for
the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a
change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among those considered
qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The
entry of aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even
if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
3. MERCADO v. MANZANO
Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However,
his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the

respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he
attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.
Ruling:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec.
20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with.
The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of
our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts.
The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce
his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine
citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

4. BIC v. GO CALLANO
Facts:

DFA informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the
National Bureau 01 Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them cable authorization No. 2230-V
(File No. 23617) authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not
authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared the documents to be null, void and of no
effect, and the documentation made by the Philippine Consulate General at Honkong pursuant
to said cable authorization consisting of the certificates of registration and identity issued to
Beato Go Callano and his brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the Philippines were
cancelled. The Board of Immigration Commissioners issued an order reversing the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting Beato and his three brothers for entry as citizens, upon
the ground that they had been able "to enter this country and gain admission as Filipino citizens
by the fraudulently secured authorization."

The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the
parties ordered deported. who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for injunction to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the
Commissioner of Immigration from executing the order of exclusion or deportation already
mentioned. They based their action on the following grounds:

1. that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines because they
were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and
2. that the order of exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation
of the Constitution.

Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners.
After trial, the Court rendered judgment finding, that according to petitioners' undisputed
evidence, "the petitioners herein are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino
citizen, with her common-law husband-a Chinese citizen, and concluding that "until the
petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as citizens of the Philippines as they
were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who, however, was not married to their
mother."

The court dismissed the case holding on the grounds that: (1) because petitioners stayed in
China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be considered
as citizens of the Chinese Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien father as
his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of nationality.
Issue:

Whether or not recognition by an alien father is a ground for losing Philippine citizenship.
Ruling:

The petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by
Philippine law wherever they may be, in conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the
Civil Code which provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
conditions and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the Philippine Constitution, "Philippine
citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law", which implies that the
question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no
other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country; rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed forces
of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; declaration by competent
authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the case of a
woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she
acquires his nationality. Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the
grounds for losing Philippine citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the
petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of
losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the petitioners' case is renunciation. But
even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion that petitioners lost their
Philippine citizenship because the law requires an express renunciation, which means a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication; a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished
from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion No. 69 of the Secretary of Justice, Series of
1940.)
3. JACOT v. DAL
Facts:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the , affirming
the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, disqualifying him from
running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and
Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his US
citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of
the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los
Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the
same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice
Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued and
Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered
the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11 disqualifying the
petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to
make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by
law for persons seeking public office.
Ruling:

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship, because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different
purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship

(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,

To additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
4. SOBEJANA v. COMELEC
Facts:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August
8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of

Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost
in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she
is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A.
No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold
office of vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the
second division and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27,
2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her
certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens
seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue:

W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all
civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions
imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same
was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of
foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to
it was not oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of
Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).
5. MAQUILING v. COMELEC
Facts:

Arnado was a natural born Filipino citizen but lost his citizenship upon naturalization as citizen
of United States of America. Sometime in 2008 and 2009, his repatriation was granted, and he
subsequently executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign citizenship. In November 2009,
Arnando filed for a certificate of candidacy and won the said election. But prior from his
declaration as winner, a pending action for disqualification was filed by Balua, one of the
contenders for the position. Balua alleged that Arnando was not a citizen of the Philippines,
with a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration that Arnando’s nationality is USA-
American and a certified true copy of computer-generated travel record that he has been using
his American passport even after renunciation of American citizenship. A division of the
COMELEC ruled against Arnando but this decision was reversed by the COMELEC en Banc
stating that continued use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
Meanwhile, Maquiling petition that should be declared winner as he gained the second highest
number of votes.
Issue:

Whether or not continued use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects
one’s qualifications to run for public office.
Ruling:

Yes. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation, but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify
one to run for an elective position which makes him dual citizen. Citizenship is not a matter of
convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are
required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. It is a continuing
requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Therefore, the Court held Arnando
disqualified for any local elective position as provided by express disqualification under Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code. Popular vote does not cure this ineligibility of the
candidate. Otherwise, substantive requirements set by the Constitution are nugatory.
Furthermore, there is no second placer to speak of because as reiterated in the case of Jalosjos
v. COMELEC, when the ineligibility was held to be void ab initio, no legal effect is produced.
Hence among the qualified candidates for position, Maquiling who garnered the highest votes
should be declared as winner.
6. ARNANDO v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he
was naturalized as a US citizen.

Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath
of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections.
However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use
his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
While the petition for disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein
Arnado garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner.

COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession.

Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2nd highest votes, contested to the application
of the rule on succession.
Issue:

Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his
subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.
Ruling:

Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, his 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
executing said affidavit. Since then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not
cured the defect in his qualification.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he
filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections.

Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any
elective local position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225
allowing natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization abroad to reacquire their Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political
rights.

Hence, they may now run for public office provided they:

1. Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and

2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their
COC.
7. DAVID v. AGBAY
Facts:

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon

retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the
beach in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion
where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR.
In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225.

The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of
arrest was issued against the petitioner.

Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225.
Ruling:

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law
allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no
retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not
err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph
1.
8. . IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar
Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the IBP on March 21, 1966; that he lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the USA on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 or the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he
intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
Issue:

Whether or not to grant the petition to resume the privilege to practice law in the Philippines
Ruling:

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is,
in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination
of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:
 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership
dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
9.
Facts:

In 1909, Perez was born in Texas, which made him a U.S. citizen. At age 10, he moved with his
parents to Mexico, where he lived for another 24 years. In 1928, he learned of his U.S.
citizenship. Starting in 1943, he entered the United States on different occasions while claiming
Mexican citizenship. He returned to Mexico each time. In 1947, he applied for admission
claiming U.S. citizenship. He admitted to immigration authorities, however, that he had stayed
in Mexico (and had previously claimed Mexican citizenship) to avoid the U.S. military draft and
that he had voted in elections in Mexico. Officials denied his entry into the United States. Perez
returned again, however, for temporary agricultural work in 1952. This time, he claimed
Mexican citizenship. A year later, he surrendered to law enforcement in San Francisco.
Immigration authorities denied Perez's U.S. citizenship and sought to deport him. The
authorities declared that Perez had lost his citizenship. They cited the Nationality Act of 1940,
which stated:

A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by:
.....

(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to

determine the sovereignty over foreign territory; or
.....

"(j) Departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war
or during a period declared by the President to be a period of national emergency for the
purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States.
Issue:

Can Congress, using its power to regulate foreign relations, declare that people who vote in a
foreign political election shall lose their citizenship?
Ruling:
Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court by a 6-3 vote ruled that the power of Congress to regulate foreign
relations can reasonably be interpreted to mean that Congress can impose consequences on
American citizens who vote in foreign elections. Such activities by U.S. citizens might lead to
"serious embarrassments to the government of their own country [the U.S.] as well as to their
fellow citizens." The necessary and proper clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8,
Clause18) gives Congress the power to take away someone's U.S. citizenship if the person votes
in a foreign political election. This type of action by Congress is "reasonably calculated to
effect...the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of our foreign relations...." The 14th
Amendment does not restrict Congress from having the power to withdraw U.S. citizenship,
though there are limitations. In this case, the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
Perez's avoidance of the military draft.
10. AFROYIM v. RUSK
Facts:

After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized
American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951
governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The
State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of
Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States
shall "lose" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim
challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary
judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.
Issue:

Does Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act, revoking U.S. citizenship to persons who vote
in other countries' elections, violate either the Fifth Amendment right to Due Process or the
Fourteenth Amendment, under which naturalized citizens are granted national citizenship?
Ruling:

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, overruling Perez v. Brownell (356 US 44), the Court held that Congress
has no general power to revoke American citizenship without consent. Noting the special bond
between Americans and their government, a bond that protects every citizen against all
manner of destruction of their rights, the Court held that only citizens themselves may
voluntarily relinquish their citizenship. This sacred principle applies equally to natural and
naturalized citizens. As such, Section 401(e) violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
11. SCHILL VS. CINCINNATI INS. CO.
Facts:

Dr. Miles Cobrun was riding his bicycle in Newburn Township Ohio when he was struck by an
SUV driven by Robert Schill (Robert). Cobrun died later that day from his injuries. Cobrun's
wife, Peggy Spaeth, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Robert and his insurer. Robert's
vehicle was insured with a liability coverage limit of $500,000. Spaeth settled with his insurer
and Robert sought additional coverage under the personal umbrella liability of his parents
(James and Jean) which was issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). Under the terms of
the policy, an insured includes a resident relative for any occurrence involving an automobile
they own, lease, rent or use. By definition, a resident relative is a person related to the insured
by blood, marriage or adoption that is the resident of your household and whose legal
residence of domicile is the same as yours.

Spaeth contends that Robert was a definitional insured under the policy as a "resident relative"
who shares the same domicile with James. She further argued that James could be “domiciled"
in Florida for some purposes and “domiciled” in Ohio “for insurance coverage purposes." On
the other hand, CIC submits James' admission that he has considered his home to be the house
in Florida since 1993 and the steps he has taken to give the impression his home is in Florida,
should be enough to prove his domicile is in Florida, not Ohio. The trial court found that Robert
did not meet the definition of "resident relative" since he did not have the same domicile as
either of his parents, the names insured, which was required under the CIC policy.
Issue:

Did Schill share the same “legal residence of domicile” with his parents at the time of the
accident?
Ruling:

NO. In order to change one's domicile, there must be actual abandonment of the first domicile,
intention not to return to the first domicile, and acquisition of a new domicile in another place
with the intention of making the new domicile a permanent home. The acts of the person must
correspond with the purpose of changing one's domicile. Because James sold his home, moved
all of his belonging from Ohio to Florida, let his Ohio driver's license expire, found new doctors,
changed his voter registration, manages his finances through Florida bank accounts, and is
careful not to stay in Ohio long enough to trigger tax consequences, his intent to be domiciled
in Florida is clear.

Further, the nature of James' contract with Ohio is transient – he works, and then he leaves.
He has stated that he intends to return to Ohio to work for as long as he is physically able. This
means that he will stop coming to Ohio when he is physically unable to work. At that point, he
will remain in Florida. Undoubtedly, he works in Ohio. But Florida is his domicile. Hence, Robert
did not share the same "legal residence of domicile" with his parents and he cannot be
considered as an insured resident relative under the umbrella policy.
12. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one
year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Ruling:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
13. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC
Facts:

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by final
judgment.Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However,
because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election
Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion
in the Permanent List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City.
Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for
Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his CoC,
petitioner stated,inter alia,that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter
of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such
denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code"
(OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving
"to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement.
Issues:

1. Did the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio
Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process?
2. Had petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office already
been removed by Section 40 (a) of the LGC?
Ruling:

The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution
No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election
case before it or any of its divisions.Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and
administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.In this
regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the
need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise
of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either
Sections 12 or 78of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered
conclusive on account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification
to run for public office is based on a final conviction.

There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be
acting in a purely administrative manner.

The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC,
disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not
apply to cases wherein a penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically
prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years
from petitioner's service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the aforementioned accessory penalty
connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison
term, which is imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's ruling in
Lacuna v. Abes,where the Court explained the meaning of the term "perpetual" as applied to
the penalty of disqualification to run for public office.

The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified the convict for public
office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence
(Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have
expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.This accessory penalty deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished
from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence.
DISMISSED.
14. CABALLERO v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections. Private respondent filed a Petition to deny due course to or cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when
he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being
a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.

Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's
substantial allegations in his petition.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto,
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
RA No. 9225. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes. He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of
origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan
temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan
during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

The Comelec issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in
his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within
one year prior to the election.

In the meantime, petitioner won the elections, private respondent then filed a Petition to
Annul Proclamation. Thereafter, private respondent took his Oath of Office as the duly-elected
Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born
and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and
had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised
his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes
back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not
been lost.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner committed a misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that
he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to election.
Ruling:

Yes, RA No. 9225 declares that natural-bom citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-
acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The law does not
provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. However, when a natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines
becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

The Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where
he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election day. Respondent
filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes
for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of elections.
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it
could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked
in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC we ruled that naturalization
in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile
in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of
such abandonment.

The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship
under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile? The court held that petitioner's reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on
his residence/domicile.
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after
becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes
as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was
able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding
the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by
virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-
established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence
thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period
from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one-year residency required
by law.
15. CAASI v. CA
Facts:
Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate of Merito Miguel filed a petition to disqualify the latter from
being a candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Pangasinan on the ground that Miguel
is a green card holder. On his defense: Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to
him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged
that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections.
COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that the possession of a green card by the
respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated
his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials Petitioner then appealed to CA and prays
for a review of the decision, "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc.,
respondents," reversing the decision of the RTC which denied. The Court of Appeals ordered
the RTC to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. It is pointless
for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as
resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very
basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic)
and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are
appealable to the COMELEC.
Issue:

Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United
States.
Ruling:

Yes. Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration” which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy
in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No.
21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer
was,” Permanently.". On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United
States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite his vigorous
disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of
his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to
visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or
tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the
requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant
of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor
of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code that states that, “Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status
as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence
requirement provided for in the election laws.”.
16. COQUILLA v. CA
Facts:

Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar
which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras
was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a
citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
Issue:

Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before
the elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
Ruling:

No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is
involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he
filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
17. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
Facts:

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act) provides that all citizens of the
Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of
age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vicepresident, senators and party-list
representatives.

Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 disqualifies from voting an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country, UNLESS he/she executes, upon registration, an
affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under the said law. -Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation
to Section 4 of the same Act empowers the COMELEC to order the proclamation of the winning
candidates (president, vicepresident, senators and party-list representatives).

Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the “Joint Congressional Oversight Committee”
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC.

Arguments of Macalintal: (1) Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,

Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. He cites the ruling of the Supreme Court in Caasi
vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the United
States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines; (2) Section
18.5 is unconstitutional, as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president; (3) Sections 19 and 25 creating the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee are unconstitutional intrudes into the independence of
the COMELEC. Should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court
that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the
legislators.
Issue:

1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution;
2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional insofar as it involves
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-
president;
3. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee violates
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.
Ruling:

1. No. Contrary to Macalintal’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
“qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.

The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who
executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines.

He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country.
His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin,
the Philippines.

Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not
actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required
by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

x x x x Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at

the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and
the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile. x x x x For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. x x x x

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad

because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished
their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

2. Yes. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp
a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach
“on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and
the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” x x x x The canvassing of the
votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president
for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
 NOTE: Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect
only to the power given to the Comelec to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for President and Vice-President, which is lodged with Congress under
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. However, its consitutionality was UPHELD
insofar as the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
the Senators and party-list representatives.

3. Yes. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section
19 stating that, “the Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval,”
and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that, “it shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates
unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out
of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the
mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
18. NICOLAS-LEWIS v. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.

Petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter” but were advised
by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the DFA dated
September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the
one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the
COMELEC’s refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner
Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:

Whether or not individuals who retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to
R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Ruling:

The Court accords merit to the petition.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225 – requiring “duals”
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote.

On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189.

It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as

possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. xxx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide … a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general
eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to
devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an
exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.

In effect, qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though
they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
19. JAO v. CA
Facts:

Arlene Salgado, Janice Marie's mother, filed a case for recognition and support against Perico
V. Jao. Jao denied the paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due
course conducted by the NBI. The test came out indicating that Janice could not have been the
possible offspring of Jao and Arlene. Upon Arlene's motion for reconsideration, the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court declared the child the offspring of Jao. Jao appealed to the CA,
arguing that the blood grouping test could have been conclusive and disputable evidence of
his non-paternity, because there was no showing of irregularity or mistake in the conduct of
the tests. CA upheld Jao's contention and reversed the trial court decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test is admissible and conclusive to prove
paternity.
Ruling:

Yes. SC denied the petition for review.

Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test. Thus, it
cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been
recognized as early as the 1950's. (Co Tao vs. CA, 101 Phil. 188)

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to, affirm paternity was
dealt with in Co Tao v. CA. In said case, the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that
"from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child."
From this statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the child of
another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance
that the appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible
father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the
trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant is the father of the child."

Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove
paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an
important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that
is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type
of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

In the United States jurisdiction, the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non-paternity
has already been passed upon in several cases. The positive results of blood tests excluding
paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were drawn around the
testing procedures, were recognized as final on the question of paternity (Gilpin v. Gilpin).
Evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite
a finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation
(Cuneo v. Cuneo). The Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly
in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be tantamount to rejecting
scientific fact.
20. SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
Facts:

Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit. The couple had 6 children: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
Virginia died and five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin and had Tobias. Merry
Lee, an American citizen, therafter obtained a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce against

Felicisimo from the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America.

Consequently, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. After 18 years, Felicisimo died. Felicidad San Luis then sought the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
Felicidad San Luis filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City.

Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo
claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death;; Felicisimo being
then the Laguna Governor. He further claimed that respondent Felicidad San Luis has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Felicidad San Luis submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the
legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256 of the Family Code considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Issue:

1. Whether venue was properly laid

2. Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry
under the Civil Code
3. Whether San Luis has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Ruling:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
 the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” It is incorrect for petitioners
to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election
laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
“residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa.

2. YES. In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the affirmative.

Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.

3. YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the Court found that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co--owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co--owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co--ownership.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.

Therefore, Felicidad’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.